Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4
121 - 140 of 832 items.
A UK firm other than a UK pure reinsurer9cannot establish a branch in another EEA State for the first time under an EEA right unless the relevant13 conditions in paragraphs 19(2), (4) and (5)12 of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act are satisfied. It is an offence for a UK firm which is not an authorised person to contravene this prohibition (paragraph 21 of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act). These conditions are that:13121213(1) the UKfirm has given the appropriate UK regulator,20
4If the UK firm is passporting under the Insurance Mediation Directive and the EEA State in which the UK firm is seeking to establish a branch has not notified the European Commission of its wish to be informed of the intention of persons to establish a branch in its territory in accordance with article 6(2) of that directive, SUP 13.3.2 G (2) and SUP 13.3.2 G (3) do not apply. Accordingly, the UK firm may establish the branch to which its notice of intention8 relates as soon
4An exempt professional firm which is included in the record of unauthorised persons carrying on insurance mediation activity maintained by the FCA20 under article 93 of the Regulated Activities Order may establish a branch in another EEA State under the Insurance Mediation Directive (see PROF 7.2).20
(1) 8If the UK firm'sEEA right derives from the CRD12 or10MiFID8,10 the appropriate UK regulator20 will give the Host State regulator a consent notice within three months unless it has reason to doubt the adequacy of a UK firm's resources or its administrative structure.8 The Host State regulator then has a further two months to notify the applicable provisions (if any) and prepare for the supervision, as appropriate, of the UK firm, or in the case of a MiFID investment firm,
20Where the PRA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the FCA before deciding whether to give a consent notice, except where paragraph 19(7A) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act applies. Where the FCA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the PRA before deciding whether to give a consent notice in relation to a UK firm whose immediate group includes a PRA-authorised person.
(1) If the appropriate UK regulator20 gives a consent notice, it will inform the UK firm in writing that it has done so.20(2) The consent notice will contain, among other matters, the requisite details or, 8if the firm is passporting under the Insurance Directives, the relevant EEA details8 (see SUP 13 Annex 18) provided by the UK firm in its notice of intention8 (see SUP 13.5 (Notices of intention)).8888(3) 10Where a consent notice is given under the UCITS Directive, the FCA20
1Section 301A(1) of chapter3 1A of Part XVIII of the Act places an obligation on a person who decides to acquire or increase control (see sections 301D and 301E of the Act) over a UK RIE3to notify the FCA5, before making the acquisition3. Furthermore, those persons are required to obtain the FCA's5 approval before acquiring control 3or increasing the level of control held.3353533
The FCA5 will approve an acquisition or an increase in 3control if it is satisfied that the acquisition by the person seeking approval does not pose a threat to the sound and prudent management of any financial market operated by the UK RIE (see section 301F(4) of the Act). 4The reference to any financial market is to be read as including a reference to any auction platform as a result of the RAP regulations.35333
1The FCA is required by article 23 of the short selling regulation to consider whether
to impose measures to prohibit or restrict short selling or otherwise limit
transactions in a financial instrument on
a trading venue where the price
of that financial instrument on
that trading venue has fallen
significantly during a single trading day in
relation to the closing price on that venue on the previous trading
day. In fulfilling this obligation, the FCA will assess:(1) whether the
The FCA will assess whether the price fall
in a financial instrument on
a trading venue is or may become
disorderly having regard to at least the following factors:(1) whether there have been violent
movements in the price of the particular financial
instrument on a particular trading
venue, including any sudden or significant movements in price
of a financial instrument during
the trading day;(2) whether there is evidence of unusual
or improper trading in the financial instrument
The FCA will consider at least the following
factors when assessing whether measures to prohibit or restrict short selling
or otherwise limit transactions are necessary or likely to prevent a further
disorderly decline in the price of the financial
instrument:(1) the volume of trading in that financial instrument on the trading venue as compared with the total
trading volume in the financial instrument over
at least that trading day;
and(2) whether the price of the financial instrument
Where the FCA imposes measures under article
23 of the short selling regulation it
will normally specify that the measures will not apply to natural or legal
persons who have satisfied the criteria to use the market
maker exemption or the authorised
primary dealer exemption and who are included on the list maintained
and published by ESMA pursuant
to article 17(13) of the short selling regulation.
(1) For the purposes of article 23(1)(b)
of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 the FCA will convert the figure of EUR
0.50 into pounds sterling using the daily spot foreign exchange rate of Sterling
to Euro of the Bank of England applicable at the end of the first business day of October 2012 rounded up to
the nearest £0.01. The FCA will state this figure (the 'sterling
figure') on its public website.(2) The rate will be calculated on
the same basis at the end of
The FCA will treat the FTSE 100 index as
the main national equity index of the Member State for the purposes of article
6(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 827/2012 and article 4
of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 826/2012 and article 23(1) of Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012, all subject to approval by European
Parliament and Council.
(1) 1The FCA's3 approach to determining penalties described in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5C is intended to ensure that financial penalties are proportionate to the breach. The FCA3 recognises that penalties may affect persons differently, and that the FCA3 should consider whether a reduction in the proposed penalty is appropriate if the penalty would cause the subject of enforcement action serious financial hardship.333(2) Where an individual or firm claims that payment of the penalty
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FCA3 will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FCA's3 starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FCA3 believes
In cases against individuals, including market abuse cases, the FCA3 may make a prohibition order under section 56 of the Act or withdraw an individual’s approval under section 63 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 reflects the FCA's3 assessment of the individual’s fitness to perform regulated activity or suitability for a particular role, and does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach.
(1) The FCA3 will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FCA3 will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FCA3 will also take into account its statutory objectives3, for example in situations where
2The FCA3 may withdraw a firm’s authorisation under section 33 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach. However, the fact that the FCA3 has withdrawn a firm’s authorisation, as a result of which the firm may have less earning potential, may be relevant in assessing whether the penalty will cause the firm serious financial hardship.3333
Where the FCA3 considers that, following commencement of an FCA3 investigation, an individual or firm has reduced their solvency in order to reduce the amount of any disgorgement or financial penalty payable, for example by transferring assets to third parties, the FCA3 will normally take account of those assets when determining whether the individual or firm would suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the disgorgement and financial penalty.333
A UK firm, other than a UK pure reinsurer or an AIFM exercising an EEA right to market an AIF under AIFMD13,9 cannot start providing cross border services into another EEA State under an EEA right unless it satisfies the conditions in paragraphs 20(1) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act and, if it derives its EEA right from the Insurance Directives, AIFMD, MiFID or the UCITS Directive,13paragraph 20(4B) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act. It is an offence for a UK firm which
4An exempt professional firm which is included in the record of unauthorised persons carrying on insurance mediation activity maintained by the FCA20 under article 93 of the Regulated Activities Order may provide cross border services in another EEA State under the Insurance Mediation Directive (see PROF 7.2).20
14A UKfirm that is an AIFM may exercise an EEA right to market a UK AIF or EEA AIF managed by it under AIFMD when the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the UKfirm has given the FCA a notice of intentionSUP 13.5.2 R; and(2) the FCA has sent a copy of the notice of intention to the Host State regulator where the AIF will be marketed and has given the UKfirm written notice that it has done so.
8(1) If8 the UK firm'sEEA right derives from MiFID8, theCRD12 or the UCITS Directive, paragraph 20(3) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the appropriate UK regulator20 to send a copy of the notice of intention8 to the Host State Regulator within one month8 of receipt.8A UK firm passporting under the CRD10 may start providing cross border services as soon as it satisfies the relevant conditions (see SUP 13.4.2 G).88812208881012(2) (a) If8 the UK firm'sEEA right derives
(1) 14If the UKfirm'sEEA right derives from AIFMD (other than the EEA right to market an AIF (referred to in (3)) and the condition in (2) is met, paragraph 20(3D) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the FCA to:(a) send a copy of the notice of intention to the Host State regulator within one month of receipt; (b) include confirmation that the UKfirm has been authorised by the FCA under AIFMD; and(c) immediately inform the UKfirm that the notice of intention and confirmation
20Where the PRA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the FCA before deciding whether to give a consent notice and where the FCA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the PRA before deciding whether to give a consent notice in relation to a UK firm whose immediate group includes a PRA-authorised person.
The periodic fee referred to in FEES 4.3.1 R is (except in relation to the Society,10fee-paying payment service providers and fee-paying electronic money issuers)107 calculated as follows:(1) identify each of the tariffs set out in Part 1 of FEES 4 Annex 2AR and Part 1 of FEES 4 Annex 2BR2727 which apply to the business of the firm for the period specified in that annex;(2) for each of the applicable27 tariffs, calculate the sum payable in relation to the business of the firm
(1) A firm which becomes authorised or registered 7during the course of a fee year26 will be required to pay a proportion of the periodic fee which reflects the proportion of the year for which it will have a permission or the right to provide particular payment services or the right to issue electronic money107- see FEES 4.2.5 G and FEES 4.2.6 R.26(2) Similarly a firm which extends its permission or its right to provide particular payment services7so that its business then falls
(1) Subject to FEES TP 8, if27 the firm's, designated professional body's, recognised investment exchange's, 12or regulated covered bondissuer's11periodic fee for the previous fee year27 was at least £50,000, it11 must pay the FCA:27272711(a) an amount equal to 50% of the FCA27 periodic fee payable for the previous fee year, by 30 April or, if later, within 30 days of the date of the invoice, in the fee year27 to which the sum due under FEES 4.2.1 R relates; and 27(b) the balance
A firm which is a member of a group may pay all of the amounts due from other firms in the same group under FEES 4.2.1 R, if:(1) it notifies the FCA (in its own capacity and, if applicable, in its capacity as agent for the PRA)26 in writing of the name of each other firm within the group for which it will pay; and26(2) it pays the fees, in accordance with this chapter, as a single amount as if that were the amount required from the firm under FEES 4.2.1 R.
If the payment made does not satisfy in full the periodic fees payable by all of the members of the group notified to the FCA26 under FEES 4.3.7 R, the FCA (in its own capacity and, if applicable, in its capacity as agent for the PRA)26 will apply the sum received among the firms which have been identified in the notification given under FEES 4.3.7R (1) in proportion to the amounts due from them. Each firm will remain responsible for the payment of the outstanding balance attributable
The appropriate regulator recognises that its responsibilities in respect of an incoming EEA firm,7 an incoming Treaty firm, an EEA authorised payment institution7 or an EEA authorised electronic money institution10 are reduced compared with a firm which is incorporated in the United Kingdom. Accordingly the periodic fees which would otherwise be applicable to incoming EEA firms,7incoming Treaty firms,10EEA authorised payment institutions7 and EEA authorised electronic money institutions10
(1) If:(a) a firm makes an application to vary its permission (by reducing its scope), or cancel it, in the way set out in SUP 6.3.15 D (3) (Variation of permission) and SUP 6.4.5 D (Cancellation of permission), or applies to vary (by reducing its scope) or cancel its authorisation or registration (regulation 8 and 10(1) of the Payment Services Regulations including as applied by regulation 14 of the Payment Services Regulations) or applies to cancel its authorisation or registration
Where a firm has applied to cancel its Part 4A permission, or its authorisation or registration under the Payment Services Regulations7or the Electronic Money Regulations, 10 or the appropriate regulator has exercised its own-initiative powers to cancel a firm's7Part 4A permission or the appropriate regulator has exercised its powers under regulation 10 (Cancellation of authorisation), including as applied by regulation 14 (Supplementary provisions) of the Payment Services Regulations
618(1) Unless (2) applies, twice a year a firm must provide the FCA with a complete report concerning complaints received from eligible complainants.618(2) If a firm has permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activities or operating an electronic system in relation to lending8 and has revenue arising from
credit-related regulated activities8
those activities8 that is less than or equal to £5,000,000 a year, the firm must provide the FCA with a complete report concerning
618A firm with only a limited permission to whom DISP 1.10.1R (1) and DISP 1.10.1R (2) do not apply is required to submit information to the FCA about the number of complaints it has received in relation to credit-related activities under the reporting requirements in SUP 16.12 (see, in particular, data item CCR007 in SUP 16.12.29C R). A firm with limited permission to whom DISP 1.10.1R (1) and DISP 1.10.1R (2) do not apply is also subject to the complaints data publication rules
1Firms that are part of a group may submit a joint report to the
FCA
. The joint report must contain the information required from all firms concerned and clearly indicate the firms on whose behalf the report is submitted. The requirement to provide a report, and the responsibility for the report, remains with each firm in the group.
(1) 4Twice a year a firm must provide the
FCA
with a complete report concerning complaints received from eligible complainants about matters relating to activities7 carried out by its employees when acting as7retail investment advisers. The report must be set out in the format in DISP 1 Annex 1C R. 7(2) DISP 1 Annex 1C R requires (for the relevant reporting period) information about:(a) the total number of complaints received by the firm about matters relating toactivities7 carried
For the purpose of inclusion in the public record maintained by the FCA, a firm must:(1) provide the FCA, at the time of its authorisation, with details of a single contact point within the firm for complainants; and(2) notify the
FCA
of any subsequent change in those details when convenient and, at the latest, in the firm's next report under the complaints reporting rules.
12This Code of Practice for Approved Persons is
issued under section 64 of the Act (Conduct:
statements and codes) for the purpose of helping to determine whether or not
an approved person's conduct
complies with a Statement of Principle.
The code sets out descriptions of conduct which, in the FCA's opinion,
do not comply with the relevant Statements
of Principle. The code also sets out certain factors which,
in the opinion of the FCA,
are to be taken into account in determining
The
significance of conduct identified in the Code
of Practice for Approved Persons as tending to establish compliance
with or a breach of a Statement of Principle will
be assessed only after all the circumstances of a particular case have been
considered. Account will be taken of the context in which a course of conduct
was undertaken, including the precise circumstances of the individual case,
the characteristics of the particular accountable
function12 and the behaviour to
The Code of Practice for Approved Persons (and
in particular the specific examples of behaviour which may be in breach of
a generic description of conduct in the code) is not exhaustive of the kind
of conduct that may contravene the Statements
of Principle. The purpose of the code is to help determine whether
or not a person's conduct complies
with a Statement of Principle.
The code may be supplemented from time to time. The appropriate
regulator12 will amend the code if there
12In
applying Statements of Principle 5
to 7, the nature, scale and complexity of the business under management and
the role and responsibility of the individual performing an accountable higher management function within the firm will
be relevant in assessing whether an approved
person's conduct was reasonable. For example, the smaller and
less complex the business, the less detailed and extensive the systems of
control need to be. The FCA will
be of the opinion that an individual
UK domestic firmslisted on
the London Stock Exchange are subject to the UK
Corporate Governance Code4, whose internal
control provisions are amplified in the publication entitled "Internal Control: Revised Guidance
for Directors on the Combined Code (October 2005)" 4issued by the Financial Reporting Council4. Firms regulated
by the appropriate regulator12 in this category will thus be subject
to that code as well as to the requirements and standards of the regulatory system.
The FCA may modify LR 2.2.4 R to allow partly paid securities to be listed if
it is satisfied that their transferability is not restricted and investors
have been provided with appropriate information to enable dealings in the securities to take place on an open and
proper basis. [Note: articles 46 and 54 CARD]
(1) This rule applies
if under the Act or under the
law of another EEA State:(a) a prospectus must
be approved and published for the securities;
or(b) the applicant is
permitted and elects to draw up a prospectus for
the securities.(2) To be listed:(a) a prospectus must
have been approved by the FCA and published in relation to the securities; or(b) if another EEA
State is the Home Member State for
the securities, the relevant
competent authority must have supplied the FCA with:(i)
24Under section 55H(3) of the Act (Variation by FCA at request of authorised person), if an FCA-authorised person applies to the FCA, the FCA may cancel its Part 4A permission. Cancellation applies to a firm's entire Part 4A permission, that is to every activity and every specified investment and not to the individual elements such as specified investments. Changes to the individual elements of a permission would require a variation.
(1) Subject to (1A), a 11firm other than a credit union wishing to cancel its Part 4A permission, must apply online at the appropriate regulator website using the form specified on the ONA12 system.99112412(1A) An FCA-authorised person wishing to cancel its Part 4A permission which covers only credit-related regulated activities must submit any form, notice or application by using the form in SUP 6 Annex 6 and submitting it in the way set out in SUP 15.7.4 R to SUP 15.7.9 G
(1) In addition to applying for cancellation of Part 4A permission24 in accordance with SUP 6.4.5 D, a firm may discuss prospective cancellations with its supervisory contact at the appropriate regulator.244 Alternatively a firm can contact the Contact Centre on 0300 500 0597.1424424241414(2) To contact the Cancellations Team: 424(a) write to: Cancellations Team, The Financial Conduct24Authority, 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5HS; or24; or2424(b) email cancellation.team@fca.org.uk24(3)
(1) If a firm is subject to the complaints rules in DISP, the FCA24 may request confirmation from the firm that there are no unresolved, unsatisfied or undischarged complaints against the firm from a customer of the firm.24(2) If there are unresolved or undischarged complaints against a firm from a customer of the firm, the FCA24 may request confirmation, as appropriate, of the steps (if any) which have been taken under the firm's complaints procedures and the amount of compensation
Consequently, the relevant regulator24 considers that it will have good reason not to grant a firm's application for cancellation of permission where:24(1) the FCA and/or the PRA24 proposes to exercise any of the powers described in SUP 6.4.24 G; or24(2) the FCA and/or the PRA24 has already begun disciplinary and/or24 restitution proceedings against the firm by exercising either or both of these powers against the firm.24
6If a mixed financial holding company is subject to equivalent provisions under this Chapter and under EEA prudential sectoral legislation in relation to the insurance sector as implemented in the United Kingdom and the FCA is the coordinator, the FCA may, on application by the firm and after consulting other relevant competent authorities, disapply such provisions of the EEA prudential sectoral legislation as implemented in the United Kingdom with regard to that undertaking which
4GENPRU 3.1.29 R4 to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and GENPRU 3 Annex 1 implement the detailed capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Groups Directive. They only deal with a financial conglomerate for which the appropriate regulator is the coordinator. If another competent authority is coordinator of a financial conglomerate, those rules do not apply with respect to that financial conglomerate and instead that coordinator will be responsible for implementing those detailed require
Paragraph 5.7 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates) deals with a case in which there are no capital ties between entities in a financial conglomerate. In particular, the appropriate regulator, after consultation with the other relevant competent authorities and in accordance with Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive, will determine which proportional share of a solvency deficit in such an entity will have to be taken into account,
The5 Annex I method to be applied may be5 decided by the coordinator after consultation with the relevant competent authorities and the financial conglomerate itself. Where the appropriate regulator acts as coordinator, the financial conglomerate itself may choose which of Method 1 or Method 2 from Annex I it will apply, unless the firm is subject to a requirement obliging the firm to apply a particular method.555
5GENPRU 3.1.29 R applies to a firm with respect to the financial conglomerate of which it is a member if notification has been made in accordance with regulation 2 of the Financial Groups Directive Regulations that the financial conglomerate is a financial conglomerate and that the appropriate regulator is coordinator of that financial conglomerate.
If GENPRU 3.1.29 R (application of Method 1 or 2 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) applies to a firm with respect to the financial conglomerate of which it is a member, then with respect to the firm and the financial conglomerate:5(1) the definitions of conglomerate capital resources and conglomerate capital resources requirement that apply for the purposes of that rule are the ones from whichever of Part 1 or Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 the firm has indicated to
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the appropriate regulator may impose such obligations
(1) In accordance with Articles5 30 and 30a5 of the Financial Groups Directive (Asset management companies and Alternative investment fund managers5), this rule deals with the inclusion of an asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 that is a member of a financial conglomerate in the scope of regulation of financial conglomerates.55(2) An asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 is in the overall financial sector and is
The Companies Act 1989 also gives the FCA1 powers to supervise the taking of action under default rules. Under section 166 of the Companies Act 1989 (Powers of the appropriate regulator1 to give directions) (see REC 4.5.4 G), the FCA1 may direct a UK RIE1to take, or not to take, action under its default rules. Before exercising these powers the FCA1 must consult the UK RIE.1 The FCA1 may also exercise these powers if a relevant office-holder applies to it under section 167 of
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FCA1 may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules- if it appears to [the FCA] that it could take action, [the FCA may direct it to do so,1 1 |
|
but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and [the FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
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The FCA1 may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
|
Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FCA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FCA] may direct it not to do so.1 1 |
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but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and the [FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
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Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK RIE has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FCA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK RIE under its default rules. However,11(1) 1where the UK RIE is acting in accordance with a direction given by the FCA to take action under section 166(2)(a) of the Act on the basis that failure to take action would involve undue risk to
Where, in relation to a member (or designated non-member) of a UK RIE :1(1) a bankruptcy order; or(2) an award of sequestration of his estate; or(3) an order appointing an interim receiver of his property; or(4) an administration or winding-up order; or(5) a resolution for a voluntary winding-up; or(6) an order appointing a provisional liquidator; has been made or passed and the UK RIE1 has not taken action under its default rules as a result of this event or of the matters giving
The procedure is that the FCA1 must notify the UK recognised body of the application and, unless within three business days after receipt of that notice, the UK recognised body: 1(1) takes action under its default rules; or(2) notifies the FCA1 that it proposes to take action forthwith; or1(3) is directed to take action by the FCA1 under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989; 1the provisions of sections 158 to 165 of the Companies Act 1989 do not apply in relation to market
(1) 8The resources of A must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether A has appropriate resources include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by A;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, A; and(c) A’s membership of a group and any effect which that membership may have.(3) Except in a case
(1) The non-financial resources of B must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on, having regard to the operational objectives of the FCA.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by B;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, B;(c) B’s a member
8Paragraph 3C of Schedule 6 to the Act sets out the appropriate non-financial resources threshold condition which is relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in relation to firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, regulated activities which include a PRA-regulated activity.
8The guidance in COND 2.4 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2D of Schedule 6 of the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity under the Act, paragraph 3C of Schedule 6 of the Act.
(1) [deleted]88(2) In this context, the FCA will interpret the term 'appropriate88' as meaning sufficient in terms of quantity, quality and availability, and 'resources' as including all financial resources (though only in the case of firms not carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity)8, non-financial resources and means of managing its resources; for example, capital, provisions against liabilities, holdings of or access to cash and other liquid assets, human
(1) [deleted]88(2) Although8 it is the firm that is being assessed, the FCA8 may take into consideration the impact of other members of the firm's group on the adequacy of its resources8, where relevant to the discharge of the FCA's functions8. For example, in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, the FCA8 may assess the consolidated solvency of the group. The FCA's8 approach to the consolidated supervision of such
(1) [deleted]88(2) Relevant matters to which the FCA may have regard when assessing whether a firm will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, this threshold condition8may include but are not limited to:(a) (in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity),8 whether there are any indications that the firm may have difficulties if the application is granted, at the time of the grant or in the future, in complying with any of the
Where an ROIE1 includes in its report made under section 295(1) of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) a statement in compliance with section 295(2)(a) of the Act that an event has occurred in the period covered by that report which is likely to affect the FCA's1 assessment of whether it is satisfied as to the requirements set out in section 292(3) (Overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses), it must include particulars
An ROIE1 must include in the first report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act after the recognition order in relation to that ROIE1 is made: 11(1) particulars of any events of the kind described in section 295(2) of the Act which occurred; (2) particulars of any change specified in REC 6.7.4 R (1) or disciplinary action specified in REC 6.7.4 R (2) which occurred; and(3) any annual report and accounts which covered a period ending; after the application for recognition
Where an ROIE1 proposes to change: (1) its address in the United Kingdom for the service of notices or other documents required or authorised to be served on it under the Act; or(2) the address of its head office;it must give notice to the FCA1 and inform it of the new address at least 14 days before the change is effected.1
Where an ROIE1 has notice that any licence, permission or authorisation which it requires to conduct any regulated activity in its home territory has been or is about to be:1(1) revoked; or(2) modified in any way which would materially restrict the ROIE1 in performing any regulated activity in its home territory or in the United Kingdom;1it must immediately notify the FCA1 of that fact and must give the FCA1 the information specified for the purposes of this rule in REC 6.7.9
The relevant requirements in regulation 5(3) are that:(1) the incoming EEA firm has given a notice to the FCA12 (see SUP 14.4.1 G) and to its Home State regulator stating the details of the proposed change;12(2) if the change arises from circumstances beyond the incoming EEA firm's control, that firm has, as soon as practicable, given to the appropriate UK regulator12 and to its Home State regulator the notice in (1).112
The FCA expects that if a firm ordinarily assigns exposures in the corporate, institution or central government and central bank exposure classes to a member of a group, substantially on the basis of membership of that group and a common group rating, and the firm does so in the case of a particular obligor group, the firm should consider whether members of that group should be treated as a single obligor for the purpose of the definition of default in article 178(1) of the EU
The FCA would not expect a firm to treat an obligor as part of a single obligor under IFPRU 4.5.1 G if the firm rates its exposures on a standalone basis or if its rating is notched. (For these purposes, a rating is notched if it takes into account individual risk factors or otherwise reflects risk factors that are not applied on a common group basis.) Accordingly, if a group has two members which are separately rated, the FCA will not expect that the default of one will necessarily
Under article 178(1)(b)1 of the EU CRR, the FCA is empowered to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential or SME commercial real estate in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities (PSEs).1
The FCA would expect to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential real estate in the retail exposure class, and/or for exposures to PSEs,1 where this was requested by the firm. Where this occurred, it would be specified in the firm's IRB permission.
To be satisfied that a firm complies with the documentation requirements in article 175(3) of the EU CRR, the FCA expects a firm should have a clear and documented policy for determining whether an exposure that has been in default should subsequently be returned to performing status (see article 175(3) of the EU CRR).
Under section 61(1) of the Act (Determination of applications), the appropriate regulator may grant an application for approval made under section 60 (Applications for approval) only if it is satisfied that the candidate is fit and proper to perform the controlled function to which the application relates.
The Act does not prescribe the matters which the appropriate regulator should take into account when determining fitness and propriety. However, section 61(2) states that the appropriate regulator may have regard (among other things) to whether the candidate or approved person is competent to carry out a controlled function.
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
Energy market participants should bear in mind that3sections 138A and 138B of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FCA4 must be satisfied that:4344(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of any of the FCA's operational objectives.44
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers