Related provisions for IFPRU 7.1.7
621 - 640 of 1010 items.
2(1) The purpose of these rules is to set out the requirements for registered societies and sponsoring bodies to pay periodic and application fees which, together, will provide the funding for the FCA's functions in respect of the registrant-only fee block (Category F). 2(2) This set of rules is in respect of the registration functions relating to registered societies transferred to the FCA by section 50 of the Financial Services Act 2012, other than friendly societies authorised
1However, there may be circumstances in which the FCA will choose to use the powers under section 382 or section 383 of the Act to apply to the court for an order for restitution against a firm. Those circumstances may include, for example, where: (1) the FCA wishes to combine an application for an order for restitution with other court action against the firm, for example, where it wishes to apply to the court for an injunction to prevent the firm breaching a relevant requirement11;
A firm and its controllers are required to notify certain changes in control (see7SUP 11 (Controllers and close links)). The purpose of the rules and guidance in this section is:7(1) to ensure that, in addition to such notifications, the appropriate regulator15 receives regular and comprehensive information about the identities of all of the controllers of a firm, which is relevant to a firm's continuing to satisfy the effective supervision threshold conditions15; 158(2) to implement
(1) [deleted]10151510(2) [deleted]101510(3) [deleted]1010(4) [deleted]1010(4A) [deleted]105151510(4B) [deleted]1051515151510(5) [deleted]8108(6) 10A firm must submit annually by electronic means to the appropriate regulator the Controllers Report which contains the information specified in the form in SUP 16 Annex 37A, within four months of the firm'saccounting reference date9.
A UK firm should be aware that the guidance is the FCA's5 interpretation of the Single Market Directives, the Act and the legislation made under the Act. The guidance is not exhaustive and is not a substitute for firms consulting the legislation or taking their own legal advice in the United Kingdom and in the relevant EEA States.5
Section 87B(1) of the Act sets out when the FCA may authorise the omission of information from a prospectus:
(1) |
The [FCA] may authorise the omission from a prospectus of any information, the inclusion of which would otherwise be required, on the ground – |
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(a) |
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest; |
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(b) |
that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission would be unlikely to mislead the public with regard to any facts or circumstances which are essential for an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2); or |
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(c) |
that the information is only of minor importance for a specific offer to the public or admission to trading on a regulated market and unlikely to influence an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2). |
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A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information must:(1) be in writing from the applicant;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for its omission; and(3) state why in the applicant's opinion one or more of the grounds in section 87B(1) of the Act applies.
An issuer whose registered office is in a non-EEA State3 is exempted from DTR 6.1.3 R to DTR 6.1.15 R if:3(1) the law of the non-EEA State in question lays down equivalent requirements; or3(2) the issuer complies with requirements of the law of a non-EEA State that the FCA considers as equivalent.3[Note: article 23(1) of the TD]3
The FCA maintains a published list of non-EEA States,3 for the purpose of article 23.1 of the TD, whose laws3 lay down requirements equivalent to those imposed upon issuers by this chapter, or where the requirements of the law of that non-EEA State are considered to be equivalent by the FCA3. Such issuers remain subject to the following requirements of DTR 6:(1) the filing of information with the FCA;(2) the language provisions; and(3) the dissemination of information provisi
(1) The FCA expects that the majority of requests it will receive for the winding up of an authorised fund (under regulation 21(1) of the OEIC Regulations or under sections1 256 or 261W1 of the Act) or termination of a sub-fund will be from authorised fund managers and depositaries who consider that the AUT, ACS1, ICVC or sub-fund in question is no longer commercially viable.(2) It is in consumers' interests to minimise, as far as possible, the period between which the FCA receives
The information referred to in COLL 7.5.1 G is listed below:(1) the name of the authorised fund or sub-fund;(2) the size of the authorised fund or sub-fund;(3) the number of unitholders; (4) whether dealing in units has been suspended;(5) why the request is being made; (6) what consideration has been given to the authorised fund or sub-fund entering into a scheme of arrangement with another regulated collective investment scheme and the reasons why a scheme of arrangement is not
In many cases it will be clear whether or not a publication or service benefits from the exclusion. A publication or service may provide reports on such a wide range of matters that it is not possible to say that it has any purpose other than to provide coverage of a wide range of matters. Alternatively, it may be clear that the principal purpose of a publication or service is something other than those specified in the article 54 exclusion. Examples of cases where, in the FCA's
It is only where there are grounds to think that there is a significant doubt as to the principal purpose of a publication or service that the question of whether or not to apply to the FCA for a certificate under article 54 of the Regulated Activities Order is expected to arise. For example, this may happen where a publication or service has several significant purposes and one of them is a disqualifying purpose referred to in the exclusion in article 54. It may on occasion be
This chapter provides assistance in determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse. It also forms part of the UK's implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (including its EU implementing legislation, that is Directive 2003/124/EC, Directive 2003/125/EC, Regulation 2273/2003 and Directive 2004/72/EC) and the auction regulation.4 It is therefore likely to be helpful to persons who:(1) want to avoid engaging in market abuseor to avoid requiring or encouraging another
12The FSCS must allocate any compensation costs levy:(1) first, to the relevant classes in proportion to the amount of compensation costs arising from, or expected to arise from, claims in respect of the different activities for which firms in those classes have permission up to the levy limit of each relevant class. The FCA provider contribution classes are not relevant classes for this purpose; and(2) thereafter, where the levy limit has been reached (whether as a result of
12The FSCS must calculate each participant firm's share of a compensation costs levy (subject to FEES 6.3.22 R (Adjustments to calculation of levy shares)) by:(1) identifying each of the relevant classes to which each participant firm belongs, using the statement of business most recently supplied under FEES 6.5.13 R (1);(2) identifying the compensation costs falling within FEES 6.5.1 R allocated, in accordance with FEES 6.5.2 R, to the classes identified in (1);(3) calculating,
The FCA may modify LR 14.2.2 R to accept a percentage lower than 25% if it considers that the market will operate properly with a lower percentage in view of the large number of shares of the same class and the extent of their distribution to the public. For that purpose, the FCA may take into account shares of the same class that are held (even though they are not listed) in states that are not EEA States.1[Note: Article 48 CARD]
The FCA will not admit shares of a company incorporated in a non-EEA State that are not listed either in its country of incorporation or in the country in which a majority of its shares are held, unless the FCA is satisfied that the absence of the listing is not due to the need to protect investors. [Note: Article 51 CARD]
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 7B
2(1) |
The [UK RIE] must make transparent and non-discriminatory rules, based on objective criteria, governing access to, or membership of, its facilities. |
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(2) |
In particular those rules must specify the obligations for users or members of its facilities arising from - |
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(a) |
the constitution and administration of the [UK RIE]; |
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(b) |
rules relating to transactions on the market; |
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(c) |
its professional standards for staff of any investment firm or credit institution having access to or membership of a financial market operated by the [UK RIE]; |
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(d) |
conditions established under sub-paragraph (3)(c) for access to or membership of a financial market operated by the [UK RIE] by persons other than investment firms or credit institutions; and |
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the rules and procedures for clearing and settlement of transactions concluded on a financial market operated by the [UK RIE]. |
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(3) |
Rules of the [UK RIE] about access to, or membership of, a financial market operated by it must permit the [UK RIE] to give access to or admit to membership (as the case may be) only - |
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(a) |
an investment firm, |
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(b) |
a credit institution, or |
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(c) |
a person who - |
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(i) |
is fit and proper, |
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(ii) |
has a sufficient level of trading ability and competence, |
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(iii) |
where applicable, has adequate organisational arrangements, and |
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(iv) |
has sufficient resources for the role he is to perform, taking into account the [UK RIE's] arrangements under paragraph 4(2)(d). |
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(4) |
Rules under this paragraph must enable - |
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(a) |
an investment firm authorised under Article 5 of [MiFID], or |
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(b) |
a credit institution authorised under the Banking Consolidation Directive, |
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by the competent authority of another EEA State (including a branch established in the United Kingdom of such a firm or institution) to have direct or remote access to or membership of, any financial market operated by the [UK RIE] on the same terms as a UK firm. |
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(5) |
The [UK RIE] must make arrangements regularly to provide the [FCA]3 with a list of users or members of its facilities. 3 |
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(6) |
This paragraph is without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 4. |
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In assessing whether access to a UK recognised body's facilities is subject to criteria designed to protect the orderly functioning of the market, or of those facilities, and the interests of investors, the FCA3 may have regard to whether: 3(1) the UK recognised body limits access as a member to persons:(a) over whom it can with reasonable certainty enforce its rules contractually;(b) who have sufficient technical competence to use its facilities;(c) whom it is appropriate to
In relation to each document in a CASS debt management firm'sCASS 11 resolution pack a firm must:(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 48 hours of that officer’s appointment; and(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
Part 1 of the table of FCA controlled functions applies in relation to an FCA-authorised person. It also applies in relation to an appointed representative for the purposes of SUP 10A.1.15 R (Appointed representatives) whether its principal is an FCA-authorised person or a PRA-authorised person. Part 2 applies in relation to a PRA-authorised person.
(1) The Takeover Panel publishes notices regarding compliance with the Takeover Code. It may also, from time to time, name in those notices persons as persons that, in the Takeover Panel's opinion, are not likely to comply with the Takeover Code. Any notices of this type will be available on the Takeover Panel's website (www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk).11(2) A firm should keep itself informed of Takeover Panel notices and take them into account in seeking to comply with MAR 4.3.1
(1) Where a restriction under MAR 4.3.1 R applies, an authorised professional firm is not prevented from providing professional advice or representation in any proceedings to the person where that falls within section 327(8) of the Act. This means that the person can obtain legal advice or representation in any proceedings from a law firm and accounting advice from an accounting firm: see MAR 4.4.1 R (2).(2) While the FCA recognises the duty of authorised professional firms to
The FCA2 will consider all the relevant circumstances of the case when deciding whether to impose a penalty or issue a public censure. As such, the factors set out in DEPP 6.4.2 G are not exhaustive. Not all of the factors may be relevant in a particular case and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.2
The criteria for determining whether it is appropriate to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty include those factors that the FCA2 will consider in1 determining the amount of penalty set out in DEPP 6.5 A to DEPP 6.5 D.1 Some particular considerations that may be relevant when the FCA2 determines whether to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty are:122(1) whether or not deterrence may be effectively achieved by issuing a public
(1) Most of the provisions in this sourcebook are marked with a G (to indicate guidance) or an R (to indicate a rule). Quotations from UK2 statute or statutory instruments are marked with the letters "UK"2 unless they form part of a piece of guidance. Quotations from the directly applicable MiFID Regulation are marked with the letters "EU". 2For a discussion of the status of provisions marked with a letter, see Chapter 6 of the Reader's Guide.21(2) Where the guidance states that
(1) This sourcebook contains quotations from the Act, the Recognition Requirements Regulations, the RAP regulations3 and the Companies Act 1989 and the MiFID Regulation2and, where necessary, words have been added to, or substituted for, the text of these provisions to facilitate understanding.(2) The additions and substitutions are enclosed in square brackets ([ ]). The omission of words within a quotation is indicated by three dots (...).(3) Any words in these quotations which
The test for whether the contents of a particular website may or may not involve a financial promotion is no different to any other medium. If a website or part of a website, operated or maintained in the course of business, invites or induces a person to engage in investment activity, it will be a financial promotion. The FCA takes the view that the person who caused the website to be created will be a communicator. So, any software engineers that may or may not have been involved
The Internet also allows hypertext links, where two different sites in the Internet can be connected almost instantaneously by simply clicking on the link. The FCA's1 views on the position of hypertext links (which should be read with the remainder of PERG 8, especially PERG 8.4 (Invitation or inducement)) are as follows.1(1) A hypertext link may or may not be a financial promotion in itself. This will depend on the nature of the hypertext link and the context in which it is placed.
The FCA considers that the 4following documents together 4determine the effect of the prospectus directive:4(1) Part 6 of the Act;(2) the PD Regulation;(3) these rules; 4(4) the ESMA Prospectus Recommendations434(5) the ESMA Prospectus Questions and Answers;4(6) the ESMA Prospectus Opinion; and4(7) the Prospectus RTS Regulation.4
In determining whether Part 6 of the Act, these rules ,4the PD Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation4have2 been complied with, the FCA will consider whether a person has acted in accordance with the4ESMA Prospectus Recommendations, the ESMA Prospectus Questions and Answers and the ESMA Prospectus Opinion.442424