Related provisions for DISP App 1.6.14
1 - 20 of 25 items.
23Firms proposing to offer arrangements involving some form of minimum underpinning or 'guarantee' should discuss their proposals with the FCA and1 HM Revenue and Customs1 at the earliest possible opportunity (see DISP App 1.5.8 G). The FCA will need to be satisfied that these proposals provide complainants with redress which is at least commensurate with the standard approaches contained in this appendix.
23One of the reasons for introducing the guidance in this appendix is to seek a reduction in the number of complaints which are referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. If a firm writes to the complainant proposing terms for settlement which are in accordance with this appendix, the letter may include a statement that the calculation of loss and redress accords with the FCAguidance, but should not imply that this extends to the assessment of whether or not the complaint should
The aspects of complaint handling dealt with in this appendix are how the firm should:(1) assess a complaint in order to establish whether the firm's conduct of the sale failed to comply with the rules, or was otherwise in breach of the duty of care or any other requirement of the general law (taking into account relevant materials published by the FCA, other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service and former schemes). In this appendix this is referred to as a "breach
Some of the distinguishing features of notices given under enactments other than the Act are as follows: (1) [deleted]66(2) [deleted]66(3) Friendly Societies Act 1992, section 58A1: The warning notice and decision notice must set out the terms of the direction which the FCA6 proposes or has decided to give and any specification of when the friendly society is to comply with it. A decision notice given under section 58A(3) must give an indication of the society's right, given by
1As a designated enforcer, the FCA has the power to apply to the courts for an enforcement order which requires a person who has committed a domestic or Community infringement or, as to the latter, is likely to commit such an infringement: (1) not to engage, including through a company and, as to a domestic infringement, whether or not in the course of business, in the conduct which constituted, or is likely to constitute, the infringement; (2) to publish the order and/or a corrective
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty, or the length of any period of suspension, restriction, condition or limitation (see DEPP 6A)4, and other conditions which the FCA seeks to impose by way of such action. These4 conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FCA recognises the benefits of such agreements, as4 they offer the potential for securing earlier
(1) The FCA3 will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FCA3 will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FCA3 will also take into account its statutory objectives3, for example in situations where
The FCA1 will consider it appropriate to impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation.2 where it believes that such action will be a more effective and persuasive
deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty alone. This is likely
to be the case where the FCA1 considers that direct and visible action in relation to a particular breach is necessary. Examples of circumstances
where the FCA1 may
consider it appropriate to take such action2 include:111(1) where
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
1Settlements in the FCA context are not the same as ‘out of court’ settlements in the commercial context. An FCA settlement is a regulatory decision, taken by the FCA, the terms of which are accepted by the firm or individual concerned. So, when agreeing the terms of a settlement, the FCA will carefully consider its statutory objectives and other relevant matters such as the importance of sending clear, consistent messages through enforcement action, and will only settle in appropriate
2The factors which the FCA may consider when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution for market misconduct rather than impose a sanction for market abuse include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct: if the misconduct is serious and prosecution is likely to result in a significant sentence, criminal prosecution may be more likely to be appropriate; (2) whether there are victims who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct:
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
1In addition, the FCA will consider, where relevant, factors including: (1) the extent to which the financial difficulties are, or are likely to be attributable to the management of the company or partnership, or to external factors, for example, market forces; (2) the extent to which it appears to the FCA that the company or partnership may, through an administrator, be able to trade its way out of its financial difficulties; (3) the extent to which the company or partnership
For the purpose of SUP 15.12.1R:(1) when calculating the number of complaints in SUP 15.12.1R(1)(a),
the firm should exclude complaints previously notified to the FCA
under this rule;(2) redress, under SUP 15.12.1R(1)(b), should be interpreted to include
an amount paid, or cost borne, by the firm, where a cash value can be
readily identified, and should include:(a) amounts paid for distress and inconvenience;(b) a free transfer out to another provider for which a transfer
would
If, notwithstanding the steps taken by a firm to comply with MCOB 1.6.3 R, it transpires that a mortgage which the firm has treated as unregulated or as a regulated credit agreement4 is in fact a regulated mortgage contract, the firm must as soon as practicable after the correct status of the mortgage has been established:(1) contact the customer and provide him with the following information in a durable medium:(a) a statement that the mortgage contract is a regulated mortgage