Related provisions for SYSC 6.3.3
81 - 100 of 121 items.
1In assessing, under SUP 12.4.8A R, whether an appointed representative, or prospective appointed representative, has established the knowledge and ability requirements for persons within its management structure and for those directly involved in its insurance mediation activity, a firm should refer to TC.
A firm should establish and maintain appropriate systems and controls for the management of operational risks that can arise from employees. In doing so, a firm should have regard to:(1) its operational risk culture, and any variations in this or its human resource management practices, across its operations (including, for example, the extent to which the compliance culture is extended to in-house IT staff);(2) whether the way employees are remunerated exposes the firm to the
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
In
relation to the retention of records for non-MiFID
business, a firm should
have appropriate systems and controls in place with respect to the adequacy
of, access to, and the security of its records so that the firm may
fulfil its regulatory and statutory obligations. With respect to retention
periods, the general principle is that records should be retained for as long
as is relevant for the purposes for which they are made.1
(1) 8If the UK firm'sEEA right derives from the CRD12 or10MiFID8,10 the appropriate UK regulator20 will give the Host State regulator a consent notice within three months unless it has reason to doubt the adequacy of a UK firm's resources or its administrative structure.8 The Host State regulator then has a further two months to notify the applicable provisions (if any) and prepare for the supervision, as appropriate, of the UK firm, or in the case of a MiFID investment firm,
1Paragraph 1A of Schedule 6 to the Act(1) "assets" includes contingent assets;"consolidated supervision" has the same meaning as in section 3M(a);"consumer" has the meaning given by section 425A(b);"financial crime" is to be read with section 1H(3)(c);"functions", in relation to either the FCA or the PRA, means the functions conferred on that regulator by or under this Act;"liabilities" includes contingent liabilities; "relevant directives" has the same meaning as in section 3M;
The following events are examples of events likely to affect an assessment of whether an ROIE1 is continuing to satisfy the recognition requirements11(1) significant changes to any relevant law or regulation in its home territory, including laws or regulations:(a) governing exchanges or, if relevant to an ROIE's satisfaction of the recognition requirements,1clearing houses;(b) designed to prevent insider dealing, market manipulation or other forms of market abuse or misconduct;(c)
The systems and controls function is the function of acting in the capacity of an employee of the firm with responsibility for reporting to the governing body of a firm, or the audit committee (or its equivalent) in relation to:(1) its financial affairs;(2) setting and controlling its risk exposure (see SYSC 3.2.10 G and SYSC 7.1.6 R);(3) adherence to internal systems and controls, procedures and policies (see SYSC 3.2.16 G and SYSC 6.2).
(1) Subject to the legal structure of the AIF and the instrument constituting the fund, an AIFM must ensure that a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50% of any variable remuneration, consists of units or shares of the AIF concerned, or equivalent ownership interests, or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments. However, if the management of AIFs accounts for less than 50% of the total portfolio managed by the AIFM, the minimum of 50 % does not apply.(2)
The requirement in MCOB 13.3.1 R(2) for a written policy and procedures is intended to ensure that a firm has addressed the need for internal systems to deal fairly with any customer in financial difficulties. MCOB 13.3.1 R(2) does not oblige a firm to provide customers with a copy of the written policy and procedures. Nor, however, does it prevent a firm from providing customers with either these documents or a more customer-orientated version.
The rules in SYSC 3 (and also for Solvency II firms, the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business)1 and SYSC 4 require a firm that communicates with a client in relation to designated investment business, or communicates or approves a financial promotion, to put in place systems and controls or policies and procedures, or an effective internal control system,1 in order to comply with the rules in this chapter.
A firm may
operate on the basis of an agency agreement as provided for by CASS 5.2.3 R for
some of its clients and with
protection provided by a client money trust
in accordance with CASS
5.3 or CASS
5.4 for other clients.
A firm may also operate on either
basis for the same client but
in relation to different transactions. A firm which
does so should be satisfied that its administrative systems and controls are
adequate and, in accordance with CASS 5.2.4 G, should ensure that
An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 will not always manage the business on a day-to-day basis1. The extent to which the approved person1 does so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale and complexity of the business and their1 position within it. The larger and more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation and reporting lines. The FCA1 will look to the approved person performing an
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.14.
(1) Principle 10 (Clients’ assets) requires a firm to arrange adequate protection for client's assets when it is responsible for them. As part of these protections, the custody rules require a firm to take appropriate steps to protect safe custody assets for which it is responsible.(2) Subject to paragraph (3), a 3prime brokerage firm should not enter into “right to use arrangements” for a client'ssafe custody assets unless:13(a) in the case of a CASS small firm or a firm to
(1) 1Before undertaking a class hedging transaction for a class of units, the authorised fund manager should:2(a) ensure that the relevant prospectus clearly:(i) states that such a transaction may be undertaken for the relevant class of units2; and(ii) explains the nature of the risks that such a transaction may pose to investors in all classes;(b) consult the depositary about the adequacy of the systems and controls it uses to ensure compliance with COLL 3.3.5A R (Hedging of
An authorised fund manager carrying out due diligence for the purpose of the rules in this section should make enquiries or otherwise obtain information needed to enable him properly to consider:(1) whether the experience, expertise, qualifications and professional standing of the second scheme's investment manager is adequate for the type and complexity of the second scheme;(2) the adequacy of the regulatory, legal and accounting regimes applicable to the second scheme and its
(1) does not envisage that an issuer will: DTR 2.5.3 R (1) does
not allow an issuer to delay
public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its
worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the
negotiations to deal with such a situation. An issuer cannot
delay disclosure of inside information on
the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation
will be jeopardised by the disclosure of its financial