Related provisions for LR 9.2.15A
41 - 60 of 127 items.
A listed company must not circulate or publish any of the following types of circular unless it has been approved by the5FCA:55(1) a class 1 circular; or5(2) a related party circular; or5(3) a circular that proposes the purchase by a listed company of its own shares which is required by LR 13.7.1R (2) to include a working capital statement; or5[Note: LR 12.4.10 G](4) a circular that proposes a reconstruction or a refinancing of a listed company which is required by LR 9.5.12
Cases (a) to (h) in DTR 5.2.1 R identify situations where a person may be able to control the manner in which voting rights are exercised and where, (taking account of any aggregation with other holdings) a notification to the issuer may need to be made. In the FCA's view:(1) Case (e) produces the result that it is always necessary for the parent undertaking of a controlled undertaking to aggregate its holding with any holding of the controlled undertaking (subject to the exemptions
A person falling within Cases (a) to (h) is an indirect holder of shares for the purpose of the definition of shareholder. These indirect holdings have to be aggregated, but also separately identified in a notification to the issuer. Apart from those identified in the Cases (a) to (h), the FCA does not expect any other significant category "indirect shareholder" to be identified. Cases (a) to (h) are also relevant in determining whether a person is an indirect holder of financial
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:(1) a person may offer to provide information on directors’ dealings on the basis that, in his opinion, were directors to buy or sell investors would do well to follow suit;(2) a person may offer to tell a client when certain shares reach a certain value (which would be advice if the person providing the
Independence is likely to be lost if either of the relevant parties could control the actions of the other by means of shareholders' votes. The FCA considers this would happen if any shareholding by one relevant party and their respective associates in the other exceeds 15% of the voting share capital, either in a single share class or several share classes. The FCA would be willing, however, to look at cross-shareholdings exceeding 15% on a case-by-case basis to consider if there
An applicant for admission must apply to the FCA by:(1) submitting, in final form:(a) the documents described in LR 3.3 in the case of an application in respect of equity shares;44(b) the documents described in LR 3.4 in the case of an application in respect of debt securities or other securities;(c) the documents described in LR 3.5 in the case of a block listing;(2) submitting all additional documents, explanations and information as required by the FCA;(3) submitting verification
3In assessing whether the voting rights attaching to different classes of
premium listedshares are proportionate for the purposes of Premium Listing Principle 4, the FCA will have regard to the following non-exhaustive list of factors:(1) the extent to which the rights of the classes differ other than their voting rights, for example with regard to dividend rights or entitlement to any surplus capital on winding up;(2) the extent of dispersion and relative liquidity of the classes;
UK domestic firms with a premium listing of equity shares6 are subject to the UK
Corporate Governance Code4, whose internal
control provisions are amplified in the publication entitled ‘Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting (September 2014)’6 issued by the Financial Reporting Council4. Firms regulated
by the appropriate regulator12 in this category will 6be subject
to that code as well as to the requirements and standards of
Analysing a typical corporate structure in terms of the definition of a collective investment scheme, money will be paid to the body corporate in exchange for shares or securities issued by it. The body corporate becomes the beneficial owner of that money in exchange for rights against the legal entity that is the body corporate. The body corporate then has its own duties and rights that are distinct from those of the holders of its shares or securities. Such arrangements will,
In the FCA's view, the question of what constitutes a single scheme in line with section 235(4) of the Act does not arise in relation to a body corporate. This is simply because the body corporate is itself a collective investment scheme (and so is a single scheme). Section 235(4) contemplates a 'separate' pooling of parts of the property that is subject to the arrangements referred to in section 235(1). But to analyse a body corporate in this way requires looking through its