Related provisions for IFPRU 7.1.7
361 - 380 of 1049 items.
1Where the FCA believes that a company or partnership to which sections 359(1) and 367(1) of the Act applies is, or is likely to become, unable to pay its debts, the FCA will consider whether it is appropriate to seek an administration order or a compulsory winding up order from the court. The FCA's approach will be in two stages: the first is to consider whether it is appropriate to seek any insolvency order; the second is to consider which insolvency order will meet, or is likely
1In determining whether it is appropriate to seek an insolvency order on this basis, the FCA will consider the facts of each case including, where relevant: (1) whether the company or partnership has taken or is taking steps to deal with its insolvency, including petitioning for its own administration, placing itself in voluntary winding up or proposing to enter into a company voluntary arrangement, and the effectiveness of those steps; (2) whether any consumer or other creditor
1After the FCA has determined that it is appropriate to seek an insolvency order, and there is no moratorium in place under Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended by the Insolvency Act 2000) (hereafter referred to in this chapter as 'the 1986 Act'), it will consider whether this order should be an administration order or a compulsory winding up order.
2The FCA3 will seek to deprive an individual of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA3 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit. Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breaching FCA3rules or other requirements of the regulatory system and the individual’s breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA3
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of an individual’s “relevant income”. “Relevant income” will be the gross amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with which the breach occurred (the “relevant employment”), and for the period of the breach. In determining an individual’s relevant income, “benefits” includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, pension contributions, share options and share schemes;
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the individual in bringing (or
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar breaches
The FCA3 and the individual on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA3 and the individual concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step
1When it considers how it should deal with a concern about a firm, the FCA will have regard to its statutory objectives and the range of regulatory tools that are available to it. It will also have regard to: (1) the responsibilities of a firm's management to deal with concerns about the firm or about the way its business is being or has been run; and (2) the principle that a restriction imposed on a firm should be proportionate to the objectives the FCA is seeking to achieve.
1In the course of its supervision and monitoring of a firm or as part of an enforcement action, the FCA may make it clear that it expects the firm to take certain steps to meet regulatory requirements. In the vast majority of cases the FCA will seek to agree with a firm those steps the firm must take to address the FCA’s concerns. However, where the FCA considers it appropriate to do so, it will exercise its formal powers under sections 55J or 55L of the Act to vary a firm's
1Examples of circumstances in which the FCA will consider varying a firm'sPart 4A permission because it has serious concerns about a firm, or about the way its business is being or has been conducted include where: (1) in relation to the grounds for exercising the power under section 55J(1)(a) or section 55L(2)(a) of the Act, the firm appears to be failing, or appears likely to fail, to satisfy the threshold conditions relating to one or more, or all, of its regulated activities,
Unless required sooner under another rule in this chapter, in complying with CASS 7.15.5 R (1) a firm should ensure it is able to determine the total amount of client money it should be holding for each client within two business days of having taken a decision to do so or at the request of the FCA.
(1) Before using a non-standard method of internal client money reconciliation, a firm must:(a) establish and document in writing its reasons for concluding that the method of internal client money reconciliation it proposes to use will:(i) (for the normal approach to segregating client money) check whether the amount of client money recorded in the firm's records as being segregated in client bank accounts meets the firm's obligation to its clients under the client money rules
A firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if: (1) its internal records and accounts of client money are materially out of date, inaccurate or invalid so that the firm is no longer able to comply with the requirements in CASS 7.15.2 R, CASS 7.15.3 R or CASS 7.15.5 R (1);(2) it will be unable to, or materially fails to, pay any shortfall into a client bank account or withdraw any excess from a client bank account so that the firm is unable to comply with CASS 7.15.29 R
The deterrent effect and impact
on a person of a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation2, by itself or in combination with a financial penalty, may
be greater than where only a financial penalty is imposed. The FCA1 will consider the overall impact and deterrent effect of the
sanctions it imposes when determining the level of penalty and the length
of suspension, restriction, condition or limitation2. 1
The FCA1 expects usually to take the following approach in respect of
the interaction between a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation2 and a financial penalty
or public censure:1(1) The FCA1 will determine which sanction, or combination of sanctions, is
appropriate for the breach.1(2) If the FCA1, following the approach set out in DEPP 6.2, considers it appropriate
to impose a financial penalty, it will calculate the appropriate level of
the financial penalty, following
The FCA1 may depart from the approach set out in DEPP 6A.4.2 G.
For example, the FCA1 may
at the outset consider that a financial penalty is the only appropriate sanction
for a breach but, having determined
the appropriate level of financial penalty, may consider it appropriate to
reduce the amount of the financial penalty for serious financial hardship
reasons. In such a situation, the FCA1 may consider it appropriate to impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation2
2These guidelines concern the following bodies (the agencies): the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA);the Serious Fraud Office (the SFO);the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS);the Crown Prosecution Service (the CPS);the Association of Chief Police Officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO);the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS);the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (the PPS);the Association of Chief Police Officers
2The guidelines are intended to assist the agencies when considering cases concerning financial crime and/or regulatory misconduct that are, or may be, of mutual interest to the FCA and one or more of the other agencies. Their implementation and wider points arising from them will be kept under review by the agencies who will liaise regularly.
2The following are indicators of whether action by the FCA or one of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered in the round.(a) 2 Tending towards action by the FCAWhere the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated
2The agencies will consider, as necessary, and keep under review whether an investigation has reached the point where it is appropriate to commence proceedings. Where agencies are deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, they will have regard to the usual codes or guidance relevant to that decision. For example, agencies other than the PPS or COPFS will have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Note: Different guidance applies to the PPS and COPFS. All criminal
So-called 'mortgage clubs' or 'wholesalers' essentially act as a distribution function for lenders, providing information to intermediaries about current deals available from a range of lenders. They provide information (often through an electronic sourcing system) in a way that helps intermediaries search the market effectively and, as such, do not deal directly with individual borrowers. If only engaged in these activities and without direct contact with individual borrowers,
So-called 'mortgage packaging companies' may undertake certain parts of the mortgage process for lenders on an outsourced basis, ensuring that a complete set of documentation is collated and sent to the lender. This might include receiving application forms from intermediaries, undertaking credit reference checks and instructing a valuer. Other activities might include a product placement service for other intermediaries who provide product advice or recommendations to their clients.
The term 'broker packagers' is typically used to describe intermediaries who either market their services directly to borrowers or who offer other intermediaries a complete mortgage outsourcing service. They are often involved in the sales and advice process, including helping the borrower complete application forms. In the FCA's view, broker packagers carrying on these types of activity in direct contact with the borrower are likely to be carrying on the regulated activities
For the purpose of article 282(6) of the EU CRR (Hedging sets), a firm must apply the CCR Mark-to-market method as set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 3 (Mark-to-market method) of the EU CRR to:(1) transactions with non-linear risk profile; or(2) payment legs and transactions with debt instruments as underlying;for which it cannot determine the delta or the modified duration, as the case may be, using an internal model approved by the FCA under Part Three Title
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for granting permission to a firm to use its own one-sided credit valuation adjustment internal models (an "internal CVA model") for the purpose of estimating the maturity factor "M", as proposed under article 162(2)(h) of the EU CRR (Maturity).(2) In the context of counterparty credit risk, the maturity factor "M" is intended to increase the own funds requirements to reflect potential higher risks associated with medium and long-term
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for permitting a firm with the permission to use the Internal Model Method set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 6 (Internal model method) and the permission to use an internal VaR model for specific risk set out in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 (Use of internal models) associated with traded debt instruments to set to 1 the maturity factor "M" defined in article 162 of the EU CRR.(2) In the context of counterparty
4The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
1This
chapter applies to:(1) a MiFID
investment firm;(2) a third country investment firm; and to(3) a person who
is the operator of an approved reporting
mechanism or of a regulated
market or MTF that
is used by a firm to report transactions to the FCA; and(4) a firm acting in its capacity as
a manager or operator of:(a) a collective investment undertaking;
or(b) a pension
scheme; or(c) an occupational
pension scheme; or(d) a personal
pension scheme; or(e) a stakeholder
pension
2In
line with guidance from CESR, the FCA acknowledges that, from a practical
point of view, it would be burdensome for branches of investment firms to be obliged to report
their transactions to two competent authorities. Therefore, all transactions executed by branches may
be reported to the competent authority of
the Host State, if the investment firm elects to do so. In these
cases transaction reports should
follow the rules of the competent authority to
which the report is
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FCA2 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA2 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA2 may do this include:222(a) where the FCA2 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;2(b) where previous FCA2 action in respect of similar breaches has failed
The FCA2 and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA2 and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.22
COND gives guidance on the threshold conditions. The FCA3threshold conditions represent the minimum conditions for which the FCA is responsible,3 which a firm is required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retainPart 4A permission. A PRA-authorised person or, as appropriate, a firm seeking to become a PRA-authorised person must also satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the threshold conditions for which the PRA is responsible in order to be given and
(1) Under section 55B(3) of the Act3, in giving or varying a Part 4A permission,3 imposing or varying any requirement or giving consent3, the FCA3 must ensure that the firm concerned will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the FCA3threshold conditions in relation to all of the regulated activities for which it has or will have permission.(2) If, however, the applicant for permission is an incoming firm seeking top-up permission, or variation of top-up permission, under Part 4A3
(1) If, among other things, a firm is failing to satisfy any of the FCA3threshold conditions, or is likely to fail to do so, the FCA3 may exercise its own-initiative powers under either section 55J (Variation or cancellation on initiative of regulator) or section 55L (Imposition of requirements by FCA) of the Act3. Use of the FCA's own-initiative powers3 is explained in SUP 7 (Individual requirements), and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FCA's3 own initiative
(1) Under section 185 of the Act (Assessment: general) the FCA may, subject to consultation with the PRA where the conditions in section 187B of the Act are satisfied, object to an acquisition of an FCA-authorised person if there are reasonable grounds to do so on the basis of the matters set out in section 186 of the Act (Assessment: criteria) or if the information provided by the section 178 notice giver is incomplete. Section 186(d) of the Act (Assessment: criteria) specifies
1An administration order can be made only in relation to companies and partnerships and only where the court believes that making such an order will achieve one or more of the four purposes set out in section 8 of the 1986 Act. The FCA will apply for an administration order only where it considers that doing so will meet or is likely to meet one or more of these purposes.
1In addition, the FCA will consider, where relevant, factors including: (1) the extent to which the financial difficulties are, or are likely to be attributable to the management of the company or partnership, or to external factors, for example, market forces; (2) the extent to which it appears to the FCA that the company or partnership may, through an administrator, be able to trade its way out of its financial difficulties; (3) the extent to which the company or partnership
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions
The FCA's3 general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:3(1) the FCA3 has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and2132(2) the FCA's3 supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives. 3
1The FCA will exercise its rights under sections 362, 371 and 374 of the Act to be heard on a third party's petition or in subsequent hearings only where it believes it has information that it considers relevant to the court's consideration of the petition or application. These circumstances may include: (1) where the FCA has relevant information which it believes may not otherwise be drawn to the court's attention; especially where the FCA has been asked to attend for a particular
1The making of an insolvency order operates to stay any proceedings already in place against the company,
partnership or individual, and prevents proceedings being commenced while the insolvency order is in place. Proceedings can continue or be commenced against those persons only with the court's permission. This may impact on the effectiveness of the FCA's use of its powers to seek injunctions and restitution orders from the court. The FCA will draw the court's
1The FCA is given power to receive the same information as creditors are entitled to receive in the winding up, administration, receivership or voluntary arrangement of an authorised person, of appointed representatives and of persons who have carried out a regulated activity while unauthorised. The FCA is also entitled to attend and make representation at any creditors' meeting or (where relevant) creditors' committee meeting taking place in those regimes. When it decides whether
Sections 250 and 261L11 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FCA12 to waive the application of certain rules in COLL to:111210(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT, ACS11 or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT, ACS11 or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT), the authorised contractual scheme manager and depositary (in the case of an ACS)11 or the ICVC and
1The FCA may impose a variation of permission or a requirement so that it takes effect immediately or on a specified date if it reasonably considers it necessary for the variation or requirement to take effect immediately (or on the date specified), having regard to the ground on which it is exercising its own-initiative powers.
1The FCA will consider exercising its own-initiative power as a matter of urgency where: (1) the information available to it indicates serious concerns about the firm or its business that need to be addressed immediately; and (2) circumstances indicate that it is appropriate to use statutory powers immediately to require and/or prohibit certain actions by the firm in order to ensure the firm addresses these concerns.
1It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of the situations that will give rise to such serious concerns, but they are likely to include one or more of the following characteristics: (1) information indicating significant loss, risk of loss or other adverse effects for consumers, where action is necessary to protect their interests; (2) information indicating that a firm's conduct has put it at risk of being used for the purposes of financial crime, or of being otherwise
1The FCA will consider the full circumstances of each case when it decides whether an urgent variation of Part 4A permission or an imposition of a requirement is appropriate. The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors the FCA may consider. (1) The extent of any loss, or risk of loss, or other adverse effect on consumers. The more serious the loss or potential loss or other adverse effect, the more likely it is that the FCA’s urgent exercise of own-initiative powers will
(1) The purpose of this section is to set out the requirements for a firm specified in SUP 16.16.1 R to report the outcomes of its prudent valuation assessments to the FCA4 and to do so in a standard format.277(2) The purpose of collecting this data on the prudent valuation assessments made by a firm is to assist the FCA4 in assessing the capital resources of firms, to enable the FCA4 to gain a wider understanding of the nature and sources of measurement uncertainty in fair-valued
(1) 7A firm to which this section applies must submit to the FCA4 quarterly (on a calendar year basis and not from a firm'saccounting reference date), within six weeks of each quarter end, a Prudent Valuation Return in respect of its fair-value assessments in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 31A.2(2) [deleted]47777
Where a firm to which SUP 16.16.4 R applies is a member of a FCA consolidation group, the firm must comply with SUP 16.16.4 R:(1) on a solo-consolidation basis if the firm has an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission, or on an unconsolidated basis if the firm does not have an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission; and(2) separately, on the basis of the consolidated financial position of the FCA consolidation group. (Firms' attention is drawn to
At least two independent minds should be applied to the formulation and implementation of the policies of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1. Where a firm1 nominates just two individuals to direct its business, the appropriate regulator will not regard them as both effectively directing the business where one of them makes some, albeit significant, decisions relating to only a few aspects of the business.
Where there are more than two individuals directing the business of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 or the UK branch of a non-EEA bank,1 the appropriate regulator does not regard it as necessary for all of these individuals to be involved in all decisions relating to the determination of strategy and general direction. However, at least two individuals should be involved in all such decisions. Both individuals' judgement should be engaged
In requiring someone to apportion responsibility, neither4 a common platform firm nor a Solvency II firm4 or small non-directive insurer5 should 4apply for that person or persons to be FCA-approved to perform the apportionment and oversight function (see SUP 10A.7.1 R, SYSC 2.1.3 R and SYSC 1 Annex 1).
The fact that there is a person performing the apportionment and oversight function, and who has responsibility for activities subject to regulation by the FCA, may have a bearing on whether a manager who is based overseas will be performing an FCA controlled function. It is a factor to take into account when assessing the likely influence of the overseas manager.
Generally, in relation to a UK establishment of an overseas firm or a firm which is part of an overseas group, where an overseas manager’s responsibilities in relation to the United Kingdom are strategic only, he will not need to be an FCA-approved person. However, where, in accordance with SYSC 3 or SYSC 4 to SYSC 10, he is responsible for implementing that strategy in the United Kingdom, and has not delegated that responsibility to a senior manager in the United Kingdom, he
4The actuarial conduct function (third country) is that part of the function of acting in the capacity of an actuary appointed (by a Solvency II firm which is a third-country insurance or reinsurance undertaking) under rule 7.1(2) of the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II Firms: Third Country Branches that relates to compliance with FCA requirements and standards under the regulatory system.