Related provisions for IPRU-INV 4.2.2
101 - 120 of 625 items.
If the Treasury designates a person as a designated guidance provider under section 333E(1)(e) of the Act in the course of a fee year, the following formula must be used to calculate the pensions guidance providers’ levy to be paid by that provider for that fee year:
(1) |
calculate the number of months between and including: |
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(i) |
the month in which the person became a designated guidance provider; and |
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(ii) |
the last month of the relevant fee year; |
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(2) |
divide the number of months calculated in (1) by 12; |
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(3) |
multiply the pension guidance providers’ levy set out in column (C) of row 5 of the table at FEES 11 Annex 1R by the number calculated in (2). |
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(1) The following enable the FCA to charge fees to cover its costs and expenses in carrying out its functions:13(a) paragraph 23 of Schedule 1ZA of the Act;13(b) regulation 92 of the Payment Services Regulations;13(c) regulation 59 of the Electronic Money Regulations;13(d) article 25(a) of the MCD Order; and13(e) regulation 21 of the Small and Medium Sized Businesses (Credit Information) Regulations. 13(2) The corresponding provisions for the FSCS levy, FOS levies, and CFEB levies
3Regulation 92 of the Payment Services Regulations and regulation 59 of the Electronic Money Regulations each provide7 that the functions of the FCA18 under the respective7 regulations are treated for the purposes of paragraph 23 of Schedule 1ZA18 to the Act as functions conferred on the FCA18 under the Act. Paragraph 23(7) 22 however, has not been included 22.7This is 22the FCA's187 obligation to ensure that the amount of penalties received or expected to be received are not
(1) 13The FCA also has a fee-raising power as a result of: regulation 21 of the Small and Medium Sized Businesses (Credit Information) Regulations.(2) The FCA’s functions under these regulations are treated as functions conferred on the FCA under the Act for the purposes of its fee-raising power in paragraph 23 of Schedule 1ZA to the Act.
Section 6A(1) of the Act (Enhancing public understanding of financial matters etc) (as it had effect before the passing of the Financial Services Act 2012) required4 the FSA to establish the CFEB in order to enhance:4(1) the understanding and knowledge of members of the public of financial matters (including the UK financial system); and(2) the ability of members of the public to manage their own financial affairs.
Paragraph 12(1) of Part 2 of Schedule 1A to the Act enables the FCA to make rules requiring certain2authorised persons or payment service providers or electronic money issuers2 to pay to the FCA specified amounts or amounts calculated in a specified way in order to meet a proportion of:22(1) the expenses incurred by the FCA in establishing the CFEB, whenever these were incurred; and(2) the expenses incurred, or expected to be incurred, by the CFEB in connection with the discharge
3For supervisory notices (as defined in section 395(13)) which have taken effect, decision notices and final notices, section 391 of the Act requires the FCA to publish, in such manner as it considers appropriate, such information about the matter to which the notice relates as it considers appropriate. Section 391 prevents the FCA from publishing warning notices, but the FCA may publish such information about the matter to which a warning notice falling within section 391(1ZB)
3The FCA may publish information about warning notices which fall within section 391(1ZB) of the Act. These are essentially disciplinary warning notices, for example, where the FCA is proposing to censure, fine, or impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation on1 a firm or individual. The power to publish information does not apply, for example, to warning notices which only propose to prohibit an individual, withdraw the approval of an individual or cancel the permission
3The FCA will take the following initial steps in considering whether it is appropriate to exercise this power: (1) It will consider whether it is appropriate to publish details of the warning notice in order to enable consumers, firms and market users to understand the nature of the FCA’s concerns. The FCA will consider the circumstances of each case but expects normally to consider it appropriate to publish these details. (2) Where the FCA considers it is appropriate to publish
3However, as required by the Act (see paragraph 6.2.1 above), the FCA will not publish information if publication of it would, in its opinion, be unfair to the person in respect of whom the action is taken or prejudicial to the interests of consumers, or detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. It may make that decision where, for example, publication could damage market confidence or undermine market integrity in a way that could be damaging to the interests of
A decision to: (1) revoke a recognition order under section 297 of the Act (Revoking recognition) or (for RAPs) regulation 4 of the RAP regulations; or3(2) make a direction under section 296 (FCA's4powers to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations; or34(3) refuse to make a recognition order under section 290 (Recognition orders) or 290A (Refusal of recognition on ground of excessive regulatory provision) or (for RAPs) regulation 2 of the RAP regulations32;is
In considering whether it would be appropriate to exercise the powers under section 296 or section 297 of the Act or (for RAPs) regulation 3 or 4 of the RAP regulations,3 the FCA4 will have regard to all relevant information and factors including:4(1) its guidance to recognised bodies;(2) the results of its routine supervision of the body concerned;(3) the extent to which the failure or likely failure to satisfy one or more of the recognised body requirements31may affect the statutory
Before exercising its powers under section 296 or section 297 of the Act or (for RAPs) regulation 3 or 4 of the RAP regulations3, the FCA4 will usually discuss its intention, and the basis for this, with the key individuals or other appropriate representatives of the recognised body. It will usually discuss its intention not to make a recognition order with appropriate representatives of the applicant.4
1Sections 87A(2), (2A), 2(3) and (4) of the Act provide for the general contents of a prospectus:
(2) |
The necessary information is the information necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment of – |
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(a) |
the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the transferable securities and of any guarantor; and |
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(b) |
the rights attaching to the transferable securities.2 |
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2(2A) |
If, in the case of transferable securities to which section 87 applies, the prospectus states that the guarantor is a specified EEA State, the prospectus is not required to include other information about the guarantor. |
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(3) |
The necessary information must be presented in a form which is comprehensible and easy to analyse. |
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(4) |
The necessary information must be prepared having regard to the particular nature of the transferable securities and their issuer.6 266 |
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Sections 87A(5) and (6) of the Act set out the requirement for a summary to be included in a prospectus:
(5) |
The prospectus must include a summary (unless the transferable securities in question are ones in relation to which prospectus rules provide that a summary is not required). |
(6) |
The summary must convey concisely, in non-technical language and in an appropriate structure, the key information relevant to the securities which are the subject of the prospectus and, when read with the rest of the prospectus, must be an aid to investors considering whether to invest in the securities2. 2 |
The summary must also contain a warning to the effect that:(1) it should be read as an introduction to the prospectus;(2) any decision to invest in the transferable securities should be based on consideration of the prospectus as a whole by the investor; (3) where a claim relating to the information contained in a prospectus is brought before a court, the plaintiff investor might, under the national legislation of the EEA States, have to bear the costs of translating the prospectus
Where, in relation to an offer in the United Kingdom, no prospectus is required under the Act, the issuer and offeror must ensure that material information they provide to qualified investors or special categories of investors, including information disclosed in the context of meetings relating to offers, is disclosed to all qualified investors or special categories of investors to whom the offer is exclusively addressed. [Note: article 15.5 PD]
The Treasury's pensions guidance costs are defined in subsection 10 of section 333R (Funding of Treasury’s pensions guidance costs) of the Act as the expenses incurred, or expected to be incurred, by the Treasury: (1) in giving pensions guidance or arranging for it to be given by designated guidance providers;(2) in meeting the expenses of designated guidance providers incurred in connection with the giving of the guidance (whether by means of the power conferred by section 333D
(1) Section 333R(1) of the Act requires the Treasury to notify the FCA of the amount of the Treasury’s pensions guidance costs.(2) Section 333R(2) requires the FCA to make rules requiring authorised persons to pay amounts, or amounts calculated in a specified way, to the FCA with a view to recovering the amounts notified by the Treasury.(3) Under subsection 3 such amounts may include a component to cover the expenses of the FCA in collecting the payments.
Section 21(2) of the Act sets out two circumstances in which a financial promotion will not be caught by the restriction in section 21(1). These are where the communicator is an authorised person or where the content of the financial promotion has been approved for the purposes of section 21 by an authorised person. Where approval is concerned it must be specifically for the purposes of enabling the financial promotion to be communicated by unauthorised persons free of the restriction
Where an authorised person makes a financial promotion, he is not subject to the restriction in section 21. So, the communication of the financial promotion by the authorised person will not be a criminal offence under the provisions of section 25 of the Act (Contravention of section 21) and any resulting contract will not be unenforceable under section 30 of the Act (Enforceability of agreement resulting from unlawful communications). However, the appropriate financial promotion
An unauthorised person may wish to pass on a financial promotion made to him by an authorised person. In this case, the fact that the financial promotion was made to him by an authorised person will not be enough for the restriction in section 21 not to apply to him. The authorised person must also both have approved its content and have done so for the purpose of section 21 of the Act. If an authorised person wishes to ensure that an unauthorised person can communicate a financial
Guidance on what constitutes a branch is given in SUP App 36. Note that if a UK MiFID investment firm is seeking to use a tied agent established in another EEA State, the rules in SUP 13 will apply as if that firm were seeking to establish a branch in that EEA State unless the firm has already established a branch in that EEA State (paragraph 20A of Schedule 3 to the Act).846
A UK firm17 cannot establish a branch in another EEA State for the first time under an EEA right unless the relevant13 conditions in paragraphs 19(2), (4) and (5)12 of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act are satisfied. It is an offence for a UK firm which is not an authorised person to contravene this prohibition (paragraph 21 of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act). These conditions are that:913121213(1) the UKfirm has given the appropriate UK regulator,20 in accordance with the
20Where the PRA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the FCA before deciding whether to give a consent notice, except where paragraph 19(7A) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act applies. Where the FCA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the PRA before deciding whether to give a consent notice in relation to a UK firm whose immediate group includes a PRA-authorised person.
(1) If the appropriate UK regulator20 proposes to refuse to give a consent notice, then paragraph 19(8) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the appropriate UK regulator20 to give the UK firm a warning notice.2020(2) If the appropriate UK regulator20 decides to refuse to give a consent notice, then paragraph 19(12) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the appropriate UK regulator20 to give the UK firm a decision notice within three months8 of the date on which
The guidance in COND 2 explains each FCA1threshold condition in Schedule 6 (threshold conditions) to the Act and indicates1 how the FCA1 will interpret it in practice. This guidance is not, however, exhaustive and is written in very general terms. A firm will need to have regard to the obligation placed upon the FCA1 under section 55B (The threshold conditions) of the Act; that is, the FCA1 must ensure that the firm will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the FCA1threshold conditions
1When assessing the FCAthreshold conditions, the FCA may have regard to any person appearing to be, or likely to be, in a relevant relationship with the firm, in accordance with section 55R of the Act (Persons connected with an applicant). For example, a firm'scontrollers, its directors or partners, other persons with close links to the firm (see COND 2.3), and other persons that exert influence on the firm which might pose a risk to the firm's satisfaction of the FCAthreshold
(1) For ease of reference, the FCA1threshold conditions in or under Schedule 6 to the Act have been quoted in full in COND 2. (1A) 1Paragraphs 2A and 3A of Schedule 6 of the Act have not been quoted. These set out the application of the FCAthreshold conditions to firms which do not carry on, or are not seeking to carry on, a PRAregulated activity and firms which carry on, or are seeking to carry on, a PRAregulated activity respectively. This application is summarised in COND
1Paragraph 1A of Schedule 6 to the Act(1) "assets" includes contingent assets;"consolidated supervision" has the same meaning as in section 3M(a);"consumer" has the meaning given by section 425A(b);"financial crime" is to be read with section 1H(3)(c);"functions", in relation to either the FCA or the PRA, means the functions conferred on that regulator by or under this Act;"liabilities" includes contingent liabilities; "relevant directives" has the same meaning as in section 3M;
Under section 33(2) of the Act (Withdrawal of authorisation), if the appropriate regulator cancels a firm'sPart 4A permission,1 and as a result there is no regulated activity for which the firm has permission, the regulator authorising that firm1 is required to give a direction withdrawing the firm's status as an authorised person.111
1If the FCA concludes that it should grant an FCA-authorised person's application for cancellation of permission and end its authorisation, the FCA will:(1) cancel the firm'sPart 4A permission under section 55H(3) of the Act;(2) withdraw the firm'sauthorised status under section 33(2) of the Act by giving the firm a direction in writing; and(3) update the firm's entry in the Financial Services Register to show it has ceased to be authorised.
An ROIE1 is required to notify the FCA1 of certain events and give information to it on a regular basis and when certain specified events occur. Section 295 of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) requires each ROIE1 to provide the FCA1 with a report (at least once a year) which contains:111(1) a statement as to whether any events have occurred which are likely to affect the FCA's assessment of whether it is satisfied that the ROIE
The period covered by a report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act starts on the day after the period covered by its last report or, if there is no such report, after the making of the recognition order recognising theROIE1 as such, and ends on the date specified in the report or, if no date is specified, on the date of the report. 1
1Work done or commissioned by the firm does not fetter the FCA's ability to use its statutory powers, for example to require a skilled person’s report under section 166 of the Act or to carry out a formal enforcement investigation; nor can a report commissioned by the firm be a substitute for formal regulatory action where this is needed or appropriate. But even if formal action is needed, it may be that a report could be used to help the FCA decide on the appropriate action to
1The FCA is not able to require the production of “protected items”, as defined in the Act, but it is not uncommon for there to be disagreement with firms about the scope of this protection. Arguments about whether certain documents attract privilege tend to be time- consuming and delay the progress of an investigation. If a firm decides to give a report to the FCA, then the FCA considers that the greatest mutual benefit is most likely to flow from disclosure of the report itself
1This does not mean that information provided to the FCA is unprotected. The FCA is subject to strict statutory restrictions on the disclosure of confidential information (as defined in section 348 of the Act), breach of which is a criminal offence (under section 352 of the Act). Reports and underlying materials provided voluntarily to the FCA by a firm, whether covered by legal privilege or not, are confidential for these purposes and benefit from the statutory protections.
1Even in circumstances where disclosure of information would be permitted under the “gateways” set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disclosure of Confidential Information) Regulations, the FCA will consider carefully whether it would be appropriate to disclose a report provided voluntarily by a firm. The FCA appreciates that firms feel strongly about the importance of maintaining confidentiality, and that firms are more likely to volunteer information to the
3The FCA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business in the UK. Its strategic objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) is to ensure that the relevant markets function well. The FCA's operational objectives are: securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers;protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system; andpromoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets.(Note: The 2000
3Under the 2000 Act the FCA has powers to investigate concerns including: • regulatory concerns about authorised firms and individuals employed by them;suspected market abuse under s.118 of the 2000 Act;• suspected misleading statements and practices under s.397 of the 2000 Act and Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012;• suspected insiderdealing under of Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993;• suspected contraventions of the general prohibition under s.19 of the 2000
3The FCA has the power to take the following enforcement action: • discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons and other individuals1under s.66 of the 2000 Act;• impose penalties on persons that perform controlled functions without approval under s.63A of the 2000 Act;• impose civil penalties in cases of market abuse under s.123 of the 2000 Act;• prohibit an individual from being employed in connection with a regulated activity, under s.56
(1) In particular, this section sets out the FCA’s policies about varying conditional approvals at the request of a firm, as required by section 63ZD of the Act (Statement of policy relating to conditional approval and variation). (2) This section does not deal with the FCA’s policies on varying a condition on its own initiative. DEPP 8 deals with that.
Under section 61(5) of the Act (Determination of applications), as applied by section 63ZA(8) of the Act (Variation of senior manager’s approval at request of relevant authorised person), the firm may withdraw an application only if it also has the consent of:(1) the approved person; and(2) the person by whom the approved person is employed if this is not the firm making the application.
Under section 63ZB of the Act (Variation of senior manager's approval on initiative of regulator), the FCA may vary an approval given by the FCA or the PRA for the performance of a designated senior management function if the FCA considers that it is desirable to do so to advance one or more of its operational objectives.
The FCA9 is concerned to ensure that every actuary appointed by a firm under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act or for the purposes of PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, 6,9 has the necessary skill and experience to provide the firm with appropriate actuarial advice from a conduct perspective9. SUP 4.3.9 R to SUP 4.3.10 G set out the FCA’s9 rules and guidance aimed at achieving this.11
Before a firm applies for approval of the person it proposes to appoint as an actuary under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act, or for the purposes of PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, 69, it must take reasonable steps to ensure that the actuary:11(1) has the required skill and experience to perform his functions under the regulatory system; and(2) is a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries or of the Faculty of Actuaries.
A firm must not appoint under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act or for the purposes of9 rule 6.1 of the PRA9 Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business,9 an actuary who is disqualified by the FCA10 under section 345 of the Act (Disciplinary measures: FCA) or the PRA under section 345A of the Act (Disciplinary measures: PRA10) from acting as an actuary either for that firm or for a relevant class of firm. 1181010
If it appears to the FCA9 that an actuary1 has failed to comply with a duty imposed on him under the Act, it has9 the power to and10 may disqualify him under section 3459 of the Act. A list of actuaries who are disqualified may be found on the FCA10 website (http://www.fca.org.uk10).101011055110101010
1A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that an actuary who is to be, or has been, appointed under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act, or for the purposes of PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, 69:8(1) does not perform the function of chairman or chief executive of the firm, or does not, if he is to perform the with-profits actuary function, become a member of the firm's governing body; and(2) does not perform any other function on behalf
This guidance is issued under section 139A of the Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance and the circumstances contemplated by it, then the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates.
Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance given by the FCA. This guidance represents the FCA's view, and does not bind the courts, for example, in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of the general prohibition on carrying on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom without authorisation (see sections 26 to 29 of the Act (Enforceability of Agreements)).
1The FCA will also take into account the potentially more serious consequences that a disapplication of an exemption will have for the member concerned compared with the consequences of a prohibition of a particular individual engaged in exempt regulated activities. However, the FCA may consider it appropriate in some cases to disapply an exemption where it decides that the member concerned is not fit and proper to carry out exempt regulated activities in accordance with section
1When it decides whether to exercise its power to disapply an exemption from the general prohibition in relation to a member, the FCA will take into account all relevant circumstances which may include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) Disciplinary or other action taken by the relevant designated professional body, where that action relates to the fitness and propriety of the member concerned: where the FCA considers that its concerns in relation to the fitness
1Where the FCA is considering making a disapplication order against a member as a result of a breach of rules made by the FCA under section 323(1) of the Act, it will take into account any proposed application by the member concerned for authorisation under the Act. The FCA may refrain from making a disapplication order pending its consideration of the application for authorisation.
The Act (section
1L) requires the FCA to "maintain
arrangements for supervising authorised persons". Section 1K of the Act also requires the FCA to
provide general guidance about
how it intends to advance its operational objectives in discharging its general
functions in relation to different categories of authorised
person or regulated activity.
One purpose of this guidance is
to discharge the duties of the FCA set
out in sections 1L and 1K of the Act.
The FCA's approach to
The design of these arrangements
is shaped by the FCA'sstatutory objectives in relation to the
conduct supervision of financial services firms as
well as the prudential supervision of firms not
supervised by the PRA. These
objectives are set out in Chapter 1 of the Act.
The FCA has one strategic objective: ensuring that the relevant
markets function well. In discharging its general functions, the FCA must, so far as is reasonably possible,
act in a way which is compatible with
(1) In designing its approach to supervision,
the FCA has regard to the regulatory
principles set out in section 3B of the Act.
In particular, the FCA's regulatory
approach aims to focus and reinforce the responsibility of the senior management
of each firm (section 3B(1)(d)
of the Act) to ensure that it
takes reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the firm responsibly and effectively, and develops
and maintains adequate risk management systems. It is the responsibility