Related provisions for SUP 6.2.4

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APER 4.6.1AGRP
4The Statement of Principle 6 (see APER 2.1A.3 P) is in the following terms: "An approved person performing an accountable significant-influence function must exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which he is responsible in his accountable function." References in APER 4.6 to a significant-influence function are to an accountable significant-influence function to which Statement of Principle 6 applies.
APER 4.6.4ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.3 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) permitting transactions without a sufficient understanding of the risks involved;(2) permitting expansion of the business without reasonably assessing the potential risks of that expansion;(3) inadequately monitoring highly profitable transactions or business practices or unusual transactions or business practices;(4) accepting implausible or unsatisfactory explanations from subordinates without
APER 4.6.6ERP
Failing to take reasonable steps to maintain an appropriate level of understanding about an issue or part of the business that he has delegated to an individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) falls within APER 4.6.2 E (see APER 4.6.14 G).
APER 4.6.7ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.6 E includes but is not limited to:(1) disregarding an issue or part of the business once it has been delegated;(2) failing to require adequate reports once the resolution of an issue or management of part of the business has been delegated;(3) accepting implausible or unsatisfactory explanations from delegates without testing their veracity.
APER 4.6.8ERP
Failing to supervise and monitor adequately the individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) to whom responsibility for dealing with an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business has been delegated falls within APER 4.6.2 E.
APER 4.6.9ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.8 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to take personal action where progress is unreasonably slow, or where implausible or unsatisfactory explanations are provided;(2) failing to review the performance of an outside contractor in connection with the delegated issue or business.
APER 4.6.11GRP
An approved person performing a significant influence function will not always manage the business on a day-to-day basis himself. The extent to which he does so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale and complexity of the business and his position within it. The larger and more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation and reporting lines. The appropriate regulator4 will look to the approved person performing a significant-influence function4
APER 4.6.12GRP
(1) It is important for the approved person performing a significant influence function to understand the business for which he is responsible (APER 4.6.4 E). An approved person performing a significant influence function is unlikely to be an expert in all aspects of a complex financial services business. However, he should understand and inform himself about the business sufficiently to understand the risks of its trading, credit or other business activities.(2) It is important
APER 4.6.13GRP
(1) An approved person performing a significant influence function may delegate the investigation, resolution or management of an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business to individuals who report to him or to others.(2) The approved person performing a significant influence function should have reasonable grounds for believing that the delegate has the competence, knowledge, skill and time to deal with the issue. For instance, if the compliance department only
APER 4.6.14GRP
Although an approved person performing a significant influence function may delegate the resolution of an issue, or authority for dealing with a part of the business, he cannot delegate responsibility for it. It is his responsibility to ensure that he receives reports on progress and questions those reports where appropriate. For instance, if progress appears to be slow or if the issue is not being resolved satisfactorily, then the approved person performing a significant influence
COBS 19.5.2RRP
(1) Subject to COBS 19.5.3 R, a firm must establish an IGC. (2) This rule does not apply to a firm ('Firm A') if another firm in Firm A's group has made arrangements under this section for an IGC to cover relevant schemes operated by Firm A.
COBS 19.5.4GRP
(1) Firms with large or complex relevant schemes should establish an IGC. For the purposes of this section, a firm may determine whether it has large relevant schemes by reference to:(a) the number of relevant policyholders in relevant schemes; (b) the funds under management in relevant schemes; and(c) the number of employers contributing to relevant schemes.(2) Examples of features that might indicate complex schemes include: (a) schemes that are operated on multiple information
COBS 19.5.5RRP
A firm must include, as a minimum, the following requirements in its terms of reference for an IGC:(1) the IGC will act solely in the interests of relevant policyholders;(2) the IGC will assess the ongoing value for money for relevant policyholders delivered by relevant schemes particularly, though not exclusively, through assessing:(a) whether default investment strategies within those schemes:(i) are designed and executed in the interests of relevant policyholders;(ii) have
COBS 19.5.6GRP
(1) An IGC is expected to act in the interests of relevant policyholders both individually and collectively. Where there is the potential for conflict between individual and collective interests, the IGC should manage this conflict effectively. An IGC is not expected to deal directly with complaints from individual policyholders. (2) The primary focus of an IGC should be the interests of relevant policyholders. Should a firm ask an IGC to consider the interests of other members,
COBS 19.5.7RRP
A firm must:(1) take reasonable steps to ensure that the IGC acts and continues to act in accordance with its terms of reference;(2) take reasonable steps to provide the IGC with all information reasonably requested by the IGC for the purposes of carrying out its role;(3) provide the IGC with sufficient resources as are reasonably necessary to allow it to carry out its role independently;(4) have arrangements to ensure that the views of relevant policyholders can be directly represented
COBS 19.5.8GRP
(1) A firm should consider allocating responsibility for the management of the relationship between the firm and its IGC to a person at the firm holding an FCAsignificant-influence function.(2) A firm should fund independent advice for the IGC if this is necessary and proportionate.(3) A firm should not unreasonably withhold from the IGC information that would enable the IGC to carry out a comprehensive assessment of value for money. (4) A firm should have arrangements for sharing
COBS 19.5.9RRP
(1) A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that the IGC has sufficient collective expertise and experience to be able to make judgements on the value for money of relevant schemes.(2) A firm must recruit independent IGC members through an open and transparent recruitment process.(3) A firm must appoint members to the IGC so that:(a) the IGC consists of at least five members, including an independent Chair and a majority of independent members; (b) IGC members are bound by
SYSC 4.2.1RRP
The senior personnel of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM,5 or of the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1must be of sufficiently good repute and sufficiently experienced as to ensure the sound and prudent management of the firm.[Note: article 9(1) of MiFID, article 7(1)(b) of the UCITS Directive3 article 8(1)(c) of AIFMD5, article 11(1) second paragraph of the Banking Consolidation Directive and article 13(1) of the CRD4]
SYSC 4.2.2RRP
A common platform firm, a management company, a full-scope UK AIFM53 and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1must ensure that its management is undertaken by at least two persons meeting the requirements laid down in SYSC 4.2.1 R and, for a full-scope UK AIFM, SYSC 4.2.7 R5.[Note: article 9(4) first paragraph of MiFID, article 7(1)(b) of the UCITS Directive3, article 8(1)(c) of AIFMD5and article 13(1) of CRD]66
SYSC 4.2.4GRP
At least two independent minds should be applied to the formulation and implementation of the policies of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1. Where a firm1 nominates just two individuals to direct its business, the appropriate regulator will not regard them as both effectively directing the business where one of them makes some, albeit significant, decisions relating to only a few aspects of the business.
SYSC 4.2.5GRP
Where there are more than two individuals directing the business of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 or the UK branch of a non-EEA bank,1 the appropriate regulator does not regard it as necessary for all of these individuals to be involved in all decisions relating to the determination of strategy and general direction. However, at least two individuals should be involved in all such decisions. Both individuals' judgement should be engaged
SYSC 4.2.6RRP
If a common platform firm, (other than a credit institution or AIFM investment firm5) or the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1, is:1(1) a natural person; or(2) a legal person managed by a single natural person; it must have alternative arrangements in place which ensure sound and prudent management of the firm.[Note: article 9(4) second paragraph of MiFID]
DTR 4.1.8RRP
The management report must contain:(1) a fair review of the issuer's business; and(2) a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the issuer.
DTR 4.1.10GRP
In DTR 4.1.9 R (2), key performance indicators are factors by reference to which the development, performance or position of the issuer's business can be measured effectively.
DTR 4.1.11RRP
The management report required by DTR 4.1.8 R must also give an indication of:(1) any important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year;(2) the issuer's likely future development;(3) activities in the field of research and development;(4) the information concerning acquisitions of own shares prescribed by Article 22 (2) of Directive 77/91/EEC;(5) the existence of branches of the issuer; and(6) in relation to the issuer's use of financial instruments and where
DTR 4.1.12RRP
(1) Responsibility statements must be made by the persons responsible within the issuer.(2) The name and function of any person who makes a responsibility statement must be clearly indicated in the responsibility statement.(3) For each person making a responsibility statement, the statement must set out that to the best of his or her knowledge:(a) the financial statements, prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accounting standards, give a true and fair view of the
LR 9.2.2ARRP
9(1) 9A listed company must carry on an independent business as its main activity at all times.(2) 9Where a listed company has a controlling shareholder, it must have in place at all times: (a) a written and legally binding agreement which is intended to ensure that the controlling shareholder complies with the independence provisions set out in LR 6.1.4D R; and(b) a constitution that allows the election and re-election of independent directors to be conducted in accordance with
REC 4.2.2GRP
UK recognised bodies are likely to develop and adapt their businesses in response to customer demand and new market opportunities. Where such developments involve changes to the way the UK recognised body operates, they are likely to involve changes to the way it satisfies the1 recognised body requirements.22
REC 4.2.3GRP
The FCA3 expects a UK recognised body to take its own steps to assure itself that it will continue to satisfy the1 recognised body requirements2 when considering any changes to its business or operations. 3
REC 3.24.1RRP
1When a UK RIE becomes aware of a transfer of ownership of the UK RIE which gives rise to a change in the persons who are in a position to exercise significant influence over the management of the UK RIE or (in the case of a UK RIE that is also an RAP) over the management of the RAP,2 whether directly or indirectly, it must immediately notify the FCA3of that event, and: 3(1) give the name of the person(s) concerned; and(2) give details of the transfer.[Note: Article 38(2)(b) of
REC 3.24.2GRP
The FCA3may regard a person who falls within any of the cases in section 301(B)(2) of the Act as being in a position to exercise significant influence. 3
SYSC 2.1.1RRP
A firm must take reasonable care to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities among its directors and senior managers in such a way that:(1) it is clear who has which of those responsibilities; and(2) the business and affairs of the firm can be adequately monitored and controlled by the directors, relevant senior managers and governing body of the firm.
SYSC 2.1.4RRP

Allocation of functions

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.3 R

1: Firm type

2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):

3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:

(1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)

(1) the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and(2) senior managers

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of:

(a) the group; or(b) a group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall

(2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the function in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2) must be allocated)

(not applicable)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior managers

(3) Any other firm

the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior manager's

Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.
SYSC 2.1.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10A.7.1 R15) and an application must be made under section 59 of the Act for approval of the individual before the function is performed. There are exceptions from this inSUP 10A.115 (Approved persons - Application).

15155

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The appropriate regulator considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the appropriate regulator would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.7 R)6. Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10 R6 does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

66

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R6and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8 R6restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the appropriate regulator, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2 G3). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.1

663

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The appropriate regulator envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code7 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,10 non-executive directors to be responsible responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness10 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor.10 That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1).

7

15

What about electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?4

4

SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1

4
SYSC 4.1.1RRP
3(1) A firm must have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing systems.8(2) [deleted]1313[Note: article 74
SYSC 4.1.2CRRP
10A management company, a full-scope UK AIFM and an incoming EEA AIFMbranch14 must have, and employ effectively, the resources and procedures that are necessary for the proper performance of its business activities.[Note: articles 12(1)(a) and 14(1)(c) of the UCITS Directive and article 12(1)(c) of AIFMD14]
SYSC 4.1.8DGRP
16When designing its arrangements, a firm should take into account insolvency law to ensure that the insolvency of the firm does not prejudice the operation of arrangements that the firm has put in place.
MAR 8.2.1RRP
A benchmark submitter must establish and maintain adequate and effective organisational and governance arrangements for the process of making benchmark submissions.
MAR 8.2.7RRP
A benchmark submitter must maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to enable it to identify and manage any conflicts of interest that may arise from the process of making benchmark submissions.
SYSC 1.2.1GRP
The purposes of SYSC are:(1) to encourage firms' directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for their firms' arrangements on matters likely to be of interest to the appropriate regulator because they impinge on the appropriate regulator's functions under the Act;(2) to increase certainty by amplifying Principle 3, under which a firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management
MAR 8.3.1RRP
A benchmark administrator must establish and maintain effective organisational and governance arrangements to enable it to carry out the activity of administering a specified benchmark.
MAR 8.3.3RRP
A benchmark administrator must maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to enable it to identify and manage any conflicts of interest that may arise from the process of administering a specified benchmark.
SYSC 8.1.7RRP
A common platform firm must exercise due skill and care and diligence when entering into, managing or terminating any arrangement for the outsourcing to a service provider of critical or important operational functions or of any relevant services and activities.[Note: article 14(2) first paragraph of the MiFID implementing Directive]
SYSC 8.1.12GRP
As SUP 15.3.8 G explains, a firm should notify the appropriate regulator when it intends to rely on a third party for the performance of operational functions which are critical or important for the performance of relevant services and activities on a continuous and satisfactory basis.[Note: recital 20 of theMiFID implementing Directive]2
BIPRU 12.4.8ERP
(1) A firm should ensure that the results of its stress tests are:(a) reviewed by its senior managers;(b) reported to that firm'sgoverning body, specifically highlighting any vulnerabilities identified and proposing appropriate remedial action;(c) reflected in the processes, strategies and systems established in accordance with BIPRU 12.3.4R;(d) used to develop effective contingency funding plans;(e) integrated into that firm's business planning process and day-to-day risk management;
BIPRU 12.4.15GRP
A firm should ensure that its contingency funding plan takes into account the terms and conditions of any central bank liquidity facilities to which it has access, including both facilities that form part of normal liquidity management operations and emergency liquidity assistance on a secured basis. Where a firm includes in its contingency funding plan the use of central bank liquidity facilities it should consider the nature of those facilities, collateral eligibility, haircuts
REC 2.3.15GRP
4For the purposes of calculating the risk-based approach, the FCA5 would normally expect the UK RIE to provide the FCA5 with an annual financial risk assessment that identifies the risks to its business. As a financial risk assessment is likely to form an integral part of the UK RIE's management process and decision-making culture, the FCA5 would normally expect it to be approved by the UK RIE'sgoverning body.555
REC 2.3.20GRP
4The FCA5 would expect to consider the financial risk assessment, any proposal with respect to an operational risk buffer and, if applicable, the consolidated balance sheet, in formulating its guidance on the amount of eligible financial resources it considers to be sufficient for the UK RIE to hold in order to meet the recognition requirements. In formulating its guidance, the FCA5 would, where relevant, consider whether or not the financial risk assessment makes adequate provision
SYSC 12.1.11RRP
Where this section applies with respect to a financial conglomerate, the risk management processes referred to in SYSC 12.1.8R (2) must include:(1) sound governance and management processes, which must include the approval and periodic review by the appropriate managing bodies within the financial conglomerate of the strategies and policies of the financial conglomerate in respect of all the risks assumed by the financial conglomerate, such review and approval being carried out
SYSC 12.1.20GRP
In some cases the management of the systems and controls used to address the risks described in SYSC 12.1.8R (1) may be organised on a group-wide basis. If the firm is not carrying out those functions itself, it should delegate them to the group members that are carrying them out. However, this does not relieve the firm of responsibility for complying with its obligations under SYSC 12.1.8R (1). A firm cannot absolve itself of such a responsibility by claiming that any breach
BIPRU 7.10.49RRP
As techniques and best practices evolve, a firm must avail itself of these advances.
BIPRU 7.10.81GRP
In assessing whether the VaR model is implemented with integrity as described in BIPRU 7.10.58R (Stress testing), the appropriate regulator will consider in particular the information technology systems used to run the model and associated calculations. The assessment may include:(1) feeder systems; risk aggregation systems; time series databases; the VaR model system; stress testing system; the backtesting system including profit and loss cleaning systems where appropriate; data
COLL 5.2.27RRP
(1) An ICVC must not acquire transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of that body corporate if:(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held by the ICVC gives the ICVC power to influence significantly the conduct of business of that body corporate; or(b) the acquisition gives the ICVC that power.(2) For the purpose of (1), an ICVC is to
COLL 5.2.28RRP
(1) An authorised fund manager17 must not acquire, or cause to be acquired for an AUT or ACS17 of which it is the authorised fund manager17, transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of the body corporate if:1717(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held for that AUT or ACS17, taken together with any such securities already held for other
SUP 12.7.2GRP
A firm's notice under SUP 12.7.1 R should give details of the appointed representative and the regulated activities which the firm is, or intends to, carry on through the appointed representative, including:(1) the name of the firm's new appointed representative (if the appointed representative is a body corporate, this is its registered name);(2) any trading name under which the firm's new appointed representative carries on a regulated activity in that capacity;(3) a description