Related provisions for BIPRU 7.8.29
41 - 60 of 291 items.
In the FCA's view, money payable to an introducer on his own account includes money legitimately due to him for services rendered to the borrower, whether in connection with the introduction or otherwise. It also includes sums payable to an introducer (for example, a housebuilder) by a buyer in connection with a transfer of property. For example, article 33A allows a housebuilder to receive the purchase price on a property that he sells to a borrower, whom he previously introduced
In the FCA's view, details of fees or commission referred to in PERG 4.5.14G (2) does not require an introducer to provide an actual sum to the borrower, where it is not possible to calculate the full amount due prior to the introduction. This may arise in cases where the fee or commission is a percentage of the eventual loan taken out and the amount of the required loan is not known at the time of the introduction. In these cases, it would be sufficient for the introducer to
In the FCA's view, the information condition in PERG 4.5.14G (3) requires the introducer to indicate to the borrower any other advantages accruing to him as a result of ongoing arrangements with N relating to the introduction of borrowers. This may include, for example, indirect benefits such as office space, travel expenses, subscription fees and this and other relevant information may be provided on a standard form basis to the borrower, as appropriate.
3The provisions in this sourcebook that apply to home reversion plans should be read in a purposive way. This means that firms should substitute equivalent home reversion terminology for lifetime mortgage terminology, where appropriate. Examples of terms and expressions that must be replaced are 'loan' or 'amount borrowed', which should be replaced with 'amount released' or 'amount to be released', as appropriate, and 'mortgage lender' and 'mortgage intermediary' which should
Given that the APR is presented as a percentage, and must be rounded to one decimal place in accordance with MCOB 10 (Annual Percentage Rate), firms should note that the tolerance allowed for the APR in MCOB 9.3.6 R(1)(b) means that, for example, where the actual APR is 5.0%, the quoted APR must be no lower than 4.9%, or where the actual APR is 16.0%, the quoted APR must be no lower than 15.9%.
An offer document may not always exactly match the illustration provided before application even when the equity release3 requirements have not changed. For example, where a fixed rate has a defined end date, the total amount payable may be different because the number of payments at the fixed rate has reduced, or the estimated amount of interest to be charged has changed, assuming a later date at which the lifetime mortgage3will start.33
The level of information required will vary according to matters such as:(1) the knowledge, experience and ability of a typical customer for the policy;(2) the policy terms, including its main benefits, exclusions, limitations, conditions and its duration;(3) the policy's overall complexity;(4) whether the policy is bought in connection with other goods and services;(5) distance communication information requirements (for example, under the distance communication rules less information
In determining what is “in good time”, a firm should consider the importance of the information to the customer's decision-making process and the point at which the information may be most useful. Distance communication timing requirements are also relevant (for example, the distance communication rules enable certain information to be provided post-conclusion in telephone and certain other sales (see ICOBS 3.1.14 R and ICOBS 3.1.15 R)).
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FCA3 will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FCA's3 starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FCA3 believes
(1) The FCA3 will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FCA3 will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FCA3 will also take into account its statutory objectives3, for example in situations where
Where the FCA3 considers that, following commencement of an FCA3 investigation, an individual or firm has reduced their solvency in order to reduce the amount of any disgorgement or financial penalty payable, for example by transferring assets to third parties, the FCA3 will normally take account of those assets when determining whether the individual or firm would suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the disgorgement and financial penalty.333
Members will individually comply with this chapter if and only if all complaints by policyholders against members are dealt with under the Lloyd's complaints procedures. Accordingly, certain of the obligations under this chapter, for example the obligation to report on complaints received and the obligation to pay fees under the rules relating to the funding of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FEES 5), must be complied with by the Society on behalf of members. Managing agents
[deleted]131(1) In the FCA's view the requirement in COLL 5.2.22R (1)(a) can be met where:(a) the risks of the underlying financial instrument of a derivative can be appropriately represented by another financial instrument and the underlying financial instrument is highly liquid; or(b) the authorised fund manager or the depositary has the right to settle the derivative in cash, and cover exists within the scheme property which falls within one of the following asset classes:(i)
13Authorised fund managers of UCITS schemes or EEA UCITS schemes should bear in mind that where a UCITS scheme, or an EEA UCITS scheme that is a recognised scheme under section 264 of the Act, employs particular investment strategies such as investing more than 35% of its scheme property in government and public securities, or investing principally in units in collective investment schemes, deposits or derivatives, or replicating an index, COBS 4.13.2R (Marketing communications
(1) 15A syndicated loan for the purposes of this guidance means a form of loan where a group or syndicate of parties lend money to a third party and, in return, receive interest payments during the life of the debt and a return of principal either at the end of the loan period or amortised over the life of the loan. Such loans are usually arranged through agent banks which may, among other things, maintain a record of the lenders’ interest in the loan and arrange or act as a
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) Regarding SYSC 19C.3.47R (3), the 50% minimum threshold for instruments must be applied equally to the non-deferred and the deferred components; in other words, firms must apply the same chosen ratio between instruments and cash for their total variable remuneration to both the upfront and deferred components. (2) This simplified example illustrates the operation of (1). The variable remuneration of a material risk taker (X) is 100, and by SYSC 19C.3.49R (3) X is required
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
(1) One way a firm may give advice on a fair analysis basis is by using ‘panels’ of insurance undertakings which are sufficient to enable the firm to give advice on a fair analysis basis and are reviewed regularly. (2) A firm which provides a service based on a fair analysis of the market (or from a sector of the market) should ensure that its analysis of the market and the available contracts is kept adequately up-to-date. For example, a firm should update its selection of contracts
12(1) Principle 6 (Customers' interests) requires that a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. This means, for example, that a firm should avoid selling practices that commit customers (or lead customers to believe that they are committed) to any regulated mortgage contract or home reversion plan before they have been able to consider the illustration and offer document. One such practice might be to present a new customer with an illustration,
Principle 7 (Communications with clients) requires that a firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. This means, for example, that a firm should avoid giving any customer a false impression about the availability of a regulated mortgage contract, home reversion plan1 or regulated sale and rent back agreement2, such as describing it as a 'special offer' not available after
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should
(1) There are certain additional disclosure requirements laid down by the Distance Marketing Directive that will have to be provided by a mortgage intermediary,6 a home purchase intermediary and a SRB intermediary64 to a consumer5 prior to the conclusion of a distance mortgage mediation contract,66 a distance home purchase mediation contract4 or a distance regulated sale and rent back mediation contract.6 The purpose of this section, MCOB 4.5, is to set out those additional requirements.
(1) The information in MCOB 4 Annex 3 will be provided in 'good time' for the purposes of MCOB 4.5.2 R (1), if provided in sufficient time to enable the customer to consider properly the services on offer.(2) An example of the circumstances in which MCOB 4.5.2 R (4) or (5) may apply is given in MCOB 4.4.4 G. If the initial disclosure document and accompanying information (including that in MCOB 4 Annex 3) was previously provided to a customer and continues to be appropriate, there
In the FCA's view, guiding a person through a decision tree should not, of itself, involve advice within the meaning of article 53 (it should be generic advice). For example, helping a person to understand what the questions or options are and how to determine which option applies to his particular circumstances. But a recommendation that the person concerned should, if the results of using the decision tree so indicate, buy a stakeholder personal pension from a particular provider
Examples of a particular investment include:(1) securities – shares in ABC plc, Treasury 10% 2001 stock, XYZ plc warrants;(2) units in collective investment schemes - ABC smaller companies fund, XYZ Growth Trust;(3) exchange-traded derivatives - LME Copper Grade A 3 months, LIFFE Japanese Government bond, ABC plc traded options;(4) contractual investments, for example, futures and other contracts having specified terms and conditions such as duration, volume, interest rate or
The power to impose a suspension
or a restriction is a disciplinary measure which the FCA2 may use in addition to, or instead of, imposing a financial penalty
or issuing a public censure.
The principal purpose of imposing a suspension or a restriction is to promote
high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from
committing further breaches,
helping to deter other persons from
committing similar breaches,
and demonstrating
The powers to impose a suspension or a restriction in relation
to authorised persons and approved persons are disciplinary measures;2 where the FCA2 considers it necessary to take action, for example, to protect consumers from an authorised
person, the FCA2 will seek to cancel or vary the authorised
person'spermissions.
If the FCA2 has
concerns with a person's fitness
to be approved, and considers it necessary to take action, the FCA2 will
seek to prohibit the approved person
If the SRB agreement seller or a member of his family makes contact with the SRB agreement provider during the 14 day cooling-off period, for example because he wants to query a term of the written pre-offer document, the provider must endeavour to answer the query in as factual a manner as the circumstances permit but avoid any language or conduct which could be interpreted as amounting to an attempt to exert pressure on the SRB agreement seller to enter into the proposed ag
The SRB agreement provider must keep a record of the written pre-offer document at Stage One and the written offer document for signing at Stage Two for a period of:(1) one year after the end of the fixed term of the tenancy under the regulated sale and rent back agreement; or(2) five years from the date of the disclosures and warnings, written offer documents and cooling-off period notices;whichever is the longer.
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the appropriate regulator) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems or resources will automatically lead to a firm contravening Principle 3 or 4. Rather, the potential impact of a group member's activities (and, for example, risk
Breaching a Principle makes a firm liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the appropriate regulator to show that a firm has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity), for example, the appropriate regulator would need
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty, or the length of any period of suspension or restriction,2 and other conditions which the FCA3 seeks to impose by way of such action. Such conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FCA3 recognises the benefits of such agreements, in that they offer the potential for securing earlier redress or protection for
(1) Any settlement agreement between the FCA3 and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.3(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may
In the opinion of thewhether the disclosure is permitted by the rules of a
prescribed market
, a prescribed auction platform,3 of the
FCA
or the Takeover Code; or
FCA
, the following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not the disclosure was made by a person in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, and are indications that it was:(1) whether the disclosure
The following are examples 4of market abuse (improper disclosure).444(1) 4X, a director at B PLC has lunch with a friend, Y, who has no connection with B PLC or its advisers. X tells Y that his company has received a takeover offer that is at a premium to the current share price at which it is trading.(2) 4A, a person discharging managerial responsibilities in B PLC, asks C, a broker, to sell some or all of As shares in B PLC. C discloses to a potential buyer that A is a person
The FCA1 will consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction
where it believes that such action will be a more effective and persuasive
deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty alone. This is likely
to be the case where the FCA1 considers that direct and visible action in relation to a particular breach is necessary. Examples of circumstances
where the FCA1 may
consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction include:111(1) where the FCA1
The FCA1 expects usually to suspend or restrict a person from
carrying out activities directly linked to the breach.
However, in certain circumstances the FCA1 may also suspend or restrict a person from
carrying out activities that are not directly linked to the breach,
for example, where an authorised person's relevant
business area no longer exists or has been restructured.11
(1) An example of a misleading communication in CONC 7.9.2 R is a calling card left at the customer's address which states or implies that the customer has missed a delivery and encourages the customer to make contact.[Note: paragraph 3.3d (box) of DCG](2) The clear fair and not misleading rule in CONC 3.3.1 R also applies to a firm in relation to a communication with a customer in relation to credit agreement1 or a consumer hire agreement.
The reasonable steps required by CONC 7.9.7 R may, for example, require a firm to ensure that:(1) post sent by the firm is properly addressed to the customer and marked “private and confidential” or an expression to the same effect;(2) where the firm has a name which indicates its debt collection activities, its name is not shown so that third parties may see the name on the firm's communications.
21Firms should make it clear that they will bear the costs of conversion if the rearrangement is made with the existing lender and to the equivalent repayment mortgage. If a complainant is not willing to rearrange with the existing lender, then the costs to be paid by the firm should normally be limited to those which would have been payable had the rearrangement been made with the existing lender and to the equivalent repayment mortgage. If it is not possible to rearrange with
12Example of assessment set out at 1.3.10
The following example illustrates the position: |
|||
Surrender value |
£10,000 |
TEP value |
£16,000 |
Loss calculated by standard approach |
£5,000 |
||
Remortgaging costs |
£300 |
||
Total |
£15,300 |
||
Complainant receives £16,000 all ultimately funded from the TEP sale. |
|||
Surrender value |
£10,000 |
TEP value |
£13,000 |
Redress calculated by standard approach |
£5,000 |
||
Remortgaging costs |
£300 |
||
Total |
£15,300 |
||
Complainant receives £15,300, £13,000 ultimately funded from the TEP sale and £2,300 ultimately funded from the firm. |
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