Related provisions for MCOB 13.3.4C
61 - 80 of 1091 items.
(1) A firm should:2(a) carry out assessments of the sort described in the overall Pillar 2 rule and IFPRU 2.2.13R on an ongoing basis; and2(b) document the assessments in (a), in line with IFPRU 2.2.43R to IFPRU 2.2.44R (Documentation of risk assessments), at least annually, or more frequently if changes in the business, strategy, nature or scale of its activities or operational environment suggest that the current level of financial resources is no longer adequate.2(2) The appropriateness
(1) As part of its obligations under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm must carry out an evaluation of its exposure to the interest-rate risk arising from its non-trading activities.(2) The evaluation under (1) must cover the effect of a sudden and unexpected parallel change in interest rates of 200 basis points in both directions.(3) A firm must immediately notify the FCA if any evaluation under this rule suggests that, as a result of the change in interest rates described in
(1) As part of its obligation under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm that is a significant IFPRU firm must:(a) for the major sources of risk identified in line with IFPRU 2.2.7R(2), carry out stress tests and scenario analyses that are appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of those major sources of risk and to the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business; and(b) carry out the reverse stress testing under SYSC 20 (Reverse stress testing).(2) In carrying out
A firm controlled by a parent financial holding company in a Member State or a parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State must comply with the ICAAPrules on the basis of the consolidated situation of that holding company, if the FCA is responsible for supervision of the firm on a consolidated basis under article 111 of CRD. [Note: article 108(3) of CRD]
For the purpose of the ICAAPrules as they apply on a consolidated basis or on a sub-consolidated basis: (1) the firm must ensure that the FCA consolidation group has the processes, strategies and systems required by the overall Pillar 2 rule;(2) the risks to which the overall Pillar 2 rule and the general stress and scenario testing rule refer are those risks as they apply to each member of the FCA consolidation group;(3) the reference in the overall Pillar 2 rule to amounts
(1) This rule relates to the assessment of the amounts, types and distribution of financial resources, own funds and internal capital (referred to in this rule as "resources") under the overall Pillar 2 rule as applied on a consolidated basis and to the assessment of diversification effects as referred to in IFPRU 2.2.14 R (3)(b) as applied on a consolidated basis.(2) A firm must be able to explain how it has aggregated the risks referred to in the overall Pillar 2 rule and the
(1) A firm must allocate the total amount of financial resources, own funds and internal capital identified as necessary under the overall Pillar 2 rule (as applied on a consolidated basis) between different parts of the FCA consolidation group. IFPRU 2.2.11 R (Identifying different tiers of capital) does not apply to this allocation(2) The firm must carry out the allocation in (1) in a way that adequately reflects the nature, level and distribution of the risks to which the group
A firm must also allocate the total amount of financial resources, own funds and internal capital (referred to in this rule as "resources") identified as necessary under the overall Pillar 2 rule as applied on a consolidated basis or sub-consolidated basis between each firm which is a member of the FCA consolidation group on the following basis:(1) the amount allocated to each firm must be decided on the basis of the principles in IFPRU 2.2.53 R (2); and(2) if the process in (1)
A firm to which the ICAAPrules apply on a consolidated basis need not prepare a consolidated basis assessment if such an assessment has been prepared by another member of its FCA consolidation group. In such cases, a firm may adopt such an assessment as its own. A firm nevertheless remains responsible for the assessment.
The purpose of IFPRU 2.2.52 R to IFPRU 2.2.55 G is to enable the FCA to assess the extent, if any, to which a firm's assessment, calculated on a consolidated basis, is lower than it would be if each separate legal entity were to assess the amount of capital it would require to mitigate its risks (to the same level of confidence) were it not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision under Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of the EUCRR (Prudential consolidation). The reason
Where a firm is a member of a FCA consolidation group or a non-EEA sub-group, the firm must ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at those levels comply with the obligations set out in the risk control rules on a consolidated basis (or a sub-consolidated basis).[Note: article 109(2) of CRD]
Compliance with the obligations in IFPRU 2.2.59 R must enable the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group to have arrangements, processes and mechanisms that are consistent, well integrated and ensure that data relevant to the purpose of supervision can be produced.[Note: article 109(2) of CRD]
When the overall financial adequacy rule applies on a consolidated basis or sub-consolidated basis, the firm must ensure that at all times its FCA consolidation group maintains overall financial resources and internal capital, including own funds and liquidity resources, which are adequate, both as to amount and quality, to ensure that there is no significant risk that the liabilities of any members of its FCA consolidation group cannot be met as they fall due.
(1) In identifying an appropriate range of adverse circumstances and events in accordance with IFPRU 2.2.37 R (2):(a) a firm will need to consider the cycles it is most exposed to and whether these are general economic cycles or specific to particular markets, sectors or industries;(b) for the purposes of IFPRU 2.2.37 R (2)(a), the amplitude and duration of the relevant cycle should include a severe downturn scenario based on forward-looking hypothetical events, calibrated against
A firm should include in the written record in IFPRU 2.2.43 R (Documentation of risk assessments) a description of the broad business strategy of the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group of which it is a member, the group's view of its principal risks and its approach to measuring, managing and controlling the risks. This description should include the role of stress testing, scenario analysis and contingency planning in managing risk on an individual basis and consolidated
A firm should satisfy itself that the systems (including IT) of the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group of which it is a member are sufficiently sound to support the effective management and, where applicable, the quantification of the risks that could affect the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group, as the case may be.
In performing stress tests and scenario analyses, a firm should take into account the risk that its group may have to bring back on to its consolidated balance sheet the assets and liabilities of off-balance sheet entities as a result of reputational contagion, notwithstanding the appearance of legal risk transfer.
SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member, comply with the obligations in this section on a consolidated basis (or sub-consolidated basis). In the FCA’s view, the application of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19D.3.1R(1) is in line with article 109(2) of the CRD
(1) This section applies in relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way, and to the extent, that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3)
(1) Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of a dual-regulated firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC
The FCA would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only to members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgment and common sense. The FCA expects that a firm will apply qualitative judgements and common sense in the final decision about the performance-related components of variable remuneration pools. (2) [deleted]1(3) We consider good practice in this area to be represented by those firms who provide a quantitative reference or
In the FCA’s view, circumstances in which a person will be using a personal hedging strategy include (and are not limited to) entering into an arrangement with a third party under which the third party will make payments, directly or indirectly, to that person that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the person's remuneration is subject to reductions.
(1) Taking account of the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual (X), both the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those relating
(1) Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same requirements applicable to variable remuneration awarded by the firm including deferral, malus and clawback.(2) The FCA expects that guaranteed variable awards and retention awards should not be common practice for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff and should be limited to rare, infrequent occurrences. The FCA expects a firm to provide prior notification to the FCA of any proposed retention1 awards.
A firm must ensure that any approval by its shareholders or owners or members, for the purposes of SYSC 19D.3.49R, is carried out in accordance with the following procedure: (1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the approval
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares;(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio
A firm must:(1) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(2) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee:(a) participated in, or was responsible for, conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm; or(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article 94(1)(n) of the CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards][Note: The FSA
The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate the adjustments.
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enable the FCA to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision.(2) SYSC 19D.3.66R and SYSC 19D.3.67R (together with SYSC 19D Annex 1) are:(a) rules referred to in (1) that render void provisions of an agreement that contravene
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the FCA’s6 view, the application of6 this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19A.3.1R(1) is in line with6 article 109(2) of
(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
(1) Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of an IFPRU investment firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC 19A1.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e.,
The FCA6 would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to 3members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to 3members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.33
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgement6 and common sense. The FCA expects a6firm to apply qualitative judgements and common sense in6 the final decision about the performance-related components6 of variable remuneration pools6. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those most appropriate to its circumstances.
In the FCA’s6 view, circumstances in which a person will be using a personal hedging strategy include (and are not limited to)6 entering into an arrangement with a third party under which the third party will make payments, directly or indirectly, to that person that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the person'sremuneration is subject to reductions.
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator8 does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:8(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those
A firm must ensure that any approval by the its shareholders or owners or members for the purposes of SYSC 19A.3.44AR is carried out in accordance with the following procedure:535(1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;55(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:6(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares; and6(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.6(2) The FCA6 would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with
(1) [deleted]6(2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA6 may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate the adjustments.
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the FCA6 to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified prohibitions on guaranteed
As the provision of credit data on companies is not a regulated activity under the Act, the Regulations create a separate monitoring and enforcement regime but apply, or make provision corresponding to, certain aspects of the Act. The FCA's approach to taking enforcement action under the Regulations will reflect its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate and responsive
Regulation 23 of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations applies many of the provisions of the Act in relation to the FCA’s investigation and information-gathering powers in respect of designated banks and designated finance platforms. The effect of this is to apply the same procedures under the Act for appointing investigators and requiring information when investigating any breaches of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations.
For example, the FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed investigators to carry out an investigation and the reasons for the appointment. The FCA's policy in regulatory investigations under the Regulations is to use powers to compel information, in the same way as it would in the course of an investigation under the Act.
The RDC is the FCA’s decision maker for some decisions which require warning notices or decision notices to be given under the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations as set out in DEPP 2 Annex 1G. The RDC will make its decisions following the procedure in DEPP 3.2 or, where appropriate, DEPP 3.3 or DEPP 3.4. For decisions made by executive procedures, the procedure to be followed will be those described in DEPP 4.
When determining whether to take action to impose a penalty or to issue a public censure under the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations, the FCA’s policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6.2 and DEPP 6.4. When determining the level of financial penalty, the FCA’s policy includes having regard to the relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6.5, DEPP 6.5A, DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.7.
As with cases under the Act, the FCA may settle or mediate appropriate cases involving breaches of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations to assist it to exercise its functions. DEPP 5, DEPP 6.7 and EG 5 set out information on the FCA’s settlement process and the settlement discount scheme.
When determining whether to take action to impose a restriction under regulation 27 of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Finance Platforms) Regulations, the FCA’s policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6A.2 and 6A.4. When determining the length of the period of restriction, the FCA’s policy includes having regard to the relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6A.3.
The FCA will treat a firm's application as withdrawn if it does not hear from the firm within 20 business days of sending a communication which requests or requires a response from the firm. The FCA will not do this if the firm has made it clear to the FCA in some other way that it intends to pursue the application.
An applicant for admission must apply to the FCA by:(1) submitting, in final form:(a) the documents described in LR 3.3 in the case of an application in respect of equity shares;44(b) the documents described in LR 3.4 in the case of an application in respect of debt securities or other securities;(c) the documents described in LR 3.5 in the case of a block listing;(2) submitting all additional documents, explanations and information as required by the FCA;(3) submitting verification
When considering an application for admission to listing, the FCA may:(1) carry out any enquiries and request any further information which it considers appropriate, including consulting with other regulators or exchanges;(2) request that an applicant, or its specified representative answer questions and explain any matter the FCA considers relevant to the application for listing;(3) take into account any information which it considers appropriate in relation to the application
When a firm appoints a skilled person4 to provide a report under section 166 (Reports by skilled persons) or collect or update information under section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act,4 the firm must, in a contract with the skilled person:44(1) require and permit the skilled person during and after the course of his appointment:(a) to cooperate with the FCA3 in the discharge of its functions under the Act in relation to the firm;
In complying with the contractual duty in SUP 5.5.1 R (1) the FCA3 expects that a skilled person appointed by a firm4 under section 166 (Reports by skilled persons) or section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act4 will cooperate with the FCA3 by, amongst other things, providing information or documentation about the planning and progress of the report and its findings and conclusions, if requested to do so. A firm should therefore
If the FCA3 is considering asking for the information specified in SUP 5.5.2 G it will take into consideration the cost of the skilled person complying with the request, and the benefit that the FCA3 may derive from the information. For example, in most cases, the FCA3 will not need to request a skilled person to give it source data, documents and working papers. However, the FCA3 may do so when it reasonably believes that this information will be relevant to any investigation
In complying with the contractual duty in SUP 5.5.1 R, the FCA3 expects that, in the case of substantial or complex reports, the skilled person will give a periodic update on progress and issues to allow for a re-focusing of the report if necessary. The channel of communication would normally be directly between the skilled person and the FCA3. However, the FCA3 would also expect firms normally to be informed about the passage of information, and the skilled person would usually
A firm must ensure that the contract required by SUP 5.5.1 R:(1) is governed by the laws of a part of the United Kingdom; (2) expressly:3.(a) provides that the FCA3 has a right to enforce the provisions included in the contract under SUP 5.5.1 R and SUP 5.5.5 R (2);44(b) provides that, in proceedings brought by the FCA3 for the enforcement of those provisions, the skilled person is not to have available by way of defence, set-off or counterclaim any matter that is not relevant
If the FCA3 considers it appropriate, it may request the firm to give it a copy of the draft contract required by SUP 5.5.1 R4 before it is made with the skilled person. The FCA3 will inform the firm of any matters that it considers require further clarification or discussion before the contract is finalised.4444
The FCA3 expects the firm, including where applicable4 in complying with Principle 11, to give the FCA3 information about the cost of the skilled persons report. This may include both an initial estimate of the cost as well as the cost of the completed report. This information is required to help inform the FCA's3 decision making in the choice of regulatory tools. Information about the number and cost of reports by skilled persons will be published by the FCA3. 44444444
If a UK firm is passporting under the UCITS Directive, regulation 12(1) states that the UK firm must not make a change in its programme of operations, or the activities to be carried on under its EEA right, unless the relevant requirements in regulation 12(2) have been complied with. These requirements are:5(1) the UK firm has given a notice to the FCA15 and to the Host State regulator stating the details of the proposed change; or15(2) if the change arises as a result of circumstances
5For further details on giving the notices to the appropriate UK regulator, as described in SUP 13.7.3 G (1), SUP 13.7.3AG and SUP 13.7.3BG12, UK firms may wish to use the standard electronic15 form available from the FCA and PRA authorisation teams 15(see SUP 13.12 (Sources of further information)).15151551515
15Where the PRA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the FCA before deciding whether to give consent to a change (or proposed change) and where the FCA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the PRA before deciding whether to give consent in relation to a UK firm whose immediate group includes a PRA-authorised person.
(1) 11A UK firm which has exercised an EEA right deriving from the MCD to provide a cross border service, must not make any material changes to the service unless it has complied with the requirements in regulation 17(B)(2).(2) The requirements in regulation 17(B)(2) are that;(a) the UK firm has given notice to the FCA stating the details of the proposed change; and(b) the period of one month has elapsed, beginning with the day on which the UK firm gave notice.(3) Paragraph (1)
(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that the FCA receives regular and comprehensive information about the firm’s systems and controls in preventing financial crime.(2) The purpose of collecting the data in the Annual Financial Crime Report is to assist the FCA in assessing the nature of financial crime risks within the financial services industry.
A UK recognised body must give the FCA1:1(1) a copy of its annual report and accounts; and(2) a copy of the consolidated annual report and accounts: (a) of any group in which the UK recognised body is a subsidiary undertaking; or(b) (if the UK recognised body is not a subsidiary undertaking in any group) of any group of which the UK recognised body is a parent undertaking;no later than the time specified for the purpose of this rule in REC 3.8.2 R.
The time specified for the purpose of REC 3.8.1 R is the latest of:(1) four months after the end of the financial year to which the document which is to be given to the FCA1relates; or1(2) the time when the documents described in REC 3.8.1 R (1) or REC 3.8.1 R (2)(b) are sent to the members or shareholders of the UK recognised body; or (3) the time when the document described in REC 3.8.1 R (2)(a) are sent to the shareholders in a parent undertaking of the group to which that
A UK recognised body is not required to provide quarterly and monthly management accounts in respect of the same period, but management accounts (whether quarterly or monthly) should be submitted for all periods. A UK recognised body may choose whichever method is the more suitable for it, but where it intends to change from providing monthly to quarterly management accounts (or from quarterly to monthly management accounts), it should inform the FCA1 of that fact.1
(1) Section 258A(1) and (2) and section 261Z(1) and (2)1 (Winding up or merger of master UCITS) of the Act, in implementation of article 60 of the UCITS Directive, provide1 that where a master UCITS is wound up, for whatever reason, the FCA is to direct the manager and trustee of any AUT or the authorised contractual scheme manager and depositary of any ACS1 which is a feeder UCITS of the master UCITS to wind up the scheme, unless one of the following conditions is satisfied:1(a)
Where the authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme that is a feeder UCITS is notified that its master UCITS is to be wound up, it must submit to the FCA the following:(1) where the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS intends to invest at least 85% in value of the scheme property in units of another master UCITS:(a) its application for approval under section 283A of the Act for that investment;(b) where applicable, its notice under section 251 (Alteration of schemes and
(1) The information in COLL 11.6.3 R must be submitted no later than two months after the date on which the master UCITS has informed the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS of the binding decision to be wound up.(2) By way of derogation from (1), where the master UCITS has informed the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS of the binding decision to be wound up more than five months before the date at which the winding up will start, the authorised fund manager
Where the authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme that is a feeder UCITS is notified that the master UCITS is to merge with another UCITS scheme or EEA UCITS scheme or divide into two or more such schemes, it must submit to the FCA the following:(1) where the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS intends it to continue to be a feeder UCITS of the same master UCITS:(a) its application under section 283A of the Act, for approval;(b) where applicable, a notice under section
(1) The information in COLL 11.6.5 R must be submitted to the FCA no later than one month after the date on which the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS has received the information of the planned merger or division in accordance with regulation 13(6) of the UCITS Regulations 2011.(2) By way of derogation from (1), where the master UCITS provides the information referred to in, or comparable with, COLL 7.7.10 R (Information to be given to Unitholders) to the authorised
Regulation 12(4) (Right of redemption) of the UCITS Regulations 2011 provides that where a master UCITS merges with another scheme, the master UCITS must enable its feeder UCITS to repurchase or redeem all the units of the master UCITS in which they have invested before the consequences of the merger become effective, unless the FCA approves the continued investment by the feeder UCITS in a master UCITS resulting from the merger.
(1) Where:(a) the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS has submitted the documents required under COLL 11.6.5R (2) and (3); and(b) does not receive the necessary approvals from the FCA by the business day preceding the last day on which the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS can request repurchase or redemption of its units in the master UCITS;the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS must exercise the right to repurchase or redeem its units in the master UCITS
Where:(1) the FCA approves an application under sections 283A (Master-feeder structures), 252A or 261S1 (Proposal to convert to a non-feeder UCITS) of the Act or regulation 22A of the OEIC Regulations that arises as a result of the winding-up, merger or division of the master UCITS (other than an application pursuant to COLL 11.6.5R (1)); and1(2) the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS holds or receives cash in accordance with COLL 11.6.9R (4) or as a result of a winding-up;the
Where the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS has submitted the documents required under COLL 11.6.3R (1), COLL 11.6.3R (2), COLL 11.6.5R (1), COLL 11.6.5R (2) or COLL 11.6.5R (3) and has received written notice of any required approvals from the FCA, it must:(1) inform the master UCITS of those approvals; and(2) in the case of the required approvals received in respect of documents submitted under COLL 11.6.3 R (1) and COLL 11.6.5 R (2), take the necessary measures to comply
Where the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS gives notice to the FCA under section 251 or section 261Q1 of the Act or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations that it intends to wind up the scheme, it must inform:(1) the unitholders of the feeder UCITS; and(2) where notice is given under COLL 11.6.5R (4) (Application for approval by a feeder UCITS where a master UCITS merges or divides), the authorised fund manager of the master UCITS;of its intention without undue delay.[Note:
1Under section 300B(2) of the Act, the FCA4may, by rules under section 293 (Notification requirements):4(1) 1specify descriptions of regulatory provision in relation to which, or circumstances in which, the duty in section 300B(1) does not apply, or(2) 1provide that the duty applies only to specified descriptions of regulatory provision or in specified circumstances.
1Under section 300B(3) of the Act, the FCA4may also by rules under section 293: 4(1) 1make provision as to the form and contents of the notice required, and(2) 1require the UK recognised body to provide such information relating to the proposal as may be specified in the rules or as the FCA4may reasonably require.4
1A notice under section 300B(1) of the Act of a proposal to make a regulatory provision must be in writing and state expressly that it is a notice for the purpose of that section. To be effective, a notice must: (1) 1contain full particulars of the proposal to make a regulatory provision which is the subject of that notice; and(2) 1either be accompanied by sufficient supporting information to enable the FCA4to assess the purpose and effect of the proposed regulatory provision
1In determining whether a UK RIE3has provided sufficient supporting information, the FCA4may have regard to the extent to which the information includes:44(1) 1clearly expressed reasons for the proposed regulatory provision; and(2) 1an appropriately detailed assessment of the likely costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory provision.
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Money Laundering Regulations. The Money Laundering Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations to apply customer due diligence measures and conduct ongoing monitoring of business relationships on designated types of business.
1The FCA is responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Regulations not only by authorised firms who are within the Money Laundering Regulations’ scope, but also by what the Regulations describe as “Annex I financial institutions”. These are businesses which are not otherwise authorised by us but which carry out certain of the activities listed in Annex I of the Banking Consolidation Directive28, now Annex I of the CRD. The activities include lending (e.g. forfaiters
1The Money Laundering Regulations add to the range of options available to the FCA for dealing with anti-money laundering failures. These options are: • to prosecute both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions;to take regulatory action against authorised firms for failures which breach the FCA'srules and requirements (for example, under Principle 3 or SYSC 3.2.6R or SYSC 6.1.1R); and• to impose civil penalties on both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions
1This means that there will be situations in which the FCA has powers to investigate and take action under both the Act and the Money Laundering Regulations. The FCA will consider all the circumstances of the case when deciding what action to take and, if it is appropriate to notify the subject about the investigation, will in doing so inform them about the basis upon which the investigation is being conducted and what powers it is using. The FCA will adopt the approach outlined
1The Money Laundering Regulations also provide investigation powers that the FCA can use when investigating whether breachesof the Regulations have taken place. These powers include: • the power to require information from, and attendance of, relevant and connected persons (regulation 37); and• powers of entry and inspection without or under warrant (regulations 38 and 39).The use of these powers will be limited to those cases in which the FCAexpects to take action under the
1The FCA will adopt a risk-based approach to its enforcement of the Money Laundering Regulations. Failures in anti-money laundering controls will not automatically result in disciplinary sanctions, although enforcement action is more likely where a firm has not taken adequate steps to identify its money laundering risks or put in place appropriate controls to mitigate those risks, and failed to take steps to ensure that controls are being effectively implemented.
1However, the Money Laundering Regulations say little about the way in which investigation and sanctioning powers should be used, so the FCA has decided to adopt enforcement and decision making procedures which are broadly akin to those under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
If a person's job for a firm involves performing: (1) an FCA-designated senior management function, the firm should apply to the FCA for approval;(2) a PRA-designated senior management function, the firm should apply to the PRA for approval;(3) both an FCA-designated senior management function and a PRA-designated senior management function, the firm should apply to both the FCA and the PRA for approval (the purpose of SUP 10C.9 is to cut down the need for this sort of dual a
The FCA is under a duty, under section 59A of the Act (Specifying functions as controlled functions: supplementary), to exercise the power to specify any senior management function as an FCA controlled function in a way that it considers will minimise the likelihood that approvals need to be given by both the FCA and the PRA for the performance by a person of senior management functions in relation to the same PRA-authorised person.
A person (referred to as ‘A’ in this rule) is not performing an FCA governing function (referred to as the ‘particular’ FCA governing function in this rule) in relation to a PRA-authorised person (referred to as ‘B’ in this rule), at a particular time, if:(1) A has been approved by the PRA to perform any PRA-designated senior management function in relation to B;(2) throughout the whole of the period between the time of the PRA approval in (1) and the time in question, A has been
Table: Examples of how the need for dual FCA and PRA approval in relation to PRA-authorised persons is reduced
1Example |
Whether FCA approval required |
Whether PRA approval required |
Comments |
(1) A is appointed as chief risk officer and an executive director. |
No. He is not treated as performing the executive director function. |
Yes |
Chief risk officer is a PRA-designated senior management function. A’s functions as a director will be included in the PRA-designated senior management function. To avoid the need for FCA approval, A’s appointment as director should not take effect before PRA approval for the chief risk officer role. |
(2) Same as example (1), except that A will take up the role as an executive director slightly later because the approval is needed from the firm's shareholders or governing body. |
No |
Yes |
The answer for (1) applies. The arrangements in this section apply if the application to the PRA says that A will start to perform the potential FCA governing function around the time of the PRA approval as well as at that time. |
(3) Same as example (1) but the application to the PRA does not mention that it is also intended that A is to be an executive director. |
Yes, to perform the executive director function. |
Yes |
SUP 10C.9.8R does not apply if the application for PRA approval does not say that A will also be performing what would otherwise be an FCA governing function. |
(4) A is to be appointed as chief executive and an executive director. |
No. A is not treated as performing the executive director function. |
Yes |
Being a chief executive is a PRA-designated senior management function. A’s functions as a director will be included in the PRA controlled function. |
(5) A is appointed as chief risk officer. Later, A is appointed as an executive director while carrying on as chief risk officer. |
Yes, when A takes up the director role. The executive director function applies. |
Yes, when A takes up the chief risk officer role. |
SUP 10C.9.8R does not apply because, when the firm applied for approval for A to perform the PRA chief risk officer designated senior management function, there was no plan for A also to perform the executive director function. |
(6) A is appointed as an executive director. Later, A takes on the chief risk officer function and remains as an executive director. |
Yes, when A is appointed as director. The executive director function applies. |
Yes, when A takes up the chief risk officer role. |
When A is appointed as chief risk officer, A is still treated as carrying on the executive director function. A retains the status of an FCA-approved person. |
(7) A is appointed as chief risk officer. A then stops performing that role and for a while does not perform any controlled function for that firm. Later, A is appointed as an executive director with the same firm. |
Yes, when A is appointed as an executive director. The executive director function applies. |
Yes, when A takes up the chief risk officer role. |
SUP 10C.9.8R does not apply because there is no current PRA approval when A is being appointed as a director. |
(8) A is appointed as an executive director and chief risk officer at the same time. Later, A gives up the role as chief risk officer but remains as an executive director. |
No, on A’s first appointment (see example (1)). But when A gives up the role as chief risk officer, FCA approval is needed to perform the executive director function. Form E should be used. The application should state that it is being made as a result of A ceasing to perform a PRA-designated senior management function. Form A should be used if there have been changes in A’s fitness (SUP 10C.10.9D(4)) |
Yes, on A’s first appointment. |
When A stops being a chief risk officer, A stops performing a PRA-designated senior management function. However, being an executive director requires FCA approval. A does not have that approval because A did not need it when A was first appointed. The combined effect of SUP 10C.9.8R and the relevant PRA rules is that the firm has three months to secure approval by the FCA. During that interim period, A keeps the status of a PRA approved person performing the director element of the PRA chief risk designated senior management function - which is included in that function under relevant PRA rules. The relevant PRA rules say that, during this transitional period, A is still treated as performing the PRA chief risk designated senior management function and SUP 10C.9.8R says that, for as long as A is performing a PRA-designated senior management function, A does not perform the executive director function. |
(9) A is appointed as the chief finance officer and an executive director at the same time. Later, A switches to being chief risk officer while remaining as an executive director. |
No |
Yes |
The arrangements in SUP 10C.9.8R continue to apply, even though A switches between PRA-designated senior management function after the PRA's first approval. |
(10) A is appointed chief risk officer and an executive director. A goes on temporary sick leave. A takes up his old job when he comes back. |
No, neither on A’s first appointment nor when A comes back from sick leave. |
Yes |
SUP 10C.9.8R still applies on A’s return because A does not stop performing either the PRA's chief risk function or what would otherwise have been the executive director function just because A goes on temporary sick leave. |
(11) A is appointed to be chairman of the governing body and chairman of the nomination committee at the same time. |
No. A does not need approval to perform the chair of the nomination committee function. |
Yes, on first appointment. |
Being chairman of the governing body is a PRA-designated senior management function. Therefore, the answer for example (1) applies. |
2(12) ‘A’ is to be appointed to perform the Head of Overseas Branch PRA-designated senior management function (SMF19) for a third-country relevant authorised person. A is also an executive director of that firm’sUKbranch. |
No. A is not treated as performing the executive3director function. |
Yes |
A’s functions as a director will be included in the PRA controlled function. |
Note: The relevant PRA rules can be found in Chapter 2 of the part of the PRA rulebook called ‘Senior Management Functions’ |
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Section 19 of the Act (The general prohibition) provides that the requirement to be authorised under the Act only applies in relation to regulated activities which are carried on 'in the United Kingdom'. In many cases, it will be quite straightforward to identify where an activity is carried on. But when there is a cross-border element, for example because a borrower is outside the United Kingdom or because some other element of the activity happens outside the United Kingdom,
The exclusions in article 72(5A) to (5F) of the Regulated Activities Order (Overseas persons) provide that an overseas person does not carry on the regulated activities of:(1) arranging (bringing about) or making arrangements with view to a regulated mortgage contract;(2) entering into a regulated mortgage contract; or(3) administering a regulated mortgage contract;of the borrower (and each of them, if more than one) is an individual and is normally resident outside the United
The FCA's view of the effect of the Act and Regulated Activities Order in various territorial scenarios is set out in the remainder of this section. In those scenarios:(1) the term "service provider" is used to describe a person carrying on any of the regulated mortgage activities;(2) the term "borrower" refers to a borrower who is an individual and not a trustee; the position of a borrower acting as a trustee is not considered; and(3) it is assumed that the activity is not an
When a person is arranging (bringing about) regulated mortgage contracts or making arrangements with a view to regulated mortgage contracts from overseas, the question of whether he will be carrying on regulated activities in the United Kingdom will depend on the relevant circumstances. In the FCA's view, factors to consider include:(1) the territorial limitation in the definition of regulated mortgage contract so that regulation only applies if the land is in the EEA;44(2) the
In the FCA's view:(1) if the borrower is normally resident in the United Kingdom and the land is in the United Kingdom4, the clear territorial limitation in the definition of regulated mortgage contract carries most weight in determining where regulation should apply; it is likely that the arranger will be carrying on regulated activities in the United Kingdom;(2) if the borrower is normally resident overseas, the arrangements are excluded by the overseas persons exclusion if
In the FCA's view, advising on regulated mortgage contracts is carried on where the borrower receives the advice. Accordingly:(1) if the borrower is located in the United Kingdom, a person advising that borrower on regulated mortgage contracts is carrying on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom; but(2) if the service provider and borrower are both located overseas, the regulated activity is not carried on in the United Kingdom.
In the FCA's view, in circumstances other than those excluded by article 72(5D) of the Regulated Activities Order, the need for an overseas lender to be authorised or to have an exemption will depend on the location of the land.4 This is because of:4(1) the territorial limitation in the definition of regulated mortgage contract so that regulation applies only if the land is in the EEA;44(2) the general principle and practice that contracts relating to land are usually governed
In the FCA's view, in circumstances other than those excluded by article 72(5E) of the Regulated Activities Order, the need for an overseas administrator to be authorised or to have an exemption will depend on the location of the land.4 This is because:4(1) the territorial limitation in the definition of regulated mortgage contract means that regulation applies only if the land is in the EEA;44(2) when administrators notify borrowers resident in the United Kingdom or the other
In most cases, there will be no preliminary agreement to enter into a regulated mortgage contract in advance of entering into the contract itself. Moreover, the exclusions relevant to a regulated activity are taken into account to determine whether a person is agreeing to carry on that regulated activity. So, for example, agreeing to arrange regulated mortgage contracts in cases where borrower and service provider are overseas, would not be regulated activities because the activities
The FCA will be responsible for implementing the Distance Marketing Directive for those firms and activities it regulates. The FCA and the Treasury agree that the Distance Marketing Directive is intended to operate on a country of origin basis, except where a firm is marketing into the UK from an establishment in an EEA State which has not implemented the Directive.
A1sponsor must in relation to a sponsor service:11(1) referred to in 3LR 8.2.1R (1) to (4), LR 8.2.1R (11), LR 8.2.1A R and, where relevant LR 8.2.1R (5)3, 1provide assurance to the FCA when required that the responsibilities of the company with or applying for a premium listing of its equity shares3 under the listing rules have been met;3(1A) 3provide to the FCA any explanation or confirmation in such form and within such time limit as the FCA reasonably requires for the purposes
3A sponsor must, for so long as it provides a sponsor service:(1) take such reasonable steps as are sufficient to ensure that any communication or information it provides to the FCA in carrying out the sponsor service is, to the best of its knowledge and belief, accurate and complete in all material respects; and(2) as soon as possible provide to the FCA any information of which it becomes aware that materially affects the accuracy or completeness of information it has previously
3Where a sponsor provides information to the FCA which is or is based on information it has received from a third party, in assessing whether a sponsor has complied with its obligations in LR 8.3.1AR (1) the FCA will have regard, amongst other things, to whether a sponsor has appropriately used its own knowledge, judgment and expertise to review and challenge the information provided by the third party.
The1sponsor will be the main point of contact with the FCA for any matter referred to in LR 8.2.1 The FCA expects to discuss all issues relating to a transaction and any draft or final document directly with the sponsor. However, in appropriate circumstances, the FCA will communicate directly with the company with or applying for a premium listing of its equity shares, or its advisers3.113
1If, in connection with the provision of a3sponsor service, a sponsor becomes aware that it, or a company with or applying for a premium listing of its equity shares is failing or has failed to comply with its obligations under3 the listing rules3, the3disclosure requirements7 or the transparency rules, the sponsor must promptly notify the FCA2.323
1In identifying conflicts of interest, sponsors should also take into account3 circumstances that could:333(1) 3create a perception in the market that a sponsor may not be able to perform its functions properly; or4(2) 3compromise the ability of a sponsor to fulfil its obligations to the FCA in relation to the provision of a sponsor service.
1LR 8.3.11 R recognises that there will be some conflicts of interest that cannot be effectively managed. Providing sponsor services in those cases could adversely affect both a sponsor's ability to perform its functions and market confidence in the sponsor regime. If in doubt about whether a conflict can be effectively managed a sponsor should discuss the issue with the FCA before it decides if it can provide a sponsor service.
6If a listed company or applicant appoints more than one sponsor to provide a sponsor service, the FCA expects the sponsors to co-operate with each other in relation to the sponsor service, including by establishing arrangements for the sharing of information as appropriate having regard to the sponsor service.
The issuer must ensure that a director or a1senior manager of the issuer verifies the application by confirming on the FCA's form that the issuer has obtained the appropriate third party advice or reports as required by RCB 2.3.16 D and is satisfied that:(1) the information provided in the application is correct and complete; and (2) the arrangements relating to the covered bond or programme will comply with the requirements in the RCB Regulations and in RCB.
Where the FCA has published evidence showing that a well-developed and long-established residential property market is present in that territory with loss rates which do not exceed the limits in article 125(3) of the EU CRR (Exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property), a firm does not need to meet the condition in article 125(2)(b) of the EU CRR in order to consider an exposure, or any part of an exposure, as fully and completely secured for the
For the purposes of articles 124(2) and 126(2) of the EU CRR, and in addition to the conditions in those regulations, a firm may only treat exposures as fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property located in the UK1 in line with article 126 where annual average losses stemming from lending secured by mortgages on commercial property in the UK did not exceed 0.5% of risk-weighted exposure amounts over a representative period. A firm must calculate
The FCA confirms that, in relation to the concessionary treatment set out in article 119(5) of the EU CRR, there are no financial institutions currently authorised and supervised by it (other than those to which the EU CRR applies directly) that are subject to prudential requirements that it considers to be comparable in terms of robustness to those applied to institutions under the EU CRR.[Note: article 119(5) of the EU CRR]
Where an exposure is denominated in a currency other than the euro, the FCA expects a firm to use appropriate and consistent exchange rates to determine compliance with relevant thresholds in the EU CRR. Accordingly, a firm should calculate the euro equivalent value of the exposure for the purposes of establishing compliance with the aggregate monetary limit of €1 million for retail exposures using a set of exchange rates the firm considers to be appropriate. The FCA expects a
The FCA considers an Ijara mortgage to be an example of an exposure to a tenant under a property leasing transaction concerning residential property under which the firm is the lessor and the tenant has an option to purchase. Accordingly, the FCA expects exposures to Ijara mortgages to be subject to all of the requirements that apply to exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, including in respect of periodic property revaluation (see articles 124 and 125 of the
The FCA expects a firm with exposure to a lifetime mortgage to inform the FCA of the difference in the own funds requirements on those exposures under the EU CRR and the credit risk capital requirement that would have applied under BIPRU 3.4.56A R.The FCA will use this information in its consideration of relevant risks in its supervisory assessment of the firm (see articles 124, 125 and 208 of the EU CRR).
When determining the portion of a past due item that is secured, the FCA expects the secured portion of an exposure covered by a mortgage indemnity product that is eligible for credit risk mitigation purposes under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4 of the EU CRR (Credit risk mitigation) to qualify as an eligible guarantee (see article 129(2) of the EU CRR).
When determining whether exposures in the form of units or shares in a CIU are associated with particularly high risk, the FCA expects the following features would be likely to give rise to such risk:(1) an absence of external credit assessment of such CIU from an ECAI recognised under article 132(2) of the EU CRR (Items representing securitisation positions) and where such CIU has specific features (such as high levels of leverage or lack of transparency) that prevent it from
The FCA expects a firm's assessment of whether types of exposure referred to in article 128(3) of the EU CRR are associated with particularly high risk to include consideration of exposures arising out of a venture capital business (whether the firm itself carries on the venture capital business or not) . The FCA considers "venture capital business" to include the business of carrying on any of the following:(1) advising on investments, managing investments, arranging (bringing
Until such time as the European Commission adopts implementing technical standards drafted by the European Supervisory Authorities Joint Committee to specify for all ECAIs the relevant credit assessments of the ECAI that correspond to credit quality steps, the FCA expects a firm to continue to have regard to the table mapping the credit assessments of certain ECAIs to credit quality steps produced in accordance with regulation 22(3) of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006.
A firm must give the FCA4 reasonable advance notice of a change in:1010(1) the firm's name (which is the registered name if the firm is a body corporate); (2) any business name under which the firm carries on a regulated activity or ancillary activity either from an establishment in the United Kingdom or with or for clients in the United Kingdom.
A firm must give the FCA4 reasonable advance notice of a change in any of the following addresses, and give details of the new address and the date of the change:1010(1) the firm's principal place of business in the United Kingdom; (2) in the case of an overseas firm, its registered office (or head office) address.
A firm must give the FCA4 reasonable advance notice of a change in any of the following telephone numbers, and give details of the new telephone number and the date of the change:131010(1) the number of the firm's principal place of business in the United Kingdom;(2) in the case of an overseas firm, the number of its head office.3
(1) 2A firm other than:55(a) a credit union; or5(b) an FCA-authorised person with permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activity;5must submit any notice under6SUP 15.5.1R, SUP 15.5.4Rand10SUP 15.5.5 R3 by submitting the form in SUP 15 Ann 3R online at the FCA's4 website.101010(2) A credit union or an FCA-authorised person with permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activity (other than a firm with only an interim permission to which the modifications
(1) If the FCA's4 information technology systems fail and online submission is unavailable for 24 hours or more, the FCA4 will endeavour to publish a notice on its website confirming that online submission is unavailable and that the alternative methods of submission set out in SUP 15.5.9R(3) and SUP 15.7.4R to SUP 15.7.9G (Form and method of notification) should be used.10101010(2) Where 10SUP 15.5.9R (2)10 applies to a firm, GEN 1.3.2 R (Emergency) does not apply.
(1) Every firm will have one or more persons responsible for directing its affairs. These persons will be performing the FCA governing functions and will be required to be FCA-approved persons unless the application provisions in SUP 10A.1, or the particular description of an FCA controlled function, provide otherwise. For example, each director of a company incorporated under the Companies Acts will perform an FCA governing function. However, if the firm is a PRA-authorised person,
(1) The director function applies in relation to a PRA-authorised person, as set out below3. 2(2) 3For a Solvency II firm or a small non-directive insurer3, the FCAdirector function may apply if the person carrying out the function is not approved to carry out a PRA controlled function or the other conditions in SUP 10A.11.12R (minimising overlap with the PRA approved persons regime) are not satisfied.2
(1) This paragraph explains the basis on which the director function and the non-executive director function are applied to persons who have a position with the firm'sparent undertaking or holding company under SUP 10A.6.8 R or SUP 10A.6.13 R.(2) The basic position is set out in SUP 10A.3.4 G. As is the case with all controlled functions, SUP 10A.6.8 R and SUP 10A.6.13 R are subject to the overriding provisions in SUP 10A.3.1 R, which sets out the requirements of section 59(1)
For a branch in the United Kingdom of an overseas firm, the FCA would not normally expect the overseas chief executive of the firm as a whole to be FCA-approved for this function where there is a senior manager under him with specific responsibility for those activities of the branch which are subject to the UKregulatory system. In some circumstances, the person within the firm responsible for UK operations may, if the function is likely to enable him to exercise significant influence
The effect of SUP 10A.1.17 R is that regulated activity in SUP 10A.6.23 R (and elsewhere) is to be taken as not including an activity that is a non-mainstream regulated activity. Therefore, a partner whose only regulated activities are incidental to his professional services, in a partnership whose principal purpose is to carry on other than regulated activities, need not be an FCA-approved person. What amounts to the principal purpose of the firm is a matter of fact in each case
Typically a non-directive friendly Society will appoint a “committee of management” to direct its affairs. However, the governing arrangements may be informal and flexible. If this is the case, the FCA would expect the society to resolve to give responsibility for the carrying on of regulated activities to one individual who is appropriate in all the circumstances. That individual may, for example, have the title of chief executive or similar. The individual would have to be an