Related provisions for MCOB 13.3.4C
261 - 280 of 796 items.
For the purpose of article 282(6) of the EU CRR (Hedging sets), a firm must apply the CCR Mark-to-market method as set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 3 (Mark-to-market method) of the EU CRR to:(1) transactions with non-linear risk profile; or(2) payment legs and transactions with debt instruments as underlying;for which it cannot determine the delta or the modified duration, as the case may be, using an internal model approved by the FCA under Part Three Title
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for granting permission to a firm to use its own one-sided credit valuation adjustment internal models (an "internal CVA model") for the purpose of estimating the maturity factor "M", as proposed under article 162(2)(h) of the EU CRR (Maturity).(2) In the context of counterparty credit risk, the maturity factor "M" is intended to increase the own funds requirements to reflect potential higher risks associated with medium and long-term
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for permitting a firm with the permission to use the Internal Model Method set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 6 (Internal model method) and the permission to use an internal VaR model for specific risk set out in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 (Use of internal models) associated with traded debt instruments to set to 1 the maturity factor "M" defined in article 162 of the EU CRR.(2) In the context of counterparty
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
Where the parent undertaking intends to benefit from the exemptions only in relation to the financial instruments referred to in Article 13 of the TD, it shall (in relation to financial instruments giving an entitlement to acquire shares which are admitted to trading on a regulated market) notify to the FCA only the list referred to in paragraph (1) of DTR 5.4.4 R.[Note: article 10(3) of the TD implementing Directive]
A parent undertaking of a management company or of an investment firm must in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that:1(1) the organisational structures of the parent undertaking and the management company or investment firm are such that the voting rights are exercised independently of the parent undertaking;(2) the persons who decide how the voting rights are exercised
A parent undertaking of a third country undertaking must comply with the notification requirements in DTR 5.4.4 R (1) and DTR 5.4.5 R and in addition: (1) must make a statement that in respect of each management company or investment firm concerned, the parent undertaking complies with the conditions of independence set down in DTR 5.4.10 R; and (2) must1 be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that the requirements of DTR 5.4.6 R are respected.[Note: article 23 of the TD
General guidance on the perimeter is also contained in various FCA documents (mainly fact sheets and frequently asked questions) that are available on the FCA website at www.fca.org.uk.These documents, and the URL on which they may be accessed, include:(1) [deleted]612446(2) [deleted]212(3) [deleted](4) [deleted]313(5) [deleted]313(6) [deleted]313(7) guidance about the position under the Insurance Mediation Directive and the Regulated Activities Order of the company appointed
Any person who, having read relevant general guidance and, where appropriate, taken legal advice, remains uncertain about whether his activities amount to regulated activities or his communications will be subject to the restriction in section 21 of the Act, may seek individual guidance from the FCA. Requests for individual guidance should be made in line with SUP 9.
In addition, the FCA has established a team to provide general assistance and guidance to persons generally about the scope of the Act. Enquiries of this kind may be made:(1) by authorised firms, to either the FirmContact Centre (email firm.queries@fca.org.uk, Tel 0845 606 9966) or their normal supervisory contact; or(2) by individuals or non-authorised firms, to the Consumer Contact Centre (email ccc@fca.org.uk, Tel 0800 111 6768 ) or the Perimeter Enquiries Team (email auth
4The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
1This
chapter applies to:(1) a MiFID
investment firm;(2) a third country investment firm; and to(3) a person who
is the operator of an approved reporting
mechanism or of a regulated
market or MTF that
is used by a firm to report transactions to the FCA; and(4) a firm acting in its capacity as
a manager or operator of:(a) a collective investment undertaking;
or(b) a pension
scheme; or(c) an occupational
pension scheme; or(d) a personal
pension scheme; or(e) a stakeholder
pension
2In
line with guidance from CESR, the FCA acknowledges that, from a practical
point of view, it would be burdensome for branches of investment firms to be obliged to report
their transactions to two competent authorities. Therefore, all transactions executed by branches may
be reported to the competent authority of
the Host State, if the investment firm elects to do so. In these
cases transaction reports should
follow the rules of the competent authority to
which the report is
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FCA2 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA2 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA2 may do this include:222(a) where the FCA2 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;2(b) where previous FCA2 action in respect of similar breaches has failed
The FCA2 and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA2 and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.22
COND gives guidance on the threshold conditions. The FCA3threshold conditions represent the minimum conditions for which the FCA is responsible,3 which a firm is required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retainPart 4A permission. A PRA-authorised person or, as appropriate, a firm seeking to become a PRA-authorised person must also satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the threshold conditions for which the PRA is responsible in order to be given and
(1) Under section 55B(3) of the Act3, in giving or varying a Part 4A permission,3 imposing or varying any requirement or giving consent3, the FCA3 must ensure that the firm concerned will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the FCA3threshold conditions in relation to all of the regulated activities for which it has or will have permission.(2) If, however, the applicant for permission is an incoming firm seeking top-up permission, or variation of top-up permission, under Part 4A3
(1) If, among other things, a firm is failing to satisfy any of the FCA3threshold conditions, or is likely to fail to do so, the FCA3 may exercise its own-initiative powers under either section 55J (Variation or cancellation on initiative of regulator) or section 55L (Imposition of requirements by FCA) of the Act3. Use of the FCA's own-initiative powers3 is explained in SUP 7 (Individual requirements), and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FCA's3 own initiative
(1) Under section 185 of the Act (Assessment: general) the FCA may, subject to consultation with the PRA where the conditions in section 187B of the Act are satisfied, object to an acquisition of an FCA-authorised person if there are reasonable grounds to do so on the basis of the matters set out in section 186 of the Act (Assessment: criteria) or if the information provided by the section 178 notice giver is incomplete. Section 186(d) of the Act (Assessment: criteria) specifies
Section 80 (1) of the Act (general duty of disclosure in listing
particulars) requires listing particulars submitted
to the FCA to contain all such information as investors
and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect
to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of:(1) the assets and liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of
the securities; and(2) the rights attaching to the securi
A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific
information in a particular case must:(1) be in writing from the issuer;(2) identify the specific information
concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the issuer's opinion
one or more of the grounds in section 82 of the Act applies.
The FCA2 will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case when it
determines the length of the period of suspension or restriction (if any)
that is appropriate for the breach concerned,
and is also a sufficient deterrent. Set out below is a list of factors that
may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these
factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors,
not listed, that are relevant.2
The following factors may be relevant
to determining the appropriate length of the period of suspension or restriction
to be imposed on a person under
the Act:(1) DeterrenceWhen determining
the appropriate length of the period of suspension or restriction, the FCA2 will
have regard to the principal purpose for which it imposes sanctions, namely
to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from
committing further
The FCA2 may delay the commencement of the period of suspension or restriction.
In deciding whether this is appropriate, the FCA2 will take into account all the circumstances of a case. Considerations
that may be relevant in respect of an authorised
person, sponsor or primary
information provider2 include:22(1) the impact of the suspension or
restriction on consumers;(2) any practical measures the authorised person, sponsor or primary information provider2 needs to take before
1The FCA2 and
the person on whom a suspension
or restriction is to be imposed may seek to agree the length of the period
of suspension or restriction and other terms. In recognition of the benefits
of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the length of a period of suspension or restriction
which might otherwise have been imposed will be reduced to reflect the stage
at which the FCA2 and
the person concerned reached
an agreement.22
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions
The FCA's3 general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:3(1) the FCA3 has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and2132(2) the FCA's3 supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives. 3
A firm does not have to give notice to the appropriate regulator5 under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:5(1) the appropriate regulator;5 or5(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Article
(1) 3A firm must, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, regularly provide the appropriate regulator with details on the financial conglomerate's legal structure and governance and organisational structure, including all regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches.(2) A firm must disclose publicly, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, on an annual basis, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description
Sections 250 and 261L11 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FCA12 to waive the application of certain rules in COLL to:111210(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT, ACS11 or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT, ACS11 or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT), the authorised contractual scheme manager and depositary (in the case of an ACS)11 or the ICVC and
At least two independent minds should be applied to the formulation and implementation of the policies of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1. Where a firm1 nominates just two individuals to direct its business, the appropriate regulator will not regard them as both effectively directing the business where one of them makes some, albeit significant, decisions relating to only a few aspects of the business.
Where there are more than two individuals directing the business of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 or the UK branch of a non-EEA bank,1 the appropriate regulator does not regard it as necessary for all of these individuals to be involved in all decisions relating to the determination of strategy and general direction. However, at least two individuals should be involved in all such decisions. Both individuals' judgement should be engaged
(1) The purpose of this section is to set out the requirements for a firm specified in SUP 16.16.1 R to report the outcomes of its prudent valuation assessments to the appropriate regulator7 and to do so in a standard format.27(2) The purpose of collecting this data on the prudent valuation assessments made by a firm is to assist the appropriate regulator7 in assessing the capital resources of firms, to enable the appropriate regulator7 to gain a wider understanding of the
(1) 7A firm to which this section applies must submit to the appropriate regulator quarterly (on a calendar year basis and not from a firm'saccounting reference date), within six weeks of each quarter end, a Prudent Valuation Return in respect of its fair-value assessments in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 31A.2(2) 7A PRA-authorised person to which this section applies must submit the report via electronic mail to prudentvaluationreturns@bankofengland.co.uk or via post or
Where a firm to which SUP 16.16.4 R applies is a member of a FCA consolidation group, the firm must comply with SUP 16.16.4 R:(1) on a solo-consolidation basis if the firm has an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission, or on an unconsolidated basis if the firm does not have an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission; and(2) separately, on the basis of the consolidated financial position of the FCA consolidation group. (Firms' attention is drawn to
After a prospectus is approved by the FCA, it must be filed with the FCA at the same time it is made available to the public in line with PR 3.2.2 R or PR 3.2.3 R (as applicable) or, if earlier, within 24 hours of receipt of the notification of the approval by the issuer, offeror or person requesting admission4. [ Note: articles 14.1 and 16.1 of PD ]4
The FCA will publish on its website, a list of prospectuses approved over the previous 12 months. The list will specify how a prospectus is made available and where it can be obtained, including, if applicable, a hyperlink to the prospectus published on the issuer's or regulated market's website. [ Note: article 14.4 PD ]
In the FCA's view, for a person to be carrying on the business of advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction1 he will usually need to be doing so with a degree of regularity and for commercial purposes – that is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain some kind of a direct or indirect financial benefit. But, in the FCA's view it is not necessarily the case that advice provided free of charge will not amount to a business. Advice is often given 'free'
In other circumstances, advice issued remotely may still be given in the United Kingdom. For example, the FCA considers that advice is given in the United Kingdom if:(1) it is contained in a non-UK periodical that is posted in hard copy to persons in the United Kingdom;(2) it is contained in a non-UK periodical (or given in or by way of a service) which is made available electronically to such persons.
Many people may be involved in the production of a periodical publication, news service or broadcast. But if the regulated activity of advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction1 is being carried on so that authorisation is required, the FCA's view is that the person carrying on the activity (and who will require authorisation) is the person whose business it is to have the editorial control over the content. In the case of a periodical publication, this
(1) Section 55C of the Financial Services Act 2012 (Power to amend Schedule 6) gave HM Treasury the power to amend Schedule 6 of the Act. HM Treasury exercised this power by making The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Threshold Conditions) Order 2013 which entered into force on 1 April 2013 (the "TC Order"). The TC Order's main result is the creation of four sets of threshold conditions, namely:(i) conditions for firms authorised and regulated by the FCA only (paragraphs
(1) As a result of the new legal framework for threshold conditions described in COND 1.1A.1G (1), PRA-authorised persons and firms seeking to become PRA-authorised persons are subject to two sets of threshold conditions:(i) the FCA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(ii)and(ii) one of the two PRA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(iii) or (iv), depending on the PRA-regulated activities which the PRA-authorised person or firm carries on, or is
COND applies to incoming EEA firms and incoming Treaty firms as set out below:(1) for an incoming EEA firm or an incoming Treaty firm which does not carry on any PRA-regulated activities, FCAthreshold conditions 2C to 2F apply; and(2) for an incoming EEA firm or an incoming Treaty firm which carries on a PRA-regulated activity, FCAthreshold conditions 3B to 3E apply.FCAthreshold conditions apply to incoming EEA firms and incoming Treaty firms only in as far as relevant to the
(1) 2The FCAthreshold conditions apply to a person that carries on, or seeks to carry on, only relevant credit activities (within paragraph 2G of Schedule 6 to the Act) and which therefore has, or is applying for, limited permission with a number of modifications (see article 10(19) of the Regulated Activities Amendment Order). Regulated activities a person carries on in relation to which sections 20(1) and (1A) and 23(1A) of the Act do not apply as a result of section 39(1D)
The fact that there is a person performing the apportionment and oversight function, and who has responsibility for activities subject to regulation by the FCA, may have a bearing on whether a manager who is based overseas will be performing an FCA controlled function. It is a factor to take into account when assessing the likely influence of the overseas manager.
Generally, in relation to a UK establishment of an overseas firm or a firm which is part of an overseas group, where an overseas manager’s responsibilities in relation to the United Kingdom are strategic only, he will not need to be an FCA-approved person. However, where, in accordance with SYSC 3 or SYSC 4 to SYSC 10, he is responsible for implementing that strategy in the United Kingdom, and has not delegated that responsibility to a senior manager in the United Kingdom, he
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The Chief Risk Officer should be accountable to a firm'sgoverning body.(2) The appropriate regulator recognises that in addition to the Chief Risk Officers primary accountability to the governing body, an executive reporting line will be necessary for operational purposes. Accordingly, to the extent necessary for effective operational management, the Chief Risk Officer should report into a very senior executive level in the firm. In practice, the appropriate regulator expects
(1) The appropriate regulator considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current
(1) This section deals with the circumstances and manner in which an AUT is to be wound up or a sub-fund of an AUT is to be terminated. Under section 256 of the Act (Requests for revocation of authorisation order), the manager or trustee of an AUT may request the FCA to revoke the authorisation order in respect of that AUT. Section 257 of the Act (Directions) gives the FCA the power to make certain directions.(2) The termination of a sub-fund under this section will be subject
1This table belongs to COLL 7.4.1 G (4) (Explanation of COLL 7.4)
Summary of the main steps in winding up an AUT or terminating a sub-fund under FCArules Notes: N = Notice to be given to the FCA under section 251 of the Act. E = commencement of winding up or termination W/U = winding up FAP = final accounting period (COLL 7.4.5 R (4)) |
|||
Step number |
Explanation |
When |
|
1 |
Receive FCA approval |
N + one month On receipt of notice from the FCA |
Section 251 of the Act |
2 |
Normal business ceases; notify unitholders |
E |
7.4.3R |
3 |
Trustee to realise and distribute proceeds |
ASAP after E |
7.4.4R(1) to (5) |
4 |
Within 4 months of FAP |
7.4.5R(5) |
|
5 |
Request FCA to revoke relevant authorisation order |
On completion of W/U |
7.4.4R(6) |
(1) Where COLL 7.4.3 R (2) (f) applies, the trustee must cancel all units in issue and1 wind up the AUT or terminate the sub-fund in accordance with the approved scheme of arrangement.(2) In any other case falling within COLL 7.4.3 R:(a) once the AUT falls to be wound up or sub-fund terminated, the trustee must realise the scheme property;(b) after paying out or retaining adequate provision for all liabilities payable and for the costs of the winding up or termination, the trustee
(1) For any annual or half-yearly accounting period which begins1 after commencement of the winding up or termination, the manager is not required to prepare a short report (COLL 4.5.13 R (Provision of short report)), provided that it has reasonably determined1 that the report is not required in the interests of the unitholders.11(1A) The manager must consult the trustee before determining that a short report is not required in the interests of unitholders.1(2) Where (1) applies,