Related provisions for REC 6.5.1
161 - 180 of 515 items.
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for restitution orders under the Act will be made by the RDC Chairman or, in an urgent case and if the Chairman is not available, by an RDC Deputy Chairman. In an exceptionally urgent case the matter will be decided by the director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, another member of the FCA's executive of at least director of division level.
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
(1) The effect of section 59 of the Act is that if a person is to perform certain functions (which are known as controlled functions) for a credit union, the credit union should first apply for approval to:2(a) the FCA (if the controlled function is specified by the FCA in its rules); or2(b) the PRA (if the controlled function is specified by the PRA in its rules).2(2) The firm should not allow the person to perform that function until the firm receives the approval.2(3) A person
This guidance is issued under section 139A of Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance in the circumstances contemplated by it, then the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates.
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
(1) 10If an appointed representative's scope of appointment is to include MCD credit intermediation activity, the principal must notify the FCA of the appointment before the appointed representative commences that activity (see SUP 12.7.1 R (1)).(2) An appointed representative must not commence an MCD credit intermediation activity until they are included on the Financial Services Register. (3) If an appointed representative's scope of appointment is to include MCD credit intermediation
(1) 8A tied agent that is an appointed representative may not start to act as a tied agent until it is included on the applicable register (section 39(1A) of the Act). If the tied agent is established in the UK, the register maintained by the FCA is the applicable register for these purposes. If the tied agent is established in another EEA State, it should consult section 39(1B) of the Act to determine the applicable register.(2) A UK MiFID investment firm that appoints an FCA
1Section 365(6) of the Act makes it clear that the FCA may petition for the compulsory winding up of a company even if it is already in voluntary winding up. This power is already available to creditors and contributories of companies in voluntary winding up. For example, the court can be asked to direct the liquidator to investigate a transaction which the company undertook before the winding up. In some circumstances, this power may be used in respect of partnerships (section
1Factors which the FCA will consider when it decides whether to use this power (in addition to the factors identified in paragraphs 13.5.1 to 13.6.3 in relation to the FCA's decisions to seek compulsory winding up) include: (1) whether the FCA's concerns can properly and effectively be met by seeking a specific direction under section 365(2) of the Act;
(2) whether the affairs of the company require independent investigation of the kind which follows a compulsory
1The exceptional circumstances referred to above may arise where the matters under investigation have become the subject of public concern, speculation or rumour. In this case it may be desirable for the FCA to make public the fact of its investigation in order to allay concern, or contain the speculation or rumour. Where the matter in question relates to a takeover bid, the FCA will discuss any announcement beforehand with the Takeover Panel. Any announcement will be subject
1The FCA will not normally publish details of the information found or conclusions reached during its investigations. In many cases, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained by the FCA in the course of exercising its functions are likely to prevent publication (see section 348 of the Act). In exceptional circumstances, and where it is not prevented from doing so, the FCA may publish details. Circumstances in which it may do so include those where the fact
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
The FCA may, on a case-by-case basis, require a firm which does not meet any of the conditions in IFPRU 1.2.3 R to comply with the rules and requirements that apply to a significant IFPRU firm if the FCA considers it appropriate to do so to meet its strategic objective or to advance one or more of its operational objectives under the Act.
(1) A firm may apply to the FCA under section 138A of the Act to waive any one or more of the conditions in IFPRU 1.2.3 R if it believes that one or more of the governance requirements in (2) that apply to a significant IFPRU firm may be disproportionate to it. In its application for such waiver, the FCA expects the firm to demonstrate, taking into account size, nature, scope and complexity of its activities in the context of it being a member of a group and the internal organisation
1If an individual appears to be unable to pay a regulated activity debt, or to have no reasonable prospect of doing so, then section 372 of the Act permits the FCA to petition for the individual's bankruptcy, or in Scotland, for the sequestration of the individual's estate. The FCA will petition for bankruptcy or sequestration only if it believes that the individual is, in fact, insolvent. In determining this, as a general rule, the FCA will serve a demand requiring the individual
1If the FCA believes that the individual is insolvent, the factors it will consider when it decides whether to seek a bankruptcy order or sequestration award include: (1) whether others have taken steps to deal with the individual's insolvency, including a proposal by the individual of a voluntary arrangement, a petition by the individual for his own bankruptcy or sequestration, or a petition by a third party for the individual's bankruptcy or the sequestration of the individual's
1Exceptionally, the FCA will consider making such a challenge using its powers in sections 356 and 357 of the Act after considering, in particular, the following matters: (1) The composition of the creditors of the company including the ratio of consumer to non-consumer creditors or the nature of their claims;
(2) whether the FCA has concerns, or is aware of concerns of creditors, about the regularity of the meeting or the identification of connected or associated
4As well as potentially breaching the requirements in this section, misleading statements by a firm may involve a breach of Principle 7 (Communications with clients) or section Part 7 (Offences relating to financial services) of the Financial Services Act 2012, as well as giving rise to private law actions for misrepresentation.
(1) Regulation 15(8)(f) of the OEIC Regulations (Requirements for authorisation) requires independence between the depositary, the ICVC and the ICVC's directors, as does section 243(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the trustee and manager of an AUT, and section 261D(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the depositary and authorised fund manager of an ACS6. COLL 6.9.3 G to COLL 6.9.5 G give the6FCA's view of the meaning of independence of these relationships. An ICVC,
(1) Regulation 15(9) of the OEIC Regulations, and sections 243(8) and 261D(10)6 of the Act require that an authorised fund's name must not be undesirable or misleading. This section contains guidance on some specific matters the FCA will consider in determining whether the name of an authorised fund is undesirable or misleading. It is in addition to the requirements of regulation 19 of the OEIC Regulations (Prohibition on certain names).6(2) The FCA will take into account whether
(1) This paragraph explains the basis on which the director function and the non-executive director function are applied to persons who have a position with the firm'sparent undertaking or holding company under SUP 10A.6.8 R or SUP 10A.6.13 R.(2) The basic position is set out in SUP 10A.3.4 G. As is the case with all controlled functions, SUP 10A.6.8 R and SUP 10A.6.13 R are subject to the overriding provisions in SUP 10A.3.1 R, which sets out the requirements of section 59(1)
1A relevant authorised person assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of an approved person is required to notify the FCA under section 63(2A) of the Act if it forms the opinion that there are grounds on which the FCA could withdraw its approval (see SUP 10C.14.24R). In discharging its obligation to notify the FCA, a relevant authorised person should take into account how relevant and how important the matter is that comes to its attention which suggests an approved person