Related provisions for DEPP 4.1.6

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SUP 3.10.8CGRP
1It is the responsibility of an insurance intermediary's senior management to determine, on a continuing basis, whether the firm is an exempt insurance intermediary for the purposes of this requirement and to appoint an auditor if management determines the firm is no longer exempt. SUP 3.7 (amplified by SUP 15) sets out what a firm should consider when deciding whether it should notify the FCA of matters raised by its auditor.
SYSC 3.2.16GRP
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
EG 2.15.2RP
1The procedures the FCA will follow when giving supervisory notices, warning notices and decision notices are set out in DEPP 1 to 5. Under these procedures, the decisions to issue such notices in contested enforcement cases are generally taken by the RDC, an FCA Board committee that is appointed by, and accountable to, the FCA Board for its decisions generally. Further details about the RDC can be found in DEPP 3 and on the pages of the FCA web site relating to the RDC. However,
DEPP 3.1.2GRP
(1) The RDC is separate from the FCA's2 executive management structure. Apart from its Chairman, none of the members of the RDC is an FCA2employee.22(2) All members of the RDC are appointed for fixed periods by the FCA2 Board. The FCA2 Board may remove a member of the RDC, but only in the event of that member's misconduct or incapacity.22
DEPP 6.5A.2GRP
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
DEPP 6.5A.3GRP
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
EG 2.12.1RP
1An important consideration before an enforcement investigation and/or enforcement action is taken forward is the nature of a firm’s overall relationship with the FCA and whether, against that background, the use of enforcement tools is likely to further the FCA's aims and objectives. So, for any similar set of facts, using enforcement tools will be less likely if a firm has built up over time a strong track record of taking its senior management responsibilities seriously and
EG 5.1.5RP
1Decisions on settlements and statutory notices arising from them are taken by two members of the FCA's senior management, rather than by the RDC (DEPP refers to these individuals as the 'settlement decision makers'). Full details of the special decision making arrangements for settlements are set out in DEPP 5.
EG 13.7.3RP
1Factors which the FCA will consider when it decides whether to use this power (in addition to the factors identified in paragraphs 13.5.1 to 13.6.3 in relation to the FCA's decisions to seek compulsory winding up) include: (1) whether the FCA's concerns can properly and effectively be met by seeking a specific direction under section 365(2) of the Act; (2) whether the affairs of the company require independent investigation of the kind which follows a compulsory
SUP 1A.1.4GRP
(1) In designing its approach to supervision, the FCA has regard to the regulatory principles set out in section 3B of the Act. In particular, the FCA's regulatory approach aims to focus and reinforce the responsibility of the senior management of each firm (section 3B(1)(d) of the Act) to ensure that it takes reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the firm responsibly and effectively, and develops and maintains adequate risk management systems. It is the responsibility
REC 2.4.5GRP
In assessing whether its connection with any person could affect whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to:4(1) the reputation and standing of that other person, including his standing with any relevant UK or overseas regulator;(2) breaches of any law or regulation by that other person; (3) the roles of any of the UK recognised body's key individuals who have a position within organisations under the control or influence of that other
DTR 8.2.1RRP
A person wishing to be included on the list of primary information providers, must apply to the FCA for approval as a primary information provider by submitting the following to the FCA:(1) the name, registered office address, registered number and the names and addresses of the directors and company secretary of the person applying for approval and, where applicable, the corporate group to which the person belongs;(2) details of all the arrangements that it has established or