Related provisions for PERG 7.4.13
121 - 140 of 245 items.
The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 9.7A.1 R or LR 9.7A.2 R if it considers that disclosure of such information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that such omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the shares.1
(1) As a result of the new legal framework for threshold conditions described in COND 1.1A.1G (1), PRA-authorised persons and firms seeking to become PRA-authorised persons are subject to two sets of threshold conditions:(i) the FCA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(ii)and(ii) one of the two PRA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(iii) or (iv), depending on the PRA-regulated activities which the PRA-authorised person or firm carries on, or is
3The FCA has the power to take the following enforcement action: • discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons and other individuals1under s.66 of the 2000 Act;• impose penalties on persons that perform controlled functions without approval under s.63A of the 2000 Act;• impose civil penalties2under s.123 of the 2000 Act;[Note: see Regulation 6 and Schedule 1 to the RAP Regulations for the application of this power and those below to contraventions
(1) A firm to which this rule applies must submit a High Earners Report to the FCA4 annually.104(2) The firm must submit that report to the FCA4 within four months of the end of the firm'saccounting reference date.104(3) A firm that is not part of a UK lead regulated group must complete that report on an unconsolidated basis in respect of remuneration awarded in the last completed financial year to all high earners of the firm who mainly undertook their professional activities
(1) 2SUP 10C.1.4R reflects the provisions of section 59(8) of the Act and, where relevant, the Treaty.(2) It preserves the principle of Home State prudential regulation. (3) For an EEA relevant authorised person, the effect is to reserve to the Home State regulator the assessment of fitness and propriety of a person performing a function in the exercise of an EEA right. A member of the governing body, or the notified3UKbranchmanager, of an EEA relevant authorised person, acting
If a person established in the EEA: (1) does not have an EEA right; (2) does not have permission as a UCITS qualifier; and(3) does not have, or does not wish to exercise, a Treaty right (see SUP 13A.3.4 G to SUP 13A.3.11 G);to carry on a particular regulated activity in the United Kingdom, it must seek Part 4A permission from the appropriate UK regulator3 to do so (see the appropriate UK regulator's website: www.fca.org.uk/firms/authorisation/apply-authorisation for the FCA and
The SRB agreement provider must keep a record of the written pre-offer document at Stage One and the written offer document for signing at Stage Two for a period of:(1) one year after the end of the fixed term of the tenancy under the regulated sale and rent back agreement; or(2) five years from the date of the disclosures and warnings, written offer documents and cooling-off period notices;whichever is the longer.
The FCA uses
a variety of tools to monitor whether a firm,
once authorised, remains in compliance
with regulatory requirements. These tools include (but are not limited to):(1) desk-based reviews;(2) liaison with other agencies or
regulators;(3) meetings with management and other
representatives of a firm;(4) on-site inspections;(5) reviews and analysis of periodic
returns and notifications;(6) reviews of past business;(7) transaction monitoring;(8) use of auditors; and(9) use
1The Money Laundering Regulations add to the range of options available to the FCA for dealing with anti-money laundering failures. These options are: • to prosecute both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions;to take regulatory action against authorised firms for failures which breach the FCA'srules and requirements (for example, under Principle 3 or SYSC 3.2.6R or SYSC 6.1.1R); and• to impose civil penalties on both authorised firms and Annex I financial institutions
3Behaviour
of the type referred to in APER 4.5.4 G includes, but is not limited to:(1) implementing
confusing or uncertain reporting lines (see APER 4.5.12 G);(2) implementing
confusing or uncertain authorisation levels (see APER 4.5.13 G);(3) implementing
confusing or uncertain job descriptions and responsibilities (see APER 4.5.13 G).
Certain consequences flow according to whether or not a body corporate is an open-ended investment company. Different requirements apply to the marketing of the shares or securities issued by a body corporate which is an open-ended investment company, compared with one that is not (see PERG 9.10.1 G to PERG 9.10.6 G (Marketing of shares or securities issued by a body corporate)). In addition, the regulated activities that require permission may differ (see PERG 9.10.7 G to PERG
Controlled activity and controlled investment are defined in Schedule 1 to the Financial Promotion Order and are listed in PERG 8.36.3 G and PERG 8.36.4 G. Broadly speaking, controlled activities and controlled investments are similar to regulated activities and specified investments under the Regulated Activities Order. However, with controlled activities, the exclusions set out in the Regulated Activities Order do not, in most cases, apply. It is important to note, however,
(1) This section specifies:(a) the persons or classes of persons to whom the exemption in article 60E(2) of the Regulated Activities Order applies; and(b) the agreements or classes of agreement to which the exemption in article 60E(2) of the Regulated Activities Order applies. (1A) 2Paragraphs (2) to (5) do not apply where the applicable agreement is an MCD article 3(1)(b) credit agreement.(2) Where the lender is a body specified in CONC App 1.3.2 R or an authorised person with