Related provisions for MCOB 2.9.2

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CONC 8.9.1GRP
The Principles (in particular Principle 6 and Principle 7) apply to actions of a firm dealing with a customer who has been referred to it through a lead generator. For example, where a firm acts on a sales lead and knows or ought to know that the lead generator is using misleading information, advice or actions to obtain a customer's personal data is likely to amount to a breach by the firm of Principle 6 and Principle 7.
CONC 8.9.6GRP
Claiming or implying a person is or represents, for example, a charitable organisation is likely to include operating a website which looks like, or is designed to look like, the website of such an organisation.
MCOB 2.3.5GRP
MCOB 2.3.2 R does not prevent a firm: (1) assisting a home finance intermediary2 so that the quality of the home finance intermediary's2 service to customers is enhanced; or 22(2) giving or receiving indirect benefits (such as gifts, hospitality and promotional competition prizes); providing in either case this is not likely to give rise to a conflict with the duties that the recipient owes to the customer. In particular, such benefits should not be of a kind or value that is
MCOB 2.3.6RRP
(1) A firm must not operate a system of giving or offering inducements to a mortgage intermediary, reversion intermediary,2SRB intermediary3 or any other third party whereby the value of the inducement increases if the intermediary2 or third party, such as a packager, exceeds a target set for the amount of business referred (for example, a volume override). 2(2) A firm must not solicit or accept an inducement whereby the value of the inducement increases if the firm exceeds a
DEPP 6A.3.2GRP
The following factors may be relevant to determining the appropriate length of the period of suspension, restriction,4 condition or disciplinary prohibition4 to be imposed on a person under the Act:3(1) DeterrenceWhen determining the appropriate length of the period of suspension, restriction,4 condition or disciplinary prohibition4 the FCA2 will have regard to the principal purpose for which it imposes sanctions, namely to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct
DEPP 6A.3.3GRP
The FCA2 may delay the commencement of the period of suspension,4 restriction or disciplinary prohibition4. In deciding whether this is appropriate, the FCA2 will take into account all the circumstances of a case. Considerations that may be relevant in respect of an authorised person, sponsor or primary information provider2 include:22(1) the impact of the suspension or restriction on consumers;(2) any practical measures the authorised person, sponsor or primary information provider2
CONC 5.3.1GRP
(1) In making the creditworthiness assessment or the assessment required by CONC 5.2.2R (1), a firm should take into account more than assessing the customer's ability to repay the credit. [Note: paragraph 4.2 of ILG](2) The creditworthiness assessment and the assessment required by CONC 5.2.2R (1) should include the firm taking reasonable steps to assess the customer's ability to meet repayments under a regulated credit agreement in a sustainable manner without the customer incurring
CONC 5.3.8GRP
An example of where a firm ought reasonably to suspect that the customer has not been truthful may be that the information supplied by the customer concerning income or employment status is clearly inconsistent with other available information.
BIPRU 7.10.27GRP
A firm may meet the requirement in BIPRU 7.10.26R by using different model parameters and employing a suitable adjustment mechanism to produce a figure which is equivalent to the figure produced using the parameters set out in BIPRU 7.10.26R. For example, a firm's model may use a 95% one-tailed confidence limit if the firm has a mechanism to convert the output of the model to reflect a 99% one-tailed confidence limit.
BIPRU 7.10.47GRP
This paragraph provides guidance onBIPRU 7.10.46 R (2). Take as an example a VaR model based on a factor model or on a historical simulation model. The ability of the model to explain price variation could be demonstrated by a statistical comparison over the same period of time between actual price changes on the portfolio and the profit and loss impact of risk factors included within the model. A firm may wish to include an estimate of residual variation not explained by the
BIPRU 7.10.54GRP
For example, BIPRU 7.10.53R might involve creating and documenting a prudent incremental PRR charge for the risk not captured in the VaR model and holding sufficient capital resources against this risk. In that case the firm should hold capital resources at least equal to its capital resources requirement as increased by adding this incremental charge to the model PRR. Alternatively the firm may make valuation adjustments through its profit and loss reserves to cover this material
PERG 2.6.11HGRP
  1. (1)

    The main provision within the definition of alternative debenture arrangements that seeks to ensure that only instruments that display the characteristics of a debt security can be alternative debentures is set out at PERG 2.6.11CG (5). It provides that the amount of additional payments under the arrangements must not exceed an amount which would, at the time the bond is issued, be a reasonable commercial return on a loan of capital. Where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered in deciding this question. The following example demonstrates how this condition should be approached.

    2. Example

    ABC Ltd is a property development company. It wishes to increase its portfolio on a short-term basis. It issues 5-year sukuk to investors and uses the proceeds to buy the head lease of a commercial property. The rental income from the lease is distributed to investors in proportion to their holdings without a cap on the level of return. After 5 years, the head lease is sold on at a profit and the proceeds shared between investors.

    In this example, the investors participate directly in the success or failure of the underlying property business. The sakk is not really in the nature of a debt instrument. It is unlikely to be an alternative debenture as:

    • additional payments under the arrangements would exceed a reasonable commercial return on a loan of the capital.

      Further, where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered. Here, the issue terms of the sukuk impose no upper limit on the amount of the periodic distributions: a sakk holder subscribing 1,000 may, in a year, get back 200 or 2,000 or nothing depending on the rental market. The maximum potential return is clearly in excess of a reasonable commercial return on a loan of 1,000; and

    • the arrangements have not been admitted to an official list or admitted to trading on a regulated market or recognised investment exchange (see PERG 2.6.11CG (6)).
  2. (2)

    If, in the above example, investors returns were capped at 500 per sakk per year, then this is the amount that must be considered in deciding whether the return exceeds a reasonable commercial return on a loan, even where the amounts actually received turn out to be far lower.

  3. (3)

    In applying the reasonable commercial return test, the sakk should be compared to a hypothetical loan to the issuer on similar terms and carrying similar risks. For example, a conventional security convertible into shares will normally carry a lower rate of interest because the conversion right has a value. The return on an exchangeable or convertible sakk should be measured against the return on an equivalent exchangeable or convertible debt security.

  4. (4)

    The risk to investors in sukuk may vary slightly from that of a conventional bond in some instances. This may be due to the fact that sukuk holders only have recourse to the bond assets or some other structural feature which results in the risk profile being higher. In such instances it may be justifiable for the rate of return to be slightly higher than that of a conventional loan.

  5. (5)

    As with any financial instrument, the pricing of sukuk will depend on the issuers view of the market at the time of issue and reasonable commercial return may vary depending on the issuer and the economic circumstances prevalent at the time of issue.

LR 5.5.3GRP
(1) The FCA will not automatically suspend, cancel or restore the listing of securities at the request of an overseas exchange or overseas authority (for example, if listing of a listed3issuer'ssecurities are suspended, cancelled or restored on its home exchange).(2) The FCA will not normally suspend the listing of securities where there is a trading halt for the security on its home exchange.(3) If a listedissuer3 requests a suspension, cancellation or restoration of the listing
REC 3.16.1GRP
The purpose of REC 3.16 is to ensure that the FCA1receives a copy of the UK recognised body's plans and arrangements for ensuring business continuity if there are major problems with its computer systems. The FCA1does not need to be notified of minor revisions to, or updating of, the documents containing a UK recognised body's business continuity plan (for example, changes to contact names or telephone numbers). 11
DEPP 6A.3A.2GRP
1The following factors may be relevant when determining the period of limitation: (1) whether the FCA may be minded to reapprove the approved person in the future, for example if the approved person takes action specified by the FCA during the period of limitation;(2) the approved person's expected lost earnings if the FCA imposes a short period of limitation; (3) whether imposing a short period of limitation would cause the approved person serious financial hardship.
CONC 3.7A.2RRP
(1) A firm must, in any relevant communication, indicate the extent of its powers, in particular whether it works exclusively with one or more lenders (including, for example, if it works exclusively with lenders who are participants in the electronic system that the firm operates) or whether it works as an independent broker.[Note: article 21(a) of the Consumer Credit Directive](2) In this rule, a “relevant communication” means a financial promotion or a document which:(a) is
DISP App 3.9.2GRP
In assessing redress, the firm should consider whether there are any other further losses that flow from its breach or failing or from its failure to disclose commission (as applicable), 1 that were reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the firm's breach or failing or of its failure to disclose commission,1 for example, where the payment protection contract's cost or rejected claims contributed to affordability issues for the associated loan or credit which led to arrears
ICOBS 8.3.3GRP
(1) Principle 8 requires a firm to manage conflicts of interest fairly. SYSC 10 also requires an insurance intermediary to take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest, and maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to prevent conflicts of interest from constituting or giving rise to a material risk of damage to its clients. 1(2) [deleted]11(3) If a firm acts for a customer in arranging a policy, it is likely to be the customer's
EG 14.2.3RP
1The following are examples of situations where the FCA may consider it appropriate to seek a court order under section 258 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261Y (in the case of an ACS) to remove the authorised fund manager or depositary: (1) Where there are grounds for concern over the behaviour of the authorised fund manager or depositary in respect of the management of the scheme or of its assets. (2) Where an authorised
EG 2.5.1RP
1Action before or following an investigation may include, for example, referring some issues or information to other authorities for consideration, including where another authority appears to be better placed to take action. For example, when considering whether to use its powers to conduct formal investigations into market misconduct, the FCA will take into account whether another regulatory authority is in a position to investigate and deal with the matters of concern (as far
SYSC 13.3.1AGRP
3The following is a non-exhaustive list of rules and guidance in the Handbook that are relevant to a firm's management of operational risk: (1) COBS contains rules and guidance that can relate to the management of operational risk; for example, COBS 2 (Conduct of business obligations), COBS 4 (Communicating with clients, including financial promotions), COBS 6 (Information about the firm, its services and remuneration), COBS 7 (Insurance mediation), COBS 9 (Suitability (including
DISP App 3.2.6GRP
The firm should take into account any information it already holds about the sale and consider other issues that may be relevant to the sale identified by the firm through other means, for example, the root cause analysis described in DISP App 3.4.
EG 4.9.1RP
1A clear division between the conduct of the investigation2 the ongoing supervision of the firm means that clarity as to who is carrying out what work in important, so that the focus on the various needs of the investigation and supervisory function are not lost. It is also important that the investigation can2 benefit2 from the knowledge of the firm or individuals that the supervisors will have built up, or from their general understanding of the firm's business or sector. In
EG 19.1.2RP
1Where conduct may amount to a breach of more than one enactment, the FCA may need to consider which enforcement powers to use and whether to use powers from one or more of the Acts. Which power or powers are appropriate will vary according to the circumstances of the case. However, where appropriate, we have tried to adopt procedures in respect of our use of powers under legislation other than the Act which are akin to those used under the Act. We expect, for example, to provide
EG 4.2.1RP
1The Act does not always require the FCA to give written notice of the appointment of investigators, for example, where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(1) or (4) of the Act and the FCA believes that the provision of notice would be likely to result in the investigation being frustrated, or where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(2) of the Act.
CASS 7A.1.2GRP
The client money distribution and transfer rules set out the required treatment of client money on the occurrence of a pooling event so that where:4(1) for example, a firmfails (but also in other situations where a primary pooling event occurs), the rules in CASS 7A.2 (Primary pooling events) facilitate the return or transfer of client money; and4(2) a person at which the firm holds client moneyfails, the rules in CASS 7A.3 (Secondary pooling events) allocate any loss of client