Related provisions for FEES 13.2.10
281 - 300 of 605 items.
The purpose of this chapter is
to implement Article 27 of MiFID,
which deals with the requirements on systematic
internalisersfor pre-trade transparency in shares, the execution of orders on behalf of clients and
standards and conditions for trading. It also provides a rule requiring investment firms to notify the
FCA
when they become, or cease to
be, a systematic internaliser,
and which gives effect to Article 21(4) of the MiFID
Regulation. The chapter
A credit union must not accept deposits except:(1) by way of subscription for its shares from persons who may lawfully be admitted to membership of the credit union under the Credit Unions Act 1979 or the Credit Union (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (as appropriate) and the rules of the credit union; or(2) from persons too young to be members under any provision of the credit union’s rules or (for Northern Ireland credit unions) under article 15 of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland)
Where a UK recognised body has taken any disciplinary action against any member or any employee of a member, in respect of a breach of a rule relating to the carrying on by the UK recognised body of any of its regulatory functions, that body must immediately notify the FCA1of that event, and give:1(1) the name of the person concerned;(2) details of the disciplinary action taken by the UK recognised body; and(3) the UK recognised body's reasons for taking that disciplinary act
1An issuer must comply with the rules that are applicable to every security in the category of listing which applies to each security the issuer has listed. The categories of listing are:(1) premium listing (commercial company); (2) premium listing (closed-ended investment fund);(3) premium listing (open-ended investment companies);(4) standard listing (shares);(5) standard listing (debt and debt-like securities);(6) standard listing (certificates representing certain securities);(7)
Section 137B(1) of the Act provides that rules may make provisions which result in client money being held by a firm on trust. CASS 11.6.1 R creates such a rule in relation to client money held by a CASS debt management firm. The consequence of this rule is there is a fiduciary relationship between a CASS debt management firm and its client, under which client money is in the legal ownership of the firm but remains in the beneficial ownership of the client. In the event of failure
1The FCA recognises the importance of consistency in its decision-making and that it must consider the approach previously taken to, say, the application of a particular rule or Principle in a given context. This applies equally to consideration by the RDC or by the settlement decision makers when they look at action taken by the FCA in earlier, similar, cases. This is not to say that the FCA cannot take a different view to that taken in the earlier case: the facts of two enforcement
3The following is a non-exhaustive list of rules and guidance in the Handbook that are relevant to a firm's management of operational risk: (1) COBS contains rules and guidance that can relate to the management of operational risk; for example, COBS 2 (Conduct of business obligations), COBS 4 (Communicating with clients, including financial promotions), COBS 6 (Information about the firm, its services and remuneration), COBS 7 (Insurance mediation), COBS 9 (Suitability (including
The client money distribution and transfer rules set out the required treatment of client money on the occurrence of a pooling event so that where:4(1) for example, a firmfails (but also in other situations where a primary pooling event occurs), the rules in CASS 7A.2 (Primary pooling events) facilitate the return or transfer of client money; and4(2) a person at which the firm holds client moneyfails, the rules in CASS 7A.3 (Secondary pooling events) allocate any loss of client
1When it decides whether a suspension order under section 267 is appropriate, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances. General factors that the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the breach of financial promotionrules by the operator (the matters listed at paragraph 14.1.1 (a) to (f) may be relevant in this context); and (2) the conduct of the operator after the breach was discovered including whether the operator has compensated
(1) 1This rule applies to a state, a regional or local authority and a public international body with listeddebt securities for whom the United Kingdom is its home Member State for the purposes of the Transparency Directive.(2) An issuer referred to in paragraph (1) that is not already required to comply with the transparency rules must comply with:(a) DTR 5.6.3 R (disclosure of changes in rights);(b) [deleted]2(c) DTR 6.1.3 R (2) (equality of treatment);(d) DTR 6.2 (Filing information