Related provisions for IFPRU 2.2.58
1 - 20 of 34 items.
A firm must have in place sound, effective and comprehensive strategies, processes and systems:(1) to assess and maintain, on an ongoing basis, the amounts, types and distribution of financial resources, own funds and internal capital that it considers adequate to cover:(a) the nature and level of the risks to which it is, or might be, exposed;(b) the risk in the overall financial adequacy rule;(c) the risk that the firm might not be able to meet the obligations in Part Three
A firm must address and control, by means which include written policies and procedures, the concentration risk arising from:(1) exposures to each counterparty, including central counterparties, groups of connected counterparties and counterparties in the same economic sector, geographic region or from the same activity or commodity;(2) the application of credit risk mitigation techniques; and(3) risks associated with large indirect credit exposures, such as a single collateral
A firm must evaluate and address through appropriate policies and procedures the risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which a firm is investor, originator or sponsor, including reputational risks, to ensure, in particular, that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in risk assessment and management decisions.[Note: article 82(1) of CRD]
(1) A firm's financial resources and internal capital must be adequate for material market risk that are not subject to an own funds requirement under Part Three of the EUCRR (Capital Requirements).(2) A firm which has, in calculating own funds requirements for position risk in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 of the EU CRR (Own funds requirements for position risk), netted off its positions in one or more of the equities constituting a stock-index against one
(1) As part of its obligations under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm must carry out an evaluation of its exposure to the interest-rate risk arising from its non-trading activities.(2) The evaluation under (1) must cover the effect of a sudden and unexpected parallel change in interest rates of 200 basis points in both directions.(3) A firm must immediately notify the FCA if any evaluation under this rule suggests that, as a result of the change in interest rates described in
(1) A firm must have policies and procedures in place for the identification, management and monitoring of the risk of excessive leverage.(2) Those policies and procedures must include, as an indicator for the risk of excessive leverage, the leverage ratio determined in accordance with article 429 of the EU CRR (Calculation of the leverage ratio) and mismatches between assets and obligations.[Note: article 87(1) of CRD]
A firm must address the risk of excessive leverage in a precautionary manner by taking due account of potential increases in that risk caused by reductions of the firm'sown funds through expected or realised losses, depending on the applicable accounting rules. To that end, a firm must be able to withstand a range of different stress events with respect to the risk of excessive leverage.[Note: article 87(2) of CRD]
(1) As part of its obligation under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm that is a significant IFPRU firm must:(a) for the major sources of risk identified in line with IFPRU 2.2.7R(2), carry out stress tests and scenario analyses that are appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of those major sources of risk and to the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business; and(b) carry out the reverse stress testing under SYSC 20 (Reverse stress testing).(2) In carrying out
Where a firm is a member of a FCA consolidation group or a non-EEA sub-group, the firm must ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at those levels comply with the obligations set out in the risk control rules on a consolidated basis (or a sub-consolidated basis).[Note: article 109(2) of CRD]
SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member, comply with the obligations in this section on a consolidated basis (or sub-consolidated basis).
(1) A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) A firm in (1) must ensure that:(a) the remuneration committee is constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgement on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity;(b) the chairman and the members of the remuneration
A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19D.3.12R or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note: article 92(2)(f) of CRD]
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including (when appropriate) establishing limits to the remuneration of members of its management body; and(2) no
(1) A firm must ensure that any measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components: (a) includes adjustments for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost and quantity of the capital and the liquidity required; and (b) takes into account the need for consistency with the timing and likelihood of the firm receiving potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings. (2)
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the appropriate regulator's view, the requirement to apply this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels (as provided for in SYSC 19A.3.1
(1) A 3CRRfirm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must
A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19A.3.12 R, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note:3article 92(2)(f) of CRD]3
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of3members of its management body; and3(3) no
The management body13 of a common platform firm must approve and periodically review the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the firm is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle.[Note: 13article 76(1) of CRD]1313
(1) 13The management body of a CRR firm has overall responsibility for risk management. It must devote sufficient time to the consideration of risk issues.(2) The management body of a CRR firm must be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in the rules implementing the CRD and in the EU CRR as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external ratings and internal models related to those risks.
(1) 13A CRR firm must ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk profile of the firm and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice.(2) The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee must determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the
13In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee must, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings.[Note: article 76(4) of CRD]
(1) 13A CRR firm's risk management function (SYSC 7.1.6 R) must be independent from the operational functions and have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body.(2) The risk management function must ensure that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. It must be actively involved in elaborating the firm's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and it must be able to deliver a complete view of the whole
13The head of the risk management function must be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the CRR firm do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the firm may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest. The head of the risk management function must not be removed without prior approval of the management body and must
A firm may calculate the risk capital requirement for an institution in the firm'sUK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group that is an EEA firm in accordance with the CRD implementation measures in the EEA firm'sEEA State that correspond to the appropriate regulator'srules that would otherwise apply under this section if the institution is subject to those CRD implementation measures.
(1) This rule applies if:(a) a firm is applying an accounting consolidation approach to part of its UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group under method three as described in BIPRU 8.7.13R (4)(a); and(b) the part of the group in (a) constitutes the whole of a group subject to the consolidated capital requirements of a competent authority under the CRD implementation measures relating to consolidation under the Banking Consolidation Directive or the Capital Adequacy Directive.(2)
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the 3CRD which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices on
A firm must develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies must include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk.22[Note: article 86(4) of the CRD]4
(1) To calculate the weighted average in IFPRU 10.3.1 R, a firm must apply to each applicable countercyclical buffer rate its total own funds requirements for credit risk, specific risk, incremental default and migration risk that relates to the relevant credit exposures in the jurisdiction in question, divided by its total own funds requirements for credit risk that relates to all of its relevant credit exposures.(2) For the purposes of (1), a firm must calculate its total own
In complying with CASS 7.13.8 R and CASS 7.13.10 R, a firm should consider, as appropriate, together with any other relevant matters:(1) the capital of the CRD credit institution or bank;(2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the CRD credit institution or bank's capital and deposits, and, in the case of a qualifying money market fund, compared to any limit the fund may place on the volume of redemptions in any period;(3) the extent to which client money that
(1) The aim of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the CRD which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published Guidelines
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, paragraph 3
2(1) |
The [UK RIE] must ensure that the systems and controls used in the performance of its [relevant functions] are adequate, and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business. |
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(2) |
Sub-paragraph (1) applies in particular to systems and controls concerning - |
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(a) |
the transmission of information; |
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(b) |
the assessment, mitigation and management of risks to the performance of the [UK RIE'srelevant functions]; |
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(c) |
the effecting and monitoring of transactions on the [UK RIE]; |
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(ca) |
the technical operation of the [UK RIE], including contingency arrangements for disruption to its facilities; |
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(d) |
the operation of the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 4(2)(d); and |
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(e) |
(where relevant) the safeguarding and administration of assets belonging to users of the [UK RIE's] facilities. |
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