Related provisions for DEPP 6.2.9
61 - 80 of 86 items.
1Where a firm or other person has failed to comply with the requirements of the Act, the rules, or other relevant legislation, it may be appropriate to deal with this without the need for formal disciplinary or other enforcement action. The proactive supervision and monitoring of firms, and an open and cooperative relationship between firms and their supervisors, will, in some cases where a contravention has taken place, lead the FCA to decide against taking formal disciplinary
(1) When deciding whether to take enforcement
action under Part 7 of the RCB Regulations,
and what form that enforcement action should take, the FCA will consider all relevant factors,
including:(a) the relevant factors on decisions to take action set out in DEPP 6.2.1 G;(b) whether any contractual or other arrangements agreed between the
parties can be used effectively to address any perceived failure under the RCB Regulations; and(c) the interests of investors in the relevant
2It is the FCA's
policy not to impose a sanction for market abuse where a person is being prosecuted for market misconduct or has been finally convicted or acquitted of market misconduct (following the exhaustion of all appeal processes) in a criminal prosecution arising from substantially the same allegations. Similarly, it is the FCA's
policy not to commence a prosecution for market misconduct where the FCA has brought or is seeking to bring
GEN 6.1.4A R,2GEN 6.1.5 R and GEN 6.1.6 R do not prevent a firm or member from entering into, arranging, claiming on or making any payment under a contract of insurance which indemnifies any person against all or part of the costs of defending appropriate regulator5 enforcement action or any costs they may be ordered to pay to the appropriate regulator5.55
1The FCA's approach to taking enforcement action under the CCA Order will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
1In the course of its supervision and monitoring of a firm or as part of an enforcement action, the FCA may make it clear that it expects the firm to take certain steps to meet regulatory requirements. In the vast majority of cases the FCA will seek to agree with a firm those steps the firm must take to address the FCA’s concerns. However, where the FCA considers it appropriate to do so, it will exercise its formal powers under sections 55J or 55L of the Act to vary a firm's
3The FCA has the power to take the following enforcement action: • discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons and other individuals1under s.66 of the 2000 Act;• impose penalties on persons that perform controlled functions without approval under s.63A of the 2000 Act;• impose civil penalties in cases of market abuse under s.123 of the 2000 Act;• prohibit an individual from being employed in connection with a regulated activity, under s.56
The FCA5 expects to maintain a close working relationship with certain
types of firm and expects that
routine supervisory matters arising can be resolved during the normal course
of this relationship by, for example, issuing individual guidance where
appropriate (see SUP 9.3). However,
where the FCA deems it appropriate,
it will exercise its own-initiative powers:55(1) in
circumstances where it considers it appropriate for the firm to
be subject to a formal requirement,
breach
In determining whether a UK recognised body has effective arrangements for monitoring and enforcing compliance with its rules (including3 its settlement arrangements), the FCA3 may have regard to:33(1) the UK recognised body's ability to:(a) monitor and oversee the use of its facilities;(b) assess its members' compliance with its rules (and settlement arrangements, where appropriate);(c) assess the significance of any non-compliance;(d) take appropriate disciplinary action against
1A clear division between the conduct of the investigation on the one hand and the need to continue with the ongoing supervision of the firm on the other may mean that the investigation does not benefit as much as it might otherwise do from the knowledge of the firm or individuals that the supervisors will have built up, or from their general understanding of the firm's business or sector. Before matters are referred to the Enforcement Division for investigation, FCA staff from
1The FCA may consider taking disciplinary action against a firm that has not taken reasonable care, as required by section 56(6) of the Act, to ensure that none of that firm's functions in relation to carrying on of a regulated activity is performed by a person who is prohibited from performing the function by a prohibition order. The FCA considers that a search by a firm of the Financial Services Register is an essential part of the statutory duty to take reasonable care to ensure
1The FCA's policy with respect to the prosecution of criminal offences is set out in EG 12 and applies to the prosecution of CCA offences under section 401 of the Act. The FCA will not prosecute a person for an offence under the CCA in respect of an act or omission where the FCA has already disciplined the person under section 66, 205, 206 or 206A of the Act in respect of that act or omission.
1Except where the FCA has issued a warning notice, and the FCA has subsequently discontinued the proceedings, the Act does not require the FCA to provide notification of the termination of an investigation or subsequent enforcement action. However, where the FCA has given a person written notice that it has appointed an investigator and later decides to discontinue the investigation without any present intention to take further action, it will confirm this to the person concerned
1When deciding whether or not to disqualify an auditor under section 249(1) or section 261K(1) of the Act (concerning the power to disqualify an auditor for breach of trust scheme
rules or contractual scheme rules), and in setting the disqualification, the FCA will take into account all the circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, the following circumstances: (1) the effect of the auditor's breach of a duty imposed by trust scheme
3Section 415B of the Act requires the FCA to consult with the PRA before it takes certain enforcement action in relation to a PRA-authorised person or someone who has a qualifying relationship (as defined in section 415B(4) of the Act) with a PRA-authorised person. Further detail on when the FCA is required to consult the PRA, and when it has agreed to notify the PRA of certain matters, is set out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the PRA and the FCA.
1The broad test the FCA will apply when it decides whether to seek an injunction is whether the application would be the most effective way to deal with the FCA's concerns. In deciding whether an application for an injunction is appropriate in a given case, the FCA will consider all relevant circumstances and may take into account a wide range of factors. The following list of factors is not exhaustive; not all the factors will be relevant in a particular case and there may be
The criteria for determining whether it is appropriate to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty include those factors that the FCA2 will consider in1 determining the amount of penalty set out in DEPP 6.5 A to DEPP 6.5 D.1 Some particular considerations that may be relevant when the FCA2 determines whether to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty are:122(1) whether or not deterrence may be effectively achieved by issuing a public