Related provisions for SUP 18.2.50

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SUP App 2.7.1GRP
For a dormant fund account operator, unless2 any of SUP App 2.4.1 R, SUP App 2.5.1 R, SUP App 2.5.3 R or SUP App 2.6.1 R applies, if a firm's circumstances change, such that its capital resources have fallen, or are expected to fall, below the level advised in individual capital guidance1 given to the firm by the FCA2 , then, consistent with PRIN 2.1.1 RPrinciple 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should inform the appropriate regulator of this fact as soon as practicable,
SUP 14.5.1GRP
Where an incoming EEA firm has been granted top-up permission by the appropriate UK regulator3 and wishes to vary that permission, the Act requires it to apply to the appropriate UK regulator3 for a variation of the top-up permission. 133
EG 2.5.1RP
1Action before or following an investigation may include, for example, referring some issues or information to other authorities for consideration, including where another authority appears to be better placed to take action. For example, when considering whether to use its powers to conduct formal investigations into market misconduct, the FCA will take into account whether another regulatory authority is in a position to investigate and deal with the matters of concern (as far
EG 14.3.2RP
1In addition to or instead of suspending the promotion of a scheme recognised under section 264, the FCA may ask the competent authorities of the EEA State in which the scheme is constituted who are responsible for the authorisation of collective investment schemes, to take such action in respect of the scheme and/or its operator as will resolve the FCA's concerns. Also, Schedule 5 to the Act states that a person who for the time being is an operator, trustee
COCON 2.1.3RRP
Rule 3: You must be open and cooperative with the FCA, the PRA and other regulators.
DISP 3.8.3RRP
So long as he has regard to the parties' rights of privacy, the Ombudsman may disclose information to the FCA5 or any other body exercising regulatory or statutory functions for the purpose of assisting that body or the Financial Ombudsman Service to discharge its functions.245
MAR 5.6.1RRP
1A firm operating an MTF must:(1) report to the FCA:(a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions; and(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; (2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and (3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse, in
REC 3.19.1RRP
Where a UK recognised body becomes aware that a person has been appointed by any regulatory body (other than the FCA2or a UK recognised body) to investigate:2(1) any business transacted by means of its facilities or12(2) any aspect of the clearing facilitation services2 which it provides;2it must immediately give the FCA2notice of that event.2
EG 2.7.1RP
1The FCA may be alerted to possible contraventions or breaches by complaints from the public or firms, by referrals from other authorities or through its own enquiries and supervisory activities. Firms may also bring their own contraventions to the FCA's attention, as they are obliged to do under Principle 11 of the Principles for Businesses and rules in the FCA's Supervision manual.
CASS 12.1.2GRP
United States ('US') legislation restricts the ability of non-US firms to trade on behalf of customers resident in the US ('US customers') on non-US futures and options exchanges. The relevant US regulator (the CFTC) operates an exemption system for firms authorised under the Act. Under the Part 30 exemption order, eligible firms may apply for confirmation of exemptive relief from Part 30 of the General Regulations under the US Commodity Exchange Act. In line with this system,
DISP 3.9.1ARRP
24The Ombudsman may designate members of the staff of FOS Ltd to exercise any of the powers of the Ombudsman relating to the consideration of a complaint apart from the powers to:(1) determine a complaint; or(2) authorise the disclosure of information to the FCA5 or any other body exercising regulatory or statutory functions.5
SUP 14.8.1GRP
For further guidance on passporting procedures, an incoming EEA firm may1 contact the FCA or PRA authorisations team,1 or their usual supervisory contact at the appropriate UK regulator1. Incoming Treaty firms and UCITS qualifiers may1 speak to their supervisory contact at the appropriate UK regulator1 in the first instance1111
EG App 3.2.2RP
1The principal activities of CIB are, however, the investigations into the conduct of companies under the Companies Acts. These are fact-finding investigations but may lead to follow-up action by CIB such as petitioning for the winding up of a company, disqualification of directors of the company or referring the matter to the Solicitors Office for prosecution. CIB may also disclose information to other prosecution or regulatory authorities to enable them to take appropriate action
EG 15.3.1RP
1When it decides whether to exercise its power to disqualify an auditor or actuary under section 345(1), and what the scope of any disqualification will be, the FCA will take into account all the circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of any breach of rules and the effect of that breach: the rules are set out in SUP 3 (Auditors) and SUP 4 (Actuaries), and in the case of firms which are ICVCs,
COLL 9.2.2GRP
(1) 1The units of an EEA UCITS scheme in respect of which a notification has been transmitted to the FSA by the competent authority of the UCITS Home State in accordance with article 93 of the UCITS Directive may be marketed in the United Kingdom. This is the effect of section 264 (Schemes constituted in other EEA States) read in conjunction with section 238(4)(c) (Restrictions on promotion) of the Act.(2) Where a management company wishes to market the units of an EEA UCITS scheme
EG 10.5.1RP
1Under section 198 of the Act the FCA has power to apply to court on behalf of the Home State regulator of certain incoming EEA firms for an injunction restraining the incoming EEA firm from disposing of, or otherwise dealing with, any of its assets. The FCA will consider exercising this power only where a request from a Home State regulator satisfies the requirements of section 198(1).
EG 15.4.1RP
1When deciding whether or not to disqualify an auditor under section 249(1) or section 261K(1) of the Act (concerning the power to disqualify an auditor for breach of trust scheme rules or contractual scheme rules), and in setting the disqualification, the FCA will take into account all the circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, the following circumstances: (1) the effect of the auditor's breach of a duty imposed by trust scheme
REC 6A.1.1GRP
1Under section 312A of the Act, an EEA market operator may make arrangements in the United Kingdom to facilitate access to, or use of, a regulated market or multilateral trading facility operated by it if:(1) the operator has given its Home State regulator notice of its intention to make such arrangements; and(2) the Home State regulator has given the FCA3 notice of the operator's intention.3
PR 4.2.1RRP
If a prospectus relating to an issuer that has its registered office in a country that is not an EEA State is drawn up in accordance with the legislation of that country, the FCA may, if the United Kingdom is the Home State in relation to the issuer, approve the prospectus if it is satisfied that:(1) the prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with international standards set by international securities commission organisations, including the IOSCO disclosure standards; and(2)
SUP 3.5.4GRP
The appropriate regulator will regard an auditor as independent if his appointment or retention does not breach the ethical guidance in current issue from the auditor's recognised supervisory body on the appointment of an auditor in circumstances which could give rise to conflicts of interest.