Related provisions for PERG 6.7.2

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DEPP 6.5D.2GRP
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FCA3 will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FCA's3 starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FCA3 believes
DEPP 6.5D.4GRP
(1) The FCA3 will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FCA3 will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FCA3 will also take into account its statutory objectives3, for example in situations where
DEPP 6.5D.5GRP
Where the FCA3 considers that, following commencement of an FCA3 investigation, an individual or firm has reduced their solvency in order to reduce the amount of any disgorgement or financial penalty payable, for example by transferring assets to third parties, the FCA3 will normally take account of those assets when determining whether the individual or firm would suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the disgorgement and financial penalty.333
SYSC 4.7.20GRP
The FCA would not consider it unusual if a person who has overall responsibility for a particular function was not a member of the governing body. For example, in some firms, the head of compliance reports directly to the governing body even though the head compliance is not a member of the governing body.
EG 19.14.2RP
1The FCA is responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Regulations not only by authorised firms who are within the Money Laundering Regulations’ scope, but also by what the Regulations describe as “Annex I financial institutions”. These are businesses which are not otherwise authorised by us but which carry out certain of the activities listed in Annex I of the Banking Consolidation Directive28, now Annex I of the CRD. The activities include lending (e.g. forfaiters
EG 19.14.3RP
1The Money Laundering Regulations add to the range of options available to the FCA for dealing with anti-money laundering failures. These options are: • to prosecute both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions;to take regulatory action against authorised firms for failures which breach the FCA'srules and requirements (for example, under Principle 3 or SYSC 3.2.6R or SYSC 6.1.1R); and• to impose civil penalties on both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions
EG 19.9.3RP
1However, there are likely to be circumstances in which the FCA will need to use the electronic commerce activity direction power. Examples could include where it was necessary to stop the behaviour complained of, or to make the continued provision of services by the incoming ECA provider conditional upon compliance with specified requirements. Overall, the FCA may use the direction power: (1) where: (a) the behaviour complained of was causing, or had the potential to cause,
EG 19.9.4RP
1The question of whether the FCA decides to prevent or prohibit the incoming electronic commerce activity, or to make it subject to certain requirements (for example, compliance with specified rules), will depend on the overall circumstance of the case. A relevant consideration will be whether the FCA is satisfied that its concerns over the incoming electronic commerce activity can be adequately addressed through the imposition of a requirement, rather than a complete prohibition
SYSC 19C.3.6GRP
  1. (1)

    In the FCA's view:

    1. (a)

      a firm's staff includes its employees;

    2. (b)

      a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;

    3. (c)

      the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;

    4. (d)

      firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;

      1
    5. (e)

      firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and

    6. (f)

      a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.

    [Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration

    .]

  2. (2)

    High-level category

    Suggested business lines

    Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Fixed income

    Foreign exchange

    Commodities

    Securitisation

    Sales areas

    Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)

    Commercial banking

    Equities

    Structured finance

    Lending quality

    Trading areas

    Research

    Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Credit/market/operational risk

    Legal

    Treasury controls

    Human resources

    Compliance

    Internal audit
SYSC 19C.3.28GRP
Where a firm makes a loss, the FCA generally expects no variable remuneration to be awarded. Variable remuneration may nevertheless be justified, for example to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
SYSC 19C.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
SYSC 4.8.22GRP
(1) The FCA would not consider it unusual if a person who has local responsibility for a particular function was not a member of the branch’sgoverning body or equivalent. (2) For example, in some branches, the head of compliance may report directly to the branch’sgoverning body even though the head of compliance is not a member of the governing body.
COCON 4.1.1GRP
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 1.(1) Misleading (or attempting to mislead) by act or omission:(a) a client; or(b) the firm for whom the person works (or its auditors); or(c) the FCA or;(d) the PRA.(2) Falsifying documents.(3) Misleading a client about:(a) the risks of an investment;(b) the charges or surrender penalties of products;(c) the likely performance of products by providing inappropriate projections of future
COCON 4.1.11GRP
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 3.(1) Failing to report promptly in accordance with their firm's internal procedures (or, if none exist, direct to the regulator concerned), information in response to questions from the FCA, the PRA, or both the PRA and the FCA.(2) Failing without good reason to: (a) inform a regulator of information of which the approved person was aware in response to questions from that regulator;
SUP 16.3.16GRP
The firm is responsible for ensuring delivery of the required report at the by the due date. If a report is received by the FCA28 after the due date and the firm believes its delivery arrangements were adequate, it may be required to provide proof of those arrangements. Examples of such proof would be:494949(1) "proof of posting" receipts from a UK post office or overseas equivalent which demonstrates that the report was posted early enough to allow delivery by the due date in
FEES 4.4.9DRP
3To the extent that a firm4 has provided the information required by FEES 4.4.7 D to the FCA as part of its compliance with another provision of the Handbook, it is deemed to have complied with the provisions of that direction.444
LR 5.6.7GRP
Examples of where the FCA will consider that a reverse takeover is in contemplation include situations where:(1) the issuer has approached the target's board;(2) the issuer has entered into an exclusivity period with a target; or(3) the issuer has been given access to begin due diligence work (whether or not on a limited basis).
LR 8.7.21AGRP
8Examples of when a sponsor should submit a cancellation request pursuant to LR 8.7.22 R include, but are not limited to:(1) situations where the sponsor ceases to satisfy the ongoing criteria for approval as a sponsor in accordance with LR 8.6.6 R and, following a notification made under LR 8.7.8 R, there are no ongoing discussions with the FCA which could lead to the conclusion that the sponsor remains eligible; or(2) where there is a change of control of the sponsor or any
COCON 4.2.16GRP
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule SC2.(1) Failing to take reasonable steps to implement (either personally or through a compliance department or other departments) adequate and appropriate systems of control to comply with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system for the activities of the firm.(2) Failing to take reasonable steps to monitor (either personally or through a compliance department
EG 9.3.1RP
2When the FCA has concerns about the fitness and propriety of an approved person, it may consider whether it should prohibit that person from performing functions in relation to regulated activities, withdraw its approval, or both. In deciding whether to withdraw its approval and/or make a prohibition order, the FCA will consider in each case whether its statutory objectives can be achieved adequately by imposing disciplinary sanctions, for example, public censures or financial
EG 9.3.5RP
2The following are examples of types of behaviour which have previously resulted in FCA the deciding to issue a prohibition order or withdraw the approval of an approved person:(1) Providing false or misleading information to the FCA; including information relating to identity, ability to work in the United Kingdom, and business arrangements; (2) Failure to disclose material considerations on application forms, such as details of County
MCOB 2.6A.4GRP
(1) In the FCA's view, a customer's interests will include:4(a) protection of the customer's rights under the plan, in particular the right to occupy the property throughout its term;(b) protection of any interest (legal or beneficial) that the customer retains, acquires or is intended to acquire in the property, including the expectation that such interests will be unencumbered by third party interests; 4(c) that, where a customer pays sums under a home purchase plan towards
MCOB 2.6A.14GRP
Members of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, for example, are required to operate a complaints procedure that allows the complaint to be referred to an independent person whose decision binds the valuer and which, in the FCA's view, provides a customer with an appropriate remedy.
DEPP 1.2.2GRP

Table: Summary of statutory and related notices

Notice

Description

Act reference

Further information

Warning notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 proposes to take and about the right to make representations.

2

Section 387

DEPP 2.2

Decision notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 has decided to take. The FCA2 may also give a further decision notice if the recipient of the original decision notice consents.

22

Section 388

DEPP 2.3

Notice of discontinuance

Identifies proceedings set out in a warning notice or decision notice and which are not being taken or are being discontinued.

Section 389

DEPP 1.2.4 G and DEPP 3.2.26 G

Final notice

Sets out the terms of the action that the FCA2 is taking.

2

Section 390

DEPP 1.2.4 G

Supervisory notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 has taken or proposes to take, for example to vary a Part 4A permission.2

22

Section 395(13)

DEPP 2.2 and DEPP 2.3
EG 19.30.7RP
1For example, the FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed investigators to carry out an investigation under the MCDO and the reasons for the appointment, unless notification is likely to result in the investigation being frustrated. In most cases, the FCA expects to carry out a scoping visit early on in the enforcement process. The FCA's policy in regulatory investigations under the MCDO is to use powers to compel information, in the same way as