Related provisions for MCOB 4.7A.16
1 - 20 of 165 items.
5A mortgage lender may only include, or rely on, a term in a regulated mortgage contract which permits it to change the rate of interest from a fixed, discounted or other concessionary rate to the firm's standard variable rate in the event of a breach of contract if each of the following conditions is met:(1) the breach of contract is material; (2) the breach of contract is unrelated to a payment shortfall; and(3) that standard variable rate is not an interest rate created especially
Circumstances that a firm should consider include how the customer will be protected in the event of:(1) the failure of a reversion provider, home purchase provideror SRB agreement provider;2(2) the transfer of a reversion provider's, home purchase provider's or SRB agreement provider's2 interest (or the interest the provider would have had, had it not nominated a third party to hold it) in the property to a third party; (3) other dealings by a reversion provider,home purchase
The steps that a firm might take in order to protect its customer's interests will depend on a number of factors, including the nature and structure of the home purchase plan, home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 and the jurisdiction in which the property is situated. If it is not possible to achieve reasonable protection (for example, due to impediments under a particular legal system) then a firm should not enter into, arrange or administer the pla
(1) In the FCA's view, a customer's interests will include:4(a) protection of the customer's rights under the plan, in particular the right to occupy the property throughout its term;(b) protection of any interest (legal or beneficial) that the customer retains, acquires or is intended to acquire in the property, including the expectation that such interests will be unencumbered by third party interests; 4(c) that, where a customer pays sums under a home purchase plan towards
4In the light of MCOB 2.6A.5BR (1)(c), and in accordance with Principle 6, a firm should not seek to prevent a tenant in Northern Ireland from ending the tenancy on less than the agreed notice period (not exceeding three months in accordance with MCOB 2.6A.5BR (1)(c)), where the notice is given in the first six months of the tenancy.
A firm is unlikely, for example, to be treating its customer fairly in relation to termination of a home purchase plan, home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2if:(1) the grounds on which it may terminate all or part of a plan or agreement2 are unduly wide, or on which a customer may terminate are unduly narrow; or(2) the customer is not given appropriate notice of termination.
A firm is also unlikely to be treating its customer fairly if, upon termination of an agreement under a home purchase plan, home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement,2 the customer does not receive (net of any reasonable sums payable by the customer):(1) in the case of a home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 where the customer retains a beneficial interest in the property, the value of that beneficial interest; or(2) in the case of
A firm is unlikely, for example, to be treating a reversion occupier or SRB agreement seller2 fairly if:(1) the reversion occupier or SRB agreement seller2 is obliged to maintain the property to a standard which exceeds the standard that the property is in when the home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 commences;(2) the reversion occupier or SRB agreement seller2 is not entitled to, or is not given, reasonable notice of an inspection, or the inspection
(1) A valuer may be considered competent if he is a suitably qualified member of a professional body.(2) A valuer may be considered independent if:(a) the customer can choose the valuer subject to the firm objecting on reasonable grounds and to the valuer being competent;(b) he owes a duty of care to the customer in valuing the property; and(c) the customer has an appropriate remedy against him under a complaints procedure which allows the complaint to be referred to an independent
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that, when a home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 ends and the customer retains a beneficial interest in the property:(1) the property is sold within a reasonable period of time; and(2) the best price that might reasonably be obtained is paid.
It is recognised that a balance has to be struck between the need to sell the property as soon as possible, and other factors, such as market conditions, which may prompt the delay of the sale. Legitimate reasons for deferring action might include the expiry of a period when a grant is repayable on re-sale, or the discovery of a title defect that needs to be remedied if the optimal selling price is to be achieved.
A person may enter into a home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 as provider or agreement provider2 without being regulated by the FCA (or an exempt person) if the person does not do so by way of business (see PERG 14.5). If a firmarranges or makes arrangements2 for such a person to enter into a home reversion plan or regulated sale and rent back agreement2 as provider or agreement provider, the firm will be responsible for ensuring that the reversion occupier's
A firm must take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result for its clients taking into account the execution factors. [Note: article 21(1) of MiFID and article 25(2) first sentence of the UCITS implementing Directive]2[Note: The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) has issued a Question and Answer paper on best execution under MiFID. This paper also incorporates the European Commission's response to CESR's questions regarding
2A management company must, in relation to each UCITS scheme or EEA UCITS scheme it manages, act in the best interests of the scheme when executing decisions to deal on its behalf in the context of the management of its portfolio, and COBS 11.2.1 R applies in relation to all such decisions.[Note: article 25(1) of the UCITS implementing Directive]
If a firm provides a quote to a client and that quote would meet the firm's obligations to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for its clients if the firm executed that quote at the time the quote was provided, the firm will meet those same obligations if it executes its quote after the client accepts it, provided that, taking into account the changing market conditions and the time elapsed between the offer and acceptance of the quote, the quote is not
The obligation to deliver the best possible result when executing client orders applies in relation to all types of financial instruments. However, given the differences in market structures or the structure of financial instruments, it may be difficult to identify and apply a uniform standard of and procedure for best execution that would be valid and effective for all classes of instrument. Best execution obligations should therefore be applied in a manner that takes into account
Where a firm executes an order on behalf of a retail client, the best possible result must be determined in terms of the total consideration, representing the price of the financial instrument and the costs related to execution, which must include all expenses incurred by the client which are directly related to the execution of the order, including execution venue fees, clearing and settlement fees and any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order.
For the purposes of ensuring that a firm obtains the best possible result for the client when executing a retail client order in the absence of specific client instructions, the firm should take into consideration all factors that will allow it to deliver the best possible result in terms of the total consideration, representing the price of the financial instrument and the costs related to execution. Speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, the size and nature of the order,
A firm's execution policy should determine the relative importance of each of the execution factors or establish a process by which the firm will determine the relative importance of the execution factors. The relative importance that the firm gives to those execution factors must be designed to obtain the best possible result for the execution of its client orders. Ordinarily, the FCA would expect that price will merit a high relative importance in obtaining the best possible
A firm must establish and implement effective arrangements for complying with the obligation to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for its clients. In particular, the firm must establish and implement an order execution policy to allow it to obtain, for its client orders, the best possible result in accordance with that obligation. [Note: article 21(2) of MiFID and article 25(3) first paragraph of the UCITS implementing Directive]2
(1) When establishing its execution policy, a firm should determine the relative importance of the execution factors, or at least establish the process by which it determines the relative importance of these factors, so that it can deliver the best possible result to its clients.(2) In order to give effect to that policy, a firm should select the execution venues that enable it to obtain on a consistent basis the best possible result for the execution of client orders.(3) A firm
A firm must, when providing the service of portfolio management or, for a management company, collective portfolio management,2 comply with the obligation to act in accordance with the best interests of its clients when placing orders with other entities for execution that result from decisions by the firm to deal in financial instruments on behalf of its client. [Note: article 45(1) of MiFID implementing Directive and article 26(1) of the UCITS implementing Directive]2
In order to comply with the obligation to act in accordance with the best interests of its clients when it places an order with, or transmits an order to, another entity for execution, a firm must:[Note: article 45(3) of the MiFID implementing Directive and article 26(1) of the UCITS implementing Directive]2(1) take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for its clients taking into account the execution factors. The relative importance of these factors must be
(1) In relation to debt collecting and debt administration, the definition of customer refers to an individual from whom the payment of a debt is sought; this would include where a firm mistakenly treats an individual as the borrower under an agreement and mistakenly or wrongly pursues the individual for a debt.[Note: paragraph 1.12 of DCG](2) In relation to debt collecting and debt administration, the definitions of customer and borrower are given extended meanings to include,
Where a customer under a regulated credit agreement fails to make an occasional payment when it becomes due, a firm should, in accordance with Principle 6, allow for such unmade payments to be made within the original term of the agreement unless:(1) the firm reasonably believes that it is appropriate to allow a longer period for repayment and has no reason to believe that doing so will increase the total amount payable to be unsustainable or otherwise cause a customer to be in
Examples of treating a customer with forbearance would include the firm doing one or more of the following, as may be relevant in the circumstances:(1) considering suspending, reducing, waiving or cancelling any further interest or charges (for example, when a customer provides evidence of financial difficulties and is unable to meet repayments as they fall due or is only able to make token repayments, where in either case the level of debt would continue to rise if interest and
(1) 3If a customer is in default or in arrears difficulties, the firm should, where appropriate:(a) inform the customer that free and impartial debt advice is available from not-for-profit debt advice bodies; and(b) refer the customer to a not-for-profit debt advice body. (2) A firm may refer the customer to a not-for-profit debt advice body by, for example, providing the customer with a copy of the current arrears information sheet under section 86 of the CCA, or with the name
An example of where a firm is likely to contravene Principle 6 and CONC 7.3.4 R is where the firm does not allow for alternative, affordable payment amounts to repay the debt due in full, where the customer is in default or arrears difficulties and the customer makes a reasonable proposal for repaying the debt or a debt counsellor or another person acting on the customer's behalf makes such a proposal.[Note: paragraphs 7.16 of ILG and 3.7j of DCG]
A firm must not pressurise a customer:(1) to pay a debt in one single or very few repayments or in unreasonably large amounts, when to do so would have an adverse impact on the customer's financial circumstances;[Note: paragraph 7.18 of ILG](2) to pay a debt within an unreasonably short period of time; or[Note: paragraphs 3.7i of DCG and 7.18 of ILG](3) to raise funds to repay the debt by selling their property, borrowing money or increasing existing borrowing.[Note: paragraph
(1) 4An example of behaviour by or on behalf of a firm which is likely to contravene CONC 7.3.10R and Principle 6 is pressurising a customer to raise funds to repay a debt by arranging the receipt of a lump sum from the customer’s pension scheme.(2) Firms are also reminded of PERG 12.6G which contains guidance on the regulated activity of advising on conversion or transfer of pension benefits.
For the purposes of identifying the types of conflict of interest that arise, or may arise, in the course of providing a service and whose existence may entail a material risk of damage to the interests of a client, a common platform firm and a management company5 must take into account, as a minimum, whether the firm or a relevant person, or a person directly or indirectly linked by control to the firm:(1) is likely to make a financial gain, or avoid a financial loss, at the
The circumstances which should be treated as giving rise to a conflict of interest cover cases where there is a conflict between the interests of the firm or certain persons connected to the firm or the firm'sgroup and the duty the firm owes to a client; or between the differing interests of two or more of its clients, to whom the firm owes in each case a duty. It is not enough that the firm may gain a benefit if there is not also a possible disadvantage to a client, or that one
A common platform firm and a management company5 must keep and regularly update a record of the kinds of service or activity carried out by or on behalf of that5firm in which a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients has arisen or, in the case of an ongoing service or activity, may arise.[Note:article 23 of MiFID implementing Directiveand article 20(1) of the UCITS implementing Directive]55
A firm must maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps to prevent conflicts of interest as defined in SYSC 10.1.3 R from constituting or giving rise to a material risk of damage to the interests of its clients.[Note: article 13(3) of MiFID]3
(1) If arrangements made by a firm under SYSC 10.1.7 R to manage conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to the interests of a client will be prevented, the firm must clearly disclose the general nature and/or sources of conflicts of interest to the client before undertaking business for the client.3(2) The disclosure must:(a) be made in a durable medium; and(b) include sufficient detail, taking into account the nature
(1) The conflicts of interest policy must include the following content:(a) it must identify in accordance with SYSC 10.1.3 R and SYSC 10.1.4 R, by reference to the specific services and activities carried out by or on behalf of the common platform firm or management company,5 the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients; and(b) it must specify procedures to be followed
5A management company, when identifying the types of conflict of interests for the purposes of SYSC 10.1.4 R, must take into account:(1) the interests of the firm, including those deriving from its belonging to a group or from the performance of services and activities, the interests of the clients and the duty of the firm towards the UCITS scheme or EEA UCITS scheme it manages; and(2) where it manages two or more UCITS schemes or EEA UCITS schemes, the interests of all of them.[Note:
5A management company must be structured and organised in such a way as to minimise the risk of a UCITS scheme's, EEA UCITS scheme's or client's interests being prejudiced by conflicts of interest between the management company and its clients, between two of its clients, between one of its clients and a UCITS scheme or an EEA UCITS scheme, or between two such schemes.[Note: articles 12(1)(b) and 14(1)(d) of the UCITS Directive]
A firm must not pay or accept any fee or commission, or provide or receive any non-monetary benefit, in relation to designated investment business or, in the case of its MiFID or equivalent third country business, another ancillary service, carried on for a client other than:(1) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided to or by the client or a person on behalf of the client; or(2) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided to or by a third party
(1) 1In relation to the sale of retail investment products,5 the table on reasonable non-monetary benefits (COBS 2.3.15 G) indicates the kind of benefits which are capable of enhancing the quality of the service provided to a client and, depending on the circumstances, are capable of being paid or received without breaching the client's best interests rule. However, in each case, it will be a question of fact whether these conditions are satisfied. 5(2) The guidance in the table
5In interpreting the table of reasonable non-monetary benefits, a firm that provides a personal recommendation in relation to a retail investment product to a retail client or gives advice, or provides a service, to an employer in connection with a group personal pension scheme or a group stakeholder pension scheme6 should be aware that acceptance of benefits on which the firm will have to rely for a period of time is more likely to impair compliance with the client's best interests
(1) Where a firm gives advice to a customer not to make a contractual repayment or to cancel any means of making such a repayment before any debt solution is agreed or entered into, the firm must be able to demonstrate the advice is in the customer's best interests.(2) Where a firm gives advice of the type in (1), the firm must advise the customer (C) that if C adopts the advice C should notify C's lenders without delay and explain that C is following the firm's advice to this
(1) The FCA expects it will generally be in the customer's best interests to maintain regular payments to lenders (even if the repayment is less than the full sum due).(2) An example where it might be in the customer's best interests not to repay at the rate necessary to meet interest and charges accruing is where there is insufficient disposable income to meet essential expenditure of the type referred to in CONC 8.5.3 G. Where that is the case, the firm should explain clearly
Where a firm has advised a customer not to make contractual repayments (in full or in part) or to cancel the means of making such payments or not to make repayments necessary to meet interest and charges accruing, the firm must advise the customer if it becomes clear that that course of action is not producing effects in the customer's best interests to enable the customer to take action in the customer's best interests. Note: paragraph 3.28c of DMG]
(1) An example of an effect not in the customer's best interests would be if a lender does not agree to stop applying interest and charges to the customer's debt. [Note: paragraph 3.28c of DMG](2) Where it becomes clear that the course of action in CONC 8.6.5 R is not producing effects in the customer's best interests the firm should, where withdrawing from the debt management plan may be in the customer's best interests, advise the customer of the possibility of withdrawing from
A number of the rules in this section require a firm to take into account its regulatory duty to treat customers fairly. In this section, references to such a duty are to the duty of a firm regulated by the FCA9 to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and to treat them fairly (see the FCA's9Principle 6 in PRIN). This duty is owed to both policyholders and potential policyholders.9
7Some of the rules made by the FCA7 contain references to, or are reliant on, rules that are only made by the PRA. Firms should consider GEN 2.2.13A R (cross-references in the Handbook) and GEN 2.2.23 R to GEN 2.2.25 G (cutover: application of provisions made by both the FCA and the PRA) when applying these rules. In the context of mathematical reserves, the FCArules ensure a firm takes into account its regulatory duty to treat customers fairly.79
In the actuarial valuation under PRA Rulebook: Non Solvency II firms: Insurance Company – Mathematical Reserves, 2.17, a firm must use methods and prudent assumptions which:(1) are appropriate to the business of the firm;(2) are consistent from year to year without arbitrary changes (see INSPRU 1.2.11 G);(3) are consistent with the method of valuing assets (see PRA Rulebook: Non-Solvency II firms: Insurance Company – Overall Resources and Valuation, 3)7;(4) include appropriate
For the purpose of 3INSPRU 1.2.28R (1)(c)3, benefits payable include:(1) all guaranteed benefits including guaranteed surrender values and paid-up values;(2) vested, declared and allotted bonuses to which the policyholder is entitled;(3) all options available to the policyholder under the terms of the contract; and(4) discretionary benefits payable in accordance with the firm's regulatory duty to treat its customers fairly.
All cash flows are to be valued using prudent assumptions in accordance with generally accepted actuarial practice. Cash flows may be omitted from the valuation calculations provided the reserves obtained as a result of leaving those cash flows out of the calculation are not less than would have resulted had all cash flows been included7. Provision for future expenses in respect of with-profits insurance contracts (excluding accumulating with-profits policies) may be made implicitly,
An additional provision for diseases covered by INSPRU 1.2.60G (5)(c) may be needed, in particular for unit-linked policies. In determining whether such a provision is needed a firm may take into consideration any ability to increase product charges commensurately (provided that such increase does not infringe on its regulatory duty to treat its customers fairly), but a provision would still be required for the period until such an increase could be brought into effect.
Future surplus7 may only be offset against future reinsurance cash outflow in respect of surplus on non-profit insurance contracts and the charges or shareholder transfers arising as surplus from with-profits insurance contracts. Such charges and transfers may only be allowed for to the extent consistent with the regulatory duty of the firm to treat its customers fairly.
Action which a firm takes either to restore its capital resources to the levels set by the intervention points in PRA2 Rulebook: Solvency II Firms: Undertakings in Difficulty or PRA Rulebook: Non-Solvency II firms: Run Off Operations2, or to prevent its capital resources falling below those points, should be consistent with Principle 6 of the FCA's Principles for Businesses. Principle 6 requires a firm to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.
If a firm intends either (a) to remedy a fall in capital resources, or (b) to prevent such a fall, for example, by taking management action to reduce the risks to which a with-profits fund is exposed or by reducing non-contractual benefits for policyholders, it should explain to the FCA how such proposed actions are consistent with the firm's obligations under Principle 6 (Customers' interests).
Where a firm submits a plan for restoration under2 PRA Rulebook: Solvency II Firms: Undertakings in Difficulty or PRA Rulebook: Non-Solvency II firms: Run Off Operations2, the FCA would expect an explanation of how any actions it plans to take to restore its capital resources are consistent with the firm's obligations under Principle 6 (Customers' interests).
1A firm which:2(1) arranges for retail clients to buy retail investment products or makes personal recommendations to retail clients in relation to retail investment products; and22(2) uses a platform service for that purpose;must take reasonable steps to ensure that it uses a platform service which presents its retail investment products without bias.
Principle 6 (Customers' interests) requires a firm to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. A firm may not exclude the duties it owes or the liabilities it has to a customer under the regulatory system. It may exclude other duties and liabilities only if it is reasonable for it to do so.
Firms are not prohibited from entering into or arrangingexecution-only sales for regulated mortgage contracts for customers to whom they have provided product information (where otherwise permitted under this section), but MCOB 2.5A.1 R and MCOB 4.8A.5 R (The customer’s best interests) mean the information they provide should not steer the customer to elect to enter into an execution-only sale.
A firm which intends to transact execution-only sales in regulated mortgage contracts must have in place and operate in accordance with a clearly defined policy which:(1) sets out the amount of business the firm reasonably expects to transact by way of execution-only sales and the steps to be taken by the firm if that business exceeds the expected levels; and(2) sets out its processes and procedures for ensuring compliance with the rules in MCOB 4.8A; in particular:(a) how it
3For supervisory notices (as defined in section 395(13)) which have taken effect, decision notices and final notices, section 391 of the Act requires the FCA to publish, in such manner as it considers appropriate, such information about the matter to which the notice relates as it considers appropriate. Section 391 prevents the FCA from publishing warning notices, but the FCA may publish such information about the matter to which a warning notice falling within section 391(1ZB)
3The FCA will take the following initial steps in considering whether it is appropriate to exercise this power: (1) It will consider whether it is appropriate to publish details of the warning notice in order to enable consumers, firms and market users to understand the nature of the FCA’s concerns. The FCA will consider the circumstances of each case but expects normally to consider it appropriate to publish these details. (2) Where the FCA considers it is appropriate to publish
3However, as required by the Act (see paragraph 6.2.1 above), the FCA will not publish information if publication of it would, in its opinion, be unfair to the person in respect of whom the action is taken or prejudicial to the interests of consumers, or detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. It may make that decision where, for example, publication could damage market confidence or undermine market integrity in a way that could be damaging to the interests of
3It is important that the FCA maintains an accurate public record. One of the ways the FCA does this is by publishing1 the reasons for variations of Part 4A permission, the imposition of requirements and variations of the approval of SMF managers1. The FCA will always aim to balance1 the interests of consumers and the possibility of unfairness to the person subject to the FCA's action. The FCA will publish relevant details of1 fundamental and non-fundamental variations of Part
2A platform service provider should pay due regard to its obligations under Principle 6 (Customers’ interests) and the client's best interests rule and not vary its platform charges inappropriately according to provider or, for substitutable and competing retail investment products, the type of retail investment product.
(1) 3A firm which wishes to rely on any of the certified high net worth investor exemptions (see Part I of the Schedule to the Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes Order, Part I of Schedule 5 to the Financial Promotions Order and COBS 4.12.6 R) should have regard to its duties under the Principles and the client's best interests rule. In particular, the firm should take reasonable steps to ascertain that the retail client does, in fact, meet the income and net assets criteria
(1) 3A firm which is asked to or proposes to assess and certify a retail client as a certified sophisticated investor (see article 23 of the Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes Order, article 50 of the Financial Promotions Order and COBS 4.12.7 R) should have regard to its duties under the Principles and the client's best interests rule. In particular, the firm should carry out that assessment with due skill, care and diligence, having regard to the generally complex nature
(1) 3A firm which wishes to rely on any of the self-certified sophisticated investor exemptions (see Part II of the Schedule to the Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes Order, Part II of Schedule 5 to the Financial Promotions Order and COBS 4.12.8 R) should have regard to its duties under the Principles and the client's best interests rule. In particular, the firm should consider whether the promotion of the non-mainstream pooled investment is in the interests of the client
(1) 3A firm which wishes to rely on one of the one-off promotion exemptions provided by the Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes or the Financial Promotion Order to promote a non-mainstream pooled investment to a retail client should have regard to its duties under the Principles and the client's best interests rule. In particular, the firm should consider whether the promotion of the non-mainstream pooled investment is in the interests of the client and whether it is fair
(1) 3A firm which wishes to rely on the excluded communications exemption in COBS 4.12.4R (5) to promote units in a qualified investor scheme to a retail client should have regard to its duties under the Principles and the client's best interests rule. (2) As explained in COLL 8.1, qualified investor schemes are intended only for professional clients and retail clients who are sophisticated investors. Firms should note that, in the FCA's view, promotion of units in a qualified
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 1.(1) Misleading (or attempting to mislead) by act or omission:(a) a client; or(b) the firm for whom the person works (or its auditors); or(c) the FCA or;(d) the PRA.(2) Falsifying documents.(3) Misleading a client about:(a) the risks of an investment;(b) the charges or surrender penalties of products;(c) the likely performance of products by providing inappropriate projections of future
Rule 4 in COCON 2.1.4R applies to all conduct rules staff, regardless of whether that person has direct contact or dealings with customers of the firm. Persons subject to the rules in COCON should consider how their actions (or their failure to act) can affect the interests of customers or result in customers being treated unfairly.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 4.(1) Failing to inform a customer of material information in circumstances where they were aware, or ought to have been aware, of such information and of the fact that they should provide it, including the following:(a) failing to explain the risks of an investment to a customer;(b) failing to disclose to a customer details of the charges or surrender penalties of investment products;
A mortgage lender which enters intointerest-only mortgages (unless they are only lifetime mortgages) must include in the policy which is required by MCOB 11.6.20 R (Responsible lending and financing policy) a policy on interest-only mortgages, setting out its processes and procedures for ensuring compliance with MCOB 11.6.41R (1) and for safeguarding the interests of customers during the term of interest-only mortgages. This policy must include:(1) details of the mortgage lender's
(1) The controls in MCOB 11.6.50R (2) may include, where appropriate: maximum loan to value limits; minimum equity requirements; regional factors such as property prices; or other eligibility requirements.(2) The policy and procedures for safeguarding the interests of a customer under an interest-only mortgage should not permit the mortgage lender to change the interest-only mortgage to a repayment mortgage, extend the term or otherwise change the features of the interest-only
MCOB 11.6.50 R sets out requirements for mortgage lenders to have appropriate procedures for managing interest-only mortgages in order to safeguard the interests of customers. Firms are reminded of the rules and guidance in SYSC (notably SYSC 7.1) relating to systems and controls for the management of risks to which firms themselves are exposed. Firms will need to consider whether their systems and controls are adequate in relation to the management of risks arising from interest-only
1Where this poses a significant risk to the consumer protection objective or to the FCA's other regulatory objectives, unauthorised activity will be a matter of serious concern for the FCA. The FCA
deals with cases of suspected unauthorised activity in a number of ways and it will not use its investigation powers and/or take enforcement action in every single instance.
1The FCA's primary aim in using its investigation and enforcement powers in the context of suspected unauthorised activities is to protect the interests of consumers. The FCA's priority will be to confirm whether or not a regulated activity has been carried on in the United Kingdom by someone without authorisation or exemption, and, if so, the extent of that activity and whether other related contraventions have occurred. It will seek to assess the risk to consumers' assets and
An exceptionally urgent case in these circumstances is one where the FCA staff believe that a decision to begin proceedings1(1) should be taken before it is possible to follow the procedure described in paragraph 10.1.2; and1(2) t is necessary to protect the interests of consumers or potential consumers.12
The orders the court may make following an application by the FCA under the powers referred to in this chapter are generally known in England and Wales as injunctions, and in Scotland as interdicts. In the chapter, the word 'injunction' and the word 'order' also mean 'interdict'. The FCA's effective use of these powers will help it work towards its operational objectives, in particular, those of securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, protecting and enhancing
Principles 6 (Customers' interests), 7 (Communications with clients), 8 (Conflicts of interest), 9 (Customers: relationships of trust) and 10 (Clients' assets) impose requirements on firms expressly in relation to their clients or customers. These requirements depend, in part, on the characteristics of the client or customer concerned. This is because what is "due regard" (in Principles 6 and 7), "fairly" (in Principles 6 and 8), "clear, fair and not misleading" (in Principle
Principles 6, 8 and 9 and parts of Principle 7, as qualified by PRIN 3.4.1 R, apply only in relation to customers (that is, clients which are not eligible counterparties).4 The approach that a firm (other than for credit-related regulated activities in relation to which client categorisation does not apply)5 needs to take regarding categorisation3of clients into customers and eligible counterparties4 will depend on whether the firm is carrying on designated investment business
1(1) In relation to the carrying on of designated investment business, a firm's categorisation of a client under the COBS client categorisation chapter (COBS 3) will be applicable for the purposes of Principles 6, 7, 8 and 9.33(1A) Client categorisation under COBS 3 or PRIN 1 Annex 1 is not relevant to credit-related regulated activities and therefore the guidance on client categorisation does not apply in relation to a credit-related regulated activity. The definitions of client
In determining its charging structure and adviser charges a firm should have regard to its duties under the client's best interests rule. Practices which may indicate that a firm is not in compliance with this duty include:(1) varying its adviser charges inappropriately according to provider or, for substitutable and competing retail investment products, the type of retail investment product; or(2) allowing the availability or limitations of services offered by third parties
In order to meet its responsibilities under the client's best interests rule and Principle 6 (Customers’ interests), a firm should consider whether the personal recommendation or any other related service7 is likely to be of value to the retail client when the total charges the retail client is likely to be required to pay are taken into account.
A firm is unlikely to meet its obligations under the fair, clear and not misleading rule and the client's best interests rule unless it ensures that:(1) the charging structure it discloses reflects, as closely as is practicable, the total adviser charge to be paid; for example, the firm should avoid using a wide range; and(2) if using hourly rates in its charging structure, it states whether the rates are indicative or actual hourly rates, provides the basis (if any) upon which