Related provisions for SUP 16.12.3B
21 - 40 of 211 items.
Article 400(2) of the EU CRR permits the FCA to fully or partially exempt exposures incurred by a firm to intra-group undertakings that meet the specified criteria from the limit stipulated in article 395(1) of the EU CRR in relation to a firm's group of connected clients that represent its wider group. The FCA will consider exempting non-trading book and trading book exposures to intra-group undertakings if specified conditions throughout IFPRU 8.2 are met.
The FCA expects that applications for exemptions under article 400(2)(c) of the EU CRR will be for firms established in the UK where the intra-group undertakings to which they have exposures meet the criteria for the core UK group in article 113(6) of the EU CRR, except for article 113(6)(d) (established in the same EEA State as the firm).
(1) Core UK groupeligible capital is equal to the sum of the following amounts for each member of the core UK group and the firm (the sub-group):(a) for ultimate parent undertaking of the sub-group, the amount calculated in line with article 6 of the EUCRR (or other prudential requirements that apply);(b) for any other member of the sub-group, the amount calculated in line with article 6 of the EUCRR (or other prudential requirements that apply) less the book value of the sub-group's
The FCA will assess core UK group and non-core large exposure group applications against article 400(2)(c) on a case-by-case basis. The FCA will only approve this treatment for non-core large exposure group undertakings where the conditions in article 400(2)(c) are met. A firm should note that the FCA will still make a wider judgement whether it is appropriate to grant this treatment even where the conditions in article 400(2)(c) are met.
The circumstances which should be treated as giving rise to a conflict of interest cover cases where there is a conflict between the interests of the firm or certain persons connected to the firm or the firm'sgroup and the duty the firm owes to a client; or between the differing interests of two or more of its clients, to whom the firm owes in each case a duty. It is not enough that the firm may gain a benefit if there is not also a possible disadvantage to a client, or that one
Firms3 should aim to identify and manage the conflicts of interest arising in relation to their various business lines and their group's activities under a comprehensive conflicts of interest policy. In particular, the disclosure of conflicts of interest by a firm should not exempt it from the obligation to maintain and operate the effective organisational and administrative arrangements under SYSC 10.1.7 R. While disclosure of specific conflicts of interest is required by SYSC
(1) A common platform firm and a management company5 must establish, implement and maintain an effective conflicts of interest policy8 that is set out in writing and is appropriate to the size and organisation of the firm and the nature, scale and complexity of its business.(2) Where the common platform firmor the management company5 is a member of a group, the policy must also take into account any circumstances, of which the firm is or should be aware, which may give rise to
(1) The conflicts of interest policy must include the following content:(a) it must identify in accordance with SYSC 10.1.3 R and SYSC 10.1.4 R, by reference to the specific services and activities carried out by or on behalf of the common platform firm or management company,5 the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients; and(b) it must specify procedures to be followed
5A management company, when identifying the types of conflict of interests for the purposes of SYSC 10.1.4 R, must take into account:(1) the interests of the firm, including those deriving from its belonging to a group or from the performance of services and activities, the interests of the clients and the duty of the firm towards the UCITS scheme or EEA UCITS scheme it manages; and(2) where it manages two or more UCITS schemes or EEA UCITS schemes, the interests of all of them.[Note:
In determining whether a UK recognised body has financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its relevant functions, the FCA5 may have regard to:5(1) the operational and other risks to which the UK recognised body is exposed;(2) if the UK recognised body guarantees the performance of transactions in specified investments, the counterparty and market risks to which it is exposed in that capacity; 5(3) the amount and composition of the UK recognised body's capital;(4)
4For the purposes of REC 2.3, "net capital" should be in the form of equity. For this purpose, the FCA5 considers that common stock, retained earnings, disclosed reserves and other instruments classified as common equity tier one capital or additional tier one capital constitute equity. The FCA5 considers that, when calculating its net capital, a UK recognised body:55(1) should deduct holdings of its own securities, or those of any undertaking in the same group as the UK recognised
(1) 4Under the standard approach, the amount of eligible financial resources is equal to six months of operating costs.(2) Under the standard approach, the FCA5 assumes liquid financial assets are needed to cover the costs that would be incurred during an orderly wind-down of the UK recognised body'sexempt activities, while continuing to satisfy all the recognition requirements and complying with any other obligations under the Act (including the obligations to pay periodic fees
4Where a UK RIE is a member of a group, the FCA5 would normally expect the annual risk assessment to be accompanied by a consolidated balance sheet: 5(1) of any group in which the UK RIE is a subsidiary undertaking; or(2) (if the UK RIE is not a subsidiary undertaking in any group) of any group of which the UK RIE is a parent undertaking.
4The FCA5 would expect to consider the financial risk assessment, any proposal with respect to an operational risk buffer and, if applicable, the consolidated balance sheet, in formulating its guidance on the amount of eligible financial resources it considers to be sufficient for the UK RIE to hold in order to meet the recognition requirements. In formulating its guidance, the FCA5 would, where relevant, consider whether or not the financial risk assessment makes adequate provision
3A firm is not subject to consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 where any of the following conditions are fulfilled:(1) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by the FCA or PRA under the EUCRR; or(2) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by a competent authority other than the FCA under the EUCRR as implemented by that competent authority.
3Where a group includes one or more BIPRU firms and one or more IFPRU investment firms which has permission under article 19 of the EUCRR (Exclusion from the scope of prudential consolidation) from the FCA not to be included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member, consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 applies to those IFPRU investment firms and the BIPRU firms.
For the purposes of the rules in this chapter, a firm's
group means the firm and: (1) any EEA parent in the group which is a financial holding company, a credit
institution, or an investment
firm;
(2) any credit
institution,
investment
firm or financial institution which is a subsidiary either of the firm or of the firm'sEEA parent
A firm may, having first notified the FCA in writing, exclude from its group the following: (1) any entity the total assets of which are less than the smaller of the following two amounts: (a) 10 million euros; or (b) 1% of the total assets of the group's parent or the undertaking that holds the participation;
provided that the total assets of such entities do not collectively breach these limits. (2) any entity the inclusion of which within the group
(1) The FCA may require a firm to provide information about the position in the group of any undertaking excluded from the consolidation under rule 14.2.5. (2) An exclusion under rule 14.2.5(2) would normally be appropriate when an entity would be excluded from the scope of consolidation under the relevant UK generally accepted accounting principles.
In complying with CASS 7.13.8 R and CASS 7.13.10 R, a firm should consider, as appropriate, together with any other relevant matters:(1) the capital of the CRD credit institution or bank;(2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the CRD credit institution or bank's capital and deposits, and, in the case of a qualifying money market fund, compared to any limit the fund may place on the volume of redemptions in any period;(3) the extent to which client money that
Notwithstanding the requirement at CASS 7.13.22 R a firm must limit the funds that it deposits or holds with a relevant group entity or combination of such entities so that the value of those funds do not at any point in time exceed 20 per cent of the total of all the client money held by the firm in its client bank accounts.
In complying with the requirement in CASS 7.13.22 R to periodically assess whether diversification (or further diversification) is appropriate, a firm should have regard to:(1) whether it would be appropriate to deposit client money in client bank accounts opened at a number of different third parties; (2) whether it would be appropriate to limit the amount of client money the firm holds with third parties that are in the same group as each other;(3) whether risks arising from
(1) A firm must apply the requirements of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels, including those subsidiaries established in a country or territory which is not an EEA State.(2) Paragraph (1) does not limit SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) (which relates to the application of the Remuneration Code within UK consolidation groups and non-EEA sub-groups).[Note:3article 92(1) of CRD]3
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the appropriate regulator's view, the requirement to apply this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels (as provided for in SYSC 19A.3.1
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred
(1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules1 in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R1 apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:11(a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration); and(c) (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies at least one of the
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the appropriate regulator to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified
(1) A firm must apply the requirements of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels, including those subsidiaries established in a country or territory which is not an EEA State.(2) Paragraph (1) does not limit SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) (which relates to the application of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code within UK consolidation groups and non-EEA sub-groups). [Note: article 92(1) of CRD]
SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member, comply with the obligations in this section on a consolidated basis (or sub-consolidated basis).
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares;(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio
(1) Subject to (2) to (7), the rules in SYSC 19D Annex 1.1R to 1.6R apply in relation to the prohibitions on dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:(a) SYSC 19D.3.44R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19D.3.59R (non-deferred variable remuneration);(c) SYSC 19D.3.61R(2) (performance adjustment – clawback); and(d) SYSC 19D Annex 1.10R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(2) Paragraph (1) applies only to
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enable the FCA to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision.(2) SYSC 19D.3.66R and SYSC 19D.3.67R (together with SYSC 19D Annex 1) are:(a) rules referred to in (1) that render void provisions of an agreement that contravene
12Details of the notification to be provided by a BIPRU firm in relation to capital instruments issued by another undertaking in its group for inclusion in its capital resources or the consolidated capital resources of its UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group are set out in BIPRU 8.6.1A R to BIPRU 8.6.1F R. 17
The SPV referred to in GENPRU 2.2.124R (2)(a) must satisfy the following conditions:(1) it is controlled by the firm and may not operate independently of the firm;(2) the rights of investors in the SPV who do not belong to the group of the BIPRU firm in question are not such as to affect the ability of the firm to control the SPV;8(3) all or virtually all of its exposures (calculated by reference to the amount) consist of exposures to the firm or to that firm'sgroup; and8(4) 8it
An SPV could take the form of a limited partnership. In such an arrangement, holders of a capital instrument issued by the SPV which do not belong to the group of the BIPRU firm in question should have no right to participate in the management of the partnership, whether under the partnership's constitutional documents or the transaction documents. In general, this means that they should be treated as limited partners. It is expected that the general partner, having control of
The SPV referred to in GENPRU 2.2.124R (2)(a) must fund its subscription for the capital issued by the firm by the issue of capital that satisfies the following conditions:(1) it must comply with the conditions for qualification as tier one capital, as amended by GENPRU 2.2.130 R, as if the SPV was itself a firm seeking to include that capital in its tier one capital resources;(2) 48(a) its terms must include an obligation on the firm that, in the event of a collapse of the SPV
A reciprocal cross-holding means a holding of the BIPRU firm of shares, any other interest in the capital, and subordinated debt, whether in the trading or non-trading book, in:(1) a credit institution; or(2) a financial institution;that satisfies the following conditions:(3) the holding is the subject of an agreement or arrangement between the BIPRU firm and either the issuer of the instrument in question or a member of a group to which the issuer belongs;(4) under the terms
112(1) LR 11.1.7 R to LR 11.1.11 R do not apply to an arrangement between a closed-ended investment fund and its investment manager or any member of that investment manager's group4 where the arrangement is such that each invests in or provides finance to an entity or asset and the investment or provision of finance is either:2(a) made at the same time and on substantially the same economic and financial terms; or2(b) referred to in the closed-ended investment fund's published
(1) 8The resources of A must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether A has appropriate resources include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by A;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, A; and(c) A’s membership of a group and any effect which that membership may have.(3) Except in a case
(1) The non-financial resources of B must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on, having regard to the operational objectives of the FCA.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by B;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, B;(c) B’s a member
(1) [deleted]88(2) Although8 it is the firm that is being assessed, the FCA8 may take into consideration the impact of other members of the firm's group on the adequacy of its resources8, where relevant to the discharge of the FCA's functions8. For example, in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, the FCA8 may assess the consolidated solvency of the group. The FCA's8 approach to the consolidated supervision of such
A firm's run-off plan should explain how it will use and manage reinsurance (if it will), including:(1) any new inwards or outwards reinsurance it proposes to enter into as a result of the closure of the with-profits fund identifying, in each case, the proposed counterparty and the counterparty's relationship to the firm's group (if any); and(2) how it will manage the risk that the reinsurance in (1) will not perform as expected.
An EEA parent institution and its subsidiary undertakings or the subsidiary undertakings of its EEA parent financial holding company or the subsidiary undertakings of its EEA parent mixed financial holding company4 that wish to use any of the approaches listed in BIPRU 1.3.2 G (1) in respect of its group, including members of its group that are BIPRU firms, may apply for an Article 129 permission.
The Article 129 procedure allows an EEA parent institution and its subsidiary undertakings or the subsidiary undertakings of its EEA parent financial holding company or the subsidiary undertakings of its EEA parent mixed financial holding company4 to apply for permission to use the approaches in BIPRU 1.3.2 G (1) without making separate applications to the competent authority of each EEA State where members of a firm's group are authorised.
Where a firm or its group has been granted an Article 129 permission, each competent authority, including the lead competent authority, will need to take action to apply that Article 129 permission to the institutions that they authorise. Part 3 of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006 governs how the appropriate regulator will take that action, whether or not the appropriate regulator is the lead competent authority.
Firms are reminded that a change in control may give rise to a change in the groupcompanies to which the appropriate regulator's7 consolidated financial supervision requirements apply. Also, the firm may for the first time become subject to the appropriate regulator's7 requirements on consolidated financial supervision (or equivalent requirements imposed by another EEA State). This may apply, for example, if the controller is itself an authorised undertaking. The appropriate regulator7
If a person is proposing a change in control over more than one firm within a group, then the controller or proposed controller may submit a single section 178 notice5 to the PRA7 in respect of all those firms which are PRA-authorised persons and a single section 178 notice to the FCA in respect of all those firms which are not PRA-authorised persons.7 The section 178 notice5should contain all the required information as if separate notifications had been made, but information
When an event occurs (for example, a group restructuring or a merger) as a result of which: (1) more than one firm in a group would undergo a change in control; or(2) a single firm would experience more than one change in control;then, to avoid duplication of documentation, all the firms and their controllers or proposed controllers may discharge their respective obligations to notify the appropriate regulator7 by submitting a single section 178 notice5 to the PRA7 containing
(1) A firm should generally use Form E where an approved person is both ceasing to perform one or more controlled functions and needs to be approved in relation to one or more FCA-designated senior management functions within the same firm or group. (2) In certain cases, a firm should use Form A. (3) The details can be found in SUP 10C.10.8D to SUP 10C.10.9D.
If it is proposed that an FCA-approved SMF manager:(1) will no longer be performing an FCA-designated senior management function under an arrangement entered into by one firm or one of its contractors; but(2) will be performing the same or a different FCA-designated senior management function under an arrangement entered into by a new firm or one of its contractors (whether or not the new firm is in the same group as the old firm);the new firm will be required to make a fresh
(1) A firm must notify the FCA no later than seven business days after an FCA-approved SMF manager ceases to perform an FCA-designated senior management function.(2) It must make that notification by submitting to the FCA a completed Form C (SUP 10A Annex 6R).(3) If: (a) the firm is also making an application for approval for that approved person to perform a controlled function within the same firm or group; and(b) ceasing to perform the FCA-designated senior management function
(1) 6A must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that A provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which A’s business is organised;(d) if A is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
(1) 6B must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that B provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which B’s business is organised;(d) if B is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
In assessing the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2C and 3B of Schedule 6 to the Act6, factors which the FCA6 will take into consideration include, among other things, whether: 6(1) it is likely that the FCA6 will receive adequate information from the firm, and those persons with whom the firm has close links, to enable it to determine whether the firm is complying with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system for which the FCA is responsible6 and to
(1) A firm must use Form E where an approved person is both ceasing to perform one or more controlled functions and needs to be approved in relation to one or more FCA controlled functions within the same firm or group.(2) A firm must not use Form E if: 2(a) the approved person has never before been approved to perform for any firm:2(i) an FCA controlled function that is2 a significant-influence function; or2(ii) an FCA-designated senior management function; or2(iii) a PRA controlled
If it is proposed that an FCA-approved person will no longer be performing an FCA controlled function under an arrangement entered into by one firm or one of its contractors, but will be performing the same or a different FCA controlled function under an arrangement entered into by a new firm or one of its contractors (whether or not the new firm is in the same group as the old firm), the new firm will be required to make a fresh application for the performance of the FCA controlled
(1) A firm must submit to the FCA a completed Form C, in the form set out in SUP 10A Annex 6R, no later than seven business days after an FCA-approved person ceases to perform an FCA controlled function.2(2) If:2(a) the firm is also making an application for approval for that approved person to perform a controlled function within the same firm or group; and2(b) ceasing to perform the FCA controlled function in (1) has triggered a requirement to make that application for approval:2(i)
(1) A firm must apply the requirements of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels, including those subsidiaries established in a country or territory which is not an EEA State.(2) Paragraph (1) does not limit SYSC 12.1.13 R and SYSC 12.1.15 R (which relate to the application of the BIPRU Remuneration Code within UK consolidation groups and non-EEA sub-groups).
The effect of SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) and SYSC 12.1.15 R is that the firm is required to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis.
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally