Related provisions for DISP App 1.1.6
1 - 20 of 25 items.
2The agencies recognise that where concurrent investigations are taking place, action taken by one agency can prejudice the investigation or subsequent proceedings brought by another agency. Consequently, it is best practice for the agencies involved in concurrent investigations to notify each other of significant developments in their investigations and of any significant steps they propose to take in the case, such as: interviewing a key witness;requiring provision of significant
7In complying with Principle 11, the FCA considers that a firm should cooperate with it in providing information for other regulators. Sections 169 (Investigations etc. in support of overseas regulator) of the Act gives the FCA certain statutory powers to obtain information and appoint investigators for overseas regulators if required (see DEPP 7 and EG 3).
1Although the FCA is not required to give written notice of the appointment of investigators appointed as a result of section 168(2), when it becomes clear who the person under investigation is, the FCA will, nevertheless, normally notify them that they are under investigation when it exercises its statutory powers to require information from them, providing such notification will not, in the FCA's view, prejudice the FCA's ability to conduct the investigation effectively.
1The FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed investigators to carry out an investigation under the Payment Services Regulations and the reasons for the appointment, unless notification is likely to prejudice the investigation or otherwise result in it being frustrated. The FCA expects to carry out a scoping visit early on in the enforcement process in most cases. The FCA's
policy in civil investigations under the Payment Services
1Article 23 of the MCDO applies many of the provisions of the Act in relation to the FCA’s investigation and information-gathering powers in respect of a registered firm. The effect of this is to apply the same procedures under the Act for appointing investigators and requiring information when investigating contraventions of the MCDO.
1The FCA has information gathering and sanctioning powers under the Act which are applicable to breaches of EMIR requirements
by authorised persons or recognised bodies. The OTC derivatives, CCPs and trade repositories regulation adds to the powers available to the FCA for dealing with breaches of EMIR requirements and sets out information gathering and sanctioning powers enabling the FCA to investigate and take action for breaches of the EMIR requirements
Part 1 of Schedule 7 to the PARs applies many of the provisions of the Act in relation to the FCA’s investigation and information-gathering powers to the FCA’s functions under the PARs. The effect of this is to apply the same procedures under the Act for appointing investigators and requiring information when investigating any breaches of the PARs.
1In investigations into possible
insider dealing,market abuse, misleading statements and practices offences, breaches of the general prohibition, the restriction on financial promotion, or the prohibition on promoting collective investment schemes, the investigator may not know the identity of the perpetrator or may be looking into market circumstances at the outset of the investigation rather than investigating a particular person. In those circumstances,
2The AIFMD
UK regulation includes information gathering and sanctioning powers that enable the FCA to investigate and take action for breaches of the regulations and directly applicable EU regulations. Specific standalone powers are in the AIFMD
UK regulation for unauthorised AIFMs, by applying relevant sections of the Act. Amendments to the Act, including those made under the Financial Services and Markets Act (Qualifying EU
2The FCA's standard practice is generally to use statutory powers to require the production of documents, the provision of information or the answering of questions in interview. This is for reasons of fairness, transparency and efficiency. It will sometimes be appropriate to depart from this standard practice, for example: (1) For suspects or possible suspects in criminal or market abuse investigations, the FCA may prefer to question that person on a voluntary basis, possibly
1Regulation 26 of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations applies many of the provisions of the Act regarding the FCA’s investigation and information-gathering powers to designated banks and designated credit reference agencies. The effect is to apply the same procedures under the Act for appointing investigators and requiring information when investigating any breaches of the Small and Medium Sized Business (Credit Information) Regulations.
The limitations in the following sections of the Act are relevant to this chapter:(1) section 175(5) (Information and documents: supplemental provisions) under which a person may be required under Part XI of the Act (Information Gathering and Investigations) to disclose information or produce a document subject to banking confidentiality (with exceptions); and (2) section 413 (Protected items), under which no person may be required to produce, disclose or allow the inspection
The Principles are also relevant to the FCA's15 powers of information-gathering, to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission,15 and of investigation and intervention, and provide a basis on which the FCA15 may apply to a court for an injunction or restitution order or require a firm to make restitution. However, the Principles do not give rise to actions for damages by a private person (see PRIN 3.4.4 R).151515