Related provisions for PERG 6.4.3
121 - 140 of 796 items.
(1) 1The FCA's3 approach to determining penalties described in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5C is intended to ensure that financial penalties are proportionate to the breach. The FCA3 recognises that penalties may affect persons differently, and that the FCA3 should consider whether a reduction in the proposed penalty is appropriate if the penalty would cause the subject of enforcement action serious financial hardship.333(2) Where an individual or firm claims that payment of the penalty
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FCA3 will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FCA's3 starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FCA3 believes
In cases against individuals, including market abuse cases, the FCA3 may make a prohibition order under section 56 of the Act or withdraw an individual’s approval under section 63 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 reflects the FCA's3 assessment of the individual’s fitness to perform regulated activity or suitability for a particular role, and does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach.
(1) The FCA3 will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FCA3 will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FCA3 will also take into account its statutory objectives3, for example in situations where
2The FCA3 may withdraw a firm’s authorisation under section 33 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach. However, the fact that the FCA3 has withdrawn a firm’s authorisation, as a result of which the firm may have less earning potential, may be relevant in assessing whether the penalty will cause the firm serious financial hardship.3333
Where the FCA3 considers that, following commencement of an FCA3 investigation, an individual or firm has reduced their solvency in order to reduce the amount of any disgorgement or financial penalty payable, for example by transferring assets to third parties, the FCA3 will normally take account of those assets when determining whether the individual or firm would suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the disgorgement and financial penalty.333
A UK firm, other than a UK pure reinsurer or an AIFM exercising an EEA right to market an AIF under AIFMD13,9 cannot start providing cross border services into another EEA State under an EEA right unless it satisfies the conditions in paragraphs 20(1) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act and, if it derives its EEA right from the Insurance Directives, AIFMD, MiFID or the UCITS Directive,13paragraph 20(4B) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act. It is an offence for a UK firm which
4An exempt professional firm which is included in the record of unauthorised persons carrying on insurance mediation activity maintained by the FCA20 under article 93 of the Regulated Activities Order may provide cross border services in another EEA State under the Insurance Mediation Directive (see PROF 7.2).20
14A UKfirm that is an AIFM may exercise an EEA right to market a UK AIF or EEA AIF managed by it under AIFMD when the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the UKfirm has given the FCA a notice of intentionSUP 13.5.2 R; and(2) the FCA has sent a copy of the notice of intention to the Host State regulator where the AIF will be marketed and has given the UKfirm written notice that it has done so.
8(1) If8 the UK firm'sEEA right derives from MiFID8, theCRD12 or the UCITS Directive, paragraph 20(3) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the appropriate UK regulator20 to send a copy of the notice of intention8 to the Host State Regulator within one month8 of receipt.8A UK firm passporting under the CRD10 may start providing cross border services as soon as it satisfies the relevant conditions (see SUP 13.4.2 G).88812208881012(2) (a) If8 the UK firm'sEEA right derives
(1) 14If the UKfirm'sEEA right derives from AIFMD (other than the EEA right to market an AIF (referred to in (3)) and the condition in (2) is met, paragraph 20(3D) of Part III of Schedule 3 to the Act requires the FCA to:(a) send a copy of the notice of intention to the Host State regulator within one month of receipt; (b) include confirmation that the UKfirm has been authorised by the FCA under AIFMD; and(c) immediately inform the UKfirm that the notice of intention and confirmation
20Where the PRA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the FCA before deciding whether to give a consent notice and where the FCA is the appropriate UK regulator, it will consult the PRA before deciding whether to give a consent notice in relation to a UK firm whose immediate group includes a PRA-authorised person.
12This Code of Practice for Approved Persons is
issued under section 64 of the Act (Conduct:
statements and codes) for the purpose of helping to determine whether or not
an approved person's conduct
complies with a Statement of Principle.
The code sets out descriptions of conduct which, in the FCA's opinion,
do not comply with the relevant Statements
of Principle. The code also sets out certain factors which,
in the opinion of the FCA,
are to be taken into account in determining
The
significance of conduct identified in the Code
of Practice for Approved Persons as tending to establish compliance
with or a breach of a Statement of Principle will
be assessed only after all the circumstances of a particular case have been
considered. Account will be taken of the context in which a course of conduct
was undertaken, including the precise circumstances of the individual case,
the characteristics of the particular accountable
function12 and the behaviour to
The Code of Practice for Approved Persons (and
in particular the specific examples of behaviour which may be in breach of
a generic description of conduct in the code) is not exhaustive of the kind
of conduct that may contravene the Statements
of Principle. The purpose of the code is to help determine whether
or not a person's conduct complies
with a Statement of Principle.
The code may be supplemented from time to time. The appropriate
regulator12 will amend the code if there
12In
applying Statements of Principle 5
to 7, the nature, scale and complexity of the business under management and
the role and responsibility of the individual performing an accountable higher management function within the firm will
be relevant in assessing whether an approved
person's conduct was reasonable. For example, the smaller and
less complex the business, the less detailed and extensive the systems of
control need to be. The FCA will
be of the opinion that an individual
UK domestic firmslisted on
the London Stock Exchange are subject to the UK
Corporate Governance Code4, whose internal
control provisions are amplified in the publication entitled "Internal Control: Revised Guidance
for Directors on the Combined Code (October 2005)" 4issued by the Financial Reporting Council4. Firms regulated
by the appropriate regulator12 in this category will thus be subject
to that code as well as to the requirements and standards of the regulatory system.
(1) A notification claiming exemption under DISP 1.1.12 R from the complaints reporting rules and the rules relating to the funding of the Financial Ombudsman Service must be given to the
FCA
by the Society on behalf of any member eligible for an exemption. (2) The Society must notify the
FCA
if the conditions relating to such an exemption no longer apply to a member who is exempt.
1The Society may choose how it publishes the complaints data summary. However, the complaints data summary should be readily available. For this reason, the
FCA
recommends that the Society publishes the summary on its website. The Society may publish further information with the complaints data summary to aid understanding.
Members will individually comply with this chapter if and only if all complaints by policyholders against members are dealt with under the Lloyd's complaints procedures. Accordingly, certain of the obligations under this chapter, for example the obligation to report on complaints received and the obligation to pay fees under the rules relating to the funding of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FEES 5), must be complied with by the Society on behalf of members. Managing agents
The FCA may modify LR 2.2.4 R to allow partly paid securities to be listed if
it is satisfied that their transferability is not restricted and investors
have been provided with appropriate information to enable dealings in the securities to take place on an open and
proper basis. [Note: articles 46 and 54 CARD]
(1) This rule applies
if under the Act or under the
law of another EEA State:(a) a prospectus must
be approved and published for the securities;
or(b) the applicant is
permitted and elects to draw up a prospectus for
the securities.(2) To be listed:(a) a prospectus must
have been approved by the FCA and published in relation to the securities; or(b) if another EEA
State is the Home Member State for
the securities, the relevant
competent authority must have supplied the FCA with:(i)
The periodic fee referred to in FEES 4.3.1 R is (except in relation to the Society,10fee-paying payment service providers and fee-paying electronic money issuers)107 calculated as follows:(1) identify each of the tariffs set out in Part 1 of FEES 4 Annex 2AR and Part 1 of FEES 4 Annex 2BR2727 which apply to the business of the firm for the period specified in that annex;(2) for each of the applicable27 tariffs, calculate the sum payable in relation to the business of the firm
(1) A firm which becomes authorised or registered 7during the course of a fee year26 will be required to pay a proportion of the periodic fee which reflects the proportion of the year for which it will have a permission or the right to provide particular payment services or the right to issue electronic money107- see FEES 4.2.5 G and FEES 4.2.6 R.26(2) Similarly a firm which extends its permission or its right to provide particular payment services7so that its business then falls
(1) Subject to FEES TP 8, if27 the firm's, designated professional body's, recognised investment exchange's, 12or regulated covered bondissuer's11periodic fee for the previous fee year27 was at least £50,000, it11 must pay the FCA:27272711(a) an amount equal to 50% of the FCA27 periodic fee payable for the previous fee year, by 30 April or, if later, within 30 days of the date of the invoice, in the fee year27 to which the sum due under FEES 4.2.1 R relates; and 27(b) the balance
A firm which is a member of a group may pay all of the amounts due from other firms in the same group under FEES 4.2.1 R, if:(1) it notifies the FCA (in its own capacity and, if applicable, in its capacity as agent for the PRA)26 in writing of the name of each other firm within the group for which it will pay; and26(2) it pays the fees, in accordance with this chapter, as a single amount as if that were the amount required from the firm under FEES 4.2.1 R.
If the payment made does not satisfy in full the periodic fees payable by all of the members of the group notified to the FCA26 under FEES 4.3.7 R, the FCA (in its own capacity and, if applicable, in its capacity as agent for the PRA)26 will apply the sum received among the firms which have been identified in the notification given under FEES 4.3.7R (1) in proportion to the amounts due from them. Each firm will remain responsible for the payment of the outstanding balance attributable
The appropriate regulator recognises that its responsibilities in respect of an incoming EEA firm,7 an incoming Treaty firm, an EEA authorised payment institution7 or an EEA authorised electronic money institution10 are reduced compared with a firm which is incorporated in the United Kingdom. Accordingly the periodic fees which would otherwise be applicable to incoming EEA firms,7incoming Treaty firms,10EEA authorised payment institutions7 and EEA authorised electronic money institutions10
(1) If:(a) a firm makes an application to vary its permission (by reducing its scope), or cancel it, in the way set out in SUP 6.3.15 D (3) (Variation of permission) and SUP 6.4.5 D (Cancellation of permission), or applies to vary (by reducing its scope) or cancel its authorisation or registration (regulation 8 and 10(1) of the Payment Services Regulations including as applied by regulation 14 of the Payment Services Regulations) or applies to cancel its authorisation or registration
Where a firm has applied to cancel its Part 4A permission, or its authorisation or registration under the Payment Services Regulations7or the Electronic Money Regulations, 10 or the appropriate regulator has exercised its own-initiative powers to cancel a firm's7Part 4A permission or the appropriate regulator has exercised its powers under regulation 10 (Cancellation of authorisation), including as applied by regulation 14 (Supplementary provisions) of the Payment Services Regulations
6If a mixed financial holding company is subject to equivalent provisions under this Chapter and under EEA prudential sectoral legislation in relation to the insurance sector as implemented in the United Kingdom and the FCA is the coordinator, the FCA may, on application by the firm and after consulting other relevant competent authorities, disapply such provisions of the EEA prudential sectoral legislation as implemented in the United Kingdom with regard to that undertaking which
4GENPRU 3.1.29 R4 to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and GENPRU 3 Annex 1 implement the detailed capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Groups Directive. They only deal with a financial conglomerate for which the appropriate regulator is the coordinator. If another competent authority is coordinator of a financial conglomerate, those rules do not apply with respect to that financial conglomerate and instead that coordinator will be responsible for implementing those detailed require
Paragraph 5.7 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates) deals with a case in which there are no capital ties between entities in a financial conglomerate. In particular, the appropriate regulator, after consultation with the other relevant competent authorities and in accordance with Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive, will determine which proportional share of a solvency deficit in such an entity will have to be taken into account,
The5 Annex I method to be applied may be5 decided by the coordinator after consultation with the relevant competent authorities and the financial conglomerate itself. Where the appropriate regulator acts as coordinator, the financial conglomerate itself may choose which of Method 1 or Method 2 from Annex I it will apply, unless the firm is subject to a requirement obliging the firm to apply a particular method.555
5GENPRU 3.1.29 R applies to a firm with respect to the financial conglomerate of which it is a member if notification has been made in accordance with regulation 2 of the Financial Groups Directive Regulations that the financial conglomerate is a financial conglomerate and that the appropriate regulator is coordinator of that financial conglomerate.
If GENPRU 3.1.29 R (application of Method 1 or 2 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) applies to a firm with respect to the financial conglomerate of which it is a member, then with respect to the firm and the financial conglomerate:5(1) the definitions of conglomerate capital resources and conglomerate capital resources requirement that apply for the purposes of that rule are the ones from whichever of Part 1 or Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 the firm has indicated to
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the appropriate regulator may impose such obligations
(1) In accordance with Articles5 30 and 30a5 of the Financial Groups Directive (Asset management companies and Alternative investment fund managers5), this rule deals with the inclusion of an asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 that is a member of a financial conglomerate in the scope of regulation of financial conglomerates.55(2) An asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 is in the overall financial sector and is
The Companies Act 1989 also gives the FCA1 powers to supervise the taking of action under default rules. Under section 166 of the Companies Act 1989 (Powers of the appropriate regulator1 to give directions) (see REC 4.5.4 G), the FCA1 may direct a UK RIE1to take, or not to take, action under its default rules. Before exercising these powers the FCA1 must consult the UK RIE.1 The FCA1 may also exercise these powers if a relevant office-holder applies to it under section 167 of
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FCA1 may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
|
Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules- if it appears to [the FCA] that it could take action, [the FCA may direct it to do so,1 1 |
|
but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and [the FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
|
The FCA1 may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
|
Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FCA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FCA] may direct it not to do so.1 1 |
|
but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and the [FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
|
Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK RIE has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FCA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK RIE under its default rules. However,11(1) 1where the UK RIE is acting in accordance with a direction given by the FCA to take action under section 166(2)(a) of the Act on the basis that failure to take action would involve undue risk to
Where, in relation to a member (or designated non-member) of a UK RIE :1(1) a bankruptcy order; or(2) an award of sequestration of his estate; or(3) an order appointing an interim receiver of his property; or(4) an administration or winding-up order; or(5) a resolution for a voluntary winding-up; or(6) an order appointing a provisional liquidator; has been made or passed and the UK RIE1 has not taken action under its default rules as a result of this event or of the matters giving
The procedure is that the FCA1 must notify the UK recognised body of the application and, unless within three business days after receipt of that notice, the UK recognised body: 1(1) takes action under its default rules; or(2) notifies the FCA1 that it proposes to take action forthwith; or1(3) is directed to take action by the FCA1 under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989; 1the provisions of sections 158 to 165 of the Companies Act 1989 do not apply in relation to market
(1) 8The resources of A must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether A has appropriate resources include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by A;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, A; and(c) A’s membership of a group and any effect which that membership may have.(3) Except in a case
(1) The non-financial resources of B must be appropriate in relation to the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on, having regard to the operational objectives of the FCA.(2) The matters which are relevant in determining whether the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met include-(a) the nature and scale of the business carried on, or to be carried on, by B;(b) the risks to the continuity of the services provided by, or to be provided by, B;(c) B’s a member
8Paragraph 3C of Schedule 6 to the Act sets out the appropriate non-financial resources threshold condition which is relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in relation to firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, regulated activities which include a PRA-regulated activity.
8The guidance in COND 2.4 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2D of Schedule 6 of the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity under the Act, paragraph 3C of Schedule 6 of the Act.
(1) [deleted]88(2) In this context, the FCA will interpret the term 'appropriate88' as meaning sufficient in terms of quantity, quality and availability, and 'resources' as including all financial resources (though only in the case of firms not carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity)8, non-financial resources and means of managing its resources; for example, capital, provisions against liabilities, holdings of or access to cash and other liquid assets, human
(1) [deleted]88(2) Although8 it is the firm that is being assessed, the FCA8 may take into consideration the impact of other members of the firm's group on the adequacy of its resources8, where relevant to the discharge of the FCA's functions8. For example, in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, the FCA8 may assess the consolidated solvency of the group. The FCA's8 approach to the consolidated supervision of such
(1) [deleted]88(2) Relevant matters to which the FCA may have regard when assessing whether a firm will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, this threshold condition8may include but are not limited to:(a) (in relation to a firm other than a firm carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity),8 whether there are any indications that the firm may have difficulties if the application is granted, at the time of the grant or in the future, in complying with any of the
Where an ROIE1 includes in its report made under section 295(1) of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) a statement in compliance with section 295(2)(a) of the Act that an event has occurred in the period covered by that report which is likely to affect the FCA's1 assessment of whether it is satisfied as to the requirements set out in section 292(3) (Overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses), it must include particulars
An ROIE1 must include in the first report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act after the recognition order in relation to that ROIE1 is made: 11(1) particulars of any events of the kind described in section 295(2) of the Act which occurred; (2) particulars of any change specified in REC 6.7.4 R (1) or disciplinary action specified in REC 6.7.4 R (2) which occurred; and(3) any annual report and accounts which covered a period ending; after the application for recognition
Where an ROIE1 proposes to change: (1) its address in the United Kingdom for the service of notices or other documents required or authorised to be served on it under the Act; or(2) the address of its head office;it must give notice to the FCA1 and inform it of the new address at least 14 days before the change is effected.1
Where an ROIE1 has notice that any licence, permission or authorisation which it requires to conduct any regulated activity in its home territory has been or is about to be:1(1) revoked; or(2) modified in any way which would materially restrict the ROIE1 in performing any regulated activity in its home territory or in the United Kingdom;1it must immediately notify the FCA1 of that fact and must give the FCA1 the information specified for the purposes of this rule in REC 6.7.9
The relevant requirements in regulation 5(3) are that:(1) the incoming EEA firm has given a notice to the FCA12 (see SUP 14.4.1 G) and to its Home State regulator stating the details of the proposed change;12(2) if the change arises from circumstances beyond the incoming EEA firm's control, that firm has, as soon as practicable, given to the appropriate UK regulator12 and to its Home State regulator the notice in (1).112
The FCA expects that if a firm ordinarily assigns exposures in the corporate, institution or central government and central bank exposure classes to a member of a group, substantially on the basis of membership of that group and a common group rating, and the firm does so in the case of a particular obligor group, the firm should consider whether members of that group should be treated as a single obligor for the purpose of the definition of default in article 178(1) of the EU
The FCA would not expect a firm to treat an obligor as part of a single obligor under IFPRU 4.5.1 G if the firm rates its exposures on a standalone basis or if its rating is notched. (For these purposes, a rating is notched if it takes into account individual risk factors or otherwise reflects risk factors that are not applied on a common group basis.) Accordingly, if a group has two members which are separately rated, the FCA will not expect that the default of one will necessarily
Under article 178(1)(b)1 of the EU CRR, the FCA is empowered to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential or SME commercial real estate in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities (PSEs).1
The FCA would expect to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential real estate in the retail exposure class, and/or for exposures to PSEs,1 where this was requested by the firm. Where this occurred, it would be specified in the firm's IRB permission.
To be satisfied that a firm complies with the documentation requirements in article 175(3) of the EU CRR, the FCA expects a firm should have a clear and documented policy for determining whether an exposure that has been in default should subsequently be returned to performing status (see article 175(3) of the EU CRR).
Under section 61(1) of the Act (Determination of applications), the appropriate regulator may grant an application for approval made under section 60 (Applications for approval) only if it is satisfied that the candidate is fit and proper to perform the controlled function to which the application relates.
The Act does not prescribe the matters which the appropriate regulator should take into account when determining fitness and propriety. However, section 61(2) states that the appropriate regulator may have regard (among other things) to whether the candidate or approved person is competent to carry out a controlled function.
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
Energy market participants should bear in mind that3sections 138A and 138B of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FCA4 must be satisfied that:4344(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of any of the FCA's operational objectives.44
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers
The FCA will try to notify the applicant
of its decision on an application for approval of listing
particulars or supplementary
listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified
in section 87C of the Act (consideration
of application for approval) for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary
prospectus.
1Under section 312C of the Act, if a UK RIE wishes to make arrangements in an EEA State other than the UK to facilitate access to or use of a regulated market,2multilateral trading facility or auction platform2 operated by it, it must give the FCA3written notice of its intention to do so. The notice must:3(1) describe the arrangements; and(2) identify the EEA State in which the UK RIE intends to make them.
The decision maker will:(1) consider whether the material on which the recommendation is based is adequate to support it; the decision maker may seek additional information about or clarification of the recommendation, which may necessitate additional work by the relevant FCA2 staff;2(2) satisfy itself that the action recommended is appropriate in all the circumstances;(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
1DEPP 7 applies when the FCA3:3(1) has appointed an investigator at
the request of an overseas regulator,
under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators) or of an EEA regulator under
section 131FA2 of the Act;
and(2) has directed, or is considering
directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act,
to permit a representative of the overseas
regulator or
of the EEA regulator2 to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the
purposes
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FCA's3 statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction
under section 169(7) or
section 131FA2 has been given or the FCA3 is considering giving. The FCA3 is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by
section 169(9) and (11) and
section 131FA2 of the Act.
As required by section 169(10) and
section 131FA2 of the Act, the Treasury has approved
the statement of policy.333