Related provisions for SUP 1A.3.5
41 - 60 of 142 items.
1Under section 166 of the Act, the FCA has a power to require a firm and certain other persons to provide a report by a skilled person, or itself to appoint a skilled person to produce such a report. The FCA may use its section 166 power to require reports by skilled persons to support both its supervision and enforcement functions.
In complying with the contractual duty in SUP 5.5.1 R (1) the FCA3 expects that a skilled person appointed by a firm4 under section 166 (Reports by skilled persons) or section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act4 will cooperate with the FCA3 by, amongst other things, providing information or documentation about the planning and progress of the report and its findings and conclusions, if requested to do so. A firm should therefore
The FCA confirms that, in relation to the concessionary treatment set out in article 119(5) of the EU CRR, there are no financial institutions currently authorised and supervised by it (other than those to which the EU CRR applies directly) that are subject to prudential requirements that it considers to be comparable in terms of robustness to those applied to institutions under the EU CRR.[Note: article 119(5) of the EU CRR]
1In the course of its supervision and monitoring of a firm or as part of an enforcement action, the FCA may make it clear that it expects the firm to take certain steps to meet regulatory requirements. In the vast majority of cases the FCA will seek to agree with a firm those steps the firm must take to address the FCA’s concerns. However, where the FCA considers it appropriate to do so, it will exercise its formal powers under sections 55J or 55L of the Act to vary a firm's
1Examples of circumstances in which the FCA will consider varying a firm'sPart 4A permission because it has serious concerns about a firm, or about the way its business is being or has been conducted include where: (1) in relation to the grounds for exercising the power under section 55J(1)(a) or section 55L(2)(a) of the Act, the firm appears to be failing, or appears likely to fail, to satisfy the threshold conditions relating to one or more, or all, of its regulated activities,
1As the provision of credit data on companies is not a regulated activity under the Act, the Regulations create a separate monitoring and enforcement regime but apply, or make provision corresponding to, certain aspects of the Act. The FCA's approach to taking enforcement action under the Regulations will reflect its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate and responsive
The FCA5 may also use its own-initiative powers5 for
enforcement purposes. EG 82 sets out in detail the FCA's5 powers under sections 55J and 55L of the Act5 and
the circumstances under which the FCA5 may use its own-initiative powers5 in this way, whether for enforcement purposes or as part of its
day to day supervision of firms.
This chapter provides additional guidance on when the FCA5 will use these powers for supervision purposes.55255555
The Act does not specify a time limit for processing the application but the FCA intends to deal with an application as quickly as possible. The more complete and relevant the information provided by an applicant, the more quickly a decision can be expected. But on occasion it may be necessary to allow time in which the FCA can monitor the content of the service. This might happen where, for example, a service is in a form that makes record keeping difficult (such as a large website
Achieving the regulatory objectives involves the FCA informing itself of developments in firms and in markets. The Act requires the FCA to maintain arrangements for supervising authorised persons (section 1L(1)). 5 The Act also requires the FCA to take certain steps to cooperate with other relevant bodies and 3regulators (section 354A). For these purposes, the FCA needs to have access to a broad range of information about a firm's business.5
(1) [deleted]88(2) Although8 it is the firm that is being assessed, the FCA8 may take into consideration the impact of other members of the firm's group on the adequacy of its resources8, where relevant to the discharge of the FCA's functions8. For example, in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, the FCA8 may assess the consolidated solvency of the group. The FCA's8 approach to the consolidated supervision of such
Similarly, the appropriate regulator6 needs to monitor a firm's continuing satisfaction of the6threshold conditions6 set out in paragraphs 3B, 4F and 5F of Schedule 6 to the Act (as applicable) (in relation to threshold conditions for which the FCA is responsible,6 see COND 2.32), which requires that a firm's close links are not likely to prevent the appropriate regulator's6 effective supervision of that firm. Accordingly the appropriate regulator6 needs to be notified of any
2Private warnings are a non-statutory tool. Fundamentally they are no different to any other FCA communication which criticises or expresses concern about a person’s conduct. But private warnings are a more serious form of reprimand than would usually be made in the course of ongoing supervisory correspondence. A private warning requires that the FCA identifies and explains its concerns about a person's conduct and/or procedures, and tells the subject of the warning that the FCA