Related provisions for GENPRU 2.2.12
41 - 60 of 167 items.
(1) A firm that does not meet the combined buffer must:(a) calculate the MDA in accordance with (4); and (b) report the MDA to the FCA in writing no later than five business days after the firm identified that it did not meet the combined buffer. (2) A firm that does not meet the combined buffer must not undertake any of the following actions before it has calculated the MDA:(a) make a distribution in connection with common equity tier 1 capital;(b) create an obligation to pay
(1) Business plan failure in the context of reverse stress testing should be understood as the point at which the market loses confidence in a firm and this results in the firm no longer being able to carry out its business activities. Examples of this would be the point at which all or a substantial portion of the firm's counterparties are unwilling to continue transacting with it or seek to terminate their contracts, or the point at which the firm's existing shareholders are
(1) The FSAappropriate regulator may request a firm to submit the design and results of its reverse stress tests and any subsequent updates as part of its ARROW risk assessment. (2) In the light of the results of a firm's reverse stress tests, the FSAappropriate regulator may require the firm to implement specific measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of business failure where that risk is not sufficiently mitigated by the measures adopted by the firm in accordance with SYSC
A firm must hold capital resources with respect to a free delivery, as set out in the Table in BIPRU 14.4.3 R, if:(1) it has paid for securities, foreign currencies or commodities before receiving them or it has delivered securitiesforeign currencies or commodities before receiving payment for them; and(2) in the case of cross-border transactions, one day or more has elapsed since it made that payment or delivery.[Note: CAD Annex II point 2]
Table: Capital treatment for free deliveries
This table belongs to BIPRU 14.4.2 R.
Transaction Type |
Up to first contractual payment leg or delivery leg |
From first contractual payment leg or delivery leg up to four days after second contractual payment leg or delivery leg |
From 5 business days post second contractual payment leg or delivery leg until extinction of the transaction |
No capital charge in the trading book |
Treat as an exposure |
Deduct value transferred plus current positive exposure from capital resources |
[Note: CAD Annex II Table 2]
If the Part 4A permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country banking and investment group of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country banking and investment group, with the rules in Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
The credit risk capital requirement3of a firm is 8% of the total of its risk weighted exposure amounts for exposures that:3(1) are on its balance sheet; and(2) derive from: (a) a loan entered into; or(b) a securitisation position originated; or(c) a fund3position entered into;3on or after 26 April 2014; and (3) have not been deducted from the firm'scapital resources under MIPRU 4.4.4 R or MIPRU 4.2BA;calculated in accordance with MIPRU 4.2A.
For the purposes of applying a risk weight, the exposure value must be multiplied by the risk weight determined in accordance with MIPRU 4.2A.10 R, MIPRU 4.2A.10A R, MIPRU 4.2A.10B R, 3MIPRU 4.2A.11 R, MIPRU 4.2A.12 R or 3MIPRU 4.2A.17 R, unless it is deducted from capital resources under MIPRU 4.4.4 R or MIPRU 4.2BA3.
A firm that is a member of a UK consolidation group must comply, to the extent and in the manner prescribed in BIPRU 8.5, with the obligations laid down in GENPRU 1.2 (Adequacy of financial resources) and4 the main BIPRU firm Pillar 1 rules (but not the base capital resources requirement) on the basis of the consolidated financial position of:424(1) where either Test 1A or Test 1B in BIPRU 8 Annex 1 (Decision tree identifying a UK consolidation group) apply, the parent institution
(1) An originator of a synthetic securitisation may calculate risk weighted exposure amounts1, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, for the securitised exposures in accordance with BIPRU 9.5.3 R and BIPRU 9.5.4 R, if either of the following conditions is fulfilled:1(a) 1significant credit risk is considered to have been transferred to third parties, either through funded or unfunded credit protection; or(b) 1the originator applies a 1250% risk weight to all securitisation
1An originator's application for a waiver of the requirements in BIPRU 9.5.1R (6) and (7) must demonstrate that the following conditions are satisfied:(1) it has policies and methodologies in place which ensure that the possible reduction of capital requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties; and(2) that such transfer of credit risk to third parties is also recognised for the purposes
When considering whether a business unit is significant, the firm should take into account all relevant factors in the light of the firm's current circumstances and its plans for the future, including:(1) the risk profile of the unit; or(2) its use or commitment of a firm's capital; or(3) its contribution to the profit and loss account; or(4) the number of employees or approved persons in the unit; or(5) the number of customers of the unit; or(6) any other factor which makes the
The significant management function is the function of acting as a senior manager with significant responsibility for a significant business unit that:(1) carries on designated investment business or other activities not falling within (2) to (4);(2) effects contracts of insurance (other than contractually based investments);(2A) carries on credit-related regulated activity;1(3) makes material decisions on the commitment of a firm's financial resources, its financial commitments,
(1) Securitisation documentation should make clear, where applicable, that any repurchase of securitised exposures or securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations is not mandatory and may only be made at fair market value. In general, any such repurchase should be subject to a firm's credit review and approval process, which should be adequate to ensure that the repurchase complies with BIPRU 9.6.1 R.(2) If an originator or sponsor repurchases
(1) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (1) is permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R.(2) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (3) is not permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R.(3) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (2) may be permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R under the following conditions:(a) the fact that the firm may give it is expressly set out in the contractual and marketing documents for the securitisation;(b) the nature of the support that the firm may give is precisely described in the documentation;(c)
(1) Subject to BIPRU 3.2.35 R, and with the exception of exposures giving rise to liabilities in the form of the items referred to in BIPRU 3.2.26 R, a firm is not required to comply with BIPRU 3.2.20 R (Calculation of risk weighted exposures amounts under the standardised approach) in the case of the exposures of the firm to a counterparty which is its parent undertaking, its subsidiary undertaking or a subsidiary undertaking of its parent undertaking provided that the following
A firm must not apply the treatment in BIPRU 3.2.25 R to exposures giving rise to liabilities in the form of any of the following items:(1) in the case of a BIPRU firm, any tier one capital or tier two capital; and(2) in the case of any other undertaking, any item that would be tier one capital or tier two capital if the undertaking were a BIPRU firm.[Note: BCD Article 80(7), part]
For the purpose of BIPRU 3.2.25R (1)(e) (Prompt transfer of capital resources): 22(1) 2in the case of an undertaking that is a firm the requirement in BIPRU 3.2.25R (1)(e) for the prompt transfer of capital resources refers to capital resources in excess of the capital and financial resources requirements to which it is subject under the regulatory system; and2(2) 44[deleted](3) 4the FCA will consider the following criteria:(a) the speed with which funds can be transferred or
1A firm operating an MTF must have:(1) transparentand non-discretionary rules and procedures for fair and orderly trading;[Note:Article 14(1) of MiFID](2) objective criteria for the efficient execution of orders;[Note: Article 14(1) of MiFID](3) transparent rules regarding the criteria for determining the financial instruments that can be traded under its systems;[Note: Subparagraph 1 of Article 14(2) of MiFID](4) transparent rules, based on objective criteria, governing access
This chapter builds on the threshold condition referred to at COND 2.4 (Appropriate resources) by providing that a firm must meet, on a continuing basis, a basic solvency requirement. This chapter also builds on Principle 4 which requires a firm to maintain adequate financial resources by setting out prudential requirements for a firm according to what type of firm it is.
More generally, having adequate prudential resources gives the firm a degree of resilience and some indication to customers of creditworthiness, substance and the commitment of its owners. Prudential standards aim to ensure that a firm has prudential resources which can provide cover for operational and compliance failures and pay redress, as well as reducing the possibility of a shortfall in funds and providing a cushion against disruption if the firm ceases to trade.
(1) Implementation of the IRB approach as referred to in BIPRU 4.2.18 R must be carried out within a reasonable period of time as set out in the IRB permission.(2) The implementation must be carried out subject to strict conditions determined by the appropriate regulator and set out in the IRB permission.(3) A firm must not use the flexibility under BIPRU 4.2.18 R selectively with the purpose of achieving reduced minimum capital requirements in respect of those IRB exposure classes
(1) To the extent that its IRB permission permits this, a firm permitted to use the IRB approach in the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts3 for one or more IRB exposure classes may apply the standardised approach in accordance with this rule.3(2) A firm may apply the standardised approach to the IRB exposure class referred to in BIPRU 4.3.2 R (1) (Sovereigns) where the number of material counterparties is limited and it would be unduly burdensome
For the purposes of BIPRU 4.2.26 R (4), the equity exposureIRB exposure class of a firm must be considered material if its aggregate value, excluding equity exposures incurred under legislative programmes as referred to in BIPRU 4.2.26 R (8) but including exposures in a CIU treated as equity exposures in accordance with BIPRU 4.9.11 R to BIPRU 4.9.15 R,4 exceeds, on average over the preceding year, 10% of the firm'scapital resources. If the number of those equity exposures is
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of3members of its management body; and3(3) no
A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.3 A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:3(1) 3it is exceptional;(2) 3it occurs in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff;3(3) 3the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and3(4) 3it is limited to the first year of service.[Note:3article 94(1)(d) and (e) of CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred
(1) A firm must ensure that any measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components: (a) includes adjustments for all types of current and future risks, taking into account the cost and quantity of the capital and the liquidity required; and (b) takes into account the need for consistency with the timing and likelihood of the firm receiving potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings. (2) A
(1) A firm must ensure that a substantial portion, at least 50%, of any variable remuneration consists of an appropriate balance of: (a) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the firm concerned, or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments for a non-listed firm; and(b) where appropriate, capital instruments which are eligible for inclusion at stage B1 of the calculation in the capital resources table, where applicable, adequately
(1) Regarding SYSC 19C.3.47R (3), the 50% minimum threshold for instruments must be applied equally to the non-deferred and the deferred components; in other words, firms must apply the same chosen ratio between instruments and cash for their total variable remuneration to both the upfront and deferred components. (2) This simplified example illustrates the operation of (1). The variable remuneration of a material risk taker (X) is 100, and by SYSC 19C.3.49R (3) X is required
Unless any of SUP App 2.4.1 R, SUP App 2.5.1 R, SUP App 2.5.3 R or SUP App 2.6.1 R applies, if a firm's circumstances change, such that its capital resources have fallen, or are expected to fall, below the level advised in individual capital guidance1 given to the firm by the appropriate regulator, then, consistent with PRIN 2.1.1 RPrinciple 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should inform the appropriate regulator of this fact as soon as practicable, explaining why capital
(1) This chapter seeks to protect the interests of credit unions' members in respect of loans to members under section 11 of the Credit Unions Act 1979 or article 28 of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 19852. Principle 4 requires credit unions to maintain adequate financial resources and CREDS 5 sets out the PRA's detailed capital adequacy requirements in respect of credit unions.(2) This chapter is not relevant to loans between credit unions, except as indicated in
(1) BIPRU 14.2 deals with the calculation of the capital requirement for CCR for trading book positions arising from financial derivative instruments, securities financing transactions and long settlement transactions. The approaches used to calculate exposure values and risk weighted exposure amounts for these positions are largely based on the approaches applicable to non-trading book positions (BIPRU 3, BIPRU 4, BIPRU 5 and BIPRU 13). However, there are some treatments that
The capital conservation plan must include the following(1) the MDA; (2) estimates of income and expenditure and a forecast balance sheet;(3) measures to increase the capital ratios of the firm; and(4) a plan and timeframe for the increase of own funds with the objective of meeting the combined buffer. [Note: article 142(2) of CRD]