Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4

241 - 260 of 1068 items.
Results filter

Search Term(s)

Filter by Modules

Filter by Documents

Filter by Keywords

Effective Period

Similar To

To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

EG 12.3.1RP
2In some cases there will be instances of market misconduct that may arguably involve a breach of the criminal law as well as market abuse1. When the FCA decides whether to commence criminal proceedings rather than impose a sanction for market abuse in relation to that misconduct, it will apply the basic principles set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. When deciding whether to prosecute market misconduct which also falls within the definition of market abuse, application
EG 12.3.2RP
2The factors which the FCA may consider when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution for market misconduct rather than impose a sanction for market abuse include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct: if the misconduct is serious and prosecution is likely to result in a significant sentence, criminal prosecution may be more likely to be appropriate; (2) whether there are victims who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct:
EG 12.3.3RP
2The importance attached by the FCA to these factors will vary from case to case and the factors are not necessarily cumulative or exhaustive.
EG 12.3.4RP
2It is the FCA's policy not to impose a sanction for market abuse where a person is being prosecuted for market misconduct or has been finally convicted or acquitted of market misconduct (following the exhaustion of all appeal processes) in a criminal prosecution arising from substantially the same allegations. Similarly, it is the FCA's policy not to commence a prosecution for market misconduct where the FCA has brought or is seeking to bring
IFPRU 4.10.1GRP
The FCA expects a firm to have a validation process that includes the following:(1) standards of objectivity, accuracy, stability and conservatism that it designs its ratings systems to meet and processes that establish whether its rating systems meet those standards;(2) standards of accuracy of calibration (ie, whether outcomes are consistent with estimates) and discriminative power (ie, the ability to rank-order risk) that it designs its rating systems to meet and processes
IFPRU 4.10.3GRP
The FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the performance of its rating systems against its chosen measure (or measures) of discriminative power. In making this comparison, a firm should rely primarily on actual historic default experience where this is available. In particular, the FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the extent of any potential inaccuracy in these measures, caused, in particular, by small sample size and the potential for divergence in the future, whether
IFPRU 4.10.4GRP
The FCA will take into consideration the sophistication of the measure of discrimination chosen when assessing the adequacy of a rating system's performance.
IFPRU 4.10.5GRP
In the case of a portfolio for which there is insufficient default experience to provide any confidence in statistical measures of discriminative power, the FCA expects a firm to use other methods. For example, analysis of whether the firm's rating systems and an external measurement approach (eg, external ratings) rank common obligors in broadly similar ways. Where such an approach is used, the FCA would expect a firm to ensure it does not systematically adjust its individual
SUP 8A.2.1GRP
Under section 60(3) of the CCA, if, on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer credit business or a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA impracticable for the firm to comply with any requirement of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) or the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) in a particular case, it may direct that the requirement be waived or varied in relation to the regulated agreement and subject
SUP 8A.2.2GRP
Under section 60(4) of the CCA, the FCA will make the direction only if it is satisfied that to do so would not prejudice the interests of debtors or hirers.
SUP 8A.2.4GRP
The requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights to cancel a cancellable agreement within the seven days following the making of that agreement does not apply in the case of the agreements described in SUP 8A.2.5 G, if: (1) on application by a firm to the FCA, the FCA has determined, having regard to:(a) the manner in which antecedent negotiations for the relevant agreements with the firm are conducted; and(b) the information
SUP 8A.2.6GRP
If on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA that it would be in the interests of hirers to do so, the FCA may direct that subject to such conditions (if any) as it may specify, section 101 of the CCA shall not apply to consumer hire agreements made by that firm.
SUP 8A.2.7GRP
Under article 53 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2013, any of the following given or made by the Office of Fair Trading which were in effect immediately before 1 April 2014 have effect as if they had been given or made by the FCA:(1) a direction given under section 60(3) of the CCA (form and content of agreements);(2) a determination made under section 64(4) of the CCA (duty to give notice of cancellation rights) and
EG 19.20.1RP
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Payment Services Regulations. The Payment Services Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations on payment service providers to provide users with a range of information and various provisions regulating the rights and obligations of payment service users and providers.
EG 19.20.2RP
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
EG 19.20.3RP
1The regulatory powers which the Payment Services Regulations provide to the FCA include: the power to require information;powers of entry and inspection;power of public censure;the power to impose financial penalties;the power to prosecute or fine unauthorised providers; andthe power to vary an authorisation on its own initiative.
EG 19.20.4RP
1The FCA also has the power to prohibit or restrict the carrying out of certain regulated activities by EEA authorised payment institutions.
EG 19.20.5RP
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
FEES 3.1.3GRP
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the 9FCA fee paying requirements on the persons set out in FEES 1.1.2R (1).9519
FEES 3.1.5GRP
(1) The rates set for authorisation fees represent an appropriate proportion of the costs of the 9FCA in processing the application or exercise of Treaty rights.17179(2) [deleted]1717(3) [deleted]1717
FEES 3.1.5AGRP
17The fees for funds8 reflect the estimated costs to the FCA of assessing applications and notifications. The level of fees payable in respect of an application or a notification will vary depending upon the provision of the Act under which it is made. This fee is adjusted when the scheme concerned is an umbrella.8
FEES 3.1.6GRP
Applications for Part 4A permission (and exercises of Treaty rights) other than in respect of credit-related regulated activities7 are categorised by the 9FCA for the purpose of fee raising as straightforward, moderately complex and complex7 as identified in FEES 3 Annex 1. This differentiation is based on the permitted activities sought and does not reflect the 9FCA's risk assessment of the applicant (or Treaty firm).979
FEES 3.1.7GRP
A potential applicant for Part 4A permission17 (or Treaty firm) has the opportunity to discuss its proposed application (or exercise of Treaty rights) with the 9FCA before submitting it formally.2 If an applicant for Part 4A permission17 (or Treaty firm) does so, the 9FCA will be able to use that dialogue to make an initial assessment of the fee categorisation and therefore indicate the authorisation fee that should be paid. 171717922171717179
FEES 3.1.8AGRP
Application fees for applications for and variations of Part 4A permission in respect of credit-related regulated activities are also set out in FEES 3 Annex 1F. Applications for Part 4A permission in respect of credit-related regulated activities are categorised by the 9FCA for the purposes of fee raising as straightforward, moderately complex and complex as identified in FEES 3 Annex 1, unless the application is for a limited permission.799[Note: PRA-authorised persons may also
EG 19.7.1RP
1The OEIC Regulations set out requirements relating to the way in which collective investment may be carried on by open-ended investment companies. Under the OEIC Regulations, the FCA has the power, amongst other things, to: revoke an open-ended investment company’s authorisation in several situations, including where the firm breaches relevant requirements or provides us with false or misleading information (regulation 23);give, vary and revoke certain directions, including that
EG 19.7.2RP
1Factors that the FCA may take into account when it decides whether to use one or more of these powers include, but are not limited to, factors which are broadly similar to those in EG 14.1.1 in the context of AUTs or ACSs. However, the relevant conduct will be that of the ICVC, the director or directors of the ICVC and its depositary. Another difference is that the FCA is also able to take disciplinary action against the ICVC itself since the ICVC will be an authorised person.
EG 19.7.3RP
1The FCA will give a company a warning notice if it proposes to revoke the company’s authorisation and a decision notice if the decision to revoke the company’s authorisation is subsequently taken. The decisions to give a warning notice or a decision notice will be taken by the RDC following the procedures set out in DEPP 3.2 or, where appropriate, DEPP 3.3. A person who receives a decision notice under the OEIC Regulations may refer the matter to the Tribunal.
EG 19.7.4RP
1Under the OEIC Regulations, the FCA may also use its disqualification powers against auditors who fail to comply with a duty imposed on them under FCArules. The procedure which the FCA will follow when exercising its disqualification powers is set out in EG 15.
EG 4.7.1RP
2The FCA's standard practice is generally to use statutory powers to require the production of documents, the provision of information or the answering of questions in interview. This is for reasons of fairness, transparency and efficiency. It will sometimes be appropriate to depart from this standard practice, for example: (1) For suspects or possible suspects in criminal or market abuse investigations, the FCA may prefer to question that person on a voluntary basis, possibly
EG 4.7.2RP
Firms, approved persons and conduct rules staff1 have an obligation to be open and co-operative with the FCA (as a result of Principle 11 for Businesses,1 Statement of Principle 4 for Approved Persons and Rule 3 of COCON 2.11). The FCA will make it clear to the person concerned whether it requires them to produce information or answer questions under the Act or whether the provision of answers is purely voluntary. The fact that the person concerned may be a regulated person does
EG 4.7.3RP
2The FCA will not bring disciplinary proceedings against a person for failing to be open and co-operative with the FCA1 simply because, during an investigation, they choose not to attend or answer questions at a purely voluntary interview. However, there may be circumstances in which an adverse inference may be drawn from the reluctance of a person (whether or not they are a firm or individual1) to participate in a voluntary interview. If a person provides the FCA with misleading
EG 4.7.4RP
2If a person does not comply with a requirement imposed by the exercise of statutory powers, they may be held to be in contempt of court. The FCA may also choose to bring proceedings for breach of Principle 11,1 Statement of Principle 4 or COCON 2.1.3R1 as this is a serious form of non-cooperation.
EG 8.4.1RP
1When varying Part 4A permission at its own-initiative under its section 55J power (or section 55Q power), the FCA may include in the Part 4A permission as varied any limitation or restriction which it could have imposed if a fresh permission were being given in response to an application under section 55A of the Act.
EG 8.4.2RP
1Examples of the limitations that the FCA may impose when exercising its own-initiative variation power in support of its enforcement function include limitations on: the number, or category, of customers that a firm can deal with; the number of specified investments that a firm can deal in; and the activities of the firm so that they fall within specific regulatory regimes (for example, so that oil market participants,locals, corporate finance
EG 8.4.3RP
1Under its section 55L power (or section 55Q power), the FCA may, at any time and of its own initiative, impose on an authorised person such requirements as it considers appropriate.
EG 8.4.4RP
1Examples of requirements that the FCA may consider imposing when exercising its own-initiative power in support of its enforcement function are: a requirement not to take on new business; a requirement not to hold or control client money; a requirement not to trade in certain categories of specified investment; a requirement that prohibits the disposal of, or other dealing with, any of the firm’s assets (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) or restricts
EG 19.17.1RP
1The RCB Regulations provide a framework for issuing covered bonds in the UK. Covered bonds issued under the RCB Regulations are subject to strict quality controls and both bonds and issuers must be registered with the FCA. The RCB Regulations give the FCA powers to enforce these Regulations. Where a person has failed, or is likely to fail, to comply with any obligation under the RCB Regulations, the FCA may make a direction that the person take
EG 19.17.2RP
1The FCA may use the information gathering powers set out in section 165 of the Act when monitoring and enforcing compliance with the RCB Regulations, and may appoint skilled persons as provided in section 166 of the Act.
EG 19.17.3RP
1The FCA's approach to the use of its enforcement powers, and its statement of policy in relation to imposing and determining financial penalties under the RCB Regulations, are set out in RCB 4.2. The FCA's penalty policy includes having regard, where relevant, DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D and such other specific matters as the likely impact of the penalty on the interests of investors in the relevant bonds. The FCA's statement of procedure in relation to giving warning notices or decision
EG 19.17.4RP
1The FCA may agree to settle cases in which it proposes to impose a financial penalty under the RCB Regulations if the right regulatory outcome can be achieved. The settlement discount scheme set out in DEPP 6.7 applies to penalties imposed under the RCB Regulations. See DEPP 5 and EG 5 for further information about the settlement process.
DTR 1A.2.1RRP
(1) The FCA may dispense with, or modify, the transparency rules in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it considers appropriate (subject to the terms of directives and the Act).(2) A dispensation or modification may be either unconditional or subject to specified conditions.(3) If an issuer, or other person has applied for, or been granted, a dispensation or modification, it must notify the FCA immediately it becomes aware of any matter which is material to the
DTR 1A.2.2RRP
(1) An application to the FCA to dispense with or modify, a transparency rule must be in writing.(2) The application must:(a) contain a clear explanation of why the dispensation or modification is requested;(b) include details of any special requirements, for example, the date by which the dispensation or modification is required;(c) contain all relevant information that should reasonably be brought to the FCA's attention;(d) contain any statement or information that is required
DTR 1A.2.4GRP

An issuer or other person should consult with the FCA at the earliest possible stage if they:

  1. (1)

    are in doubt about how the transparency rules apply in a particular situation; or

  2. (2)

    consider that it may be necessary for the FCA to dispense with or modify a transparency rule.

DTR 1A.2.5GRP

1Where a transparency rule refers to consultation with the FCA, submissions should be made in writing other than in circumstances of exceptional urgency.

Address for correspondence

Note: The FCA's address for correspondence in relation to the transparency rules2 is:

Primary Market Monitoring

Enforcement and Markets Oversight Division2

The Financial Conduct Authority

25 The North Colonnade

Canary Wharf

London E14 5HS

EG 9.6.1RP
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case. These may include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct or other unfitness that resulted in the order; (2) the amount of time since the original order was made; (3) any steps taken subsequently by the individual to remedy the misconduct or other unfitness; (4) any evidence which, had it been
EG 9.6.2RP
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will take into account any indication given by the FCA in the final notice that it is minded to revoke or vary the prohibition order on application after a certain number of years (see paragraph 9.2.4).
EG 9.6.3RP
2If the individual applying for a revocation or variation of a prohibition order proposes to take up an offer of employment to perform a controlled function, the FCA will take this into account when considering whether to grant or refuse the application1.
EG 9.6.4RP
2The FCA will not generally grant an application to vary or revoke a prohibition order unless it is satisfied that: the proposed variation will not result in a reoccurrence of the risk to consumers or confidence in the financial system that resulted in the order being made; and the individual is fit to perform functions in relation to regulated activities generally, or to those specific regulated activities in relation to which the individual has been prohibited. The FCA will
EG 9.6.5RP
2The FCA will consult the PRA before varying or revoking a prohibition order if, as a result of the variation or revocation, an individual will either be prohibited from, or no longer be prohibited from, a function of interest to the PRA as defined at section 56(7B) of the Act.
COCON 3.1.2GRP
In assessing compliance with, or a breach of, a rule in COCON, the FCA will have regard to the context in which a course of conduct was undertaken, including: (1) the precise circumstances of the individual case; (2) the characteristics of the particular function performed by the individual in question; and (3) the behaviour expected in that function.
COCON 3.1.4GRP
In determining whether or not the particular conduct of a person complies with the rules in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include: (1) whether that conduct relates to activities that are subject to other provisions of the Handbook; (2) whether that conduct is consistent with the requirements and standards of the regulatory system relevant to the person'sfirm.
COCON 3.1.5GRP
In determining whether or not the conduct of a senior conduct rules staff member complies with rules SC1 to SC4 in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) whether they exercised reasonable care when considering the information available to them;(2) whether they reached a reasonable conclusion upon which to act;(3) the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business;(4) their role and responsibility as determined by reference to the relevant statement
COCON 3.1.7GRP
UK domestic firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code, whose internal control provisions are explained in the publication entitled ‘Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (October 2005)’ issued by the Financial Reporting Council. Therefore, firms in this category will be subject to that code, as well as to the rules in COCON. In forming an opinion as to whether a senior conduct rules staff member has
SUP 16.10.2GRP
Standing data is used by the FCA10 :2020(1) to ensure that a firm is presented with the correct regulatory return when it seeks to report electronically;(2) in order to communicate with a firm;(3) as the basis for some sections of the Financial Services Register;20 and 20(4) in order to carry out thematic analysis across sectors and groups of firms.
SUP 16.10.4RRP
(1) Within 30 business days of its accounting reference date, a firm must check the accuracy of its standing data through the relevant section of the FCA10 website.2020(2) [paragraph suspended by FSA 2004/79]5(3) If any standing data is incorrect, the firm must submit5 the corrected standing data to the FCA10520 using the appropriate form set out in SUP 15 Ann 3 and in accordance with SUP 16.10.4A R.55
SUP 16.10.4ARRP
(1) A firm other than: 88(a) a credit union; or8(b) an FCA-authorised person with permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activity;8must submit any corrected standing data under SUP 16.10.4R (3) using the appropriate online systems available from the FCA’s website.9820202077(2) A credit union or a firm with permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activity8must submit any corrected standing data under SUP 16.10.4R (3) to static.data@fca.org.uk or via post
SUP 16.10.4BGRP
5If the FCA's20 information technology systems fail and online submission is unavailable for 24 hours or more, the FCA20 will endeavour to publish a notice on its website confirming that online submission is unavailable and that the alternative methods of submission set out in SUP 16.3.9 R20 should be used.202020
SUP 16.10.5GRP
The standing data is made available to the firm when the firm logs into the appropriate section of the FCA's10 website. The firm should check the standing data and send any corrections to the FCA10 . The FCA's10 preferred method of receiving corrections to standing data is by the online forms available at the FCA's10 website.22020202020202020
SUP 12.4.8GRP
If a firm has doubts that a prospective introducerappointed representative or other person is of sufficiently good reputation and otherwise fit and proper, the FCA will expect it to resolve those doubts before appointing the prospective introducer appointed representative. For example, if a firm is aware that a person's previous appointment as an introducer appointed representative or representative was terminated, it should take reasonable steps to find out the reasons for the
SUP 12.4.9GRP
(1) 1An appointed representative must not commence an insurance mediation activity until he is included on the Financial Services Register as carrying on such activities (see SUP 12.5.2 G (3)). (2) If an appointed representative's scope of appointment is to include an insurance mediation activity, the principal must notify the FSAFCA of the appointment before the appointed representative commences that activity (see SUP 12.7.1 R (1)). (3) As an exception, pre-notification is not
SUP 12.4.10GRP
(1) 1The FCA has the power to decide not to include on the Financial Services Register (or to remove from the Financial Services Register) an appointed representative whose scope of appointment includes an insurance mediation activity, if it appears to the FCA that he is not a fit and proper person to carry on those activities (article 95 of the Regulated Activities Order).(2) If the FCA proposes to use the power in (1), it must give the appointed representative a warning notice.
SUP 12.4.10CGRP
(1) 10If an appointed representative's scope of appointment is to include MCD credit intermediation activity, the principal must notify the FCA of the appointment before the appointed representative commences that activity (see SUP 12.7.1 R (1)).(2) An appointed representative must not commence an MCD credit intermediation activity until they are included on the Financial Services Register. (3) If an appointed representative's scope of appointment is to include MCD credit intermediation
SUP 12.4.11RRP
8If a UK MiFID investment firm appoints an FCA registered tied agent, SUP 12.4.2 R and SUP 12.4.2A R apply to that firm as though the FCA registered tied agent were an appointed representative.[Note: paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 23(3) of MiFID]
SUP 12.4.12GRP
(1) 8A tied agent that is an appointed representative may not start to act as a tied agent until it is included on the applicable register (section 39(1A) of the Act). If the tied agent is established in the UK, the register maintained by the FCA is the applicable register for these purposes. If the tied agent is established in another EEA State, it should consult section 39(1B) of the Act to determine the applicable register.(2) A UK MiFID investment firm that appoints an FCA
CASS 1A.3.1-AGRP
3The material in CASS 1A.3.1BG about how CASS 1A.3 fits into the FCA approved persons regime for relevant authorised persons also applies to a CASS small firm and the function in CASS 1A.3.1R. However:(1) the function in CASS 1A.3.1R is not an FCA specified significant-harm function; and(2) the person performing that function will not necessarily be subject to the employee certification regime described in SYSC 5.2 (Certification Regime).
CASS 1A.3.1ARRP
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.14.
CASS 1A.3.1BGRP
(1) (a) CASS 1A.3.1AR describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a). The table of FCA controlled functions3 in SUP 10A.4.4R3 together with SUP 10A.7.9R3 specify the CASS operational oversight function as an FCA required function4 for a firm to which CASS 1A.3.1AR applies.3(b) The CASS operational oversight function does not apply to a relevant authorised person.3(2) (a) For a firm that is a UK relevant authorised person5, the function
CASS 1A.3.1CRRP
2If, at the time a firm that is not a relevant authorised person3becomes a CASS medium firm or a CASS large firm in accordance with CASS 1A.2.12 R (1) or CASS 1A.2.12 R (2), the firm is not able to comply with CASS 1A.3.1A R because it has no director or senior manager who is an approved person in respect of the CASS operational oversight function, the firm must:(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that it complies with CASS 1A.3.1A R as soon as practicable, which must at least
CASS 1A.3.1DGRP
(1) 3CASS 1A.3.1CR provides a grace period for a firm that is not a relevant authorised person to apply for someone to be approved to perform the CASS operational oversight function. (2) There is no equivalent to CASS 1A.3.1CR for a relevant authorised person, because a person does not need specific FCA approval before carrying out the function. This is explained in (3) to (5), below.(3) As explained in CASS 1A.3.1BG(2), the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR is not, by itself, a controlled
EG 13.7.1RP
1Section 365(6) of the Act makes it clear that the FCA may petition for the compulsory winding up of a company even if it is already in voluntary winding up. This power is already available to creditors and contributories of companies in voluntary winding up. For example, the court can be asked to direct the liquidator to investigate a transaction which the company undertook before the winding up. In some circumstances, this power may be used in respect of partnerships (section
EG 13.7.2RP
1Given the powers available to creditors (or contributories), the FCA anticipates that there will only be a limited number of cases where it will exercise the right under section 365(6) to petition for the compulsory winding up of a company already in voluntary winding up. The FCA will only be able to exercise this right where one or both of the grounds on which it can seek compulsory winding up are met.
EG 13.7.3RP
1Factors which the FCA will consider when it decides whether to use this power (in addition to the factors identified in paragraphs 13.5.1 to 13.6.3 in relation to the FCA's decisions to seek compulsory winding up) include: (1) whether the FCA's concerns can properly and effectively be met by seeking a specific direction under section 365(2) of the Act; (2) whether the affairs of the company require independent investigation of the kind which follows a compulsory
EG 13.7.4RP
1Where the FCA is requested by a Home State regulator of an EEA firm or a Treaty firm to present a petition for the compulsory winding up of that firm, the FCA will first need to consider whether the presentation of the petition is necessary in order to comply with a Community obligation.
EG 6.1.1RP
1The FCA will not normally make public the fact that it is or is not investigating a particular matter, or any of the findings or conclusions of an investigation except as described in other sections of this chapter. The following paragraphs deal with the exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may make a public announcement that it is or is not investigating a particular matter.
EG 6.1.2RP
1Where the matter in question has occurred in the context of a takeover bid, and the following circumstances apply, the FCA may make a public announcement that it is not investigating, and does not propose to investigate, the matter. Those circumstances are where the FCA:(1) has not appointed, and does not propose to appoint, investigators; and (2) considers (following discussion with the Takeover Panel) that such an announcement is appropriate in the interests of preventing or
EG 6.1.3RP
1Where it is investigating any matter, the FCA will, in exceptional circumstances, make a public announcement that it is doing so if it considers such an announcement is desirable to: (1) maintain public confidence in the financial system or the market; or (2) protect consumers or investors; or (3) prevent widespread malpractice; or (4) help the investigation itself, for example by bringing forward witnesses; or (5) maintain the smooth operation of the market. In deciding whether
EG 6.1.4RP
1The exceptional circumstances referred to above may arise where the matters under investigation have become the subject of public concern, speculation or rumour. In this case it may be desirable for the FCA to make public the fact of its investigation in order to allay concern, or contain the speculation or rumour. Where the matter in question relates to a takeover bid, the FCA will discuss any announcement beforehand with the Takeover Panel. Any announcement will be subject
EG 6.1.6RP
1The FCA will not normally publish details of the information found or conclusions reached during its investigations. In many cases, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained by the FCA in the course of exercising its functions are likely to prevent publication (see section 348 of the Act). In exceptional circumstances, and where it is not prevented from doing so, the FCA may publish details. Circumstances in which it may do so include those where the fact
SYSC 4.5.6GRP
(1) One purpose of the management responsibilities map is to help the firm and the FCA satisfy themselves that the firm has a clear organisational structure (as required by SYSC).(2) It also helps the FCA to identify who it needs to speak to about particular issues and who is accountable if something goes wrong.
SYSC 4.5.7RRP
A management responsibilities map must include:(1) (a) the names of all the firm's:(i) approved persons (including PRA approved persons); (ii) members of its governing body and (if different) management body who are not approved persons; (iii) senior management; and(iv) senior personnel; and(b) details of the responsibilities which they hold;(2) all responsibilities described in any current statement of responsibilities; (3) details of the management and governance arrangements
SYSC 4.5.12GRP
(1) This provision gives guidance on specific aspects of SYSC 4.5.5R and SYSC 4.5.7R.(2) A firm need only include summary details of the persons in SYSC 4.5.7R(1).(3) A firm'sSMF managers and members of its governing body may overlap with its senior management and senior personnel. If so, the firm does not have to give the same details twice.(4) A firm should include details of individuals in addition to those in SYSC 4.5.7R(1), (3) and (5) if they are needed to make the management
SYSC 4.5.13GRP
(1) The FCA expects that the management responsibilities map of a small and non-complex firm is likely to be simple and short. It may be no more than a single sheet of paper.(2) A firm is likely to be small and non-complex for these purposes if:(a) it is:(i) a small CRR firm as defined in the part of the PRA's rulebook called “Allocation of responsibilities”; or(ii) a credit union that meets the size requirements for small CRR firms under the PRA's requirements in (a)(i);(b) it
SYSC 4.5.18GRP
SYSC 4 Annex 1G sets out the main business activities and functions that the FCA thinks are likely to be relevant to most firms, although the FCA does not require firms to organise themselves in this way.
SYSC 4.5.21GRP
A firm should consider past versions of its management responsibilities map as an important part of its records and as an important resource for the FCA in supervising the firm.
SYSC 18.3.1RRP
(1) A firm must establish, implement and maintain appropriate and effective arrangements for the disclosure of reportable concerns by whistleblowers.(2) The arrangements in (1) must at least:(a) be able effectively to handle disclosures of reportable concerns including: (i) where the whistleblower has requested confidentiality or has chosen not to reveal their identity; and(ii) allowing for disclosures to be made through a range of communication methods; (b) ensure the effective
SYSC 18.3.2GRP
(1) When establishing internal arrangements in line with SYSC 18.3.1R a firm may:(a) draw upon relevant resources prepared by whistleblowing charities or other recognised standards setting organisations; and (b) consult with its UK-based employees or those representing these employees.(2) In considering if a firm has complied with SYSC 18.3.1R the FCA will take into account whether the firm has applied the measures in (1).(3) A firm may wish to clarify in its written procedures
SYSC 18.3.6RRP
(1) A firm must, in the manner described in (2), communicate to its UK-based employees that they may disclose reportable concerns to the PRA or the FCA and the methods for doing so. A firm must make clear that:(a) reporting to the PRA or to the FCA is not conditional on a report first being made using the firm’s internal arrangements; (b) it is possible to report using the firm’s internal arrangements and also to the PRA or FCA; these routes may be used simultaneously or consecutively;
SYSC 18.3.7RRP
Firms must ensure that their appointed representatives or, where applicable, their tied agents, inform any of their UK-based employees who are workers that, as workers, they may make protected disclosures to the FCA.
SYSC 18.3.9GRP
The FCA would regard as a serious matter any evidence that a firm had acted to the detriment of a whistleblower. Such evidence could call into question the fitness and propriety of the firm or relevant members of its staff, and could therefore, if relevant, affect the firm’s continuing satisfaction of threshold condition 5 (Suitability) or, for an approved person or a certification employee, their status as such.
EG 8.5.1RP
1The FCA will consider cancelling a firm'sPart 4A permission using its own-initiative powers contained in sections 55J and 55Q respectively of the Act in two main circumstances: (1) where the FCA has very serious concerns about a firm, or the way its business is or has been conducted; (2) where the firm'sregulated activities have come to an end and it has not applied for cancellation of its Part 4A permission.
EG 8.5.2RP
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
EG 8.5.3RP
1Depending on the circumstances, the FCA may need to consider whether it should first use its own-initiative powers to impose requirements on a firm or to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission before going on to cancel it. Amongst other circumstances, the FCA may use this power where it considers it needs to take immediate action against a firm because of the urgency and seriousness of the situation.
EG 8.5.4RP
1Where the situation appears so urgent and serious that the firm should immediately cease to carry on all regulated activities, the FCA may first vary the firm'sPart 4A permission so that there is no longer any regulated activity for which the firm has a Part 4A permission. If it does this, the FCA will then have a duty to cancel the firm'sPart 4A permission - once it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary to keep the Part 4A permission in force.
EG 8.5.5RP
1However, where the FCA has cancelled a firm'sPart 4A permission, it is required by section 33 of the Act to go on to give a direction withdrawing the firm'sauthorisation. Accordingly, the FCA may decide to keep a firm'sPart 4A permission in force to maintain the firm's status as an authorised person and enable it (the FCA) to monitor the firm's activities. An example is where the FCA needs to supervise an orderly winding down of the firm's regulated business (see SUP 6.4.22 (When