Related provisions for LR 13.5.5
Table: Examples of factors to take into account when deciding whether old misconduct is sufficiently serious to disclose
Factors to take into account |
Comments |
(A) Whether P has committed a serious breach of individual conduct requirements. |
Individual conduct requirements has the same meaning as in Part Two of SYSC 22 Annex 1R (Template for regulatory references given by relevant authorised persons and disclosure requirements). Factors to take into account in deciding whether the breach is serious include the following. (1) The extent to which the conduct was deliberate or reckless. (2) The extent to which the conduct was dishonest. (3) Whether the breaches are frequent or whether they have continued over a long period of time. The fact that breaches were frequent or repeated may increase the likelihood that they should be disclosed since the breaches may show a pattern of non-compliance. (4) The extent of loss, or risk of loss, caused to existing, past or potential investors, depositors, policyholders or other counterparties or customers. (5) The reasons for the breach. For example, where the breach was caused by lack of experience which has been remedied by training or further experience, it is less likely that the breach will still be relevant. |
(B) Whether the conduct caused B to breach requirements of the regulatory system or P was concerned in a contravention of such a requirement by B and, in each case, whether P’s conduct was itself serious. |
(1) The factors in (A) are relevant to whether P’s conduct was serious. (2) The seriousness of the breach by B is relevant. The factors in (A) are also relevant to this. (3) A breach by B of certain requirements is always likely to be serious under (2). Breach of the threshold conditions is an example. However that does not mean that P’s involvement will automatically be serious. |
(C) Whether P’s conduct involved dishonesty (whether or not also involving a criminal act). |
Dishonesty is an important factor but it is not automatically decisive in every case. For instance, a small one-off case of dishonesty many years ago may not be sufficiently serious to require disclosure. |
(D) Whether the conduct would have resulted in B’s dismissing P, had P still been working for B, based on B's disciplinary policies and the requirements of the law about unfair dismissal. |
|
(E) Whether the conduct was such that, if B was considering P for a role today and became aware of the historical conduct, B would not employ P today notwithstanding the time that has passed. |
|
Note 1: P refers to the employee about whom the reference is being written. |
|
Note 2: B refers to the firm giving the reference. |
Table: This table belongs to COLL 6.3.2 G (2) (a) and COLL 6.3.3 R (Valuation)1.
Valuation and pricing |
||
1 |
The valuation of scheme property |
|
(1) |
Where possible, investments should be valued using a reputable source. The reliability of the source of prices should be kept under regular review. |
|
(2) |
For some or all of the investments comprising the scheme property, different prices may quoted according to whether they are being bought (offer prices) or sold (bid prices). The valuation of a single-priced authorised fund should reflect the mid-market value of such investments. In the case of a dual-priced authorised fund, the issue basis of the valuation will be carried out by reference to the offer prices of investments and the cancellation basis by reference to the bid prices of those same investments. The prospectus should explain how investments will be valued for which a single price is quoted for both buying and selling.1 1 |
|
3(2A) |
Schemes investing in approved money-market instruments5should value such instruments on an amortised cost basis on condition that:5
|
|
[Note:CESR's UCITS eligible assets guidelines with respect to article 4(2) of the UCITS eligible assets Directive] |
||
(2B) |
Short-term money market funds may value approved money-market instruments on an amortised cost basis.7 |
|
[Note: paragraph 21 of CESR's guidelines on a common definition of European money market funds]7 |
||
(3) |
Any part of the scheme property of an authorised fund that is not an investment should be valued at a fair value, but for immovables this is subject to COLL 5.6.20 R (3) (f) (Standing independent valuer and valuation). |
|
(4) |
For the purposes of (2) and (3), any fiscal charges, commissions, professional fees or other charges that were paid, or would be payable on acquiring or disposing of the investment or other part of the scheme property should, in the case of a single-priced authorised fund,2 be excluded from the value of an investment or other part of the scheme property. In the case of a dual-priced authorised fund, any such payments should be added to the issue basis of the valuation, or subtracted from the cancellation basis of the valuation, as appropriate. Alternatively, the prospectus of a dual-priced authorised fund may prescribe any other method of calculating unitprices that ensures an equivalent treatment of the effect of these payments.2 |
|
(5) |
Where the authorised fund manager has reasonable grounds to believe that:
|
|
(6) |
The circumstances which may give rise to a fair value price being used include:
|
|
(7) |
In determining whether to use such a fair value price , the authorised fund manager should include in his consideration:
|
|
4(7A) |
Where the authorised fund manager, the depositary or the standing independent valuer have reasonable grounds to believe that the most recent valuation of an immovable does not reflect the current value of that immovable, the authorised fund manager should consult and agree with the standing independent valuer a fair and reasonable value for the immovable. |
|
(8) |
The authorised fund manager should document the basis of valuation (including any fair value pricing policy) and, where appropriate, the basis of any methodology and ensure that the procedures are applied consistently and fairly. |
|
(9) |
Where a unit price is determined using properly applied fair value prices in accordance with policies in (8), subsequent information that indicates the price should have been different from that calculated will not normally give rise to an instance of incorrect pricing. |
|
2 |
The pricing controls of the authorised fund manager |
|
(1) |
An authorised fund manager needs to be able to demonstrate that it has effective controls over its calculations of unit prices. |
|
(2) |
The controls referred to in (1) should ensure that:
|
|
(3) |
In exercising its pricing controls, the authorised fund manager may exercise reasonable discretion in determining the appropriate frequency of the operation of the controls and may choose a longer interval, if appropriate, given the level of activity on the authorised fund1or the materiality of any effect on the price. |
|
(4) |
Evidence of the exercise of the pricing controls should be retained. |
|
(5) |
Evidence of persistent or repetitive errors in relation to these matters, and in particular any evidence of a pattern of errors working in an authorised fund manager's favour, will make demonstrating effective controls more difficult. |
|
(6) |
Where the pricing1function is delegated to a third party, COLL 6.6.15 R (1) (Committees and delegation) will apply. |
|
3 |
The depositary's review of the authorised fund manager's systems and controls |
|
(1) |
This section provides details of the types of checks a depositary should carry out to be satisfied that the authorised fund manager adopts systems and controls which are appropriate to ensure that prices of units are calculated in accordance with this section and to ensure that the likelihood of incorrect prices will be minimised. These checks also apply where an authorised fund manager has delegated all or some of its pricing1 functions to one or more third parties5. 5 |
|
(2) |
A depositary should thoroughly review an authorised fund manager's systems and controls to confirm that they are satisfactory. The depositary's review should include an analysis of the controls in place to determine the extent to which reliance can be placed on them. |
|
(3) |
A review should be performed when the depositary is appointed and thereafter as it feels appropriate given its knowledge of the robustness and the stability of the systems and controls and their operation. |
|
(4) |
A review should be carried out more frequently where a depositary knows or suspects that an authorised fund manager's systems and controls are weak or are otherwise unsatisfactory. |
|
(5) |
Additionally, a depositary should from time to time review other aspects of the valuation of the scheme property of each authorised fund for which it is responsible, verifying, on a sample basis, if necessary, the assets, liabilities, accruals, units in issue1, securities prices (and in particular the prices of OTC derivatives,5unapproved securities and the basis for the valuation of unquoted securities) and any other relevant matters, for example an accumulation factor or a currency conversion factor. |
|
(6) |
A depositary should ensure that any issues, which are identified in any such review, are properly followed up and resolved. |
|
4 |
The recording and reporting of instances of incorrect pricing |
|
(1) |
An authorised fund manager should record each instance where the price of a unit is incorrect as soon as the error is discovered, and report the fact to the depositary together with details of the action taken, or to be taken, to avoid repetition as soon as practicable. |
|
(2) |
In accordance with COLL 6.6.11 G (Duty to inform the FCA), the depositary should report any breach of the rules in COLL 6.3 immediately to the FCA. However, notification should relate to instances which the depositary considers material only. |
|
(3) |
A depositary should also report to the FCA immediately any instance of incorrect pricing1where the error is 0.5% or more of the price of a unit, where a depositary believes that reimbursement or payment is inappropriate and should not be paid by an authorised fund manager. |
|
(4) |
In accordance with SUP 16.6.8 R, a depositary should also make a return to the FCA on a quarterly basis which summarises the number of instances of incorrect pricing1 during a particular period. |
|
5 |
The rectification of pricing breaches |
|
(1) |
COLL 6.6.3R(3)(c)10(Functions of the authorised fund manager) places a duty on the authorised fund manager to take action to reimburse affected unitholders, former unitholders, and the scheme itself, for instances of incorrect pricing1, except if it appears to the depositary that the breach is of minimal significance. |
|
(2) |
A depositary may consider that the instance of incorrect pricing1is of minimal significance if:
|
|
(3) |
In determining (2), if the instance of incorrect pricing1 is due to one or more factors or exists over a period of time, each price should be considered separately. |
|
(4) |
If a depositary deems it appropriate, it may, in spite of the circumstances outlined in (2), require a payment from the authorised fund manager or from the authorised fund to the unitholders, former unitholders, the authorised fund or the authorised fund manager (where appropriate). |
|
(5) |
The depositary should satisfy itself that any payments required following an instance of incorrect pricing1 are accurately and promptly calculated and paid. |
|
(6) |
If a depositary considers that reimbursement or payment is inappropriate, it should report the matter to the FCA, together with its recommendation and justification. The depositary should take into account the need to avoid prejudice to the rights of unitholders, or the rights of unitholders in a class of units. |
|
(7) |
It may not be practicable, or in some cases legally permissible, for the authorised fund manager to obtain reimbursement from unitholders, where the unitholders have benefited from the incorrect price. |
|
(8) |
In all cases where reimbursement or payment is required, amounts due to be reimbursed to unitholders for individual sums which are reasonably considered by the authorised fund manager and depositary to be immaterial, need not normally be paid. |