Related provisions for PERG 6.4.3
221 - 240 of 1061 items.
(1) The winding up of an ICVC may be carried out under this section instead of by the court provided the ICVC is solvent and the steps required under regulation 21 the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company) are fulfilled. This section lays down the procedures to be followed and the obligations of the ACD and any other directors of the ICVC. (2) The termination of a sub-fund may be carried out4 under this section, instead of by the
This table belongs to COLL 7.3.1 G (4) (Explanation of COLL 7.3)3
3Summary of the main steps in winding up a solvent ICVC or terminating a sub-fund3 under FCArules, assuming FCA approval. Notes: N = Notice to be given to the FCA under regulation 21 of OEIC Regulations E = commencement of winding up or termination W/U = winding up FAP = final accounting period (COLL 7.3.8 R(4)) |
|||
Step number |
Explanation |
When |
COLL rule (unless stated otherwise) |
1 |
Commence preparation of solvency statement |
N-28 days |
7.3.5 (2) |
2 |
Send audited solvency statement to the FCA with copy to depositary |
By N + 21 days |
7.3.5 (4) and (5) |
3 |
Receive the FCA approval |
N + one month |
Regulation 21 of OEIC Regulations |
4 |
Normal business ceases; notify unitholders3 3 |
E |
7.3.6 |
5 |
Realise proceeds, wind up, instruct depositary accordingly |
ASAP after E |
7.3.7 |
6 |
Prepare final account or termination account & have account audited |
On completion of W/U or termination |
7.3.8 |
7 |
Send final account or termination account and auditor's report to the FCA & unitholders |
3 | 7.3.8(6) |
8 |
Request FCA to revoke relevant authorisation order or update its records4 |
On completion of W/U or termination4 |
7.3.7(9) |
(1) An ICVC must not be wound up except:44(a) under this section; or4(b) as an unregistered company under Part V of the Insolvency Act 1986.4(1A) 4A sub-fund must not:(a) be terminated except under this section; or(b) wound up except under Part V of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as modified by regulation 33C of the OEIC Regulations) as an unregistered company.(2) An ICVC must not be wound up or a sub-fund terminated4 under this section if there is a vacancy in the position of ACD.
(1) Before notice is given to the FCA under regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations of the proposals referred to in COLL 7.3.4 R (3), the directors must make a full enquiry into the ICVC's or, in the case of termination of a sub-fund, the sub-fund's4 affairs, business and property4 to determine whether the ICVC or the sub-fund4 will be able to meet all its liabilities. (2) The ACD must then, based on the results of this enquiry, prepare a statement either: (a) confirming that the
(1) [deleted]44(2) The ACD must, as soon as practicable after winding up or termination has commenced, cause the scheme property to be realised and the liabilities of the ICVC or the sub-fund to be met out of the proceeds.(3) The ACD must instruct the depositary how such proceeds (until utilised to meet liabilities or make distributions to unitholders) must be held and those instructions must be prepared with a view to the prudent protection of creditors and unitholders against
(1) Once the ICVC's affairs are wound up or termination of the sub-fund has been completed (including distribution or provision for distribution in accordance with COLL 7.3.7 R (5)),3 the ACD must prepare an account of the winding up or termination showing: 3(a) how it has been conducted; and(b) how the scheme property has been disposed of. (2) The account in (1) must be, if there is: (a) more than one director, approved by the board of directors and be signed on their behalf
(1) If: (a) during the course, or as a result, of the enquiry referred to in COLL 7.3.5 R (1) (Solvency statement), the directors become of the opinion that it will not be possible to provide the confirmation referred to in (2)(a) of that rule; or(b) after winding up or termination has commenced, the ACD becomes of the opinion that the ICVC or the sub-fund4 will be unable to meet all its liabilities within twelve months of the date of the statement provided under (a) of COLL 7.3.5
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for restitution orders under the Act will be made by the RDC Chairman or, in an urgent case and if the Chairman is not available, by an RDC Deputy Chairman. In an exceptionally urgent case the matter will be decided by the director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, another member of the FCA's executive of at least director of division level.
1An exceptionally urgent case in these circumstances is one where the FCA staff believe that a decision to begin proceedings (1) should be taken before it is possible to follow the procedure described in paragraph 11.1.1; and (2) it is necessary to protect the interests of consumers or potential consumers.
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
(1) The purpose of this section2 is to set out the requirements for firms in the retail mortgage, investment, consumer credit lending8 and pure protection contract markets specified in SUP 16.11.1 R to report individual product sales data, and to report individual performance data on regulated mortgage contracts,7 to the FCA17. In the case of firms in the sale and rent back market, there is a requirement to record, but not to submit, sales7data.6 These requirements apply6 whether
(1) A firm may submit a sales 7data report more frequently than required by SUP 16.11.3 R7if it wishes.7(2) If it is easier and more practical for a firm to submit additional data relating to products other than those specified in SUP 16.11.5 R, it may submit that additional data to the FCA17 in a data report.17
(1) A firm may appoint another person to provide a 7data report on the firm's behalf if the firm has informed the FCA17 of that appointment in writing.717(2) Where (1) applies, the firm must ensure that the data report complies with the requirements of SUP 16.11 and identifies the originator of the transaction.
This section applies to:(1) a firm that is the EEA parent undertaking of an RRD group; (2) a qualifying parent undertaking that is the EEA parent undertaking of an RRD group; and(3) an IFPRU 730k firm that is the subsidiary of the EEA parent undertaking of an RRD group where: (a) the EEA parent undertaking is an EEA parent financial holding company or an EEA parent mixed financial holding company that is incorporated in, or formed under, the law of an EEA state other than the
If the RRD group includes an IFPRU 730k firm that is not a significant IFPRU firm (and does not include an IFPRU 730k firm that is a significant IFPRU firm) the group recovery plan must include:(1) a summary of the key elements of the group recovery plan;(2) information on the governance of the group, including: (a) how the group recovery plan is integrated into the corporate governance of the group; and (b) the group's overall risk management framework;(3) a description of the
(1) A firm or qualifying parent undertaking must send the group recovery plan to its EEAconsolidating supervisor.(2) Where the consolidating supervisor is the FCA, a firm or qualifying parent undertaking must send the group recovery plan in line with SUP 16.20 (Recovery plans and information for resolution plans).[Note: articles 6(1) and 7(1) of RRD]
1The FCA has certain functions in relation to what are described as “registrant-only” mutual societies. These societies are not regulated or supervised under the Act. Instead, they are subject to the provisions of IPSA65, FIPSA68, FSA74 and FSA92, which require them to register with the FCA and fulfil certain other obligations, such as the requirement to submit annual returns.
1The FCA's enforcement activities in respect of registrant-only societies focus on prosecuting societies that fail to submit annual returns. As registrant-only societies are not subject to the rules imposed by the Act and by the FCA
Handbook, the requirement that they submit annual returns provides an important check that the interests and investments of members, potential members, creditors and other interested parties are being safeguarded. The power to prosecute
1The decision whether to initiate criminal and other proceedings under these Acts will be taken in accordance with the procedure described in EG 12.1.7. Under section 18 IPSA65, a society may appeal certain decisions of the FCA relating to the refusal, cancellation or suspension of a society’s registration to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session. Refusals to register a branch or to register the amendment of a society’s rules and cancellations or suspensions of
(1) The effect of section 59 of the Act is that if a person is to perform certain functions (which are known as controlled functions) for a credit union, the credit union should first apply for approval to:2(a) the FCA (if the controlled function is specified by the FCA in its rules); or2(b) the PRA (if the controlled function is specified by the PRA in its rules).2(2) The firm should not allow the person to perform that function until the firm receives the approval.2(3) A person
(1) The controlled functions specified by the FCA for credit unions and other relevant authorised persons can be found in the table in SUP 10C.4.3R.211(2) The controlled functions specified by the PRA for credit unions and other relevant authorised persons can be found in the PRA’s Rulebook. They are not summarised in the Handbook.2
2(1) The FCA and the PRA have specified different functions.2(2) Sometimes a person’s job description means that they are performing an FCA controlled function and a PRA controlled function at the same time for the same firm. SUP 10C.9 has arrangements that reduce the need for the same person to be approved by both the FCA and the PRA.2
2As well as listing the FCA’sdesignated senior management functions for credit unions and other relevant authorised persons, SUP 10C has other requirements about SMF managers:(1) SUP 10C sets out the procedures for applying for, granting, removing and varying approval as an SMF manager.(2) SUP 10C requires firms to give various types of reports to the FCA about their SMF managers.(3) SUP 10C explains that each firm must prepare a statement of responsibilities for each of its SMF
1The FCA resolves many enforcement cases by settlement. Early settlement has many potential advantages as it can result, for example, in consumers obtaining compensation earlier than would otherwise be the case, the saving of FCA and industry resources, messages getting out to the market sooner and a public perception of timely and effective action. The FCA therefore considers it is in the public interest for matters to settle, and settle early, if possible.
1The possibility of settlement does not, however, change the fact that enforcement action is one of the tools available to the FCA to secure our statutory objectives. The FCA seeks to change the behaviour not only of those subject to the immediate action, but also of others who will be alerted to our concerns in a particular area. There is no distinction here between action taken following agreement with the subject of the enforcement action and action resisted by a firm before
1Settlements in the FCA context are not the same as ‘out of court’ settlements in the commercial context. An FCA settlement is a regulatory decision, taken by the FCA, the terms of which are accepted by the firm or individual concerned. So, when agreeing the terms of a settlement, the FCA will carefully consider its statutory objectives and other relevant matters such as the importance of sending clear, consistent messages through enforcement action, and will only settle in appropriate
1In recognition of the value of early settlement, the FCA operates a scheme to award explicit discounts for early settlement of cases involving financial penalties. Details of the scheme, which applies only to settlement of cases where investigators were appointed on or after 20 October 2005, are set out in DEPP 6.7. This chapter provides some commentary on certain practical aspects of the operation of the scheme.
1Decisions on settlements and statutory notices arising from them are taken by two members of the FCA's senior management, rather than by the RDC (DEPP refers to these individuals as the 'settlement decision makers'). Full details of the special decision making arrangements for settlements are set out in DEPP 5.
The report referred to in IPRU-INV 4.4.2D must reach the FCA1 within two months of the end of the relevant quarter and must state: (1) whether the Society has any information indicating or tending to indicate that, during the quarter to which the report relates, the members’ agents1 failed to meet the financial resource requirements referred to in IPRU-INV 4.4.1D; (2) whether, at the end of the quarter to which the report relates, the members’ agents1 failed to meet the financial
The report in IPRU-INV 4.4.4D must reach the FCA1 within seven months of that members’ agent's1 accounting reference date and must: (1) confirm that: (a) the Society has received from that members’ agent1 in respect of the financial year to which the report relates, all relevant attachments to the Annual Financial Return that the members’ agent1 is required to make to the Society under the requirements identified in IPRU-INV 4.4.1D; (b) that members’ agent1 met the applicable
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the market abuse. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the market abuse:(a) the conduct of the individual in
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the market abuse, or others, from committing further or similar abuse then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the market abuse to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar
The FCA3 and the individual on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA3 and the individual concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step
This guidance is issued under section 139A of Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance in the circumstances contemplated by it, then the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates.
Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance given by the FCA. This guidance represents the FCA's view, and does not bind the courts, for example, in relation to an action for damages brought by a private person for breach of a rule (see section 138D of the Act (Action for damages)), or in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of the general prohibition on carrying on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom without authorisation
The characteristics that a reasonable investor can be expected to have will inform the use of judgment required by the 'expectation test' and the 'satisfaction test'. These tests relate to the investor's ability to realise an investment within a reasonable period and to do so on the basis of the net value of its assets. In the FCA's view, the characteristics of the reasonable investor include:(1) sound judgment based on good sense;(2) some knowledge of, and possibly experience
The reasonable investor is a hypothetical investor. The implications of this are that the test does not relate to actual investment by a particular person at a particular time or in relation to a particular issue of any class of shares or securities. In the FCA's view, what underlies the test is what a reasonable investor would think he was getting into if he were contemplating investment in a particular body corporate. In addition, because the investor is hypothetical, the investment
After an initial assessment, however, the FCA's view is that subsequent applications of the investment condition could produce a different result, but only if there is a change to the constitution or practice of the body corporate which is significant and sustained. For example, this may happen if there is a change in the body corporate's published intentions or regular practices. As the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said in parliamentary debate when commenting on the definition,
Section 236(3) uses the words "the investor would, if he were to participate in the scheme". This is consistent with the fact that the reasonable investor is hypothetical. But applying the test at this early stage makes it clear that there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could base the expectation in section 236(3)(a). And on which he could be satisfied on the matters in section 236(3)(b). In the FCA's view, this requires, for example,
Article 25(1) applies only where the arrangements bring about or would bring about the particular transaction in question. This is because of the exclusion in article 26. In the FCA's view, a person brings about or would bring about a transaction only if his involvement in the chain of events leading to the transaction is of enough importance that without that involvement it would not take place. The second limb (article 25(2)) is potentially much wider as it does not require
The ordinary business of a publisher or broadcaster can involve him in publishing or broadcasting financial promotions (for example, advertisements) on behalf of authorised or exempt persons. Journalists who write about investments or financial services may promote the services of an authorised or exempt person. In the FCA's opinion, such persons would not normally be regarded as making arrangements under article 25(2). This is the case even if any arrangements they may have made
The Regulated Activities Order contains an exclusion (article 27: Enabling parties to communicate) to bring a degree of certainty to this area. This applies to arrangements which might otherwise fall within article 25(2) merely because they provide the means by which one party to a transaction (or potential transaction) is able to communicate with other parties. In the FCA's view, the crucial element of the exclusion is the inclusion of the word ‘merely’. So that, where a publisher,
For example, in the FCA's view a publisher or broadcaster would be likely to be making arrangements within the meaning of article 25(2) and be unable to make use of the exclusion in article 27 if:(1) he enters into an agreement with a provider of investment services such as a broker or product provider for the purpose of carrying their financial promotion; and(2) as part of the arrangements, the publisher or broadcaster does one or more of the following:(a) brands the investment
Other persons who may benefit from the exclusion in article 27 include persons who provide the means for someone to route an order to another person. A person providing such order routing services would not, in the FCA's view, be merely facilitating communication (of the orders) if he provides added value. This added value could be in the form, for example, of such things as formatted screens, audit trails, checking completeness of orders or matching orders or reconciling tra
(1) 1The FCA may suspend, with effect from such time as it may determine, the listing of any securities if the smooth operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardised or it is necessary to protect investors. [Note: article 18(1) CARD](2) An issuer that has the listing of any of its securities suspended must continue to comply with all listing rules applicable to it.(3) If the FCA suspends the listing of any securities, it may impose such conditions on the procedure
Examples of when the FCA may suspend the listing of securities include (but are not limited to) situations where it appears to the FCA that:(1) the issuer has failed to meet its continuing obligations for listing; or(2) the issuer has failed to publish financial information in accordance with the listing rules; or(3) the issuer is unable to assess accurately its financial position and inform the market accordingly; or(4) there is insufficient information in the market about a
(1) The removal of the exclusion for groups and joint enterprises in article 69 of the Regulated Activities Order (Groups and joint enterprises) may have implications for a company providing services for:(a) other members of its group; or(b) other participants in a joint enterprise of which it is a participant.(2) Such companies might typically provide risk or treasury management or administration services which may include regulated activities relating to a contract of insurance.
Article 67 excludes from the activities of dealing as agent, arranging (bringing about) deals in investments, making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments, assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance and advising on investments, any activity which:(1) is carried on in the course of carrying on any profession or business which does not otherwise consist of the carrying on of regulated activities in the United Kingdom; and(2) may
Article 67 may also apply to activities relating to assignments of insurance policies, as, in the FCA's view, article 2.3 of the IMD applies essentially to the creation of new contracts of insurance and not the assignment of rights under existing policies. As such, where a solicitor or licensed conveyancer arranges an assignment of a contract of insurance, the exclusion in article 67 remains of potential application. For similar reasons, trustees advising on or arranging assignments
Article 72B (see also PERG 5.3.7 G (Connected contracts of insurance)) may be of relevance to persons who supply non-motor goods or provide services related to travel in the course of carrying on a profession or business which does not otherwise consist of carrying on regulated activities. In the FCA's view, the fact that a person may carry on regulated activities in the course of the carrying on of a profession or business does not, of itself, mean that the profession or business
In the FCA's view, the liability risks referred to in PERG 5.11.13G (5) cover risks in relation to liabilities that the policyholder might have to others (that is, third party claims). Many policies will provide this sort of cover and so fall outside the scope of the exclusion. For example, a policy that covers the cost of unauthorised calls made when a mobile telephone is stolen includes 'liability risks' and would not be a 'connected contract of insurance'. By contrast, travel
2There is no set form for a stage 1 letter though it will always explain the nature of the misconduct, the FCA's view on penalty, and the period within which the FCA expects any settlement discussions to be concluded. In some cases, a draft statutory notice setting out the alleged rule breaches and the proposed penalty may form part of the letter, to convey the substance of the case team’s concerns and reasons for arriving at a particular penalty figure.
2The timing of the stage 1 letter will vary from case to case. Sufficient investigative work must have taken place for the FCA to be able to satisfy itself that the settlement is the right regulatory outcome. In many cases, the FCA can send out the stage 1 letter substantially before the person concerned is provided with the FCA's preliminary investigation report (see paragraphs 4.13.1 to 4.13.4). The latest point the FCA will send a stage 1 letter is when the person is provided
1In deciding whether to make a prohibition order and/or, in the case of an approved person, to withdraw its approval, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances including whether other enforcement action should be taken or has been taken already against that individual by the FCA. As is noted below, in some cases the FCA may take other enforcement action against the individual in addition to seeking a prohibition order and/or withdrawing its approval. The FCA will also
1The FCA has the power to make a range of prohibition orders depending on the circumstances of each case and the range of regulated activities to which the individual's lack of fitness and propriety is relevant. Depending on the circumstances of each case, the FCA may seek to prohibit individuals from performing any class of function in relation to any class of regulated activity, or it may limit the prohibition order to specific functions in relation to specific regulated activities.
1Where the FCA issues a prohibition order, it may indicate in the decision notice or final notice that it would be minded to revoke the order on the application of the individual in the future, in the absence of new evidence that the individual is not fit and proper. If the FCA gives such an indication, it will specify the number of years after which it would be minded to revoke or vary the prohibition on an application. However, the FCA will only adopt this approach in cases
1Paragraphs 9.3.1 to 9.3.7 set out additional guidance on the FCA's approach to making prohibition orders against approved persons and/or withdrawing such persons’ approvals. Paragraphs 9.5.1 to 9.5.2 set out additional guidance on the FCA's approach to making prohibition orders against other individuals.
The FCA expects a firm to have a validation process that includes the following:(1) standards of objectivity, accuracy, stability and conservatism that it designs its ratings systems to meet and processes that establish whether its rating systems meet those standards;(2) standards of accuracy of calibration (ie, whether outcomes are consistent with estimates) and discriminative power (ie, the ability to rank-order risk) that it designs its rating systems to meet and processes
The FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the performance of its rating systems against its chosen measure (or measures) of discriminative power. In making this comparison, a firm should rely primarily on actual historic default experience where this is available. In particular, the FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the extent of any potential inaccuracy in these measures, caused, in particular, by small sample size and the potential for divergence in the future, whether
In the case of a portfolio for which there is insufficient default experience to provide any confidence in statistical measures of discriminative power, the FCA expects a firm to use other methods. For example, analysis of whether the firm's rating systems and an external measurement approach (eg, external ratings) rank common obligors in broadly similar ways. Where such an approach is used, the FCA would expect a firm to ensure it does not systematically adjust its individual
Under section 60(3) of the CCA, if, on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer credit business or a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA impracticable for the firm to comply with any requirement of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) or the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) in a particular case, it may direct that the requirement be waived or varied in relation to the regulated agreement and subject
The requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights to cancel a cancellable agreement within the seven days following the making of that agreement does not apply in the case of the agreements described in SUP 8A.2.5 G, if: (1) on application by a firm to the FCA, the FCA has determined, having regard to:(a) the manner in which antecedent negotiations for the relevant agreements with the firm are conducted; and(b) the information
If on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA that it would be in the interests of hirers to do so, the FCA may direct that subject to such conditions (if any) as it may specify, section 101 of the CCA shall not apply to consumer hire agreements made by that firm.
Under article 53 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2013, any of the following given or made by the Office of Fair Trading which were in effect immediately before 1 April 2014 have effect as if they had been given or made by the FCA:(1) a direction given under section 60(3) of the CCA (form and content of agreements);(2) a determination made under section 64(4) of the CCA (duty to give notice of cancellation rights) and
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Payment Services Regulations. The Payment Services Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations on payment service providers to provide users with a range of information and various provisions regulating the rights and obligations of payment service users and providers.
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
1The regulatory powers which the Payment Services Regulations provide to the FCA include: the power to require information;powers of entry and inspection;power of public censure;the power to impose financial penalties;the power to prosecute or fine unauthorised providers; andthe power to vary an authorisation on its own initiative.
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
17The fees for funds8 reflect the estimated costs to the FCA of assessing applications and notifications. The level of fees payable in respect of an application or a notification will vary depending upon the provision of the Act under which it is made. This fee is adjusted when the scheme concerned is an umbrella.8
Applications for Part 4A permission (and exercises of Treaty rights) other than in respect of credit-related regulated activities7 are categorised by the 9FCA for the purpose of fee raising as straightforward, moderately complex and complex7 as identified in FEES 3 Annex 1. This differentiation is based on the permitted activities sought and does not reflect the 9FCA's risk assessment of the applicant (or Treaty firm).979
A potential applicant for Part 4A permission17 (or Treaty firm) has the opportunity to discuss its proposed application (or exercise of Treaty rights) with the 9FCA before submitting it formally.2 If an applicant for Part 4A permission17 (or Treaty firm) does so, the 9FCA will be able to use that dialogue to make an initial assessment of the fee categorisation and therefore indicate the authorisation fee that should be paid. 171717922171717179
Application fees for applications for and variations of Part 4A permission in respect of credit-related regulated activities are also set out in FEES 3 Annex 1F. Applications for Part 4A permission in respect of credit-related regulated activities are categorised by the 9FCA for the purposes of fee raising as straightforward, moderately complex and complex as identified in FEES 3 Annex 1, unless the application is for a limited permission.799[Note: PRA-authorised persons may also