Related provisions for TC 2.1.2
1 - 20 of 165 items.
(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
(1) Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of an IFPRU investment firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC 19A1.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e.,
Where an overseas firm in SYSC 19A1.1.1R(1)(d) (i.e., an overseas firm that would have been a IFPRU investment firm if it had been a UK domestic firm) wishes to deem an employee who earns more than €750,000 not to be Remuneration Code staff, the overseas firm may apply for a waiver of the requirement in SYSC 19A.3.4R in respect of that employee.
A firm must:(1) maintain a record of its Remuneration Code staff in accordance with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note:3article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
A firm must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47 R (1); and(3) 3when an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.(2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.[Note:3article 94(1)(p) of CRD and Standard 14 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator8 does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:8(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those
4A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:(1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and(2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance.
A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.3 A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:3(1) 3it is exceptional;(2) 3it occurs in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff;3(3) 3the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and3(4) 3it is limited to the first year of service.[Note:3article 94(1)(d) and (e) of CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
3A firm must ensure that remuneration packages relating to compensation for, or buy out from, an employee's contracts in previous employment align with the long term interests of the firm and are subject to appropriate retention, deferral and performance and clawback arrangements.[Note: article 94(1)(i) of CRD]
In the appropriate regulator's view, variable remuneration can be awarded to Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The appropriate regulator considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part
A firm must set an 5appropriate ratio 5between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced;3(2) the level of the 5fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component3; and3(3) subject
3A firm may set a higher maximum level of the 5ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration provided:555(1) the overall level of the variable component does not exceed 200% of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each Remuneration Code staff; and55(2) is approved by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm in accordance with SYSC 19A.3.44B R.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]
A firm must ensure that any approval by the its shareholders or owners or members for the purposes of SYSC 19A.3.44AR is carried out in accordance with the following procedure:535(1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;55(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount, or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature,
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred
3A firm must:(1) ensure that any of the total variable remuneration is subject to malus or clawback arrangements;(2) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(3) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee: (a) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm;(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
(1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules1 in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R1 apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:11(a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration); and(c) (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies at least one of the
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the appropriate regulator to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified
(1) This section applies in relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way, and to the extent, that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3)
(1) Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff comprises:(a) an employee of a dual-regulated firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm’s risk profile in accordance with Regulation (EU) 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 (Regulatory technical standards to identify staff who are material risk takers); or(b) subject to (2) and (3), an employee of an overseas firm in SYSC
Where an overseas firm in SYSC 19D1.1.R(1)(d) (i.e., an overseas firm that would have been a dual-regulated firm if it had been a UK domestic firm) wishes to deem an employee who earns more than €750,000 not to be dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, the overseas firm may apply for a waiver of the requirement in SYSC 19D.3.4R in respect of that employee.
A firm must:(1) maintain a record of its dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff under the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and(3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced employees; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note: article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise, they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management
A firm must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19D.3.56R(1); and(3) when an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19D.3.56R(1)
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. (2) A firm must ensure that its employees do not use remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.(3) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.[Note:
A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:(1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility, as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and(2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance
(1) A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.(2) A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:(a) it is exceptional;(b) it occurs in the context of hiring new dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff;(c) the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and(d) it is limited to the first year of service.[Note: article 94(1)(d) and (e) of the CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation
(1) Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same requirements applicable to variable remuneration awarded by the firm including deferral, malus and clawback.(2) The FCA expects that guaranteed variable awards and retention awards should not be common practice for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff and should be limited to rare, infrequent occurrences. The FCA expects a firm to provide prior notification to the FCA of any such proposed awards.
A firm must set an appropriate ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; (2) the level of the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; and(3) subject to SYSC
A firm may set a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration provided:(1) the overall level of the variable component does not exceed 200% of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff; and(2) is approved by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm in accordance with SYSC 19D.3.50R.[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]
A firm must ensure that any approval by its shareholders or owners or members, for the purposes of SYSC 19D.3.49R, is carried out in accordance with the following procedure: (1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the approval
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than:(a) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff who do not perform a PRA-designated senior management function, three to five years, with no vesting taking place until one year after the award, and vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis.(b) for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares;(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio
A firm must ensure that:(1) any variable remuneration, including a deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the firm as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the firm, the business unit and the individual concerned;(2) any variable remuneration is subject to clawback, such that it is only awarded if an amount corresponding to it can be recovered from the individual by the firm if the recovery is justified
A firm must:(1) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(2) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee:(a) participated in, or was responsible for, conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm; or(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article 94(1)(n) of the CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards][Note: The FSA
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
(1) A firm must make all reasonable efforts to recover an appropriate amount corresponding to some or all vested variable remuneration where either of the following circumstances arise during the period in which clawback applies (including any part of such period occurring after the relevant employment has ceased):(a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2)
(1) Subject to (2) to (7), the rules in SYSC 19D Annex 1.1R to 1.6R apply in relation to the prohibitions on dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:(a) SYSC 19D.3.44R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19D.3.59R (non-deferred variable remuneration);(c) SYSC 19D.3.61R(2) (performance adjustment – clawback); and(d) SYSC 19D Annex 1.10R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(2) Paragraph (1) applies only to
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enable the FCA to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision.(2) SYSC 19D.3.66R and SYSC 19D.3.67R (together with SYSC 19D Annex 1) are:(a) rules referred to in (1) that render void provisions of an agreement that contravene
(1) 13A firm must not assess an employee as competent to carry on an activity in TC Appendix 1 until the employee has demonstrated the necessary competence to do so and has (if required by TC Appendix 1) attained 16each module of an appropriate qualification16. This assessment need not take place before the employee starts to carry on the activity.14161613(2) A firm may assess an employee who is subject to, but has not satisfied, an appropriate qualification16requirement as competent
Firms should ensure that employees are appropriately supervised at all times. It is expected that the level and intensity of that supervision will be significantly greater in the period before the firm has assessed the employee as competent, than after. A firm should therefore have clear criteria and procedures relating to the specific point at which the employee is assessed as competent in order to be able to demonstrate when and why a reduced level of supervision may be considered
Firms should ensure that those supervising employees carrying on an activity in TC Appendix 1 have the necessary coaching and assessment skills as well as technical knowledge and experience17 to act as a competent supervisor and assessor. In particular firms should consider whether it is appropriate to require those supervising employees not assessed as competent to attain 16an appropriate qualification 16as well except where the employee is giving advice on retail investment products,17 see TC 2.1.5 R.
161617A firm must ensure that an employee does not carry on any of the following activities without first attaining 16each module of an appropriate qualification:1616(1) [deleted]1616(1A) 16advising on and dealing in securities which are not stakeholder pension schemes, personal pension schemes18 or broker funds;(1B) advising on and dealing in derivatives;(2) the activity of a broker fund adviser;(3) advising on syndicate participation at Lloyd's; or(4) the activity of a pension transfer
(1) If a firm is satisfied that an employee meets the conditions in this rule then the requirements to have attained 16each module of an appropriate qualification 16will only apply if that employee is carrying on one of the activities specified in this rule.1616(2) The conditions are that a firm should be satisfied that an employee:(a) has at least three years' up-to-date relevant experience in the activity in question obtained while employed outside the United Kingdom;(b) has
Firms should ensure that their employees' training needs are assessed at the outset and at regular intervals (including if their role changes). Appropriate training and support should be provided to ensure that any relevant training needs are satisfied. Firms should also review at regular intervals the quality and effectiveness of such training.
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
BIPRU Remuneration Code staff comprises categories of staff including senior management, risk-takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk-takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile.
A firm must: (1) maintain a record of its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in line with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the BIPRU Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions: (1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated: (a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in line with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
A firm must ensure that: (1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19C.3.47R (1); and(3) when employees reach retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments in SYSC 19C.3.47R (1) and subject
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk-alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. (2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics, such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values, can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance.
The requirement for assessment of performance to be in a multi-year framework reflects the fact that profits from a firm's activities can be volatile and subject to cycles. The financial performance of firms and individual employees can be exaggerated as a result. Performance assessment on a moving average of results can be a good way of meeting this requirement. However, other techniques, such as good quality risk adjustment and deferral of a sufficiently large proportion of
(1) A firm should not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration in hiring new BIPRU Remuneration Code staff (X) unless: (a) it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the remuneration is not more generous in its amount or terms (including any deferral or retention periods) than the variable remuneration awarded or offered by X’s previous employer; and(b) it is subject to appropriate performance adjustment requirements.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period of not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount; or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum: (a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
(1) 1For the purposes of TC 2.1.1 R, if an employee carries on an activity in TC Appendix 1 (other than an overseeing activity), a firm must ensure that the employee attains an appropriate qualification within 30 months of starting to carry on that activity.(2) For the purposes of (1), a firm must record the date on which the employee starts to carry on that activity.
For the purposes of calculating the 30 months referred to in TC 2.2A.1 R, a firm must:(1) aggregate periods of time spent carrying on the activity during different periods of employment; and(2) disregard any period of 60 business days or more during which the employee is not carrying on the activity due to being continuously absent from work.
An AIFM must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies and practices for AIFM Remuneration Code staff that are consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management and do not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profile of the instrument constituting the fund of the AIFs it manages.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
AIFM Remuneration Code staff comprise those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the AIFMs or of the AIFs the AIFM manages. This includes senior management, risk takers, control functions, and any employees receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
(1) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for AIFM Remuneration Code staff (inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits), an AIFM must comply with the AIFM remuneration principles in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to the requirement for significant AIFMs to have a remuneration committee (SYSC 19B.1.9 R).(3)
(1) 2£500,000 is a particularly high amount for the purpose of SYSC 19B.1.18R (4).(2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the possibility of lower sums being considered a particularly high amount.(3) Whilst any variable remuneration component of £500,000 or more paid to AIFM Remuneration Code staff should be subject to 60% deferral, firms should also consider whether lesser amounts should be considered to be 'particularly high', taking account, for example, of whether there
An AIFM must ensure that:(1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the AIFs it manages;(2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments in SYSC 19B.1.17R (1); and(3) in the case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred
1Article 72 exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to a group personal pension scheme or a stakeholder pension scheme. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the financial promotion must inform the employee that the employer will make a contribution to the pension that the employee will receive from the pension scheme to which the financial promotion relates in the event of the employee becoming a member;(2) the employer
6Article 72A exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a group personal pension scheme or a stakeholder pension scheme. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract
6Article 72B exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to work-related insurance. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) where the provider of the insurance is not the employer, the employer must not receive or have received, any direct financial benefit (including any commission, discount, remuneration or reduction in premium) as a result of making the communication; and(2) where the communication is a non-real time financial
6Article 72C exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to work-related insurance. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
6Article 72D exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) where the provider of the staff mortgage is an undertaking in the same group as the employer, the employer must not receive or have received, any direct financial benefit (including any commission, discount, remuneration or reduction in premium) as a result of making the communication; and(2) where the communication
6Article 72E exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
9Article 72F exempts any financial promotion which is made to an employee by or on behalf of a person in relation to an exempt staff loan. An exempt staff loan is defined as a credit agreement which is:(1) offered by a lender to a borrower as an incident of employment with the lender, or with an undertaking in the same group as the lender11; and(2) an exempt agreement under a provision of article 60G (exempt agreements: exemptions relating to the total charge for credit) of the
6The exemptions described in PERG 8.14.40A G to PERG 8.14.40AEA G9 should enable employers (and their contracted service providers) to promote employee benefits packages that include any pension schemes, work-related insurance schemes,9staff mortgages and certain staff loans9 to employees without undue concern that they may be breaching the restriction in section 21 of the Act. PERG 8.14.34 G (Communications by employers and contracted service providers to employees) has further
1Article 73 exempts any financial promotion made by a person in the course of carrying out his duties as an adviser for, or employee of, an advice centre. This is provided the financial promotion relates to:(1) a home finance transaction; or2(2) rights under, or rights to or interests in rights under, a life policy; or(3) a child trust fund within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Child Trust Funds Act 2004.
(1) This rule applies to the following schemes of a listed company incorporated in the United Kingdom and of any of its major subsidiary undertaking (even if that major subsidiary undertaking is incorporated or operates overseas):(a) an employees' share scheme if the scheme involves or may involve the issue of new shares or the transfer of treasury shares; and(b) a long-term incentive scheme in which one or more directors of the listed company is eligible to participate.(2) The
LR 9.4.1 R does not apply to the following long-term incentive schemes:(1) an arrangement where participation is offered on similar terms to all or substantially all employees of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings whose employees are eligible to participate in the arrangement (provided that all or substantially all employees are not directors of the listed company); and(2) an arrangement where the only participant is a director of the listed company (or an
(1) This rule applies to the grant to a director or employee of a listed company or of any subsidiary undertaking of a listed company of an option to subscribe, warrant to subscribe or other similar right to subscribe for shares in the capital of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings.(2) A listed company must not, without the prior approval by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders of the listed company in a general meeting, grant the option, warrant or
LR 9.4.4 R does not apply to the grant of an option to subscribe, warrant to subscribe or other similar right to subscribe for shares in the capital of a listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings:(1) under an employees' share scheme if participation is offered on similar terms to all or substantially all employees of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings whose employees are entitled to participate in the scheme; or(2) following a take-over or reconstruction,
7Situations when the FCA may impose restrictions or limitations on the services a sponsor can provide include (but are not limited to) where it appears to the FCA that: (1) the employees of the person applying to be a sponsor whom it is proposed will perform sponsor services have no or limited relevant experience and expertise of providing certain types of sponsor services or of providing sponsor services to certain types of company; or(2) the person applying to be a sponsor
A sponsor, or a 8person48applying for approval as a sponsor, will not satisfy LR 8.6.5R (2) unless it has:4888(1) 8submitted a sponsor declaration to the FCA:(a) for a person applying for approval as a sponsor, within three years of the date of its application; and(b) for a sponsor, within the previous three years; and(2) 8a sufficient number of employees with the skills , knowledge and expertise necessary for it to:(a) provide sponsor services in accordance with LR 8.3; (b)
8To determine whether a sponsoror a person applying for approval as a sponsoris able to satisfy LR 8.6.7R (1)(a), the FCA may consider whether any of the person's employees have had material involvement in the provision of sponsor services that have required the submission of a sponsor declaration within the previous three years.
8A sponsor or a person applying for approval as a sponsor will not satisfy LR 8.6.5R (3) unless it has in place:(1) clear and effective reporting lines for the provision of sponsor services (including clear and effective management responsibilities);(1A) effective systems and controls which require employees with management responsibilities for the provision of sponsor services to understand and apply the requirements of LR 8; (2) effective systems and controls for the appropriate
Financial promotions other than unsolicited real time financial promotions are exempt where they follow up an earlier financial promotion which, in compliance with another exemption (such as that for promotions made to high net worth individuals or sophisticated investors – see PERG 8.14.21 G and PERG 8.14.27 G), contains certain indications or information. This is provided the financial promotion:(1) is made by the person who made or directed the earlier financial promotion;(2)
Financial promotions made only to or directed only at certain types of person who are sophisticated enough to understand the risks involved are exempt. These are:(1) authorised persons;(2) exempt persons (where the financial promotion relates to a controlled activity which is a regulated activity for which the person is exempt);(3) governments and local authorities; and(4) persons whose ordinary business involves carrying on a controlled activity of the kind to which the financial
The main purpose of the exemption appears to be to guard against the possibility that, during the course of a broadcast interview or a live website presentation, a financial promotion is made inadvertently by a director or employee of a company or other business undertaking when he is not acting in the capacity of a journalist (see PERG 8.12.25 G). The exemption applies if the financial promotion relates only to:(1) shares of the undertaking or of another undertaking in the same
The exemption applies where the financial promotion:(1) comprises words which are spoken by the director or employee and not broadcast, transmitted or displayed in writing; or(2) is displayed in writing only because it is part of an interactive dialogue to which the director or employee is a party and in the course of which he is expected to respond immediately to questions put by a recipient of the communication.This is provided that the financial promotion is not part of an
The second part of the exemption (referred to in PERG 8.12.34G (2)) envisages that the director or employee will be holding the equivalent of a conversation conducted in writing. Typically this will involve the exchange of e-mails. It is possible that this part of the exemption could be used by companies making so-called webcasts over the Internet. However, this would only be the case if the service through which the webcast is provided is a regularly updated news or information
(1) The purposes of this section are to:(a) provide UK recognised bodies with guidance regarding the provisions of PIDA; and(b) Encourage UK recognised bodies to consider adopting and communicating to workers appropriate internal procedures for handling workers' concerns as part of an effective risk management system.(2) In this section "worker" includes, but is not limited to, an individual who has entered into a contract of employment.
In accordance with section 1 of PIDA:(1) a "protected disclosure" is a qualifying disclosure which meets the relevant requirements set out in part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 19963;3(2) a "qualifying disclosure" is a disclosure, made in the public interest3, of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show that one or more of the following (a "failure") has been, is being, or is likely to be, committed:3(a) a criminal offence;
(1) UK recognised bodies are encouraged to consider adopting appropriate internal procedures which will encourage their workers with concerns to blow the whistle internally about matters which are relevant to the functions of the FCA.22(2) In considering appropriate internal procedures, UK recognised bodiesmay find the guidance provided to firms in SYSC 18.2.2 G (2) and SYSC 18.2.2 G (3)1 helpful.1
A firm should consult SYSC 3.2.2 G to SYSC 3.2.5 G for guidance on reporting lines and delegation of functions within a firm and SYSC 3.2.13 G to SYSC 3.2.14 G for guidance on the suitability of employees and appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents1. This section provides additional guidance on management of employees and other human resources in the context of operational risk.
A firm should establish and maintain appropriate systems and controls for the management of operational risks that can arise from employees. In doing so, a firm should have regard to:(1) its operational risk culture, and any variations in this or its human resource management practices, across its operations (including, for example, the extent to which the compliance culture is extended to in-house IT staff);(2) whether the way employees are remunerated exposes the firm to the
A firm should ensure that all employees are capable of performing, and aware of, their operational risk management responsibilities, including by establishing and maintaining:(1) appropriate segregation of employees' duties and appropriate supervision of employees in the performance of their responsibilities (see SYSC 3.2.5 G);(2) appropriate recruitment and subsequent processes to review the fitness and propriety of employees (see SYSC 3.2.13 G and SYSC 3.2.14 G);(3) clear
The systems and controls function is the function of acting in the capacity of an employee of the firm with responsibility for reporting to the governing body of a firm, or the audit committee (or its equivalent) in relation to:(1) its financial affairs;(2) setting and controlling its risk exposure (see SYSC 3.2.10 G and SYSC 7.1.6 R);(3) adherence to internal systems and controls, procedures and policies (see SYSC 3.2.16 G and SYSC 6.2).
1For a full-scope UK AIFM, the requirement to have an employee responsible for reporting to the governing body of the firm or the audit committee for matters in SUP 10A.8.1R (2) and SUP 10A.8.1R (3) is derived from the AIFMD level 2 regulation, which imposes obligations on such firms to have a permanent risk management function and, where appropriate and proportionate for their business, an internal audit function.
(1) The RDC is separate from the FCA's2 executive management structure. Apart from its Chairman, none of the members of the RDC is an FCA2employee.22(2) All members of the RDC are appointed for fixed periods by the FCA2 Board. The FCA2 Board may remove a member of the RDC, but only in the event of that member's misconduct or incapacity.22
In setting the method of determining the remuneration of employees involved in the risk management function:(1) firms that SYSC 19D applies to will also need to comply with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code; and(2) firms that the remuneration part of the PRA Rulebook applies to will also need to comply with it.16513138
(1) A firm'sgoverning body is likely to delegate many functions and tasks for the purpose of carrying out its business. When functions or tasks are delegated, either to employees or to appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents8, appropriate safeguards should be put in place.(2) When there is delegation, a firm should assess whether the recipient is suitable to carry out the delegated function or task, taking into account the degree of responsibility involved.(3)
Where it is made possible and appropriate by the nature, scale and complexity of its business, a firm should segregate the duties of individuals and departments in such a way as to reduce opportunities for financial crime or contravention of requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the duties of front-office and back-office staff should be segregated so as to prevent a single individual initiating, processing and controlling transactions.
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate compliance function. The organisation and responsibilities of a compliance function should be documented. A compliance function should be staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent to perform their duties objectively. It should be adequately resourced and should have unrestricted access to the firm's relevant records as
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
A circular to shareholders about the approval of an employee's share scheme or long-term incentive scheme must:(1) include either the full text of the scheme or a description of its principal terms;(2) include, if directors of the listed company are trustees of the scheme, or have a direct or indirect interest in the trustees, details of the trusteeship or interest;(3) state that the provisions (if any) relating to:(a) the persons to whom, or for whom, securities, cash or other
The resolution approving the adoption of an employees' share scheme or long-term incentive scheme may authorise the directors to establish further schemes based on any scheme which has previously been approved by shareholders but modified to take account of local tax, exchange control or securities laws in overseas territories, provided that any shares made available under such further schemes are treated as counting against any limits on individual or overall participation in
A circular to shareholders about proposed amendments to an employees' share scheme or a long-term incentive scheme must include:(1) an explanation of the effect of the proposed amendments; and(2) the full terms of the proposed amendments, or a statement that the full text of the scheme as amended will be available for inspection.
CASS 11.3.4 R describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice bodies. As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4 R (in conjunction with SUP 10A.4.1 R and SUP 10A.7.10 R), in a CASS large debt management firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4 R is required to be discharged by a director