Related provisions for PERG 6.7.11
1 - 20 of 1010 items.
(1) 1A person subject to enforcement action may
agree to a financial penalty or other outcome rather than contest formal action
by the FCA.44(2) The fact that he does so will not
usually obviate the need for a statutory notice recording the FCA's4 decision to take that action. Where, however, the person subject to enforcement action agrees
not to contest the content of a proposed statutory
notice, the decision to give that statutory notice will be taken
by senior FCA4 staff.44(3)
Settlement discussions may take
place at any time during the enforcement process if both parties agree. This
might be before the giving of a warning notice,
before a decision notice, or
even after referral of the matter to the Tribunal.
But the FCA4 would
not normally agree to detailed settlement discussions until it has a sufficient
understanding of the nature and gravity of the suspected misconduct or issue
to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate outcome. Settlement
(1) The settlement decision makers may, but need not, participate in the discussions
exploring possible settlement.(2) If the settlement decision makers have not been involved in the discussions, but
an agreement has been reached, they may ask to meet the relevant FCA4 staff or the person concerned
in order to assist in the consideration of the proposed settlement.4
The terms of any proposed settlement:(1) will be put in writing and be agreed
by FCA4 staff
and the person concerned;4(2) may refer to a draft of the proposed statutory notices setting out the facts
of the matter and the FCA's4 conclusions; 4(3) may, depending upon the stage in
the enforcement process at which agreement is reached, include an agreement
by the person concerned to: (a) waive and not exercise any rights
under sections 387 (Warning notices) and 394 (Access to Authority
(1) Where the settlement decision makers decline to issue a statutory
notice despite the proposed settlement, they may invite FCA4 staff
and the person concerned to
enter into further discussions to try to achieve an outcome the settlement decision makers would be prepared
to endorse.4(2) However, if the proposed action
by the FCA4 has
been submitted to the RDC for
consideration, it will be for the RDC to
decide:4(a) whether to extend the period for
representations in response
(1) DEPP 2.4 sets out the FCA's4 approach
to giving third parties copies of statutory
notices pursuant to section 393 (Third party rights) of the Act.4(2) The decision to give a warning notice or a decision
notice to a third party is a statutory
notice associated decision.(3) In cases therefore where the decision
to give a warning notice or decision notice is taken by settlement decision makers, those decision
makers will decide whether a copy of the notice should be given to
The FCA4 will consider the full circumstances of each case when determining whether or not to take action for a financial penalty or public censure. Set out below is a list of factors that may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.4(1) The nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach, including:(a) whether the breach was deliberate
When deciding whether to take action for market abuse or requiring or encouraging, the FCA4 may consider the following additional factors:4(1) The degree of sophistication of the users of the market in question, the size and liquidity of the market, and the susceptibility of the market to market abuse.(2) The impact, having regard to the nature of the behaviour, that any financial penalty or public censure may have on the financial markets or on the interests of consumers:(a)
The FCA's4 rules on systems and controls against money laundering are set out in SYSC 3.2 and SYSC 6.3. The FCA4, when considering whether to take action for a financial penalty or censure in respect of a breach of those rules, will have regard to whether a firm has followed relevant provisions in the Guidance for the UK financial sector issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group.44
The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with a firm's regulatory obligations rests with the firm itself. However, the FCA4 may take disciplinary action against an approved person where there is evidence of personal culpability on the part of that approved person. Personal culpability arises where the behaviour was deliberate or where the approved person's standard of behaviour was below that which would be reasonable in all the circumstances at the time of the conduct
In some cases it may not be appropriate to take disciplinary measures against a firm for the actions of an approved person (an example might be where the firm can show that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the breach). In other cases, it may be appropriate for the FCA4 to take action against both the firm and the approved person. For example, a firm may have breached the rule requiring it to take reasonable care to establish and maintain such systems and controls as are
In addition to the general factors outlined in DEPP 6.2.1 G, there are some additional considerations that may be relevant when deciding whether to take action against an approved person pursuant to section 66 of the Act. This list of those considerations is non-exhaustive. Not all considerations below may be relevant in every case, and there may be other considerations, not listed, that are relevant.(1) The approved person's position and responsibilities. The FCA4 may take into
The FCA4 will not discipline approved persons on the basis of vicarious liability (that is, holding them responsible for the acts of others), provided appropriate delegation and supervision has taken place (see APER 4.6.13 G and APER 4.6.14 G). In particular, disciplinary action will not be taken against an approved person performing a significant influence function simply because a regulatory failure has occurred in an area of business for which he is responsible. The FCA4 will
3In addition to the general factors outlined in DEPP 6.2.1 G, there are some additional considerations that the FCA4 will have regard to when deciding whether to take action against a person that performs a controlled function without approval contrary to section 63A of the Act.4(1) The conduct of the person. The FCA4 will take into consideration whether, while performing controlled functions without approval, the person committed misconduct in respect of which, if he had been
The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with Part VI of the Act, the Part 6 rules, the prospectus rules or a provision otherwise made in accordance with the Prospectus Directive or a requirement imposed under such provision rests with the persons identified in section 91(1) and section 91(1A) (Penalties for breach of Part 6 rules) of the Act respectively. Normally therefore, any disciplinary action taken by the FCA4 for contraventions of these obligations will in the
However, in the case of a contravention by a person referred to in section 91(1)(a) or section 91(1)(b) or section 91(1A) of the Act ("P"), where the FCA4 considers that another person who was at the material time a director of P was knowingly concerned in the contravention, theFCA4 may take disciplinary action against that person. In circumstances where the FCA4 does not consider it appropriate to seek a disciplinary sanction against P (notwithstanding a breach of relevant requirements
The Principles are set out in PRIN 2.1.1 R. The Principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms under the regulatory system. The Principles derive their authority from the FCA's4 rule-making powers set out in section 137A4(General rule-making power) of the Act. A breach of a Principle will make a firm liable to disciplinary action. Where the FCA4 considers this is appropriate, it will discipline a firm on the basis of the Principles alone.444
The Listing Principles and Premium Listing Principles5 are set out in LR 7. The Listing Principles set out in LR 7.2.1 R5 are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of all5listed companies. In addition to the Listing Principles, the Premium Listing Principles set out in LR 7.2.1A R are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of all listed companies with a premium listing of equity shares. The Listing Principles and Premium Listing Principles5 derive their
In determining whether a Listing Principle or Premium Listing Principle5 has been broken, it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Listing Principle or Premium Listing Principle5 in question. Under each of the Listing Principles and Premium Listing Principles5, the onus will be on the FCA4 to show that a listed company has been at fault in some way. This requirement will differ depending upon the relevant5 Listing Principle or Premium Listing Princip
When deciding how to proceed in such cases, the FCA4 will examine the circumstances of the case, and consider, in the light of the relevant investigation, disciplinary and enforcement powers, whether it is appropriate for the FCA4 or another authority to take action to address the breach. The FCA4 will have regard to all the circumstances of the case including whether the other authority has adequate powers to address the breach in question.444
In some cases, it may be appropriate for both the FCA4and another authority to be involved, and for both to take action in a particular case arising from the same facts. For example, a breach of RIE rules may be so serious as to justify the FCA4 varying or cancelling the firm's Part IV permission, or withdrawing approval from approved persons, as well as action taken by the RIE. In such cases, the FCA4 will work with the relevant authority to ensure that cases are dealt with efficiently
In relation to behaviour which may have happened or be happening in the context of a takeover bid, the FCA4 will refer to the Takeover Panel and give due weight to its views. Where the Takeover Code has procedures for complaint about any behaviour, the FCA4 expects parties to exhaust those procedures. The FCA4 will not, save in exceptional circumstances, take action under any of section 123 (FCA's4power to impose penalties), section 129 (Power of court to impose penalties), section
The FCA4 will not take action against a person over behaviour which (a) conforms with the Takeover Code or rules of an RIE and (b) falls within the terms of any provision of the Code of Market Conduct which states that behaviour so conforming does not amount to market abuse. The FCA4 will seek the Takeover Panel's or relevant RIE's views on whether behaviour complies with the Takeover Code or RIE rules and will attach considerable weight to its views.44
If any of the circumstances in DEPP 6.2.26 G apply, and the FCA4 considers that the use of its disciplinary powers under section 123 or section 129, or of its injunctive powers under section 381 or of its powers relating to restitution under section 383 or 384 is appropriate, it will not take action during an offer to which the Takeover Code applies except in the circumstances set out in DEPP 6.2.27 G.4
In any case where the FCA4 considers that the use of its powers under any of sections 123, 129, 381, 383 or 384 of the Act may be appropriate, if that use may affect the timetable or outcome of a takeover bid or where it is appropriate in the context of any exercise by the Takeover Panel of its powers and authority, the FCA4 will consult the Takeover Panel before using any of those powers.44
Where the behaviour of a person which amounts to market abuse is behaviour to which the Takeover Code is relevant, the use of the Takeover Panel's powers will often be sufficient to address the relevant concerns. In cases where this is not so, the FCA4 will need to consider whether it is appropriate to use any of its own powers under the market abuse regime. The principal circumstances in which the FCA4 is likely to consider such exercise are:44(1) where the behaviour falls within
Where the FCA considers that the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts (RWEA) achieved via the securitisation is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, significant risk transfer will be considered to not have been achieved. Consequently, a firm will not be able to recognise any reduction in RWEA due to the transaction.
For IFPRU 4.12.3 G (3) (option 3), the1FCA intends to grant permission for an originator to make its own assessment of significant risk transfer only where it is satisfied that:1(1) in every relevant case, the reduction in own funds requirements achieved would be justified by a commensurate transfer of risk to third parties;(2) the firm has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; and(3) such transfer of risk to third parties
A firm seeking to achieve capital relief by deducting or applying a 1250% risk weight where permitted under articles 243 or 244 of the EU CRR does not need to make the notification in IFPRU 4.12.1 R.1 However, in such cases, a firm should consider whether the characteristics of the transaction are such that the FCA would reasonably expect prior notice of it.1
Notification under IFPRU 4.12.1 G should include sufficient information to enable the FCA to assess whether the possible reduction in RWEA which would be achieved by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties. The FCA expects this to include the following:(1) details of the securitisation positions, including rating, exposure value and RWEA broken down by securitisation positions sold and retained;(2) key transaction documentation
The FCA's review will focus on the proportion of credit risk transferred, compared to the proportion by which RWEA are reduced in the transaction. Where the FCA judges that the reduction in RWEA is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, it will inform the firm that significant risk transfer has not been achieved by this transaction. Otherwise, the FCA will inform the firm that it does not object to the transaction.
The FCA does not intend to pre-approve transactions. The FCA will provide a view on whether it considers that commensurate risk transfer has been achieved at a point in time, which may be provided after a transaction has closed. The FCA may reassess its judgement of the achievement of commensurate risk transfer if the level of credit risk transfer in a transaction changes materially.
Where a firm applies for such permission, the FCA would expect the scope should be defined according to a range of characteristics, including the type of asset class and the structural features of the transaction. The characteristics the FCA would expect a firm to consider when scoping a permission application include:(1) asset class (eg, residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, leasing, loans to corporates or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
To assess a firm's ability to use its own policies and methodologies for assessing significant risk transfer, the FCA's permission reviews will focus on:(1) the firm's understanding of the risk of any potential transactions within permission scope, including for potential underlying assets, securitisation structures and other relevant factors that affect the economic substance of risk transfer;(2) the governance around significant risk transfer assessment (including sign-off procedures)
The information the FCA expects a firm to provide in a permission application includes the following:(1) details of the firm's governance processes for significant risk transfer, including details of any relevant committees and the seniority and expertise of key persons involved in sign-off;(2) a copy of the firm's significant risk transfer policy, including details of the significant risk transfer calculation policies, methodologies and any models used to assess risk transfer
The FCA intends to apply two materiality limits to the proportion of risk-weighted exposure amount (RWEA) relief that can be taken under any permission covering multiple transactions:(1) transaction level limit any transaction that would, in principle, be within the scope of the permission, but that resulted in an RWEA reduction exceeding 1% of the firm's credit risk-related RWEAs as at the date of the firm's most recent regulatory return, will fall outside the scope of a multiple
Permissions relating to individual transactions do not need to be granted prior to the execution of a transaction. The FCA does not intend to specify the timeframe in which a firm should submit an individual transaction permission, but the firm should note that capital relief from a specific transaction will not be available until a firm has obtained permission covering the significant risk transfer assessment and capital treatment (unless the transaction is being notified under
Depending on the nature of a transaction, the FCA may grant an individual permission for the duration of the transaction, or may impose a time limit on the permission. Where a firm sought to take capital relief on a transaction beyond the expiry date of the relevant permission, the firm would need to renew the permission prior to its expiry date.
Given that significant risk transfer should be met on a continuing basis, permissions will typically include a requirement to notify the FCA of any change in circumstances from those under which the permission was granted (eg, where the amount of credit risk transfer had changed materially). Any reduction in credit risk transfer subsequent to the permission being granted will require the firm to take a commensurate reduction in RWEA relief. If a firm does not effect a commensurate
(1) If a firm is found to have provided support to a securitisation, the expectation that the firm will provide future support to its securitisations is increased. The FCA will take account of this increased expectation in future assessments of commensurate risk transfer to that firm.(2) The FCA expects securitisation documentation to make clear, where applicable, that repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator beyond its contractual obligations is not mandatory
The FCA expects originators seeking to apply the securitisation risk weights to synthetic securitisations to take into account all relevant factors to assess the amount of risk transferred. As well as the size and timing of amounts payable to the protection seller, the circumstances in which those amounts are payable can undermine the effectiveness of risk transfer. The FCA expects a firm seeking capital relief through synthetic securitisations to incorporate premiums in their
Article 238 of the EU CRR (Maturity of credit protection) requires maturity to be assessed in considering significant risk transfer. When considering the effective maturity of synthetic securitisations, the FCA expects a firm to consider whether the transaction contained an option to terminate the protection at the discretion of the protection buyer.
The FCA considers the following to be examples of features which generally indicate a positive incentive to call or, at least, to constitute grounds for discussion with the FCA prior to the conclusion of the transaction:(1) the transaction contains terms, such as payments at maturity or payments upon early termination or significant premiums, which may reduce risk transfer;(2) the transaction includes a requirement for the protection buyer to incur additional costs or obligations
Significant risk transfer is an ongoing requirement. Accordingly, the FCA expects firms to ensure that any reduction in own funds requirements achieved through securitisation continues to be matched by a commensurate transfer of risk throughout the life of the transaction. The FCA expects firms to take a substance over form approach to assessing significant risk transfer. Firms should be able to demonstrate that the capital relief post-transaction adequately captures the economic
When risk transfer transactions are structured as a group of linked transactions rather than a single transaction, the FCA expects the aggregate effect of linked transactions to comply with the EU CRR. The FCA expects firms to ensure that analysis of risk transfer incorporates all linked transactions, particularly if certain transactions within a group of linked transactions are undertaken at off-market rates.
The FCA expects the instruments used to transfer credit risk not to contain provisions which limit the amount of risk transferred. For example, should losses or defaults on the securitised exposures occur1(ie, deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool) the FCA expects the originator's net cost of protection or the yield payable to investors should not increase as a result.1
To ensure continued appropriateness, the FCA expects firms to update the opinions of qualified legal counsel, required by the EU CRR, as necessary to ensure their continuing validity. For example, an opinion may need to be updated if relevant statutory provisions are amended, or where a new decision or judgment of a court has a bearing on the continuing validity of counsel's opinion.
The FCA does not operate a pre-approval process for transactions. The FCA expects a firm to discuss with its supervisor at any early stage securitisation transactions that are material or have complex features. Where a firm claims a regulatory capital reduction from securitisation transactions in its disclosures to the market, the FCA expects such disclosures to include caveats making clear the risk of full or partial re-characterisation where this risk is material in the light
The FCA will seek to ensure that the securitisation framework is not used to undermine or arbitrage other parts of the prudential framework. For other similar credit protection arrangements (eg, those subject credit risk mitigation or trading book requirements), the impact of certain features (such as significant premiums or call options) may cast doubt on the extent of risk transferred and the resulting capital assessment. Features which result in inadequate own funds requirements
Where a firm achieves significant risk transfer for a particular transaction, the FCA expects it to continue to monitor risks related to the transaction to which it may still be exposed. The firm should consider capital planning implications of securitised assets returning to its balance sheet. The EU CRR requires a firm to conduct regular stress testing of its securitisation activities and off-balance sheet exposures. The stress tests should consider the firm-wide impact of stressed
(1) IFPRU 2.3 sets out guidance on IFPRU 2.2 (Adequacy of financial resources) so far as it applies to an IFPRU investment firm. In particular, guidance on how a firm should carry out its ICAAP, as well as some factors the FCA will take into consideration when undertaking a SREP. The terms ICAAP and SREP are explained in IFPRU 2.3.3 G. IFPRU 2.3.48 G to IFPRU 2.3.52 R are rules that apply to a firm with an IRB permission.(2) IFPRU 2.3 is mainly written on the basis that IFPRU
The adequacy of a firm's capital needs to be assessed both by a firm and the FCA. This process involves:(1) an internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP), which a firm is obliged to carry out in accordance with the ICAAPrules; and(2) a supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), which is conducted by the FCA.
The FCA will review a firm'sICAAP, including the results of the firm's stress tests carried out under IFPRU and the EUCRR, as part of its SREP. Provided that the FCA is satisfied with the appropriateness of a firm's capital assessment, the FCA will take into account that firm'sICAAP and stress tests in its SREP. More material on stress tests for a firm with an IRB permission can be found in IFPRU 2.3.50 R to IFPRU 2.3.54 G.11
The SREP is a process under which the FCA: (1) reviews the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by a firm to comply with IFPRU, SYSC and with requirements imposed by or under the EUCRR and wider regulatory system and evaluates the risks to which the firm is, or might be, exposed;(2) determines whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the firm and the capital held by the firm ensures a sound management and coverage
As part of its SREP, the FCA will also consider whether a firm should hold a capital planning buffer and the amount and quality of such capital planning buffer. In making these assessments, the FCA will have regard to the nature, scale and complexity of a firm's business and of the major sources of risks relevant to such business as referred to in the general stress and scenario testing rule and SYSC 20 (Reverse stress testing), as applicable. Accordingly, a firm'scapital planning
After completing a review as part of the SREP, the FCA may notify the firm of the amount and quality of capital which it should hold as a capital planning buffer over and above the level of capital recommended as its ICG. The FCA may set a firm'scapital planning buffer either as an amount and quality of capital which it should hold now (ie, at the time of the FCA notification following the firm'sSREP) or, in exceptional cases, as a forward-looking target that the firm should build
Where the amount or quality of capital which the FCA considers a firm should hold to meet the overall financial adequacy rule or as a capital planning buffer is not the same as that which results from a firm'sICAAP, the FCA usually expects to discuss any such difference with the firm. Where necessary, the FCA may consider the use of its powers under section 166 of the Act (Reports by skilled persons) to assist in such circumstances.
If a firm considers that the individual capital guidance given to it is inappropriate to its circumstances it should, consistent with Principle 11 (Relations with regulators), inform the FCA that it disagrees with that guidance. The FCA may reissue the individual capital guidance if, after discussion with the firm, the FCA concludes that the amount or quality of capital that the firm should hold to meet the overall financial adequacy rule is different from the amount or quality
If a firm disagrees with the FCA's assessment as to the amount or quality of capital planning buffer that it should hold, it should, consistent with Principle 11 (Relations with regulators), notify the FCA of its disagreement. The FCA may reconsider its initial assessment if, after discussion with the firm, the FCA concludes that the amount or quality of capital that the firm should hold as capital planning buffer is different from the amount or quality initially suggested.
If, after discussion, the FCA and a firm still do not agree on an adequate level of capital, the FCA may consider using its powers under section55L of the Act on its own initiative to require the firm1 to hold capital in line with the FCA's view of the capital necessary to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule. In deciding whether it should use its powers under section 55L,1the FCA will take into account the amount and quality of the capital planning buffer which the
If the FCA gives individual capital guidance to a firm, the FCA will state what amount and quality of capital the FCA considers the firm needs to hold in order to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule. It will generally do so by saying that the firm should hold own funds of an amount which is at least equal to a specified percentage of that firm'sown funds requirements plus one or more static add-ons for specific risks, in line with the overall Pillar 2 rule.
Where the FCA notifies a firm that it should hold a capital planning buffer, the notification will state what amount and quality of capital the FCA considers is adequate for the firm to hold. This will normally be notified to the firm, together with its individual capital guidance and expressed as a separate amount of own funds that the firm should hold in excess of the amount of own funds indicated as its individual capital guidance.
For the purposes of IFPRU 2.3.21 G, 1IFPRU 2.3.20 G1 applies as it applies to individual capital guidance. References in those provisions to individual capital guidance should be read as if they were references to capital planning buffer. In relation toIFPRU 2.2.62 R, where the general stress and scenario testing rule or SYSC 20 (Reverse stress testing), as part of the ICAAPrules, applies to a firm on a consolidated basis, the FCA may notify the firm that it should hold a group
A firm continuing to hold capital in accordance with its individual capital guidance and its ability to carry on doing so is a fundamental part of the FCA's supervision of that firm. Therefore, if a firm'sown funds have fallen, or are expected to fall, below the level advised in individual capital guidance, then, consistent with Principle 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should inform the FCA of this fact as soon as practicable, explaining why this has happened or is expected
In the circumstance in IFPRU 2.3.23 G, the FCA may ask a firm for alternative or more detailed proposals and plans or further assessments and analyses of capital adequacy and risks faced by the firm. The FCA will seek to agree with the firm appropriate timescales and scope for any such additional work, in the light of the circumstances which have arisen.
Monitoring the use of a firm'scapital planning buffer is also a fundamental part of the FCA's supervision of that firm. A firm should only use its capital planning buffer to absorb losses or meet increased own funds requirements if certain adverse circumstances materialise. These should be circumstances beyond the firm's normal and direct control, whether relating to a deteriorating external environment or periods of stress, such as macroeconomic downturns or financial/market
Consistent with Principle 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should notify the FCA as early as possible in advance where it has identified that it would need to use its capital planning buffer. The firm's notification should at least state: (1) what adverse circumstances are likely to force the firm to draw down its capital planning buffer; (2) how the capital planning buffer will be used up in line with the firm's capital planning projections; and(3) what plan is in place
Following discussions with the firm on the items listed in IFPRU 2.3.27 G, the FCA may put in place additional reporting arrangements to monitor the firm's use of its capital planning buffer in accordance with the plan referred to in IFPRU 2.3.27 G (3). The FCA may also identify specific trigger points as the capital planning buffer is being used up by the firm, which could lead to additional supervisory actions.
Where a firm'scapital planning buffer is being drawn down due to circumstances other than those in IFPRU 2.3.26 G, such as poor planning or mismanagement, the FCA may ask the firm for more detailed plans for it to restore its capital planning buffer. In the light of the relevant circumstances, the FCA may consider taking other remedial actions, which may include using its powers under section 55L of the Act on its own initiative, to impose a requirement on a firm.11
IFPRU 2.3.34 G to IFPRU 2.3.36G set out what the FCA considers to be a proportional approach to preparing an ICAAP as referred to in IFPRU 2.2.12 R (The processes, strategies and systems required by the overall Pillar 2 rule should be comprehensive and proportionate), according to the relative degree of complexity of a firm's activities. If a firm adopts the appropriate approach, it may enable the FCA more easily to review a firm'sICAAP when the FCA undertakes its SREP. The FCA
(1) This paragraph applies to a proportional ICAAP in the case of a firm that is a significant IFPRU firm (see IFPRU 1.2.3 R) whose activities are complex.(2) A proportional approach to that firm'sICAAP should cover the matters identified in IFPRU 2.3.34 G and IFPRU 2.3.35 G, but is likely also to involve the use of models, most of which will be integrated into its day-to-day management and operation.(3) Models of the kind referred to in (2) may be linked to generate an overall
(1) A firm may take into account factors other than those identified in the overall Pillar 2 rule when it assesses the level of capital it wishes to hold. These factors might include external rating goals, market reputation and its strategic goals. However, a firm should be able to distinguish, for the purpose of its dialogue with the FCA, between capital it holds to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule, capital it holds as a capital planning buffer and capital held
A firm should assess and monitor, in detail, its exposure to sectoral, geographic, liability and asset concentrations. The FCA considers that concentrations in these areas increase a firm's exposure to credit risk. Where a firm identifies such concentrations it should consider the adequacy of its own funds requirements.
If IFPRU 2.3.50 Rapplies to a firm on a consolidated basis, the following adjustments are made to IFPRU 2.3.50 R in accordance with the general principles of Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of the EU CRR (Prudential consolidation): (1) references to own funds are to the consolidated own funds of the firm's FCA consolidation group or, as the case may be, its non-EEA sub-group; and(2) references to the capital requirements in Part Three of the EU CRR (Capital requirements) are to
If a firm's current available own funds are less than the own funds requirements indicated by the stress test, that does not necessarily mean there is a breach of IFPRU 2.3.50 R. The firm may wish to set out any countervailing effects and off-setting actions that can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the FCA as being likely to reduce that difference. The FCA is only likely to consider a demonstration of such actions as credible if those actions are set out in a capital management
In considering if there are any systems and control weaknesses, and their effect on the adequacy of the own funds requirements, a firm should be able to demonstrate to the FCA that all the issues identified in SYSC have been considered and that appropriate plans and procedures exist to deal adequately with adverse scenarios.
As an asset manager's mandates become more complex, the risk of it failing to comply fully with the terms of its contracts increases. In the event of such failure, a firm can be exposed to substantial losses resulting from customers' claims and legal actions. Although the FCA would expect an asset manager to have adequate controls in place to mitigate that risk, it may also like to consider the potential cost to it if customers claim that it has not adhered to mandates. Past claims
The FCA expects an asset manager to consider the impact of economic factors on its ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due. Therefore, an asset manager should develop scenarios which relate to its strategic and business plan. An asset manager might consider: (1) the effect of a market downturn that affects both transaction volumes and the market values of assets in its funds - in assessing the impact of such a scenario, an asset manager may consider the extent to which
A firm should not expect the FCA to accept as adequate any particular model that it develops, or automatically to reflect the results from the model in any individual capital guidance or capital planning buffer. However, the FCA will take into account the results of a sound and prudent model when giving individual capital guidance or when dealing with the firm in relation to its capital planning buffer.
In relation to the use of an ECM (see IFPRU 2.3.36 G), the FCA is likely to place more reliance on a firm'sICAAP if the firm provides the following information: (1) a comparison of the amount of capital that the ECM generates in respect of each of the risks captured in the own funds requirements before aggregation with the corresponding components of the own funds requirements calculation; and(2) evidence that the guidance inIFPRU 2.3.68 G to IFPRU 2.3.75 G1 has been followed
The appropriate regulator has divided its definition of capital into categories, or tiers, reflecting differences in the extent to which the capital instruments concerned meet the purpose and conform to the characteristics of capital listed in GENPRU 2.2.9 G. The appropriate regulator generally prefers a firm to hold higher quality capital that meets the characteristics of permanency and loss absorbency that are features of tier one capital. Capital instruments falling into
This table belongs to GENPRU 2.2.17 R
Type of firm |
Location of rules |
Remarks |
BIPRU firm16without an investment firm consolidation waiver 16 |
GENPRU 2 Annex 4 (Deducts material holdings) |
Applies to a BIPRU firm16not using GENPRU 2 Annex 5 or GENPRU 2 Annex 6 16 |
BIPRU firm16without an investment firm consolidation waiver 16 |
GENPRU 2 Annex 5 (Deducts illiquid assets) |
A BIPRU firm16must give one Month's prior notice to the FCA16 before starting to use or stopping using this method 1616 |
BIPRU firm16with an investment firm consolidation waiver 16 |
GENPRU 2 Annex 6 (Deducts illiquid assets and material holdings) |
A firm with an investment firm consolidation waiver must use this method. No otherBIPRU firm16 may use it. 16 |
GENPRU 2.2.19 R sets out three different methods of calculating capital resources for BIPRU firms16. The differences between the three methods relate to whether and how material holdings and illiquid assets are deducted when calculating capital resources. The method depends on whether a firm has an investment firm consolidation waiver. If a firm does have such a waiver, it should deduct illiquid assets, own groupmaterial holdings and certain contingent liabilities. If a firm does
12A firm must notify the appropriate regulator in writing of its intention to issue a capital instrument which it intends to include within its capital resources at least one month before the intended date of issue, unless there are exceptional circumstances which make it impracticable to give such a period of notice, in which event the firm must give as much notice as is practicable in those circumstances. When giving notice, a firm must:(1) provide details of the amount of
12A firm must provide a further notification to the appropriate regulator in writing including all the information required in GENPRU 2.2.61BR (1) to (4) as soon as it proposes any change to the intended date of issue, amount of issue, type of investors, stage of capital or any other feature of the capital instrument to that previously notified to the appropriate regulator.
12If a firm proposes to establish a debt securities program for the issue of capital instruments for inclusion within its capital resources, it must: (1) notify the appropriate regulator of the establishment of the program; and(2) provide the information required by GENPRU 2.2.61BR (1) to (4)at least one month before the first proposed drawdown. Any changes must be notified to the appropriate regulator in accordance with GENPRU 2.2.61C R.
12The capital instruments to which GENPRU 2.2.61B R does not apply are:(1) ordinary shares which:(a) are the most deeply subordinated capital instrument issued by the firm;(b) meet the criteria set out in GENPRU 2.2.83R (2) and (3) and, for a BIPRU firm, GENPRU 2.2.83A R; and(c) are the same as ordinary shares previously issued by the firm;(2) debt instruments issued from a debt securities program, provided that program was notified to the appropriate regulator prior to its first
12A firm must notify the appropriate regulator in writing, no later than the date of issue, of its intention to issue a capital instrument listed in GENPRU 2.2.61E R which it intends to include within its capital resources. When giving notice, a firm must: (1) provide the information set out at GENPRU 2.2.61BR (1) to (3); and(2) confirm that the terms of the capital instrument have not changed since the previous issue by the firm of that type of capital instrument.
12GENPRU 2.2.61B R provides that, in exceptional circumstances, a firm may provide less than one month's notice of the intended issue. The appropriate regulator is unlikely to consider circumstances to be exceptional unless they are such that there is a risk of a firm'scapital resources falling below its capital resources requirement if a one-month notification period is observed. In such circumstances, a firm should notify the appropriate regulator as soon as it has resolved
4The purpose of GENPRU 2.2.64R (4) is to ensure that a firm retains flexibility over the payment of coupons and can preserve cash in times of financial stress. However, a firm may include, as part of the capital instrument terms, a right to make payments of a coupon mandatory if an item of capital becomes ineligible to form part of its capital resources (e.g. through a change in the relevant rules) and the firm has notified the appropriate regulator that the instrument is in
The appropriate regulator considers that dividend pushers diminish the quality of capital by breaching the principle of complete discretion over coupons set out in GENPRU 2.2.64R (4). A dividend pusher operates so that, in a given period of time, payments must be made on senior securities if payments have previously been made on junior securities or securities ranking pari passu. As such, dividend pushers may not be included in the terms of tier one capital, unless the firm has
8The appropriate regulator considers that a BIPRU firm's financial resources are not preserved under GENPRU 2.2.69CR (2) unless, among other things, the conditions of the substituted payment are that:(1) there is no decrease in the amount of the firm'score tier one capital;(2) the deferred coupon is satisfied without delay using newly issued core tier one capital that has an aggregate fair value no more than the amount of the coupon;(3) the firm is not obliged to find new investors
(1) 8In relation to the cancellation or deferral of the payment of a coupon in accordance with GENPRU 2.2.64R (4) and GENPRU 2.2.64R (5), GENPRU 2.2.68A R, or GENPRU 2.2.69B R, the appropriate regulator expects that situations where a coupon may need to be cancelled or deferred will be resolved through analysis and discussion between the firm and the appropriate regulator. If the appropriate regulator and the firm do not agree on the cancellation or deferral of the payment
A firm may not include a capital instrument in its tier one capital resources, unless its contractual terms are such that:(1) (if it is redeemable other than in circumstances set out in GENPRU 2.2.64R (3)(a) (redemption on a winding up)) it is redeemable only at the option of the firm or, in the case of a BIPRU firm, on the date of maturity;88(2) the firm cannot exercise that redemption right:(a) before the fifth anniversary of its date of issue;(b) unless it has given notice
8In the case of a BIPRU firm, an incentive to redeem is a feature of a capital instrument that would lead a reasonable market participant to have an expectation that the firm will redeem the instrument. The appropriate regulator considers that interest rate step-ups and principal stock settlements, in conjunction with a call option, are incentives to redeem. Only instruments with moderate incentives to redeem are permitted as tier one capital, in accordance with the limited conversion
A firm may include a term in a tier one instrument allowing the firm to redeem it before the date in GENPRU 2.2.70R (2)(a) if the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the other conditions in GENPRU 2.2.70 R are met;(2) the circumstance that entitles the firm to exercise that right is:8(a) 8(in the case of an insurer) a change in law or regulation in any relevant jurisdiction or in the interpretation of such law or regulation by any court or authority entitled to do so; and(b)
The purpose of GENPRU 2.2.71 R to GENPRU 2.2.72 R is this. In general a tier one instrument should not be redeemable by the firm before its fifth anniversary. However there may be circumstances in which it would be reasonable for the firm to redeem it before then. GENPRU 2.2.71 R allows the firm to include a right to redeem the instrument before the fifth anniversary in certain circumstances. A tax call is an example of a term that may be allowed. GENPRU 2.2.71 R says that the
A firm must not redeem any tier one instrument that it has included in its tier one capital resources unless it has notified the appropriate regulator of its intention at least one month before it becomes committed to do so. When giving notice, the firm must provide details of its position after such redemption in order to show how it will:77(1) meet its capital resources requirement;78(2) 7have sufficient financial resources to meet the overall financial adequacy rule; and8(3)
8The appropriate regulator considers that, in order to comply with GENPRU 2.2.74 R, the firm should, at a minimum, provide the appropriate regulator with the following information:(1) a comprehensive explanation of the rationale for the redemption;(2) the firm's financial and solvency position before and after the redemption, in particular whether that redemption, or other foreseeable internal and external events or circumstances, may increase the risk of the firm breaching
8A BIPRU firm must not purchase a tier one instrument that it has included in its tier one capital resources unless:(1) the firm initiates the purchase;(2) 10[deleted]10(3) the firm has given notice to the appropriate regulator in accordance with GENPRU 2.2.79G R; and10(4) 10(in the case of hybrid capital) it is on or after the fifth anniversary of the date of issue of the instrument.
8A BIPRU firm must not purchase a tier one instrument in accordance with GENPRU 2.2.79A R unless it has notified the appropriate regulator of its intention at least one month before it becomes committed to doing so. When giving notice, the firm must provide details of its position after the purchase in order to show how, over an appropriate timescale, adequately stressed, and without planned recourse to the capital markets, it will:(1) meet its capital resources requirement;
8The appropriate regulator considers that:(1) in order to comply with GENPRU 2.2.79G R, the firm should, at a minimum, provide the appropriate regulator with the following information:(a) a comprehensive explanation of the rationale for the purchase;(b) the firm's financial and solvency position before and after the purchase, in particular whether the purchase, or other foreseeable internal and external events or circumstances, may increase the risk of the firm breaching its
10A BIPRU firm must not announce to the holders of a tier one instrument its intention to purchase that instrument unless it has notified that intention to the appropriate regulator in accordance with GENPRU 2.2.79G R and it has not, during the period of one month from the date of giving notice, received an objection from the appropriate regulator.
10A BIPRU firm must not include in stage A of the capital resources table different classes of the same share type (for example "A ordinary shares" and "B ordinary shares") that meet the conditions in GENPRU 2.2.83 R and GENPRU 2.2.83A R but have differences in voting rights, unless it has notified the appropriate regulator of its intention at least one month before the shares are issued or (in the case of existing issued shares) the differences in voting rights take effect.
If a firm has surplus eligible partnership capital or eligible LLP members' capital that it wishes to repay in circumstances other than those set out in GENPRU 2.2.93 R or GENPRU 2.2.94 R it may apply to the appropriate regulator for a waiver to allow it to do so. If a firm applies for such a waiver the information that the firm supplies with the application might include:(1) a demonstration that the firm would have sufficient capital resources to meet its capital resources
8A BIPRU firm must not include a capital instrument at stage B1 of the calculation in the capital resources table unless (in addition to satisfying all the other requirements in relation to tier one capital and hybrid capital) its contractual terms are such that:(1) it cannot be redeemed in cash but can only be converted into core tier one capital;(2) it must be converted into core tier one capital by the firm during emergency situations; (3) the emergency situations referred
(1) 8In respect of GENPRU 2.2.115AR (4), the appropriate regulator may require the firm to convert the instrument into core tier one capital based on its financial and solvency situation. The appropriate regulator will take into account, among other things, the factors identified at GENPRU 2.2.69FG (2), adjusted to take into account the effects of a conversion rather than payment of a coupon.(2) Even if a firm meets its capital resources requirement, the appropriate regulator
(1) 8The effects of the mechanisms described in GENPRU 2.2.117A R will be more meaningful if they happen immediately after losses cause a significant deterioration of the financial as well as the solvency situation and even before the reserves are exhausted.(2) If a firm does not operate the loss absorption mechanism in a prudent and timely way, then the appropriate regulator may consider using its powers under 55J of the Act to, on its own initiative, vary the firm'sPart 4A
A firm which satisfies the conditions for the inclusion of capital set out in GENPRU 2.2.124 R, must, in addition, if that transaction is in any respect unusual, notify the appropriate regulator at least one Month in advance of the date on which the firm intends to include that capital in its capital resources.
The appropriate regulator is more concerned that the subordination provisions listed in GENPRU 2.2.159 R should be effective than that they should follow a particular form. The appropriate regulator does not, therefore, prescribe that the loan agreement or capital instrument should be drawn up in a standard form.
A firm must not amend the terms of the capital or the documents referred to in GENPRU 2.2.159R (8) unless:(1) at least one Month before the amendment is due to take effect, the firm has given the appropriate regulator notice in writing of the proposed amendment and the appropriate regulator has not objected; and(2) that notice includes confirmation that the legal opinions referred to in GENPRU 2.2.159R (12) and, if applicable, GENPRU 2.2.163 R (General conditions for eligibility
In relation to a tier two instrument, a firm must notify the appropriate regulator:(1) in the case of an insurer, six Months; and(2) in the case of a BIPRU firm, one Month;before it becomes committed to7 the proposed repayment (unless that firm intends to repay an instrument on its final maturity date). When giving notice, the firm must provide details of its position after such repayment in order to show how it will:777(3) meet its capital resources requirement; and7(4) have
(1) The purpose of GENPRU 2.2.177R (2) is to ensure that a firm which issues an item of capital with a coupon retains flexibility over the payments of such coupon and can preserve cash in times of financial stress. However, a firm may include, as part of the capital instrument terms, a right to make payments of a coupon mandatory if an item of capital becomes ineligible to form part of its capital resources (for example, through a change in the relevant rules) and the firm has
A BIPRU firm which adopts the standardised approach to credit risk may include general/collective provisions in its tier two capital resources only if:(1) they are freely available to the firm;(2) their existence is disclosed in internal accounting records; and(3) their amount is determined by the management of the firm, verified by independent auditors and notified to the appropriate regulator.
Article 169(3) of the EU CRR allows the use of direct estimates of PDs, although such a measure could be assessed over a variety of different time horizons which the EU CRR does not specify. Accordingly, the FCA considers that it acceptable in principle to use methodologies of this type in lieu of estimation of long-run averages for the grade/pool/score of the underlying rating system, where the following conditions are met. Meeting these conditions requires a firm using the
Accordingly, the FCA expects a firm using a variable scalar approach should adopt a PD that is the long-run default rate expected over a representative mix of good and bad economic periods, assuming that the current lending conditions including borrower mix and attitudes and the firm's lending policies remain unchanged. If the relevant lending conditions or policies change, then the FCA would expect the long-run default rate to change (see article 180(1)(a), (b) and (2)(a) of
The FCA considers that, until more promising account level arrears data is collected, enabling firms to better explain the movement in their arrears rate over time, the likelihood of firms being able to develop a compliant variable scalar approach for non-mortgage retail portfolios is low. This is because of the difficulty that firms have in distinguishing between movements in default rates that result from cyclical factors and those that result from non-cyclical reasons for these
Segmentation should be done on the basis of the main drivers of both willingness and ability to pay. In the context of residential mortgages, an example of the former is the amount of equity in the property and an example of the latter is the ratio of debt to income. The FCA expects a firm to:(1) incorporate an appropriate number of drivers of risk within the segmentation to maximise the accuracy of the system;(2) provide detailed explanations supporting its choices of drivers,
To the extent that the basis of segmentation is not sufficient completely to explain movements in non-cyclical default risk, the long-run default rate for that segment will not be stable (eg, a change in the mix of the portfolio within the segment could change the long-run default rate). In such cases, the FCA would expect a firm to make a conservative compensating adjustment to the calibration of the long-run average PD for the affected segments and be able to demonstrate that
The FCA expects a firm to review and amend as necessary the long run default rate to be applied to each segment on a regular (at least an annual) basis. When reviewing the long run default rate to be applied to each segment, the FCA expects a firm to consider the extent to which:(1) realised default rates are changing due to cyclical factors and the scaling factors needs to be changed;(2) new information suggests that both the PiT PDs and the long run PDs should be changed; and(3)
The FCA expects that, over time, the actual default rates incurred in each segment would form the basis of PD estimates for the segments. However, at the outset, the key calibration issue is likely to be the setting of the initial long-run default rate for each segment, as this will underpin the PD of the entire portfolio for some years to come. A firm should apply conservatism in this area and this is something on which the FCA is likely to focus on in model reviews.
A firm should put in place a governance process to provide a judgemental overlay to assess its choices of segments, PD estimates and scalars, both initially and on a continuing basis. Moreover, where the basis of its estimation is a formulaic approach, the FCA considers that the act of either accepting or adjusting the estimate suggested by the formula would represent the exercise of judgement.
The FCA expects a firm to consider the following issues when seeking to apply a variable scalar approach for UK mortgages:(1) in respect of Principle 2 (IFPRU 4.6.5 G), the commonly used Council for Mortgage Lenders database was based on arrears data and not defaults during a period, and the use of these data without further analysis and adjustment can undermine the accuracy of any calculations; and(2) in respect of Principle 3 (IFPRU 4.6.5 G), the historical data time period
The FCA expects a firm that is including mortgage arrears data as a proxy for default data to:(1) carry out sensitivity analysis identifying the circumstances in which the assumption that arrears may be used as a proxy for default would produce inaccuracy in long-run PD estimates;(2) set a standard for what might constitute a potentially significant level of inaccuracy, and demonstrate why, in practice, the use of this proxy would not result in any significant inaccuracy;(3) establish
When using historical mortgage data as a key input into variable scalar models, the FCA expects a firm to:(1) carry out sensitivity analysis identifying the implications of using different cut-off dates for the start of the reference data set; and(2) justify the appropriateness of its choice of cut-off date.
Where a firm has not chosen to apply the definition of default at the level of an individual credit facility in accordance with article 178(1) of the EU CRR, the FCA expects it to ensure that the PD associated with unsecured exposures is not understated as a result of the presence of any collateralised exposures.
Where a firm chooses to apply the definition of default at the level of an individual credit facility, in accordance with article 178(1) of the EU CRR, and a customer has defaulted on a facility, then default on that facility is likely to influence the PD assigned to that customer on other facilities. The FCA expects a firm to take this into account in its estimates of PD (see article 178(1) of the EU CRR).
To ensure that a rating system provides a meaningful differentiation of risk and accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk, the FCA expects a firm to develop country-specific mid-market PD models. Where a firm develops multi-country mid-market PD models, the FCA expects the firm to be able to demonstrate that the model rank orders risk and predicts default rates for each country where it is to be used for own funds requirements calculation.
The FCA expects a firm using a rating agency grades as the primary driver in its IRB models to be able to demonstrate (and document) compliance with the following criteria:(1) the firm has its own internal rating scale;(2) the firm has a system and processes in place that allow it to continuously collect and analyse all relevant information, and the 'other relevant information' considered by the firm in accordance with article 171(2) of the EU CRR reflects the information collected
The FCA expects a firm to estimate PD for a rating system in line with this section where the firm's internal experience of defaults for that rating system was 20 defaults or fewer, and reliable estimates of PD cannot be derived from external sources of default data, including the use of market price-related data. In PD estimation for all exposures covered by the rating system, the FCA expects the firm to:(1) use a statistical technique to derive the distribution of defaults implied
The decision to give a warning notice and a decision notice in a particular matter will often not be taken by the same decision maker. Certain types of action require that the warning notice decision be taken by FCA6 staff under executive procedures and the decision notice decision be taken by the RDC. Similarly, in enforcement cases the RDC might take the decision to give a warning notice,4 but the decision to give a decision notice could be taken by the settlement decision makers
FCA6 staff under executive procedures will take the decision to give a warning notice if the FCA6 proposes to:66(1) refuse an application for a Part 4A permission6 or to refuse an application to cancel a Part 4A permission6;66(2) impose a limitation or a requirement which was not applied for, or specify a narrower description of regulated activity than that applied for, on the grant of a Part 4A permission6;6(3) refuse an application to vary a Part 4A permission6, or to restrict
If representations are made in response to a warning notice proposing the action set out atDEPP 2.5.3G (2), DEPP 2.5.3G (3), DEPP 2.5.3G (3A),6 or DEPP 2.5.3G (6), then the RDC will take the decision to give a decision notice if the action involves a fundamental variation or requirement6 (see DEPP 2.5.8 G). Otherwise, the decision to give the decision notice will be taken by FCA6 staff under executive procedures.6666
6FCA staff under executive procedures will take the decision where the FCA is proposing or deciding to:(1) refuse its consent to the granting by the PRA of an application for a Part 4A permission, or give its consent subject to conditions; (2) refuse its consent to the granting by the PRA of an application for the variation of a Part 4A permission, or give its consent subject to conditions; or(3) refuse its consent to the granting by the PRA of an application to perform a controlled
The RDC will take the decision to give a supervisory notice exercising the FCA's 6own-initiative powers6 (by removing a regulated activity, by imposing a limitation or requirement or by specifying a narrower description of regulated activity) if the action involves a fundamental variation or requirement6 (see DEPP 2.5.8 G). Otherwise, the decision to give the supervisory notice6 will be taken by FCA6 staff under executive procedures.66666
FCA6 staff under executive procedures will take the following statutory notice decisions:6(1) the refusal of an application for listing of securities;(2) the suspension of listing on the FCA's6 own initiative or at the request of the issuer;6(3) [deleted]22(4) the discontinuance of listing of securities at the issuer's request;(5) the exercise of any of the powers in sections 87K or 87L of the Act in respect of a breach of any applicable provision; and2(6) [deleted]22(7) the refusal
If securities have matured or otherwise ceased to exist the FCA6 will remove any reference to them from the official list. This is a purely administrative process, and not a discontinuance of listing in the sense used in Part 6 of the Act. Decisions relating to imposition of limitations or other restrictions of sponsors and primary information providers.66
6Under section 88(4)(aa) of the Act, if the FCA proposes to impose limitations or other restrictions on the services to which a sponsor's approval relates, it must give him a warning notice. If, after considering any representations made in response to the warning notice, the FCA decides to impose limitations or other restrictions on the services to which a sponsor's approval relates, it must give him a decision notice. Where the sponsor has requested or otherwise agrees to the
6If the FCA is proposing or deciding to refuse a sponsor's application for the withdrawal or variation of a limitation or other restriction on the services to which a sponsor's approval relates under section 88(8)(d) of the Act, the decision maker will be FCA staff under executive procedures where FCA staff decided to impose the limitation or other restriction. Otherwise, the RDC will take the decision to give the warning notice and decision notice.
6Under section 89P(5)(b) of the Act, if the FCA proposes to impose limitations or other restrictions on the dissemination of regulated information to which a primary information provider's approval relates, it must give him a warning notice. If, after considering any representations made in response to the warning notice, the FCA decides to impose limitations or other restrictions on the dissemination of regulated information to which a primary information provider's approval
6Under section 89P(9)(d) of the Act, if the FCA is proposing or deciding to refuse a primary information provider's application for the withdrawal or variation of a limitation or other restriction on the dissemination of regulated information to which a primary information provider's approval relates, the decision maker will be FCA staff under executive procedures where FCA staff decided to impose the limitation or other restriction. Otherwise, the RDC will take the decision to
FCA6 staff will usually inform or discuss with the person concerned any action they contemplate before they recommend to the RDC that the FCA6 takes formal action. The FCA6 may also be invited to exercise certain powers by the persons who would be affected by the exercise of those powers. In these circumstances if the person concerned has agreed to or accepted the action proposed then the decisions referred to in DEPP 2.5.13 G will be taken by FCA6 staff under executive procedures
The decisions referred to in DEPP 2.5.12 G are:(1) the decision to give a supervisory notice pursuant to section 259(3), (8) or 9(b) (directions on authorised unit trust schemes); section 268(3), 7(a) or 9(a) (directions in respect of recognised overseas schemes); or section 282(3), (6) or (7)(b) (directions in respect of relevant recognised schemes) of the Act;(1A) the decision to give a supervisory notice pursuant to section 261Z1(3), (8) or (9)(b) (Procedure on giving directions
A decision to give a warning notice or decision notice refusing an application for an authorisation order declaring a scheme7 to be an AUT, ACS7 or ICVC2 will be taken by the RDC only if the application is by an authorised fund manager who is not the operator of an existing AUT, ACS7 or ICVC. Otherwise, the decision to give the warning notice or decision notice will be taken by FCA6 staff under executive procedures.2762
The FCA6 expects to adopt a procedure in respect of notices under enactments other than the Act which is similar to that for statutory notices under the Act, but which recognises any differences in the legislative framework and requirements. DEPP 2 Annex 1 and DEPP 2 Annex 2 therefore identify notices to be given pursuant to other enactments and the relevant FCA6 decision maker.66
Some of the distinguishing features of notices given under enactments other than the Act are as follows: (1) [deleted]66(2) [deleted]66(3) Friendly Societies Act 1992, section 58A1: The warning notice and decision notice must set out the terms of the direction which the FCA6 proposes or has decided to give and any specification of when the friendly society is to comply with it. A decision notice given under section 58A(3) must give an indication of the society's right, given by
3For supervisory notices (as defined in section 395(13)) which have taken effect, decision notices and final notices, section 391 of the Act requires the FCA to publish, in such manner as it considers appropriate, such information about the matter to which the notice relates as it considers appropriate. Section 391 prevents the FCA from publishing warning notices, but the FCA may publish such information about the matter to which a warning notice falling within section 391(1ZB)
3The FCA’s approach to publishing information about warning notices is set out in paragraphs 6.2.3 to 6.2.11 below. This should be contrasted with the FCA’s approach to the publication of decision notices and final notices as set out in paragraphs 6.2.12 to 6.2.15 below. In particular, the considerations that the FCA will take into account when deciding what information to publish about a warning notice, including whether publication would be unfair, recognise that the FCA has
3The FCA may publish information about warning notices which fall within section 391(1ZB) of the Act. These are essentially disciplinary warning notices, for example, where the FCA is proposing to censure, fine, suspend or restrict a firm or individual. The power to publish information does not apply, for example, to warning notices which only propose to prohibit an individual, withdraw the approval of an individual or cancel the permission of a firm.
3The decisions on whether to exercise the power to publish information about a warning notice, and if so what information to publish, will be taken by the RDC after it has consulted with the persons to whom the warning notice has been given or copied. The procedure the FCA will follow when making these decisions is set out in DEPP 3.
3The principal purpose of this power is to promote the early transparency of enforcement proceedings. This has several benefits, including: consumers, firms and market users will be able to understand the types of behaviour that the FCA considers unacceptable at an earlier stage, which in turn should encourage more compliant behaviour;by showing at an earlier stage that the FCA is taking action, confidence in the FCA and the regulatory system should be enhanced;there will be more
3The FCA will take the following initial steps in considering whether it is appropriate to exercise this power: (1) It will consider whether it is appropriate to publish details of the warning notice in order to enable consumers, firms and market users to understand the nature of the FCA’s concerns. The FCA will consider the circumstances of each case but expects normally to consider it appropriate to publish these details. (2) Where the FCA considers it is appropriate to publish
3A person to whom the warning notice is given or copied who seeks to demonstrate potential unfairness from publication must provide clear and convincing evidence of how that unfairness may arise and how he could suffer a disproportionate level of damage. For example, this may be the case if publication could materially affect the person’s health, result in bankruptcy or insolvency, a loss of livelihood or a significant loss of income, or prejudice criminal proceedings to which
3If, after consulting the persons to whom the notice is given or copied, the FCA still considers it is appropriate to publish information about a warning notice, it will publish this information in a statement (a warning notice statement). This will ordinarily include a brief summary of the facts which gave rise to the warning notice to enable consumers, firms and market users to understand the nature of the FCA’s concerns. Where the FCA considers it appropriate to identify the
3As the FCA may only publish information about disciplinary warning notices and not others, it will in many cases not be able to publish details of all of the sanctions it is seeking to impose (for example, the fact that it is proposing to prohibit an individual as well as impose a fine). For this reason, the FCA will not normally publish the nature and level of the proposed disciplinary sanctions.
3Any warning notice statement the FCA publishes will make clear that: (a) the warning notice is not the final decision of the FCA;(b) the recipient has the right to make representations to the RDC which, in the light of those representations, will decide on the appropriate action and whether to issue a decision notice; and (c) if a decision notice is issued, the subject of the notice will have the right to refer the matter to the Tribunal which will reach an independent decision
3The FCA will consider the circumstances of each case, but will ordinarily publicise enforcement action where this has led to the issue of a final notice. The FCA may also publicise enforcement action where this has led to the issue of a decision notice. The FCA will decide on a case-by-case basis whether to publish information about the matter to which a decision notice relates, but expects normally to publish a decision notice if the subject of enforcement action decides to
3If the FCA intends to publish a decision notice, it will give advance notice of its intention to the person to whom the decision notice is given and to any third party to whom a copy of the notice is given. The FCA will consider any representations made, but will normally not decide against publication solely because it is claimed that publication could have a negative impact on a person’s reputation. The FCA will also not decide against publication solely because a person asks
3Publication will generally include placing the decision notice or final notice on the FCA website and this will often be accompanied by a press release. The FCA will also consider what information about the matter should be included on the Financial Services Register. Additional guidance on the FCA's approach to the publication of information on the Financial Services Register in certain specific types of cases is set out at the end of this chapter.
3However, as required by the Act (see paragraph 6.2.1 above), the FCA will not publish information if publication of it would, in its opinion, be unfair to the person in respect of whom the action is taken or prejudicial to the interests of consumers, or detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. It may make that decision where, for example, publication could damage market confidence or undermine market integrity in a way that could be damaging to the interests of
3Publishing notices is important to ensure the transparency of FCA decision-making; it informs the public and helps to maximise the deterrent effect of enforcement action. The FCA will upon request review warning notice statements, decision notices, final notices and related press releases that are published on the FCA's website. The FCA will determine at that time whether continued publication is appropriate, or whether notices and publicity should be removed or amended.
3In carrying out its review the FCA will consider all relevant factors. In particular, the FCA will take into account:
the seriousness of the person’s misconduct;the nature of the action taken by the FCA and the level of any sanction imposed on the person;whether the FCA has continuing concerns in respect of the person and any risk they might pose to the FCA's objectives;whether the person is a firm or an individual;whether the publication sets out the FCA's expectations
3The FCA expects usually to conclude that warning notice statements, notices and related press releases that have been published for less than six years should not be removed from the website, and that notices and related press releases relating to prohibition orders which are still applicable should not be removed from the website regardless of the length of time they have been published.
3In cases where the FCA publishes a warning notice statement and the FCA subsequently decides not to take any further action, or where it publishes a decision notice and the subject of enforcement action successfully refers the matter to the Tribunal, the FCA will make it clear on its website that the warning notice decision notice no longer applies. The FCA will normally do this by publishing a notice of discontinuance with the consent of the person to whom the notice of discontinuance
Publishing the reasons for variations of Part 4A permission the imposition of requirements, and maintaining an accurate public record, are important elements of the FCA's approach to its statutory objectives. The FCA will always aim to balance both the interests of consumers and the possibility of unfairness to the person subject to the FCA's action. The FCA will publish relevant details of both fundamental and non-fundamental variations of Part 4A permission and requirements
A firm must notify the appropriate regulator35 immediately it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that any of the following has occurred, may have occurred or may occur in the foreseeable future:35(1) the firm failing to satisfy one or more of the threshold conditions; or(2) any matter which could have a significant adverse impact on the firm's reputation; or(3) any matter which could affect the firm's ability to continue to provide adequate services to
The circumstances which may give rise to any of the events in SUP 15.3.1 R are wide-ranging and the probability of any matter resulting in such an outcome, and the severity of the outcome, may be difficult to determine. However, the appropriate regulator35 expects firms to consider properly all potential consequences of events.35
Principle 11 requires a firm to deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way and to disclose to the appropriate regulator35appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the appropriate regulator35 would reasonably expect notice. Principle 11 applies to unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and takes into account the activities of other members of a group3535
10Although PRIN does not apply to a firm in relation to its carrying on of auction regulation bidding, the FCA35expects to be given notice of events that are material to the FCA's35supervision of that business and so firms carrying on that business should have regard to the guidance in SUP 15.3.8 G to SUP 15.3.10 G.3535
Compliance with Principle 11 includes, but is not limited to, giving the appropriate regulator35 notice of:35(1) any proposed restructuring, reorganisation or business expansion which could have a significant impact on the firm's risk profile or resources, including, but not limited to:(a) setting up a new undertaking within a firm'sgroup, or a new branch (whether in the United Kingdom or overseas); or (b) commencing the provision of cross border services into a new territory;
A notification under Principle 11 may be given orally or in writing (as set out in SUP 15.7.1 R and SUP 15.7.2 G), although the appropriate regulator35 may request written confirmation of a matter. However, it is the responsibility of a firm to ensure that matters are properly and clearly communicated to the appropriate regulator.35 A firm should provide a written notification if a matter either is complex or may be such as to make it necessary for the appropriate regulator35
(1) A firm must notify the appropriate regulator35 of:35(a) a significant breach of a rule (which includes a Principle, or a Statement of Principle ; or(aa) a significant breach of any requirement imposed by the CCA or by regulations or an order made under the CCA (except if the breach is an offence, in which case (c) applies), but any notification under (aa) is required to be made only to the FCA; or 14(b) a breach of any requirement imposed by the Act or by regulations or an
A firm must notify the appropriate regulator35 immediately if:(1) civil proceedings are brought against the firm and the amount of the claim is significant in relation to the firm's financial resources or its reputation; or(2) any action is brought against the firm under section 71 of the Act (Actions for damages) or section 150 (Actions for damages); or(3) disciplinary measures or sanctions have been imposed on the firm by any statutory or regulatory authority, competition authority,
A firm must notify the appropriate regulator35 immediately if one of the following events arises and the event is significant:35(1) it becomes aware that an employee may have committed a fraud against one of its customers; or(2) it becomes aware that a person, whether or not employed by it, may have committed a fraud against it; or(3) it considers that any person, whether or not employed by it, is acting with intent to commit a fraud against it; or(4) it identifies irregularities
The notifications under SUP 15.3.17 R are required as the appropriate regulator35 needs to be aware of the types of fraudulent and irregular activity which are being attempted or undertaken, and to act, if necessary, to prevent effects on consumers or other firms. A notification under SUP 15.7.3 G should provide all relevant and significant details of the incident or suspected incident of which the firm is aware.35
A firm must notify the appropriate regulator35 immediately of any of the following events:35(1) the calling of a meeting to consider a resolution for winding up the firm; or(2) an application to dissolve the firm or to strike it off the Register of Companies; or(3) the presentation of a petition for the winding up of the firm; or(4) the making of, or any proposals for the making of, a composition or arrangement with any one or more of its creditors; or(5) an application for the
3SUP 15.3.23 D to SUP 15.3.25 D are given in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Society and of the Council generally, with a view to achieving the objective of enabling the appropriate regulator35to:35(1) comply with its general duty under section 314 of the Act (Regulators’35 general duty);35(2) determine whether underwriting agents, or approved persons acting for them or on their behalf, are complying with the requirements imposed on them by or under the Act;(3) enforce
3The Society must immediately inform the appropriate regulator35 in writing if it becomes aware that any matter likely to be of material concern to the appropriate regulator35 may have arisen in relation to:(1) the regulated activities for which the Society has permission; or (2) underwriting agents; or (3) approved persons or individuals acting for or on behalf of underwriting agents.
3The Society must inform the appropriate regulator35 if it commences investigations or disciplinary proceedings relating to apparent breaches:35(1) of the Act or requirements made under the Act, including the threshold conditions or the Principles or other rules, by an underwriting agent; or(2) of the Statements of Principle by an individual or other person who carries out controlled functions for or on behalf of an underwriting agent.
3The Society must inform the appropriate regulator35 if it commences investigations or disciplinary proceedings which do not fall within the scope of SUP 15.3.24 D but which:35(1) involve an underwriting agent, or an approved person who carries out controlled functions for it or on its behalf; or (2) may indicate that an individual acting for or on behalf of an underwriting agent may not be a fit and proper person to perform functions in relation to regulated activities.
15Changes that the FCA would expect to be notified of under SUP 15.3.26 R include:(1) an AIFM being appointed to manage another AIF;(2) the appointment of a different depositary for an AIF the AIFM manages; and(3) the appointment of any new senior personnel if the AIFM is not required to apply for the FCA's approval for that appointment under section 59 of the Act.
19A full-scope UK AIFM must notify the FCA of material changes under SUP 15.3.26 R in the following manner:(1) for the management of a new AIF or a new investment compartment of an AIF, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6A R; (2) for changes of senior personnel whose appointment is not required to be approved by the FCA under section 59 of the Act, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6B R; and(3) for all other material changes, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6C R .
15Where a small authorised UK AIFM no longer meets the conditions in regulation 917 (meaning of “small AIFM”)19 of the AIFMD UK regulation it must:171619(1) immediately notify the FCA using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6D R;19 and(2) within 30 calendar days, apply to the FCA for a variation of its permission to become a full-scope UK AIFM.[Note: article 3(3) second and third paragraphs of AIFMD]
(1) 19A small authorised UK AIFM must notify the FCA before it starts to manage a new AIF or a new investment compartment of an AIF using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6A R.(2) (1) does not apply where:(a) the management of the new AIF or investment compartment would result in the AIFM exceeding the relevant threshold of assets under management so that it will no longer meet the conditions in regulation 9 (meaning of "small AIFM") of the AIFMD UK regulation (see SUP 15.3.28 R); or
(1) 19A small registered UK AIFM must notify the FCA of changes in the following manner:(a) for the management of a new AIF or a new investment compartment of an AIF, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6A R;(b) (a) does not apply where:(i) the management of the new AIF or investment compartment would result in the AIFM exceeding the relevant threshold of assets under management so that it will no longer meet the conditions in regulation 9 (meaning of "small AIFM") of the AIFMD
19A EuSEF manager or a EuVECA manager should notify the FCA of the following changes in the following manner:(1) for changes to senior personnel, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6B R; and (2) for changes to the jurisdiction in which its EuSEF or EuVECA is marketed or to market a new EuSEF or EuVECA, by using the form in SUP 15 Annex 6F G
(1) 21A firm must notify the FCA if it has or may have committed a significant infringement of any applicable competition law.(2) A firm must make the notification as soon as it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that a significant infringement has, or may have, occurred.(3) (a) A firm must make the notification in writing unless (3)(b) applies.(b) A firm may make the notification orally where it has made or will make an oral application for leniency
(1) 21Where a firm notifies the FCA under SUP 15.3.32R, the firm should not infer or assume that any lack of (or delay in) a response, objection or enforcement activity by the FCA or any other competition authority means that the agreement or conduct:(a) does not infringe competition law; or (b) is, or will be, immune from enforcement.(2) Notification under SUP 15.3.32R is not sufficient to constitute an application for leniency or immunity from penalty in any subsequent investigation
The purpose of DTR 8.4.1 R is to ensure that a primary information provider can disseminate regulated information to as wide a public as possible, as close to simultaneously as possible, in the United Kingdom and other EEA States. In considering whether a primary information provider has satisfied the requirements in DTR 8.4.1 R, the FCA will consider the number and nature of arrangements that the primary information provider has with media operators.
A primary information provider must prioritise the order of dissemination of pending regulated information according to the headline information, except that a primary information provider must prioritise the dissemination of regulated information that is submitted by the FCA if the FCA requests it.
A primary information provider must:(1) disseminate regulated information at least between the hours of 7:00 am and 6:30 pm on any business day;(2) be able to receive regulated information at all times; (3) provide service support at least between the hours of 7.00 am and 6.30 pm on any business day to:(a) any person who has requested the dissemination of regulated information; and(b) any media operator with whom the primary information provider has an arrangement for the dissemination
In considering whether a primary information provider satisfies the requirements of DTR 8.4.9 R, the FCA will consider, among other things, whether the primary information provider has arrangements in place for an alternative primary information provider to receive and disseminate regulated information on its behalf.
A primary information provider must record the following information for each announcement of regulated information it disseminates: (1) the name of any person who communicates regulated information on behalf of an issuer or other organisation to the primary information provider;(2) the name of the issuer or organisation on whose behalf the regulated information is communicated;(3) the security validation details of the issuer or organisation;(4) the date and time the regulated
Regulated information disseminated to a media operator by a primary information provider must contain the following: (1) identification of the information as regulated information which has been disseminated by a primary information provider;(2) the unique identification number for the item of regulated information;(3) the sequence number of the regulated information;(4) a clear indication of the start of the regulated information;(5) the name of the issuer or organisation concerned;(6)
If requested by the FCA, a primary information provider must:(1) place an embargo on regulated information; or(2) cancel any embargo placed on regulated information by the person that has submitted the regulated information and disseminate the regulated information; or(3) cancel any embargo placed on regulated information by the FCA and disseminate the regulated information.
In considering whether a primary information provider satisfies the requirements of DTR 8.4.31 R, the FCA will consider, among other things, whether the primary information provider has in place appropriate measures to identify new and emerging risks which would be likely to prevent its compliance with DTR 8.4.11 R, DTR 8.4.19 R or DTR 8.4.20 R.
A primary information provider must notify the FCA immediately if:(1) there is any change to the names and contact details of staff who are available to assist the FCA exercise its functions in relation to the dissemination of regulated information by the primary information provider; or(2) any contractual arrangement between the primary information provider and a media operator regarding the dissemination of regulated information is terminated; or(3) any changes are proposed
The FCA expects a firm to justify any low LGD estimates using analysis on volatility of sources of recovery, notably on collateral, and cures (see IFPRU 4.7.5 G). This includes:(1) recognising that the impact of collateral volatility on low LGDs is asymmetric, as surpluses over amounts owed need to be returned to borrowers and that this effect may be more pronounced when estimating downturn, rather than normal period LGDs; and(2) recognising the costs and discount rate associated
Where a firm wishes to include cures in its LGD estimates, the FCA expects it to do this on a cautious basis, with reference to both its current experience and how this is expected to change in downturn conditions. In particular, this involves being able to articulate clearly both the precise course of events that will allow such cures to take place and any consequences of such actions for other elements of its risk quantification. For example:(1) where cures are driven by the
To ensure that estimates of LGDs take into account the most up-to-date experience, the FCA expects a firm to take account of data for relevant incomplete workouts (ie, defaulted exposures for which the recovery process is still in progress, with the result that the final realised losses in respect of those exposures are not yet certain) (see article 179(1)(c) of the EU CRR).
To ensure that sovereign LGD models are sufficiently conservative in view of the estimation error that may arise from the lack of data on losses to sovereigns, the FCA expects a firm to apply a 45% LGD floor to each unsecured exposure in the sovereign asset class (see article 179(1)(a) of the EU CRR).
The FCA believes that an average reduction in property sales prices of 40% from their peak price, prior to the market downturn, forms an appropriate reference point when assessing downturn LGD for UK mortgage portfolios. This reduction captures both a fall in the value of the property due to house price deflation, as well as a distressed forced sale discount.
Where a firm adjusts assumed house price values within its LGD models to take account of current market conditions (for example, appropriate house price indices), the FCA recognises that realised falls in market values may be captured automatically. A firm adopting such approaches may remove observed house price falls from its downturn house price adjustment so as not to double count. A firm wishing to apply such an approach must seek the consent of the FCA and be able to demonstrate
To ensure that its LGD estimates are oriented towards downturn conditions, the FCA expects a firm to have a process through which it:(1) identifies appropriate downturn conditions for each IRB exposure class within each jurisdiction;(2) identifies adverse dependencies, if any, between default rates and recovery rates; and(3) incorporates adverse dependencies, if identified, between default rates and recovery rates in the firm's estimates of LGD in a manner that meets the requirements
To ensure that its LGD estimates incorporate material discount effects, the FCA expects a firm's methods for discounting cash flows to take account of the uncertainties associated with the receipt of recoveries for a defaulted exposure. For example, by adjusting cash flows to certainty-equivalents or by using a discount rate that embodies an appropriate risk premium; or by a combination of the two.
If a firm intends to use a discount rate that does not take full account of the uncertainty in recoveries, the FCA expects it to be able to explain how it has otherwise taken into account that uncertainty for the purposes of calculating LGDs. This can be addressed by adjusting cash flows to certainty-equivalents or by using a discount rate that embodies an appropriate risk premium for defaulted assets, or by a combination of the two (see article 5(2) of the EU CRR).
The FCA expects a firm using advanced IRB approaches to have done the following in respect of wholesale LGD estimates:(1) applied LGD estimates at transaction level;(2) ensured that all LGD estimates (both downturn and non-downturn) are cautious, conservative and justifiable, given the paucity of observations. Under article 179(1)(a) of the EU CRR, estimates must be derived using both historical experience and empirical evidence, and not be based purely on judgemental consideration.
The FCA uses a framework for assessing the conservatism of a firm's wholesale LGD models for which there are a low number of defaults. This framework is set out in IFPRU 4 Annex 2G (Wholesale LGD and EAD framework) and does not apply to sovereign LGD estimates which are floored at 45%. This framework is also in the process of being used to assess the calibration of a firm's material LGD-models for low-default portfolios.
In the following cases, the FCA expects a firm to determine the effect of applying the framework in IFPRU 4 Annex 2G (Wholesale LGD and EAD framework) to models which include LGD values that are based on fewer than 20 'relevant' data points (as defined in IFPRU 4 Annex 2G):(1) the model is identified for review by the FCA; or(2) the firm submits a request for approval for a material change to its LGD model.
Where an independent calculation approach is adopted for the calculation of unexpected loss on defaulted assets, the FCA expects a firm to ensure that estimates are at least equal, at a portfolio level, to a 100% risk weight, ie,1 8% capital requirement on the amount outstanding net of provisions (see article 181(1)(h) of the EU CRR).
The extent to which a borrower's assets are already given as collateral will clearly affect the recoveries available to unsecured creditors. If the degree to which assets are pledged is substantial, this will be a material driver of LGDs on such exposures. Although potentially present in all transactions, the FCA expects a firm to be particularly aware of this driver in situations in which borrowing on a secured basis is the normal form of financing, leaving relatively few assets
The FCA expects a firm to take into account the effect of assets being substantially used as collateral for other obligations estimating LGDs for borrowers for which this is the case. The FCA expects a firm not to use unadjusted data sets that ignore this impact, and note that it is an estimate for downturn conditions that is normally required. In the absence of relevant data to estimate this effect, conservative LGDs potentially of 100% are expected to be used (see articles
To enable the FCA to be satisfied that the issuer and the proposed owner will comply with requirements imposed on the issuer or owner, as the case may be, by or under the RCB Regulations, the applicant should use the application form to provide relevant details of the proposed covered bond or programme and demonstrate how each of the requirements will be complied with.
(1) The FCA's application form covers both issuer registration and covered bond registration as the FCA will not normally consider applications for issuer registration in isolation from the application for registration of the covered bond.(2) An issuer which has been admitted to the register of issuers should use the same form to apply for registration of subsequent covered bonds or programmes.(3) The issuer does not need to apply for registration of individual issuances from
In relation to registration of an issuer of regulated covered bonds, the FCA will need to be satisfied that the issuer's compliance with the requirements of the regulatory system has been adequate and does not give rise to any material cause for concern over the issuer's ability to issue regulated covered bonds in compliance with the RCB Regulations.
The FCA will:(1) expect the issuer to demonstrate that it has in place appropriate systems, controls, procedures and policies, including in relation to risk management, underwriting, arrears and valuation; (2) expect the issuer to demonstrate that the cash-flows generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the payments due in a timely manner including under conditions of economic stress and in the event of the failure of the issuer;(3) take account of any over collateralisation
The risk factors which the FCA will take into account in assessing the issuer's and owner's compliance with Regulations 17(2)(d) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) will include credit risk of the assets, concentration risk, market risk and counterparty risk.
(1) The credit risk of an asset is the risk of loss if another party fails to perform its obligations or fails to perform them in a timely fashion.(2) Where, for example, the asset pool includes residential mortgages the relevant factors which the FCA may consider include: (a) whether the asset pool contains (or could contain) loans made to individuals who have been made bankrupt or have had court judgments made against them;(b) the extent to which the asset pool contains (or
Concentration risk is the risk of loss from exposures being limited in number or variety. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include:(1) the level of granularity of the asset pool (i.e. what is the number and size distribution of assets in the pool); (2) whether the borrowers or collateral is unduly concentrated in a particular industry, sector, or geographical region.
Market risk is the risk that arises from fluctuations in the values of, or income from, assets or in interest or exchange rates. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include whether the hedging agreements (defined in Regulation 1(2) of the RCB Regulations as agreements entered into or assets held as protection against possible financial loss) adequately protect against any adverse mismatched cash-flows due to changes in market variables.
Counterparty risk is the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transactions cash flows. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include whether the:(1) counterparty has an appropriate credit rating;(2) counterparty can unilaterally terminate the hedging agreement, and if so under what circumstances;(3) contractual arrangements contain appropriate termination procedures (for example, what provisions apply in the event of
(1) The FCA will assess each risk factor separately and then assess any inter-dependencies and correlations to form a judgment on the quality of the asset pool as a whole. For example, an asset pool which is of high credit quality and so low risk due to a combination of factors such as owner occupation, low income multiples, full valuation methodologies, and a strong payments track record, may permit another factor such as high loan-to-value ratios, that would otherwise be considered
The FCA expects the issuer to demonstrate that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme that adequately deal with:(1) the identification and rectification of any breach of Regulations 17(2) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations;(2) the appointment of replacements for parties, for example servicers, cash managers or paying agents; and(3) the orderly winding-up
The FCA expects the issuer to demonstrate, as part of showing that Regulations 17 (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations will be complied with, that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme which enable the views and interests of investors in the regulated covered bond to be taken account of in an appropriate and timely way by a suitably qualified, adequately resourced,
(1) The FCA expects legal advice to deal adequately with at least the following matters in relation to the actual or proposed arrangements:(a) whether the transfer of the assets to the owner would be upheld in the event of liquidation or administration, or similar collective insolvency proceedings, of the issuer or the transferor (if different from the issuer);(b) the risk of the transfer of an asset to the owner being re-characterised as the creation of a security interest;(c)
(1) The FCA expects the report from the accountants to address at least the following matters:(a) that the level of over collateralisation meets the limits set out in the covered bond arrangements which are designed to ensure compliance with the requirement that the asset pool is capable of covering claims attaching to the bond in Regulation 17 (requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations; and(b) that appropriate due diligence procedures (which
1Assets which would be eligible for inclusion in a liquidity buffer under BIPRU 12.7 can be liquid assets for the purposes of limb (a) of the definition of liquid assets in Regulation 1(2) of the RCB Regulations. The FCA will also expect that liquid assets which consist of deposits should be held in the same currency or currencies as the regulated covered bonds issued by the issuer.
(1) This section applies to an IFPRU investment firm.(2) This section does not apply to an exempt IFPRU commodities firm if the conditions in (2) are met.(3) The conditions are:(a) article 498 of the EU CRR (Exemptions for commodities dealers) applies to it;(b) the exempt IFPRU commodities firm is not a member of a FCAconsolidation group or non-EEA sub-group;(c) each investment firm in the group that the exempt IFPRU commodities firm belongs to meets the conditions in article
This section contains:(1) rules that exercise the discretion afforded to the FCA as competent authority under article 18 of the EU CRR (Methods of prudential consolidation); and(2) guidance on the criteria that the FCA will take into account when considering whether to grant a permission to a firm on a case-by-case basis for the individual consolidation method under article 9 of the EUCRR (Individual consolidation method).
In carrying out the calculations for the purposes of Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of the EU CRR (Prudential consolidation), a firm (for whom the FCA is the consolidating supervisor) must include the proportion according to the share of capital held of participations in institutions and financial institutions managed by an undertaking included in the consolidation together with one or more undertakings not included in the consolidation, where those undertakings' liability is limited
In carrying out the calculations for the purposes of Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of the EU CRR (Prudential consolidation), a firm (for whom the FCA is the consolidating supervisor) must carry out a full consolidation of any undertaking with whom it has an article 18(5) relationship.[Note: article 18(5) of the EU CRR]
Article 9(2) of the EU CRR (Individual consolidation method) requires a firm, which is a parent institution, to demonstrate fully to the FCA, as competent authority, that there are no material practical or legal impediments to the prompt transfer of own funds of the subsidiary referred to in article 9(1) of the EUCRR, or repayment of liabilities when due by that subsidiary to the firm.
The FCA will assess an application for individual consolidation against articles 9 and 396(2) (Compliance with large exposure requirements) of the EU CRR on a case-by-case basis. The FCA will assess whether it is still appropriate to permit the treatment if doing so risks conflict with its statutory objectives. The FCA will apply a high level of scrutiny to applications under article 9 of the EU CRR, consistent with the previous solo consolidation regime.
When making its assessment, the FCA will consider whether any minority interest may represent an impediment of any kind to the prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities from the subsidiary to the parent undertaking. To reassure the FCA, the parent institution should demonstrate that any minority interest in a subsidiary will not result in the potential blocking or delay of prompt transfer of own funds or repayment of liabilities. Therefore, it may be possible for
The FCA will consider the non-exhaustive criteria below when determining whether the condition in article 9(2) of the EU CRR is met:(1) the speed with which funds can be transferred or liabilities repaid to the firm and the simplicity of the method for the transfer or repayment; (2) whether there are any interests other than those of the firm in the subsidiary and what impact those other interests may have on the firm's control over the subsidiary and the ability of the firm to
The FCA will assess applications to exclude entities from the scope of prudential consolidation against article 19(2) of the EU CRR on a case-by-case basis. The FCA will only grant this treatment with respect to undertakings where one of the conditions in article 19(2) is met. The FCA will still make a judgement as to whether it is appropriate to grant this treatment even where one of the conditions in article 19(2) is met.
Article 113(6) of the EU CRR (Intra-group credit risk exemption) permits a firm, subject to conditions, to apply a 0% risk-weighting for exposures to certain entities within its FCAconsolidation group, namely its parent undertaking, its own subsidiaries and subsidiaries of its parent undertaking. Article 400(1)(f) of the EU CRR then fully exempts such exposures from the large exposures limit stipulated in article 395(1) of the EUCRR (Limits to large exposures).
The FCA will assess core UK group applications against article 113(6) on a case-by-case basis. The FCA expects to approve this treatment for core UK groupundertakings if the conditions stipulated in article 113(6) are met. A firm should note that the FCA will still make a wider judgement whether it is appropriate to grant this treatment even where the conditions in article 113(6) are met. It is the FCA's intention to continue to apply a high level of scrutiny to applications under
In relation to article 113(6)(d), the FCA expects the condition to be satisfied if the counterparty is: (1) incorporated in the UK; or(2) an undertaking of a type that falls within the scope of the Council Regulation of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (Regulation 1346/2000/EC) and it is established in the UK other than by incorporation, and if the firm can demonstrate that the counterparty's centre of main interests is situated in the UK within the meaning of that Regul
In relation to article 113(6)(e), the FCA will consider the following non-exhaustive criteria when assessing whether this condition has been met:(1) the speed with which funds can be transferred or liabilities repaid to the firm and the simplicity of the method for the transfer or repayment. As part of the FCA's overall assessment, it would consider ownership of 100% of the subsidiary as one of the indicators that prompt transfer of own funds is likely to be achieved;(2) whether
When demonstrating how article 113(6)(e) of the EU CRR is met, the FCA considers that, for a counterparty which is not a firm, the application should include a legally binding agreement between the firm and the counterparty. This agreement will be to promptly, on demand, by the firm increase the firm'sown funds by an amount required to ensure that the firm complies with the provisions contained in Part Two of the EU CRR (Own funds) and any other requirements relating to capital
For the purpose of article 113(6)(e), the FCA considers that the agreement to increase the firm'sown funds may be limited to capital resources available to the undertaking and may reasonably exclude such amount of capital resources that, if transferred to the firm, would cause the undertaking to become balance sheet insolvent in the manner contemplated in section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
To the extent that a firm makes available multiple facilities, the FCA expects the firm to be able to demonstrate:(1) how they deal with the fact that exposures on one facility may become exposures under another on which the losses are ultimately incurred; and (2) the impact of its approach on its own funds requirements.
The FCA expects firms using own estimates of EAD to have done the following in respect of EAD estimates:(1) applied EAD estimates at the level of the individual facility;(2) where there is a paucity of observations, ensured that all EAD estimates are cautious, conservative and justifiable. In accordance with article 179(1)(a) of the EU CRR, estimates must be derived using both historical experience and empirical evidence, and must not be based purely on judgemental consideration.
In the following cases, the FCA expects firms to determine the effect of applying the framework in IFPRU 4 Annex 2G (Wholesale LGD and EAD framework) to models which include EAD values that are based on fewer than 20 'relevant' data points (as defined in IFPRU 4 Annex 2G):(1) the model is identified for review by the FCA; or(2) the firm submits a request for approval for a material change to its EAD model.
The FCA expects the time horizon for additional drawings to be the same as the time horizon for defaults. This means that EAD estimation need cover only additional drawings that might take place in the next year, such that:(1) no own funds requirements need be held against facilities, or proportions of facilities that cannot be drawn down within the next year; and(2) where facilities can be drawn down within the next year, firms may, in principle, reduce their estimates to the
In cases where firms estimate conversion factors (CFs) directly using a reference data set that includes a significant number of high CFs as a result of very low undrawn limits at the observation date, the FCA expects firms to:(1) investigate the distribution of realised CFs in the reference data set;(2) base the estimated CF on an appropriate point along that distribution, that results in the choice of a CF appropriate for the exposures to which it is being applied and consistent
If the availability of a facility is subject to a further credit assessment by the firm, an EAD/CF may not be required. However, the FCA expects this to be the case only if the subsequent credit assessment was of substantially equivalent rigour to that of the initial credit approval and if this includes a re-rating or a confirmation of the rating of the borrower.
Firms are not expected to include in their EAD/CF estimates the probability of increases in limits between observation and default date. If the reference data set includes the impact of such increases, the FCA expects firms to be able to adjust their estimates accordingly with the aim of assessing what the exposure would have been at default if the limit had not been increased.
The FCA expects firms to investigate the incidence of exposures existing at default that arise from products or relationships that are not intended to result in a credit exposure and, consequently, have no credit limit established against them and are not reflected in their estimates of EAD. Unless such exposures are immaterial, the FCA expects firms to estimate a Pillar 1 own funds requirement on a portfolio basis to such exposures.
Exposures include not only principal amounts borrowed under facilities but also interest accrued which will fluctuate between payment dates. To ensure proper coverage of interest, the FCA expects firms to take the following approach:(1) accrued interest to date should be included in current exposure for performing exposures;(2) firms may choose whether estimated increases in accrued interest up to the time of default should be included in LGD or EAD;(3) in the estimation of EAD,
The FCA considers that there is scope within the EU CRR for a firm to recognise on-balance sheet netting (including in respect of cross-currency balances) through EAD as an alternative to LGD1 in cases where a firm meets the general conditions for on-balance1 sheet netting, as set out in article 205 of1 the EU CRR.11
For the CF on undrawn limits, this may be applied on the basis of the net limit, provided the conditions in the EU CRR for the use of net limits are met. However, firms are reminded that the purpose of the measure is to estimate the amount that would be outstanding in the event of a default. This implies that their ability, in practice, to constrain the drawdown of credit balances will be particularly tested. Moreover, the FCA expects the appropriate conversion factor to be
Firms are reminded that, since the basis of EAD estimation is that default by the borrower is expected to take place in a one-year time horizon and quite possibly in downturn conditions, the FCA expects any reduction in their CF in anticipation of syndication to take account of this scenario (see article 4(56) of the EU CRR).
Under section 138A(4) of the Act, the appropriate regulator9 may not give a waiver unless it is satisfied that:99(1) compliance by the firm with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome, or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of, in the case of the PRA, any of its objectives and, in the case of the FCA, any of its operational objectives.99
9The FCA must consult the PRA before publishing or deciding not to publish a waiver which relates to:(1) a PRA-authorised person; or(2) an authorised person who has as a member of its immediate group a PRA-authorised person;unless the waiver relates to rules made by the FCA under sections 247 or 248 of the Act.
The appropriate regulator9 will acknowledge an application promptly and if necessary will seek further information from the firm. The time taken to determine an application will depend on the issues it raises. A firm should make it clear in the application if it needs a decision within a specific time.96
The appropriate regulator9 will treat a firm's application for a waiver as withdrawn if it does not hear from the firm within 20 business days of sending a communication which requests or requires a response from the firm. The appropriate regulator9 will not do this if the firm has made it clear to the appropriate regulator9 in some other way that it intends to pursue the application. 3999
In some cases, the appropriate regulator9 may give a modification of a rule rather than direct that the rule is not to apply. The appropriate regulator9 may also impose conditions on a waiver, for example additional reporting requirements. A waiver may be given for a specified period of time only, after which time it will cease to apply. A firm wishing to extend the duration of a waiver should follow the procedure in SUP 8.3.3 D. A waiver will not apply retrospectively.99
If the appropriate regulator9 believes that a particular waiver given to a firm may have relevance to other firms, it may publish general details about the possible availability of the waiver. For example, IPRU(INV) 3-80(10)G explains that a firm that wishes to use its own internal model to calculate its position risk requirement (PRR) will need to apply for a waiver of the relevant rules.9
Under section 138A(1) of the Act the appropriate regulator9 may give a waiver with the consent of a firm. This power may be used by the appropriate regulator9 in exceptional circumstances where the appropriate regulator9 considers that a waiver should apply to a number of firms (for example, where a rule unmodified may not meet the particular circumstances of a particular category of firm). In such cases the appropriate regulator9 will inform the firms concerned that the waiver
For an application for a waiver of the presumption of contravention of a binding rule, which is actionable under section 138D9 of the Act, the appropriate regulator9 would normally wish to be satisfied that the evidential rule is itself unduly burdensome or does not achieve the purpose of the rule.299
1The FCA recognises that there are good reasons for firms wishing to carry out their own investigations. This might be for, for example, disciplinary purposes, general good management, or operational and risk control. The firm needs to know the extent of any problem, and it may want advice as to what immediate or short-term measures it needs to take to mitigate or correct any problems identified. The FCA encourages this proactive approach and does not wish to interfere with a
1A firm’s report – produced internally or by an external third party – can clearly assist the firm, but may also be useful to the FCA where there is an issue of regulatory concern. Sharing the outcome of an investigation can potentially save time and resources for both parties, particularly where there is a possibility of the FCA taking enforcement action in relation to a firm’s perceived misconduct or failing. This does not mean that firms are under any obligation to share the
1Work done or commissioned by the firm does not fetter the FCA's ability to use its statutory powers, for example to require a skilled person’s report under section 166 of the Act or to carry out a formal enforcement investigation; nor can a report commissioned by the firm be a substitute for formal regulatory action where this is needed or appropriate. But even if formal action is needed, it may be that a report could be used to help the FCA decide on the appropriate action to
1The FCA invites firms to consider, in particular, whether to discuss the commissioning and scope of a report with FCA staff where: (1) firms have informed the FCA of an issue of potential regulatory concern, as required by SUP 15; or (2) the FCA has indicated that an issue or concern has or may result in a referral to Enforcement.
1The FCA's approach in commenting on the proposed scope and purpose of the report will vary according to the circumstances in which the report is commissioned; it does not follow that the FCA will want to be involved in discussing the scope of a report in every situation. But if the firm anticipates that it will proactively disclose a report to the FCA in the context of an ongoing or prospective enforcement investigation, then the potential use and benefit to be derived from the
1Some themes or issues are common to any discussion about the potential use or value of a report to the FCA. These include: (1) to what extent the FCA will be able to rely on the report in any subsequent enforcement proceedings; (2) to what extent the FCA will have access to the underlying evidence or information that was relied upon in producing the report; (3) where legal privilege or other professional confidentiality is claimed over any material gathered or generated in the
1In certain circumstances the FCA may prefer that a firm does not commission its own investigation (whether an internal audit report or a report by external advisers) because action by the firm could itself be damaging to an FCA investigation. This is true in particular of criminal investigations, where alerting the suspects could have adverse consequences. For example, where the FCA suspects that individuals are abusing positions of trust within financial institutions and that
1How the results of an investigation are presented to the FCA may differ from case to case; the FCA acknowledges that different circumstances may call for different approaches. In this sense, one size does not fit all. The FCA will take a pragmatic and flexible approach when deciding how to receive the results of an investigation. However, if the FCA is to rely on a report as the basis for taking action, or not taking action, then it is important that the firm should be prepared
1The FCA is not able to require the production of “protected items”, as defined in the Act, but it is not uncommon for there to be disagreement with firms about the scope of this protection. Arguments about whether certain documents attract privilege tend to be time- consuming and delay the progress of an investigation. If a firm decides to give a report to the FCA, then the FCA considers that the greatest mutual benefit is most likely to flow from disclosure of the report itself
1For reasons that the FCA can understand, firms may seek to restrict the use to which a report can be put, or assert that any legal privilege is waived only on a limited basis and that the firm retains its right to assert legal privilege as the basis for non-disclosure in civil proceedings against a private litigant.
1The FCA understands that the concept of a limited waiver of legal privilege is not one which is recognised in all jurisdictions; the FCA considers that English law does permit such “limited waiver” and that legal privilege could still be asserted against third parties notwithstanding disclosure of a report to the FCA. However, the FCA cannot accept any condition or stipulation which would purport to restrict its ability to use the information in the exercise of the FCA's statutory
1This does not mean that information provided to the FCA is unprotected. The FCA is subject to strict statutory restrictions on the disclosure of confidential information (as defined in section 348 of the Act), breach of which is a criminal offence (under section 352 of the Act). Reports and underlying materials provided voluntarily to the FCA by a firm, whether covered by legal privilege or not, are confidential for these purposes and benefit from the statutory protections.
1Even in circumstances where disclosure of information would be permitted under the “gateways” set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disclosure of Confidential Information) Regulations, the FCA will consider carefully whether it would be appropriate to disclose a report provided voluntarily by a firm. The FCA appreciates that firms feel strongly about the importance of maintaining confidentiality, and that firms are more likely to volunteer information to the
A person wanting to provide sponsor services4, and to be included on the list of sponsors, must apply to the FCA for approval as a sponsor by submitting the following to the Sponsor Supervision Team at the FCA's address:4(1) a completed Sponsor Firm Application Form; and4(2) [deleted]44(3) the application fee set out in 1FEES 31[Note: The Sponsor's Firm Application Form can be found on the UKLA section of the FCA's website.]4
When considering an application for approval as a sponsor the FCA may:(1) carry out any enquiries and request any further information which it considers appropriate, including consulting other regulators;(2) request that the applicant or its specified representative answer questions and explain any matter the FCA considers relevant to the application; and6(3) take into account any information which it considers appropriate in relation to the application.22(4) [deleted]22[Note:
The FCA will approve a person as a sponsor only if it is satisfied that the person :4(1) is 4an authorised person or a member of a designated professional body;(2) is 4competent to provide8sponsor services4 in accordance with LR 88; and8(3) has appropriate 4systems and controls in place to carry out its role as a sponsor in accordance with LR 884.488
7Situations when the FCA may impose restrictions or limitations on the services a sponsor can provide include (but are not limited to) where it appears to the FCA that: (1) the employees of the person applying to be a sponsor whom it is proposed will perform sponsor services have no or limited relevant experience and expertise of providing certain types of sponsor services or of providing sponsor services to certain types of company; or(2) the person applying to be a sponsor
8Where a person wishes to apply for approval as a sponsor to provide a limited range of sponsor services, it may do so on the basis that the FCA will impose a limitation or restriction on its approval (in accordance with section 88 of the Act). In such circumstances, the FCA will assess whether the person satisfies LR 8.6.5R (2) and LR 8.6.5R (3) taking into consideration the sponsor services to which the approval, as formally limited or restricted by the FCA, will relate.
A sponsor, or a 8person48applying for approval as a sponsor, will not satisfy LR 8.6.5R (2) unless it has:4888(1) 8submitted a sponsor declaration to the FCA:(a) for a person applying for approval as a sponsor, within three years of the date of its application; and(b) for a sponsor, within the previous three years; and(2) 8a sufficient number of employees with the skills , knowledge and expertise necessary for it to:(a) provide sponsor services in accordance with LR 8.3; (b)
8To determine whether a sponsoror a person applying for approval as a sponsoris able to satisfy LR 8.6.7R (1)(a), the FCA may consider whether any of the person's employees have had material involvement in the provision of sponsor services that have required the submission of a sponsor declaration within the previous three years.
8In assessing whether a sponsor or a person applying for approval as a sponsor satisfies LR 8.6.7R (2) the FCA will consider a variety of factors including:(1) the nature, scale and complexity of its business;(2) the diversity of its operations; (3) the volume and size of transactions it undertakes;(4) the volume and size of transactions it anticipates undertaking in the following year; and (5) the degree of risk associated with the transactions it undertakes or anticipates
4In assessing whether a sponsor or a8person applying for approval as a sponsor can demonstrate it is competent in the areas required under LR 8.6.7R (2), the FCA may also take into account, where relevant, the guidance or advice on the listing rules or disclosure rules and transparency rules5the sponsor or8person has given in circumstances other than in providing sponsor services.885
When considering a sponsor's ability to comply with LR 8.6.12 R, the FCA will consider8 a variety of factors, including:8(1) the nature, scale and complexity of its business;(2) the diversity of its operations;(3) the volume and size of the transactions it undertakes;4(4) the volume and size of the transactions it anticipates undertaking in the following year; and44(5) the degree of risk associated with the transactions it undertakes or anticipates undertaking in the following
6A sponsor must have effective arrangements to create and retain for six years accessible records which are sufficient to be capable of demonstrating that it has provided sponsor services and otherwise complied with its obligations under LR 8 including:88(1) where a declaration is to be submitted to the FCA:88(a) under LR 8.4.3R (1), LR 8.4.9R (1), LR 8.4.13R (1), LR 8.4.14R (2) or LR 8.4.17 R; or (b) pursuant to an appointment under LR 8.2.1R (5);the basis of each declaration
6In considering whether a sponsor has satisfied the requirements regarding sufficiency of records in LR 8.6.16A R, the FCA will consider whether the records would enable a person with general knowledge of the sponsor regime but no specific knowledge of the actual sponsor service undertaken to understand and verify the basis upon which material judgments have been made throughout the provision of the sponsor service.
4For each 8sponsor service requiring the submission of a document to the FCA or contact with the FCA, a sponsor must:8(1) at the time of submission or on first making contact with the FCA8notify the FCAof the name and contact details of a key 8contact within8 the sponsor for that matter8; and8888(2) ensure that its key8contact : 88(a) has8 sufficient knowledge about the listed company or applicant and the proposed matter8to be able to answer queries from the FCA about it; 888(b)
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 1
2(1) The [UK RIE] must have financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its [ relevant functions] as a [UK RIE]. |
(2) In considering whether this requirement is satisfied, the [FCA]5must (without prejudice to the generality of regulation 6(1)) take into account all the circumstances, including the [UK RIE's] connection with any person , and any activity carried on by the [UK RIE], whether or not it is anexempt activity. 5 |
In determining whether a UK recognised body has financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its relevant functions, the FCA5 may have regard to:5(1) the operational and other risks to which the UK recognised body is exposed;(2) if the UK recognised body guarantees the performance of transactions in specified investments, the counterparty and market risks to which it is exposed in that capacity; 5(3) the amount and composition of the UK recognised body's capital;(4)
In assessing whether a UK recognised body has sufficient financial resources in relation to counterparty and market risks, the FCA5 may have regard to:5(1) the amount and liquidity of its financial assets and the likely availability of liquid financial resources to the UK recognised body during periods of major market turbulence or other periods of major stress for the UK financial system;3 and(2) the nature and scale of the UK recognised body's exposures to counterparty and market
In assessing whether a UK recognised body has sufficient financial resources in relation to operational and other risks, the FCA5 may have regard to the extent to which, after allowing for the financial resources necessary to cover counterparty and market risks, the UK recognised body's financial resources are sufficient and sufficiently liquid:5(1) to enable the UK recognised body to continue carrying on properly the regulated activities that it expects to carry on; and(2) to
4(1) 4The FCA5 considers that a UK RIE which at any time holds:5(a) eligible financial resources not less than the greater of:(i) the amount calculated under the standard approach; and (ii) the amount calculated under the risk-based approach; and (b) net capital not less than the amount of eligible financial resources determined under (1)(a);will, at that time, have sufficient financial resources to meet the recognition requirement in respect of operational and other risks unless
4The FCA5 would expect to provide a UK recognised body with individual guidance on the amount of eligible financial resources which it considers would be sufficient for the UK recognised body to hold in respect of operational and other risks in order to satisfy the recognition requirements. In formulating its individual guidance, the FCA5 will ordinarily apply the approach described in REC 2.3.9 G for UK RIEs.5555
4For the purposes of REC 2.3, "net capital" should be in the form of equity. For this purpose, the FCA5 considers that common stock, retained earnings, disclosed reserves and other instruments classified as common equity tier one capital or additional tier one capital constitute equity. The FCA5 considers that, when calculating its net capital, a UK recognised body:55(1) should deduct holdings of its own securities, or those of any undertaking in the same group as the UK recognised
(1) 4Under the standard approach, the amount of eligible financial resources is equal to six months of operating costs.(2) Under the standard approach, the FCA5 assumes liquid financial assets are needed to cover the costs that would be incurred during an orderly wind-down of the UK recognised body'sexempt activities, while continuing to satisfy all the recognition requirements and complying with any other obligations under the Act (including the obligations to pay periodic fees
4For the purposes of calculating the risk-based approach, the FCA5 would normally expect the UK RIE to provide the FCA5 with an annual financial risk assessment that identifies the risks to its business. As a financial risk assessment is likely to form an integral part of the UK RIE's management process and decision-making culture, the FCA5 would normally expect it to be approved by the UK RIE'sgoverning body.555
4The FCA5 would normally expect to use the financial risk assessment prepared by the UK RIE in the course of preparing individual guidance on the amount of financial resources that it considers is sufficient for a UK RIE to hold in order to satisfy the recognition requirements. The financial risk assessment would provide the basis for calculating the amount of eligible financial resources that should be held by the UK RIE under the risk-based approach.5
4The financial risk assessment should be based on a methodology which provides a reasonable estimate of the potential business losses which a UK RIE might incur in stressed but plausible market conditions. The FCA5 would expect a UK RIE to carry out a financial risk assessment at least once in every twelve-month period, or more frequently if there are material changes in the nature, scale or complexity of the UK RIE's operations or its business plans that suggest such financial
4Where a UK RIE is a member of a group, the FCA5 would normally expect the annual risk assessment to be accompanied by a consolidated balance sheet: 5(1) of any group in which the UK RIE is a subsidiary undertaking; or(2) (if the UK RIE is not a subsidiary undertaking in any group) of any group of which the UK RIE is a parent undertaking.
4The FCA5 would expect to consider the financial risk assessment, any proposal with respect to an operational risk buffer and, if applicable, the consolidated balance sheet, in formulating its guidance on the amount of eligible financial resources it considers to be sufficient for the UK RIE to hold in order to meet the recognition requirements. In formulating its guidance, the FCA5 would, where relevant, consider whether or not the financial risk assessment makes adequate provision
4The FCA5 would normally consider a UK recognised body to be failing the recognition requirements if it held financial resources less than the amount calculated under REC 2.3.9G (1)(a)(i) (in respect of UK RIEs). The FCA5 therefore expects a UK recognised body to hold an operational risk buffer of a sufficient amount in excess of this minimum, to ensure that it is at all times able to comply with its regulatory obligations.555
(1) [deleted]55(2) The FCA5 would normally expect a UK RIE to hold, in addition to the minimum amount determined under REC 2.3.9G (1)(a)(i), an operational risk buffer consistent with a risk-based approach.5(a) Where the amount of eligible financial resources calculated by a UK RIE under REC 2.3.17G (5) (the risk-based approach) is greater than the amount of eligible financial resources calculated under REC 2.3.13 G (the standard approach), and the difference is of an amount sufficient
For the purpose of LR 5.6.4R (2), the FCA considers that the following factors are indicators of a fundamental change:(1) the extent to which the transaction will change the strategic direction or nature of its business; or(2) whether its business will be part of a different industry sector following the completion of the transaction; or(3) whether its business will deal with fundamentally different suppliers and end users.
An issuer, or in the case of an issuer with a premium listing, its sponsor, must contact the FCA as early as possible:(1) before announcing a reverse takeover which has been agreed or is in contemplation, to discuss whether a suspension of listing is appropriate; or (2) where details of the reverse takeover have leaked, to request a suspension.
Examples of where the FCA will consider that a reverse takeover is in contemplation include situations where:(1) the issuer has approached the target's board;(2) the issuer has entered into an exclusivity period with a target; or(3) the issuer has been given access to begin due diligence work (whether or not on a limited basis).
Generally, when a reverse takeover is announced or leaked, there will be insufficient publicly available information about the proposed transaction and the issuer will be unable to assess accurately its financial position and inform the market accordingly. In this case, the FCA will often consider that suspension will be appropriate, as set out in LR 5.1.2G (3) and (4). However, if the FCA is satisfied that there is sufficient publicly available information about the proposed
The FCA will generally be satisfied that there is sufficient information in the market about the propos ed transaction if: (1) the target has shares or certificates representing equity securities admitted to a regulated market; and(2) the issuer makes an announcement stating that the target has complied with the disclosure requirements applicable on that regulated market and providing details of where information disclosed pursuant to those requirements can be obtained.
The FCA will generally be satisfied that there is sufficient publicly available information in the market about the proposed transaction if the target has securities admitted to an investment exchange or trading platform that is not a regulated market and the issuer:(1) confirms, in a form acceptable to the FCA, that the disclosure requirements in relation to financial information and inside information of the investment exchange or trading platform on which the target'ssecurities
Where the target in a reverse takeover is not subject to a public disclosure regime, or if the target has securities admitted on an investment exchange or trading platform that is not a regulated market but the issuer is not able to give the confirmation and make the announcement contemplated by LR 5.6.12 G, the FCA will generally be satisfied that there is sufficient publicly available information in the market about the proposed transaction such that a suspension is not required
Where an issuer acquires the shares or certificates representing equity securities of a target with a different listing category from its own and the issuer wishes to maintain its existing listing category, the FCA will generally be satisfied that a cancellation is not required on completion of a reverse takeover if: (1) the issuer will continue to be eligible for its existing listing category following completion of the transaction;(2) the issuer provides an eligibility letter
The FCA will generally be satisfied that a cancellation is not required on completion of a reverse takeover if the target is listed with a different listing category from that of the issuer and the issuer wishes to transfer its listing to a different listing category in conjunction with the acquisition and the issuer as enlarged by the relevant acquisition complies with the relevant requirements of LR 5.4A to transfer to a different listing category.
Under section 169(1)(b) and section 131FA2 of the Act,
the FCA3 may
appoint an investigator to investigate any matter at the request of an overseas regulator or EEA regulator2. The powers of the investigator appointed by the FCA3 (referred to here as the 'FCA's3 investigator') include the power to require persons to
attend at a specified time and place and answer questions (the compulsory
interview power).333
Where the FCA3 appoints an investigator in response to a request from an overseas regulator or EEA regulator2 it may, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act,
direct him to permit a representative of that regulator to attend and take
part in any interviews conducted for the purposes of the investigation. The FCA3 may
only give a direction under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 if it is satisfied that any information
obtained by an overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2
The FCA3 may need to consider whether to use its direction power at two
stages of an investigation:3(1) at the same time that it considers
the request from the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 to appoint investigators;(2) after it has appointed investigators,
either at the request of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 or on the recommendation of the
investigators.
Before making a direction under
section 169(7) or section
131FA2 the FCA3 will discuss and determine with the overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2 how this statement of policy will
apply to the conduct of the interview, taking into account all the circumstances
of the case. Amongst other matters, the FCA3 will at this stage determine the extent to which the representative
of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 will be able to participate in
the interview. The overseas regulator
The direction will contain the
identity of the representative of the overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2 that is permitted to attend any
interview and the role that he will play in the interview. If the FCA3 envisages that there will be more than one interview in the course
of the investigation, the direction may also specify which interview(s) the representative is allowed to attend.32
In circumstances where an interview
is to be conducted as part of the investigation, the FCA's3 investigator will have conduct of the interview. In general,
the FCA's3 investigators
will be employees of the FCA3, but in appropriate cases the FCA3 may appoint persons who
are not its employees. In those cases, the FCA3 may choose to require that an FCA3 employee is present at the interview and may choose to appoint
that person as an investigator.333333
The FCA's3 investigator will act on behalf of the FCA3 and under its control. He may be instructed to permit the representative
of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 to assist in the preparation of
the interview. Where the FCA3 considers it appropriate, it may permit the representative to
attend and ask questions of the interviewee in the course of the interview.
The interview will be conducted according to the terms of the direction and
the notification referred to in DEPP
If the direction does permit the
representative of an overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 to attend the interview and ask
the interviewee questions, the FCA's3 investigator will retain control of the interview throughout.
Control of the interview means the following will apply:3(1) The FCA's3 investigator instigates and concludes the interview, introduces
everyone present and explains the procedure of the interview. He warns the
interviewee of the possible consequences of refusing
The FCA3 will in general provide written notice of the appointment of
an investigator to the person under
investigation pursuant to the request of an overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2. Whether or not the interviewee
is the person under investigation,
the FCA's3 investigator
will inform the interviewee of the provisions under which he has been appointed,
the identity of the requesting authority and general nature of the matter
under investigation. The interviewee will also normally
When the FCA's3 investigator has exercised the compulsory interview power, at
the outset of the interview the interviewee will be given an appropriate warning.
The warning, amongst other things, must state that the interviewee is obliged
to answer all questions put to them during the interview, including any put
by the representative of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2. It will also state that in criminal
proceedings or proceedings for market abuse the FCA3 will
not use
The FCA's3 investigator may decide which documents or other information
may be put to the interviewee, and whether it is appropriate to give the interviewee
sight of the documents before
the interview takes place. Where the overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2 wishes to ask questions about documents during the interview and the FCA's3 investigator
wishes to inspect those documents before
the interview, he will be given the opportunity to do so. If the FCA's3 investigator wishes
When the FCA's3 investigator has exercised the compulsory interview power, the FCA's3 investigator
will require the person attending
the interview to answer questions. Where appropriate, questions may also be
posed by the representative of the overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2. The interviewee will also be
required to answer these questions. The FCA's3 investigator may intervene at any stage during questioning by
the representative of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulato
Interviews will, in general, be
conducted in English. Where the interviewee's first language is not English,
at the request of the interviewee arrangements will be made for the questions
to be translated into the interviewee's first language and for his answers
to be translated back into English. If a translator is employed at the request
of the representative of the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 then the translation costs will
normally be met by the overseas regulator
All compulsory interviews will
be tape-recorded. The method of recording will be decided on and arranged
by the FCA's3 investigator.
Costs will be addressed similarly to that set out in the preceding paragraph.
The FCA3 will
not provide the overseas regulator or EEA
regulator2 with transcripts of the tapes
of interviews unless specifically agreed to, but copies of the tapes will
normally be provided where requested. The interviewee will be provided with
a copy of tapes of the
The interviewee may be accompanied
at the interview by a legal adviser or a non-legally qualified observer of
his choice. The costs of any representation will not be met by the FCA3. The
presence at the interview of a representative of the overseas
regulator or EEA regulator2 may mean that the interviewee
wishes to be represented or accompanied by a person either
from or familiar with that regulator's jurisdiction. As far as practical the
arrangements for the interview should