Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4
421 - 440 of 1060 items.
The FCA anticipates that there will be only a few firms needing to seek approval for an individual to perform the significant management function set out in SUP 10A.9.1R (1). In most firms, those approved for the FCA governing functions, FCA required functions and, where appropriate, the systems and controls function or the equivalent PRA controlled functions, are likely to exercise all the significant influence at senior management level.
A proprietary trader undertakes activities with the firm'smoney and has the ability to commit the firm. By virtue of this role, all proprietary traders have potential to be able to exercise significant influence on the firm for the purposes of the definition of significant-influence function. Therefore, it is the FCA's expectation that all firms will assess all their proprietary traders to ascertain the ones for whom approval is required.
The question may arise whether a manager who is based overseas will be performing the significant management function under SUP 10A.9.9 R and should, therefore, be an FCA-approved person. This is especially true where the firm operates matrix management. The fact there is a person performing the apportionment and oversight function, and who has responsibility for activities subject to regulation by the FCA, may have a bearing on this. It is a factor to take into account when assessing
A firm is not subject to consolidated supervision under the rules in this Chapter where any of the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by a competent authority other than the FCA; or (2) the firm is a member of a UK consolidation group already included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by the FCA under BIPRU 8; or (3) the firm
A firm need not meet the requirements in rules 14.3.1 and 14.3.2 if: (1) there is no credit
institution in the group;
(2) no firm in the group
deals in investments as principal, except where it is dealing solely as a result of its activity of operating a collective investment
scheme, or where the firm's positions fulfil the CAD Article 5 exempting criteria; (3) [Deleted](4) the firm notifies
If the firm notifies the FCA under rule 14.1.4 that it will not apply the rules in this section, it must: (1) submit to FCA a consolidated supervision return within the time period specified by SUP 16, together with a consolidated profit and loss
account;
(2) ensure that each firm in the group deducts from its solo financial resources any quantifiable contingent liability in respect of other group entities; (3) ensure that the solo financial
(1) [Deleted](2) The conditions in rule 14.1.5 aim to ensure that the firm is protected from weaknesses in other group entities. (3) In rule 14.1.5(2), contingent liabilities includes direct and indirect guarantees.
(4) 14.1.5(3) aims to ensure that the expenditure-based requirement incorporates the firm's actual ongoing annual expenditures (including any share of depreciation on fixed assets) where these have been met by another group entity. (5) The FCA
Reports of transactions made in accordance with Articles 25 (3) and (5) of MiFID shall contain the information specified in SUP 17 Annex 1 EU which is relevant to the type of financial instrument in question and which the FCA declares is not already in its possession or is not available to it by other means. |
[Note: article 13(1) of the MiFID Regulation.] |
11A firm must keep at the disposal of the FCA, for at least five years, the relevant
data relating to all transactions in financial instruments which it has carried
out, whether on own account or on behalf of a client.
In the case of transactions carried
out on behalf of clients, the
records shall contain all the information and details of the identity of the client, and the information required under
the money laundering directive.[Note:
article 25(2) of MiFID]
11The
requirement to keep information at the disposal of the FCA means that a firm should
maintain that information in such a form that it can readily be gathered and
transmitted to the FCA upon request. Where more than
one firm has given effect to
a transaction, each firm should be considered to have carried
out the transaction for the
purposes of SUP 17.4.3 R and should keep the records, even where only
one firm makes a transaction report as contemplated in this
Chapter.
An example of a good or service 3relating to the execution of trades that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) is post-trade analytics. These would not meet the evidential criteria for a good or service to be directly related to the execution of trades under COBS 11.6.4E (1).33
Examples of goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) include price feeds or historical price data that have not been analysed or manipulated in order to present the investment manager with meaningful conclusions. These would not meet the evidential criteria for a good or service to amount to the provision of substantive research under COBS 11.6.5E
Examples of goods or services that relate to the execution of trades or the provision of research that the FCA does not regard as meeting the requirements of either evidential provisions COBS 11.6.4E (1) or COBS 11.6.5E (1)3 include:3(1) services relating to the valuation or performance measurement of portfolios;(2) computer hardware; (3) connectivity services such as electronic networks and dedicated telephone lines; (4) seminar fees;(4A) 3corporate access services;3(5) subscriptions
The reference to substantive 3research in the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) is not confined to investment research as defined in the Glossary. Substantive research can potentially be or include investment research, but this is not part of the criteria under COBS 11.6.5 E.3 In addition, any goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FCA regards as not acceptable under COBS 11.6.7 G or COBS 11.6.8 G3 should be viewed as not meeting the
In assessing the adequacy of prior and periodic disclosures made by an investment manager under this section, the FCA will have regard to the extent to which the investment manager adopts disclosure standards developed by industry associations such as the Investment Management Association, the National Association of Pension Funds and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe.
(1) One purpose of the management responsibilities map for third country relevant authorised persons is to help the firm and the FCA satisfy themselves that the branch has a clear organisational structure (as required by SYSC, where applicable). (2) It also helps the FCA to identify who it needs to speak to about particular issues and who is accountable if something goes wrong.
(1) The management responsibilities map is an important support to the FCA’s functions as Host Statecompetent authority.(2) Having requirements and powers that apply directly to individuals helps to make the requirements on firms that the FCA is required or entitled to impose as Host Statecompetent authority more effective.(3) The management responsibilities map helps the FCA to operate its powers and requirements for individuals. For example it helps the FCA:(a) to identify
An EEA relevant authorised person may exclude from its management responsibilities map:(1) any information contained in its requisite details;(2) any information contained in any notice of changes to its requisite details under the EEA Passport Rights Regulations; and(3) any other information that has been supplied by the firm to the FCA or the PRA (including through the firm’sHome Statecompetent authority) if:(a) that information was supplied to the FCA or the PRA as a Host Statecompetent
(1) The guidance in this paragraph applies to EEA relevant authorised persons and third-country relevant authorised persons.(2) The FCA expects that the management responsibilities map of a small and non-complex branch is likely to be simple and short. It may be no more than a single sheet of paper.(3) A branch is likely to be small and non-complex if it:(a) conducts a limited number of simple business lines; and(b) does not rely on group governance arrangements or on governance
A firm does not have to give notice to the FCA2 under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:55(1) the FCA2 or55(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Article 10(2) of the Financial Groups Directive
(1) 3A firm must, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, regularly provide the FCA2 with details on the financial conglomerate's legal structure and governance and organisational structure, including all regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches.(2) A firm must disclose publicly, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, on an annual basis, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description of the financial
The FOS ADR levy is
calculated as follows:(1) Determine the number of hours, or part of an
hour, taken by the FCA, in performing functions
under the ADR Regulations.(2) Using the table at FEES 3 Annex 9R(11),
determine the relevant pay grades of those employed by the
FCA to perform the functions under the
ADR Regulations.(3) Next, multiply the applicable rate in the table
at FEES 3 Annex 9R(11) by the number of hours or part hours obtained under
(1).(4) Then add any fees and disbursements
(1) CASS 11.3.4R describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice bodies.1(2) As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4R (in conjunction with SUP 10A.4.1R and SUP 10A.7.10R), in a CASS large debt management firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4R is required to be discharged by a director
A CASS large debt management firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of: (1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that CASS debt management firm's systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the CASS debt management firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.
If, at the time a CASS debt management firm that is not a relevant authorised person1becomes a CASS large debt management firm in accordance with CASS 11.2.8 R, the firm is not able to comply with CASS 11.3.4 R because it has no director or senior manager who is an approved person in respect of the CASS operational oversight function, the firm must:(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that it complies with CASS 11.3.4 R as soon as practicable, which must at least include submitting
(1) 1CASS 11.3.5R provides a grace period for a firm that is not a relevant authorised person to apply for someone to be approved to perform the CASS operational oversight function. (2) There is no equivalent to CASS 11.3.5R for a relevant authorised person, because a person does not need specific FCA approval before carrying out the function. This is explained in (3) to (5), below.(3) As explained in CASS 11.3.3G, the function in CASS 11.3.5R is not, by itself, a controlled function.(4)
(1) 6A must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that A provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which A’s business is organised;(d) if A is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
(1) 6B must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that B provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which B’s business is organised;(d) if B is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
6The guidance in COND 2.3 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2C of Schedule 6 of the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, paragraph 3B of Schedule 6 of the Act.
In assessing the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2C and 3B of Schedule 6 to the Act6, factors which the FCA6 will take into consideration include, among other things, whether: 6(1) it is likely that the FCA6 will receive adequate information from the firm, and those persons with whom the firm has close links, to enable it to determine whether the firm is complying with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system for which the FCA is responsible6 and to
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
A parent undertaking of a management company or of an investment firm must in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that:1(1) the organisational structures of the parent undertaking and the management company or investment firm are such that the voting rights are exercised independently of the parent undertaking;(2) the persons who decide how the voting rights are exercised
A parent undertaking of a third country undertaking must comply with the notification requirements in DTR 5.4.4 R (1) and DTR 5.4.5 R and in addition: (1) must make a statement that in respect of each management company or investment firm concerned, the parent undertaking complies with the conditions of independence set down in DTR 5.4.10 R; and (2) must1 be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that the requirements of DTR 5.4.6 R are respected.[Note: article 23 of the TD
Where the FCA has modified LR 14.2.2 R to accept a percentage lower than 25% on the basis that the market will operate properly with a lower percentage, but the FCA considers that in practice the market for the shares is not operating properly, the FCA may revoke the modification in accordance with LR 1.2.1 R (4).
A company2 must forward to the FCA, for publication through the document viewing facility, two copies of:2(1) all circulars, notices, reports or other documents to which the listingrules apply, at the same time as any such documents are issued; and(2) all resolutions passed by the company other than resolutions concerning ordinary business at an annual general meeting, as soon as possible after the relevant general meeting.
A benchmark submitter who suspects that any person(1) is manipulating, or has manipulated, a specified benchmark;(2) is attempting, or has attempted, to manipulate a specified benchmark; or(3) is colluding, or has colluded, in the manipulation or attempted manipulation of a specified benchmark;must notify the FCA without delay.
(1) The FCA expects the report required under MAR 8.2.12 R to be issued annually, although the FCA may agree a longer period depending on the benchmark submitter's particular circumstances, including the nature and scale of its engagement in the specified benchmark and the internal framework for monitoring compliance with the requirements of this chapter.(2) A benchmark submitter which proposes to appoint an auditor to report to the FCA under MAR 8.2.12 R on a less frequent than
(1) 1A person who notifies the FCA of a desire to obtain interim permission in accordance with article 56 (Interim permission) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2013 must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, a fee of :(a) where the person is a sole trader:(i) if the notification is made on or before 30 November 2013, £105; or(ii) £150; (b) in any other case:(i) if the notification is made on or before 30 November
(1) 2A local authority which notifies the FCA of a desire to obtain interim permission in accordance with article 56 (Interim permission) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2013 must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, a fee of £350.(2) The fee required by (1) must be paid by debit card (Maestro/Visa only), credit card (Visa/Mastercard only), bankers draft, cheque, or other payable order.(3) The fee required
A firm (with the exception of a sole trader who has no employees)21 must:12(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information is likely to take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. Examples of situations where information provided by a person (P) might take the form of advice are given below.(1) P may provide information on a selected, rather than balanced and neutral, basis that would tend to influence the decision of a person. This may arise where P offers to provide information about
The potential for variation in the form, content and manner of pre-purchase questioning is considerable, but there are two broad types. The first type involves providing questions and answers which are confined to factual matters (for example, the amount of the cover). In the FCA's view, this does not itself amount to advising on contracts of insurance, if it involves the provision of information rather than advice. There are various possible scenarios, including the following:(1)
In the case of PERG 5.8.18G (2) and similar scenarios, the FCA considers that it is necessary to look at the process and outcome of pre-purchase questioning as a whole. It may be that the element of advice incorporated in the questioning can properly be viewed as generic advice if it were considered in isolation. But although the actual advice may be generic, the process has ended in identifying one or more particular contracts of insurance. The combination of the generic advice
This is explained in greater detail, together with the provisions on the granting of certificates by the FCA on the application of the proprietor of a periodical publication or news or information service or broadcast, in PERG 7 (Periodical publications, news services and broadcasts: applications for certification).
Within the legal constraints that apply, the appropriate regulator2 may pass on to a skilled person any information which it considers relevant to the skilled person's function. A skilled person, being a primary recipient under section 348 of the Act (Restrictions on disclosure of confidential information by Authority etc.), is bound by the confidentiality provisions in Part XXIII of the Act (Public record, disclosure of information and cooperation) as regards confidential information
2In respect of the appointment of a skilled person under section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act, a contractual or other requirement imposed on a person to keep any information confidential will not apply if:(1) the information is or may be relevant to anything required to be done as part of the skilled person's appointment under section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act;(2) a firm
2A firm may provide information that would otherwise be subject to a contractual or other requirement to keep it in confidence if it is provided for the purposes of anything required to be done in respect of the skilled person's collection or updating of information under section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act.
1DEPP 6A sets out the FCA's2 statement of policy with respect to the imposition of suspensions
or restrictions under sections 88A, 89Q and 206A of the Act3, and the period for which those suspensions or restrictions
are to have effect, as required by sections3 88C(1), 89S(1)2 and 210(1) of the Act. It also sets out the FCA's statement of policy on the imposition of suspensions, conditions or limitations under section 66 of the Act, the period for which suspensions or conditions
The power to impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation3 is a disciplinary measure which the FCA2 may use in addition to, or instead of, imposing a financial penalty
or issuing a public censure.
The principal purpose of imposing such a measure3 is to promote
high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from
committing further breaches,
helping to deter other persons from
committing similar breaches,
and demonstrating
The powers to impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation3 in relation
to authorised persons and approved persons are disciplinary measures;2 where the FCA2 considers it necessary to take action, for example, to protect consumers from an authorised
person, the FCA2 will seek to cancel or vary the authorised
person'spermissions.
If the FCA2 has
concerns with a person's fitness
to be approved, and considers it necessary to take action, the FCA2 will
seek to prohibit
3The FCA expects to impose a limitation in two situations. The FCA may impose a limitation where it considers it appropriate for an approval to cease to have effect:(1) after a certain period, unless the approved person demonstrates during the period of limitation that it is appropriate for them to be reapproved without the limitation;(2) after a short period, without giving the approved person the opportunity to demonstrate that they should be re-approved.The imposition of a
Pursuant to the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (Short Selling) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2554), the FCA will direct how notifications to use
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption shall
be made. Such directions will be published on the FCA website and listed in FINMAR 2 Annex 1
G.
(1) If the FCA considers that a natural or legal
person ('P') who has notified the FCA of his intention to use either
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption does
not satisfy the criteria to use the market
maker exemption or the authorised
primary dealer exemption, the FCA will send a letter to P setting
out the reasons why it is minded to prohibit P from using the market maker exemption or the authorised primary dealer exemption.(2) P will be given
If P is not satisfied with the FCA's decision to prohibit P's use of
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption,
P may seek a review of the decision. This will be conducted by a group of
at least three senior FCA staff. None of the group conducting
the review will have been connected with the earlier decision taken in respect
of P's use of the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption.
The review may take place after the expiry
23Firms proposing to offer arrangements involving some form of minimum underpinning or 'guarantee' should discuss their proposals with the FCA and1 HM Revenue and Customs1 at the earliest possible opportunity (see DISP App 1.5.8 G). The FCA will need to be satisfied that these proposals provide complainants with redress which is at least commensurate with the standard approaches contained in this appendix.
23One of the reasons for introducing the guidance in this appendix is to seek a reduction in the number of complaints which are referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. If a firm writes to the complainant proposing terms for settlement which are in accordance with this appendix, the letter may include a statement that the calculation of loss and redress accords with the FCAguidance, but should not imply that this extends to the assessment of whether or not the complaint should
23'Relevant benefits' are those benefits that fall outside what is required in order that policyholders' reasonable expectations at that point of sale can be fulfilled. (The phrase 'policyholders' reasonable expectations' has technically been superseded. However, the concept now resides within the obligations imposed upon firms by FCA Principle 6 ('...a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly....') Additionally, most of these benefits would