Related provisions for IFPRU 7.1.7
701 - 720 of 1060 items.
1Schedule 5 to the CRA gives: (a) the FCA; and (b) any other person, who may be an FCA
employee, specifically authorised or appointed by the FCA for this purpose; the power to require, by notice in writing, which must contain the particulars specified by paragraph 15 of Schedule 5, the production of information to enable the FCA to ascertain whether a person has complied with or is complying with an injunction granted or an undertaking given under Schedule
(1) The FCA may, at any time, require an issuer to publish such information in such form and within such time limits as it considers appropriate to protect investors or to ensure the smooth operation of the market.(2) If an issuer fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (1) the FCA may itself publish the information (after giving the issuer an opportunity to make representations as to why it should not be published).
(1) 1While the FCA will seek to obtain information from an RIE in the context of an open, cooperative and constructive relationship with the RIE, where it appears to the FCA that obtaining information in that context will not achieve the necessary results, the FCA or (as the case may be) its officers may, under section 165(7) of the Act, by notice in writing, require any of the following persons to provide or produce specified information or information of a specified description,
(1) In order to discharge its functions under the Act, the FCA1 needs timely and accurate information about firms. The provision of this information on a regular basis enables the FCA1 to build up over time a picture of firms' circumstances and behaviour.777(2) Principle 11 requires a firm to deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and to disclose to the FCA1 appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FCA1 would reasonably expect notice. The reporting
For a dormant fund account operator, unless2 any of SUP App 2.4.1 R, SUP App 2.5.1 R, SUP App 2.5.3 R or SUP App 2.6.1 R applies, if a firm's circumstances change, such that its capital resources have fallen, or are expected to fall, below the level advised in individual capital guidance1 given to the firm by the FCA2 , then, consistent with PRIN 2.1.1 RPrinciple 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should inform the appropriate regulator of this fact as soon as practicable,
1The FCA has published a separate regulatory guide, UNFCOG, which describes how it will use the general powers under the Unfair Terms Regulations, including its powers to obtain undertakings and seek information from firms. In addition, EG 10 describes how the FCA will use its injunctive powers under these Regulations.
The purpose of this chapter is
to implement Article 27 of MiFID,
which deals with the requirements on systematic
internalisersfor pre-trade transparency in shares, the execution of orders on behalf of clients and
standards and conditions for trading. It also provides a rule requiring investment firms to notify the
FCA
when they become, or cease to
be, a systematic internaliser,
and which gives effect to Article 21(4) of the MiFID
Regulation. The chapter
(1) The FCA interprets 'main' by reference to the share of the firm's business in the group, its contribution to the group's
balance sheet (measured on the basis of total assets) or profit and loss statement (measured on the basis of gross income). (2) The form in SUP 16 Ann 19 R, together with the guidance in SUP 16 Ann 20 G, shows the mechanics of the calculation.
1The FCA will always give written notice of the appointment of investigators to the person under investigation if it is required to give such notice under section 170 of the Act. In such cases, if there is a subsequent change in the scope or conduct of the investigation and, in the FCA's opinion, the person under investigation is likely to be significantly prejudiced if not made aware of this, that person will be given written notice of the change. It is impossible to give a definitive
In the FCA's view, the question of whether funds are invested by BC with the aim of spreading investment risk is not affected by the levels of risk involved in particular investments. What matters for these purposes is that the aim is to spread the risk, whatever it may be. For example, the value of each of BC's investments, if taken separately, might be subject to a high level of risk. However, this would not itself result in BC failing to satisfy the property condition as long