Related provisions for SYSC 2.2.3

SYSC 2.2.1R01/12/2001

(1) A firm must make a record of the arrangements it has made to satisfy SYSC 2.1.1 R (apportionment) and SYSC 2.1.3 R (allocation) and take reasonable care to keep this up to date.(2) This record must be retained for six years from the date on which it was superseded by a more up-to-date record.

SYSC 2.2.2G01/12/2001

(1) A firm will be able to comply with SYSC 2.2.1 R by means of records which it keeps for its own purposes provided these records satisfy the requirements of SYSC 2.2.1 R and provided the firm takes reasonable care to keep them up to date. Appropriate records might, for this purpose, include organisational charts and diagrams, project management documents, job descriptions, committee constitutions and terms of reference provided they show a clear description of the firm's major functions.(2)

SYSC 3.2.2G01/12/2001

A firm's reporting lines should be clear and appropriate having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business. These reporting lines, together with clear management responsibilities, should be communicated as appropriate within the firm.

SYSC 3.2.3G01/11/2007

(1) A firm'sgoverning body is likely to delegate many functions and tasks for the purpose of carrying out its business. When functions or tasks are delegated, either to employees or to appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents8, appropriate safeguards should be put in place.(2) When there is delegation, a firm should assess whether the recipient is suitable to carry out the delegated function or task, taking into account the degree of responsibility involved.(3)

SYSC 3.2.4G01/12/2001

(1) The guidance relevant to delegation within the firm is also relevant to external delegation ('outsourcing'). A firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations. So, for example, under Principle 3 a firm should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions by its contractor.(2) A firm should take steps to obtain sufficient information from its contractor to enable it to assess the impact of outsourcing on its systems and controls.

SYSC 3.2.5G01/12/2001

Where it is made possible and appropriate by the nature, scale and complexity of its business, a firm should segregate the duties of individuals and departments in such a way as to reduce opportunities for financial crime or contravention of requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the duties of front-office and back-office staff should be segregated so as to prevent a single individual initiating, processing and controlling transactions.

SYSC 3.2.6HR01/03/2006

5A firm must allocate to a director or senior manager (who may also be the money laundering reporting officer) overall responsibility within the firm for the establishment and maintenance of effective anti-money laundering systems and controls.

SYSC 3.2.8R01/04/2009

(1) A firm which carries on designated investment business with or for retail clients or professional clients8 must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of:8(a) having responsibility for oversight of the firm's compliance; and(b) reporting to the governing body in respect of that responsibility.1(2) In 10 (1) "compliance" means compliance with the rules in:(a) COBS8(Conduct of Business); 8(b) COLL ( Collective Investment Schemes sourcebook)10; and1010(c) CASS

SYSC 3.2.9G01/04/2013

(1) SUP 10A.7.8 R26 uses SYSC 3.2.8 R to describe the controlled function, known as the compliance oversight function, of acting in the capacity of a director or senior manager to whom this function is allocated.26(2) The rules referred to in SYSC 3.2.8 R (2) are the minimum area of focus for the firm'scompliance oversight function. A firm is free to give additional responsibilities to a person performing this function if it wishes.

SYSC 3.2.16G01/05/2011

9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities

SYSC 2.1.1R01/12/2001

A firm must take reasonable care to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities among its directors and senior managers in such a way that:(1) it is clear who has which of those responsibilities; and(2) the business and affairs of the firm can be adequately monitored and controlled by the directors, relevant senior managers and governing body of the firm.

SYSC 2.1.3R01/12/2001

A firm must appropriately allocate to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, the functions of:(1) dealing with the apportionment of responsibilities under SYSC 2.1.1 R; and(2) overseeing the establishment and maintenance of systems and controls under SYSC 3.1.1 R.

SYSC 2.1.4R01/12/2001

Allocation of functions

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.3 R

1: Firm type	2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):	3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:
(1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)	(1) the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and(2) senior managers
	(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of:
	(a) the group; or(b) a group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall
(2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the function in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2) must be allocated)	(not applicable)	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and (2) senior managers
(3) Any other firm	the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and (2) senior manager's
Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.

SYSC 2.1.5G01/12/2001

SYSC 2.1.3 R and SYSC 2.1.4 R give a firm some flexibility in the individuals to whom the functions may be allocated. It will be common for both the functions to be allocated solely to the firm's chief executive. SYSC 2.1.6 G contains further guidance on the requirements of SYSC 2.1.3 R and SYSC 2.1.4 R in a question and answer form.

SYSC 2.1.6G23/10/2015

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

	Question	Answer
1	Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?	An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10A.7.1 R15) and an application must be made under section 59 of the Act for approval of the individual before the function is performed. There are exceptions from this inSUP 10A.115 (Approved persons - Application). 15 15 5
2	If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?	If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.
3	What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?	The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The appropriate regulator considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.
4	If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?	Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).
5	Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?	Yes.
6	Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?	Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).
7	If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?	Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the appropriate regulator would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14.
8	If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?	Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).
9	What if a firm does not have a chief executive?	Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2
10	What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?	A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)
11	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?	The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.7 R)6. Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10 R6 does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1). 6 6
12	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?	SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R6and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8 R6restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the appropriate regulator, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2 G3). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.1 6 6 3
13	What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?	The appropriate regulator envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).
14	What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?	The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 7 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,10 non-executive directors to be responsible responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness10 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor.10 That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1). 7
15	What about electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?4 4	SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1 4

APER 4.5.3E01/12/2001

Failing to take reasonable steps to apportion responsibilities for all areas of the business under the approved person's control falls within APER 4.5.2 E (see APER 4.5.11 G).

APER 4.5.4E01/12/2001

Failing to take reasonable steps to apportion responsibilities clearly amongst those to whom responsibilities have been delegated falls within APER 4.5.2 E (see APER 4.5.11 G).

APER 4.5.5E01/12/2001

Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.4 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) implementing confusing or uncertain reporting lines (see APER 4.5.12 G);(2) implementing confusing or uncertain authorisation levels (see APER 4.5.13 G);(3) implementing confusing or uncertain job descriptions and responsibilities (see APER 4.5.13 G).

APER 4.5.6E01/04/2009

In the case of an approved person who is responsible under SYSC 2.1.3 R (1) or SYSC 4.4.5 R (1)1 for dealing with the apportionment of responsibilities under SYSC 2.1.1 R or SYSC 4.4.3 R1, failing to take reasonable care to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities among the firm'sdirectors and senior managers falls within APER 4.5.2 E.

APER 4.5.7E01/04/2013

Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.6 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to review regularly the significant responsibilities which the firm is required to apportion;9(2) failing to act where that review shows that those significant responsibilities have not been clearly apportioned.

APER 4.5.8E01/12/2001

Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that suitable individuals are responsible for those aspects of the business under the control of the individual performing a significant influence function falls within APER 4.5.2 E (see APER 4.5.14 G).

APER 4.5.9E01/12/2001

Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.8 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to review the competence, knowledge, skills and performance of staff to assess their suitability to fulfil their duties, despite evidence that their performance is unacceptable (see APER 4.5.14 G);(2) giving undue weight to financial performance when considering the suitability or continuing suitability of an individual for a particular role (see APER 4.5.14 G);(3) allowing managerial

APER 4.5.12G01/12/2001

The organisation of the business and the responsibilities of those within it should be clearly defined (see APER 4.5.5 E (1)). Reporting lines should be clear to staff. Where staff have dual reporting lines there is a greater need to ensure that the responsibility and accountability of each individual line manager is clearly set out and understood.

CREDS 2.2.1G08/01/2012

SYSC 4.1.1 R requires every firm, including a credit union, to have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing

CREDS 2.2.12G08/01/2012

A credit union should ensure appropriate segregation of duties in order to minimise the risk of financial crime or contravention of requirements and standards under the regulatory system.

CREDS 2.2.13G08/01/2012

Guidance on segregation of duties is given in CREDS 2.2.18 G and CREDS 2.2.19 G.

CREDS 2.2.18G08/01/2012

CREDS 2.2.12 G states that all credit unions should ensure appropriate segregation of duties. Duties should be segregated to prevent one individual from initiating, controlling, and processing a transaction (for example, both the approval and the payment of an invoice).

CREDS 2.2.19G08/01/2012

Responsibilities of connected persons (for example, relatives and other close relationships) should be kept entirely separate. They should not hold key posts at the same time as each other. Where this is unavoidable, a credit union should have a written policy for ensuring complete segregation of duties and responsibilities.

CREDS 2.2.22G08/01/2012

Documentation should not be restricted to "lower level" controls applied in processing transactions, but should also cover "high level" controls including:(1) identifying those powers to be exercised only by the committee of management, and the powers delegated to others;(2) the purpose, composition and reporting lines of sub-committees, and senior managers to whom responsibilities are delegated;(3) the specific roles and responsibilities of individual officers;(4) the timing,

CREDS 2.2.56G08/01/2012

The planning system should be defined clearly, documented appropriately, and planning related tasks and decision-making responsibilities allocated clearly within the credit union.

SYSC 5.1.7R01/01/2014

The senior personnel of a common platform firm must define arrangements concerning the segregation of duties within the firm and the prevention of conflicts of interest.[Note: article 88 of the CRD and 8annex V paragraph 1 of the Banking Consolidation Directive]

SYSC 5.1.7AG06/08/2009

3Other firms should take account of the segregation of functions rules (SYSC 5.1.6 R and SYSC 5.1.7 R) as if they were guidance (and as if "should" appeared in those rules instead of "must") as explained in SYSC 1 Annex 1.3.3 G4.

SYSC 5.1.8G01/01/2007

The effective segregation of duties is an important element in the internal controls of a firm in the prudential context. In particular, it helps to ensure that no one individual is completely free to commit a firm's assets or incur liabilities on its behalf. Segregation can also help to ensure that a firm'sgoverning body receives objective and accurate information on financial performance, the risks faced by the firm and the adequacy of its systems.

SYSC 5.1.9G01/04/2009

A firm should normally ensure that no single individual has unrestricted authority to do all of the following:3(1) initiate a transaction;(2) bind the firm;(3) make payments; and(4) account for it.

SYSC 5.1.10G01/04/2009

Where a firm is unable to ensure the complete segregation of duties (for example, because it has a limited number of staff), it should ensure that there are adequate compensating controls in place (for example, frequent review of an area by relevant senior managers).3

CASS 11.3.1R01/04/2014

A CASS small debt management firm, other than a not-for-profit debt advice body, must allocate to a director or senior manager performing a significant-influence function responsibility for:(1) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.

CASS 11.3.2R01/04/2014

A CASS small debt management firm that is a not-for-profit debt advice body must allocate to a director or senior manager:(1) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.

CASS 11.3.3G01/04/2014

CASS 11.3.4 R describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice bodies. As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4 R (in conjunction with SUP 10A.4.1 R and SUP 10A.7.10 R), in a CASS large debt management firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4 R is required to be discharged by a director

CASS 11.3.4R01/04/2014

A CASS large debt management firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of: (1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that CASS debt management firm's systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the CASS debt management firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.

CASS 11.3.6R01/04/2014

(1) Subject to (2), a CASS debt management firm must make and retain an appropriate record of the person to whom responsibility is allocated in accordance with, as applicable, CASS 11.3.1 R, CASS 11.3.2 R, and CASS 11.3.4 R.(2) A CASS small debt management firm must make and retain such a record only where it allocates responsibility to a person other than the person in that firm who performs the compliance oversight function.(3) A CASS debt management firm must ensure that a

CASS 1A.3.1BG01/10/2011

1CASS 1A.3.1A R describes the controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function. The table of controlled functions in SUP 10.4.5 R together with SUP 10.7.9 R specify the CASS operational oversight function as a required function for a firm to which CASS 1A.3.1A R applies.

CASS 1A.3.3R01/01/2013

(1) Subject to (2), a firm must make and retain an appropriate record of the person to whom responsibility is allocated in accordance with CASS 1A.3.1 R, CASS 1A.3.1A R or CASS 1A.3.1C R (2)2.1(2) A CASS small firm must make and retain such a record only where it allocates responsibility to a person other than the person in that firm who performs the compliance oversight function.(3) A firm must ensure that the record made under this rule is retained for a period of five years

REC 2.5.3G01/04/2013

In assessing whether the systems and controls used by a UK recognised body in the performance of its relevant functions are adequate and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business, the FCA3 may have regard to the UK recognised body's:3(1) arrangements for managing, controlling and carrying out its relevant functions, including: (a) the distribution of duties and responsibilities among its key individuals and the departments of the UK recognised body responsible for performing

REC 2.5.6G01/04/2013

In assessing a UK recognised body's systems and controls for assessing and managing risk, the FCA3 may also have regard to the extent to which these systems and controls enable the UK recognised body to:3(1) identify all the general, operational, legal and market risks wherever they arise in its activities;(2) measure and control the different types of risk;(3) allocate responsibility for risk management to persons with appropriate knowledge and expertise; and(4) provide sufficient,

REC 2.5.13G01/04/2013

The FCA3 may have regard to the arrangements a UK recognised body makes to structure itself and to allocate responsibility for decisions so that it can continue to take proper regulatory decisions notwithstanding any conflicts of interest, including:3(1) the size and composition of the governing body and relevant committees; (2) the roles and responsibilities of key individuals, especially where they also have responsibilities in other organisations; (3) the arrangements for transferring

REC 2.5.17G01/04/2013

A UK recognised body's arrangements for internal and external audit will be an important part of its systems and controls. In assessing the adequacy of these arrangements, the FCA3 may have regard to: 3(1) the size, composition and terms of reference of any audit committee of the UK recognised body'sgoverning body;(2) the frequency and scope of external audit; (3) the provision and scope of internal audit; (4) the staffing and resources of the UK recognised body's internal audit

SYSC 4.4.3R01/04/2009

A firm must take reasonable care to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities among its directors and senior managers in such a way that:(1) it is clear who has which of those responsibilities; and(2) the business and affairs of the firm can be adequately monitored and controlled by the directors, relevant senior managers and governing body of the firm.

SYSC 4.4.5R01/04/2009

A firm must appropriately allocate to one or more individuals, in accordance with the following table, the functions of:

(1)
dealing with the apportionment of responsibilities under SYSC 4.4.3 R; and
(2)
overseeing the establishment and maintenance of systems and controls under SYSC 4.1.1 R.

1: Firm type	2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):	3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:
(1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)	(1) the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and (2) senior managers
	(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of: (a) the group; or (b) a group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall
(2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the functions in SYSC 4.4.5R (2) must be allocated)	(not applicable)	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and (2) senior managers
(3) Any other firm	the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)	the firm's and its group's: (1) directors; and (2) senior managers
Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.

SYSC 4.4.6G23/10/2015

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question		Answer
1	Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person?	An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10A.7.1 R17) and an application must be made under section 59 of the Act for approval of the individual before the function is performed. There are exceptions from this in SUP 10A.117 (Approved persons - Application). 17 17
2	If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?	If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.
3	What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?	The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The appropriate regulator considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.
4	If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?	Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).
5	Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?	Yes.
6	Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?	Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).
7	If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?	Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14.
8	If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?	Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).
9	What if a firm does not have a chief executive?	Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.
10	What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?	A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)
11	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?	The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R). Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 4.4 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).
12	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?	SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R(2) and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R restrict the application of SYSC 4.4.5 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the appropriate regulator, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.
13	What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?	The appropriate regulator envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).
14	What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?	The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,9 non-executive directors to be responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness9 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor9. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1). 5
15	What about incoming electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?	SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.

SUP 10A.6.23R01/04/2013

(1) If a firm is a partnership, the partner function is the function of acting in the capacity of a partner in that firm.(2) If the principal purpose of the firm is to carry on one or more regulated activities, each partner performs the partner function.(3) If the principal purpose of the firm is other than to carry on regulated activities:(a) a partner performs the partner function to the extent only that he has responsibility for a regulated activity; and(b) a partner in a firm

SUP 10A.6.24G01/04/2013

Any apportionment referred to in SUP 10A.6.23R (3)(b) will have taken place under SYSC 2.1.1 R or SYSC 4.3.1 R and SYSC 4.4.3 R. The FCA may ask to see details of the apportionment but will not require, as a matter of course, a copy of the material which records this (see SYSC 2.2).

SUP 10A.6.32R01/04/2013

(1) Each person on the non-directive friendly society'sgoverning body will be taken to have responsibility for its regulated activities, unless the firm has apportioned this responsibility to one particular individual to whom it is reasonable to give this responsibility.(2) The individual need not be a member of the governing body.

DEPP 6.2.9AG01/04/2013

3In addition to the general factors outlined in DEPP 6.2.1 G, there are some additional considerations that the FCA4 will have regard to when deciding whether to take action against a person that performs a controlled function without approval contrary to section 63A of the Act.4(1) The conduct of the person. The FCA4 will take into consideration whether, while performing controlled functions without approval, the person committed misconduct in respect of which, if he had been

SUP 10A.9.1R01/04/2013

SUP 10A.9 applies only to a firm which:(1) under SYSC 2.1.1 R or, SYSC 4.1.1 R, apportions a significant responsibility, within the description of the significant management function, to a senior manager of a significant business unit; or(2) undertakes proprietary trading; or(3) (in the case of an EEA firm) undertakes the activity of accepting deposits from banking customers and activities connected with this.

SUP 10A.9.14G01/04/2013

A firm carrying on insurance mediation activity, other than a sole trader, must allocate to a director or senior manager the responsibility for the firm'sinsurance mediation activity (MIPRU 2.2.1 R). MIPRU 2.2.2 R (3) provides that the firm may allocate this responsibility to the person performing the significant management function.

SYSC 3.1.5G01/12/2001

SYSC 2.1.3 R (2) prescribes how a firm must allocate the function of overseeing the establishment and maintenance of systems and controls described in SYSC 3.1.1 R.

SYSC 3.1.6R01/11/2007

2A firm which is not a common platform firm must employ personnel with the skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities allocated to them.

CREDS 2.1.4G01/04/2013

The purposes of SYSC, which applies to all credit unions, are:(1) to encourage directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for the arrangements that all firms must put in place on matters likely to be of interest to the appropriate regulator because they impinge on the appropriate regulator's function under the Act;(2) to reinforce Principle 3, under which all firms must take reasonable care to organise and control their affairs responsibly and

CREDS 10.1.3G01/10/2015

Module	Relevance to Credit Unions
The Principles for Businesses (PRIN)	The Principles for Businesses (PRIN) set out, high-level requirements, some of which are imposed by the FCA and some by the PRA.12 They provide a general statement of regulatory requirements. The Principles apply to all12 credit unions. In applying the Principles to credit unions, the appropriate regulator 12 will be mindful of proportionality. In practice, the implications are likely to vary according to the size of the credit union. 12 12 12
Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC)	SYSC 1 and SYSC 4 to 10 apply to all credit unions in respect of the carrying on of their regulated activities and unregulated activities in a prudential context. SYSC 18 applies to all credit unions without restriction.
Threshold Conditions (COND)	In order to become authorised under the Act all firms must meet the threshold conditions. The threshold conditions must be met on a continuing basis by credit unions. Failure to meet one of the conditions is sufficient grounds for the exercise by the appropriate regulator 12 of its powers. 12 12
Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER)	The purpose of the Statements of Principle contained in APER 2 is to provide guidance to approved persons in relation to the conduct expected of them in the performance of a controlled function. The Code of Practice for Approved Persons sets out descriptions of conduct which, in the opinion of the appropriate regulator 12, do not comply with a Statement of Principle and, in the case of Statement of Principle 3, conduct which tends to show compliance within that statement. 12
The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons (FIT)	The purpose of FIT is to set out and describe the criteria that the appropriate regulator 12 will consider when assessing the fitness and propriety of a person in respect of whom an application is being made for approval to undertake a controlled function under the approved persons regime. The criteria are also relevant in assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of persons who have already been approved. 12
General Provisions (GEN)	GEN contains rules and guidance on general matters, including interpreting the Handbook, statutory status disclosure, the appropriate regulator's 12 logo and insurance against financial penalties.
Fees manual (FEES)	This manual sets out the fees applying to credit unions.
Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS)	A credit union which acts as a CTF provider or provides a cash-deposit ISA will need to be aware of the relevant requirements in COBS. COBS 4.6 (Past, simulated past and future performance), COBS 4.7.1 R (Direct offer financial promotions), COBS 4.10 (Systems and controls and approving and communicating financial promotions), COBS 13 (Preparing product information) and COBS 14 (Providing product information to clients) apply with respect to accepting deposits as set out in those provisions, COBS 4.1 and BCOBS.
Banking: Conduct of Business sourcebook (BCOBS)	BCOBS sets out rules and guidance for credit unions on how they should conduct their business with their customers. In particular there are rules and guidance relating to communications with banking customers and financial promotions (BCOBS 2), distance communications (BCOBS 3), information to be communicated to banking customers (BCOBS 4), post sale requirements (BCOBS 5), and cancellation (BCOBS 6). BCOBS 5.1.13 R (Value dating) does not apply to credit unions. The rules in BCOBS 3.1 that relate to distance contracts for accepting deposits are likely to have limited application to a credit union. This is because the Distance Marketing Directive only applies where there is "an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme run by the supplier" (Article 2(a)). If, therefore, the credit union normally operates face to face and has not set up facilities to enable customers to deal with it at a distance, such as facilities for a customer to deal with it purely by post, telephone, fax or the Internet, the provisions will not be relevant.
Supervision manual (SUP)	The following provisions of SUP are relevant to credit unions: 13SUP 1A13 (The appropriate regulator's 12 approach to supervision), SUP 2 (Information gathering by the appropriate regulator 12 on its own initiative), SUP 3.1 to SUP 3.8 (Auditors), SUP 5 (Skilled persons), SUP 6 (Applications to vary or cancel Part 4A12permission), SUP 7 (Individual requirements), SUP 8 (Waiver and modification of rules), SUP 9 (Individual guidance), 13SUP 10A and SUP 10B13 (Approved persons), SUP 11 (Controllers and Close links), SUP 15 (Notifications to the appropriate regulator 12) and SUP 16 (Reporting Requirements). Credit unions are reminded that they are subject to the requirements of the Act and SUP 11 on controllers and close links, and are bound to notify the appropriate regulator 12 of changes. It may be unlikely, in practice, that credit unions will develop such relationships. It is possible, however, that a person may acquire control of a credit union within the meaning of the Act by reason of holding the prescribed proportion of deferred shares in the credit union. In relation to SUP 16, credit unions are exempted from the requirement to submit annual reports of controllers and close links. 12 12 12 12 12
Decision, Procedure and Penalties manual (DEPP)	DEPP is relevant to credit unions because it sets out: (1) the FCA's 12 decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5); and (2) the FCA's 12 policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties under the Act (see DEPP 6). 12 12
Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP)	DISP sets out rules and guidance in relation to treating complainants fairly and the Financial Ombudsman Service.
Compensation (COMP)	COMP sets out rules relating to the scheme for compensating consumers when authorised firms are unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims against them.12
The Enforcement Guide (EG)	The Enforcement Guide (EG) describes the FCA's 12 approach to exercising the main enforcement powers given to it by the Act and by other legislation.2 12
Financial crime: a guide for firms (FC)	FC provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime.

MAR 8.3.2R02/04/2013

In discharging its duties, the benchmark administrator must have regard to the importance of maintaining integrity of the market and the continuity of the specified benchmark including the need for contractual certainty for contracts which reference the specified benchmark.

MAR 8.3.10R01/04/2015

The benchmark administrator through its oversight committee must:(1) develop practice standards in a published code which, for the relevant specified benchmark, set out the responsibilities for: 11(a) 1benchmark submitters and (where applicable) persons who make benchmark submissions available;(b) 1the benchmark administrator; and(c) 1the oversight committee;(2) undertake regular periodic reviews of:(a) the practice standards mentioned in MAR 8.3.10R (1);(b) the setting and definition

SYSC 8.1.6R01/04/2009

If a firm outsources critical or important operational functions or any relevant services and activities, it remains fully responsible for discharging all of its obligations under the regulatory system and must comply, in particular, with the following conditions:2(1) the outsourcing must not result in the delegation by senior personnel of their responsibility;(2) the relationship and obligations of the firm towards its clients under the regulatory system must not be altered;(3)

SYSC 8.1.14G01/07/2011

6A management company should be aware that SUP 15.8.6 R (Delegation by UCITS management companies) and COLL 6.6.15A R (Committees and delegations) contain requirements implementing article 13 of the UCITS Directive in relation to delegation that will apply to it.

SYSC 6.3.8R01/04/2009

A firm must allocate to a director or senior manager (who may also be the money laundering reporting officer) overall responsibility within the firm for the establishment and maintenance of effective anti-money laundering systems and controls.1

LR 9.6.11R01/07/2005

A listed company must notify a RIS of any change to the board including:(1) the appointment of a new director stating the appointees name and whether the position is executive, non-executive or chairman and the nature of any specific function or responsibility of the position;(2) the resignation, removal or retirement of a director (unless the director retires by rotation and is re-appointed at a general meeting of the listed company's shareholders);(3) important changes to the

Related provisions for SYSC 2.2.3

Search Term(s)

Filter by Topics

Filter by Modules

Filter by Documents

Filter by Keywords

Effective Period

Similar To

Allocation of functions

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R