Related provisions for PERG 6.7.11
501 - 520 of 1091 items.
2The FCA has various powers under sections 97, 122A, 122B, 122C,1 131E, 131FA, 165 to 169 and 284 of the Act and Schedule 5 to the CRA to gather information and appoint investigators, and to require the production of a report by a skilled person. In any particular case, the FCA will decide which powers, or combination of powers, are most appropriate to use having regard to all the circumstances. Further comments on the use of these powers are set out below.
2Information may also be provided to the FCA voluntarily. For example, firms may at times commission an internal investigation or a report from an external law firm or other professional adviser and decide to pass a copy of this report to the FCA. Such reports can be very helpful for the FCA in circumstances where enforcement action is anticipated or underway. The FCA's approach to using firm-commissioned reports in an enforcement context is set out at the end of this chapter.
1Where the FCA has decided that an investigation is appropriate (see chapter 2) and it appears to it that there are circumstances suggesting that contraventions or offences set out in section 168 may have happened, the FCA will normally appoint investigators pursuant to section 168. Where the circumstances do not suggest any specific breach or contravention covered by section 168, but, the FCA still has concerns about a firm, an appointed representative, a recognised investment
1In some cases involving both general and specific concerns, the FCA may consider it appropriate to appoint investigators under both section 167 and section 168 at the outset. Also, where, for example, it has appointed investigators under section 167, it may subsequently decide that it is appropriate to extend the appointment to cover matters under section 168 as well.
1When it decides whether a suspension order under section 267 is appropriate, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances. General factors that the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the breach of financial promotionrules by the operator (the matters listed at paragraph 14.1.1 (a) to (f) may be relevant in this context); and (2) the conduct of the operator after the breach was discovered including whether the operator has compensated
1In addition to or instead of suspending the promotion of a scheme recognised under section 264, the FCA may ask the competent authorities of the EEA State in which the scheme is constituted who are responsible for the authorisation of collective investment schemes, to take such action in respect of the scheme and/or its operator as will resolve the FCA's concerns. Also, Schedule 5 to the Act states that a person who for the time being is an operator,
trustee
1As delays in the provision of information and/or documents can have a significant impact on the efficient progression of an investigation, the FCA expects persons to respond to information and document requests in a timely manner to appropriate deadlines. When an investigation is complex (and the timetable allows), the FCA may decide to issue an information or document
requirement in draft, allowing a specified period (of usually no more than three working
As set out in DEPP 5, special decision-making arrangements apply in relation to settlement. The person concerned may agree all relevant issues with the FCA (in which case the settlement decision makers will give all relevant statutory notices). Alternatively, a focused resolution agreement may be agreed (in which case the settlement decision makers are responsible for giving the warning notice and the RDC for giving any decision notice).2 The FCA would expect to hold any settlement
1If the settlement negotiations result in a proposed settlement of the dispute, FCA staff will put the terms of the proposed settlement in writing and agree them with the person concerned. The settlement decision makers (and, as the case may be, the RDC)2 will then consider the matter2 under the procedures set out in DEPP 5. A settlement is2 likely to result in the giving of statutory notices (see EG 2.15.1 to EG 2.15.32).
1The FCA's power under section 56 of the Act to prohibit individuals who are not fit and proper from carrying out functions in relation to regulated activities helps the FCA to work towards achieving its statutory objectives. The FCA may exercise this power to make a prohibition order where it considers that, to achieve any of those objectives, it is appropriate either to prevent an individual from performing any function in relation to regulated activities, or to restrict the
1The FCA's effective use of the power under section 63 of the Act to withdraw approval from an approved person will also help ensure high standards of regulatory conduct by preventing an approved person from continuing to perform the controlled function to which the approval relates if he is not a fit and proper person to perform that function. Where it considers this is appropriate, the FCA may prohibit an approved person, in addition to withdrawing their approval.
1This chapter applies to every firm which:(1) is subject to the requirements as to the form and content of regulated agreements under the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) made under section 60(1) of the CCA that wishes to apply for a direction from the FCA waiving or varying those requirements;(2) is subject to the requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers
This chapter explains how the regime works for obtaining: (1) a direction from the FCA waiving or varying the requirements as to the form and content of regulated agreements under the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) made under section 60(1) of the CCA;(2) a determination by the FCA that the requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty or issuing a public censure is to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar breaches, and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant behaviour. Financial penalties and public censures are therefore tools that the FCA3 may employ to help it to achieve its statutory
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:(1) a person may offer to provide information on directors’ dealings on the basis that, in his opinion, were directors to buy or sell investors would do well to follow suit;(2) a person may offer to tell a client when certain shares reach a certain value (which would be advice if the person providing the
1Where the FCA applies to the court under section 380(3) or sections 381(3) and (4) of the Act, the FCA may ask the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make orders on an interim basis, restraining a person from disposing of, or otherwise dealing with, assets. To succeed in an application for such interim relief, the FCA will have to show a good arguable case for the granting of the injunction. The FCA will not have to show that a contravention has already occurred or
1The FCA may request the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases, for example, where it has evidence showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that a person will contravene a requirement of the Act and that the contravention will result in the dissipation of assets belonging to investors.
1The FCA may use its section 122B power to require information and documents from a person to support both its supervisory and its enforcement functions under the Market Abuse Regulation or any directly applicable EU regulation made under the Market Abuse Regulation, or under the auction regulation.[Note: see Regulation 6 and Schedule 1 to the RAP Regulations for application of the power in relation to functions under the auction regulation]
An investment
firm, which is authorised by the
FCA
, must promptly notify the
FCA
in writing of its status as a
systematic internaliser in respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated
market:(1) when it gains that status; or(2) if it ceases to have that status.[Note:Article
21(4) of the MiFID Regulation]
Where the FCA1 considers that it is unlikely to make a recognition order, it will discuss its concerns with the applicant with a view to enabling the applicant to make changes to its rules or guidance, or other parts of the application. If the FCA1 decides to refuse to make a recognition order, it will follow the procedure set out in section 298 of the Act (Directions and revocation: procedure) (which applies in consequence of section 290(5) of the Act (Recognition orders)) which
Where a UK RIE decides to:(1) restrict the open position on any of the contracts of a member; or(2) issue instructions to a member to close out its positions on any contracts;that UK RIE must immediately give the FCA2notice of that event, and the member's name, the nature and size of any position to be restricted or closed out and the reasons for the UK RIE's decision.2
1Where an RAP proposes to impose a maximum bid size or take other remedial measures to mitigate risks of market abuse, financial crime or anti-competitive behaviour in accordance with article 57 of the auction regulation, the RAP must give the FCA2notice of that event and details of the remedial measures proposed.2
FCA2 staff responsible for the taking of a statutory notice decision under executive procedures may refer the matter to the RDC for the RDC to decide whether to give the statutory notice if:2(1) the RDC is already considering, or is shortly to consider, a closely related matter; and(2) the relevant FCA2 staff believe, having regard to all the circumstances, that the RDC should have responsibility for the decision. The relevant considerations might include: 2(a) the desirability
1A firm operating an MTF must:(1) report to the FCA:(a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions; and(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; (2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and (3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse, in
Firms are also referred to SUP 15.6 (Inaccurate, false or misleading information). This requires, in SUP 15.6.4 R, a firm to notify the appropriate regulator1 if false, misleading, incomplete or inaccurate information has been provided. This would apply in relation to information provided in an application for a waiver.1
1Section 59(1) is relevant where the firm directly employs the person concerned. Under the provision, a firm ('A') must take reasonable care to ensure that no person performs a controlled function under an arrangement entered into by A in relation to the carrying on by it of a regulated activity, unless the appropriate regulator (as defined in section 59(4) of the Act)
approves the performance by that person of the controlled function to which the approval relates.