Related provisions for DISP App 1.2.14

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DISP App 1.2.6GRP
12If the complainant's endowment mortgage outgoings exceed the equivalent cost for the repayment method, the complainant should be compensated for the higher payments in addition to any loss on the surrender value and capital repaid comparison. This means, for example, that if the endowment arrangement has been more expensive, this may result in compensatable loss even though the capital repayment against surrender comparison may be favourable to the endowment.

12Example 1

Example 1

Capital shortfall and higher endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 5 years

Endowment premium per month: £75

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£3,200

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage:

£4,200

Surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,000)

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Total outgoings to date

Equivalent repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£21,950

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£22,250

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

(£300)

Basis of compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because the surrender value of the endowment is less than the capital repaid and also because of the higher total outgoings to date of the endowment mortgage relative to the repayment mortgage. The two losses and the conversion cost are therefore added together in order to calculate the redress.

Redress

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,000)

Loss from total extra outgoings under endowment mortgage:

(£300)

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Total loss:

(£1,500)

Therefore total redress is:

£1,500

12Example 2

Example 2

Capital shortfall partially offset by lower endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 5 years

Endowment premium per month: £60

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£2,500

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage

£4,200

Surrender value less capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage:

(£1,700)

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage

(£300)

Total outgoings to date:

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£21,950

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£21,350

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

£600

Basis of Compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because the surrender value of the endowment is less than the capital repaid but has gained form the lower outgoings of the endowment mortgage to date. In calculating the redress the gain may be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to take account of the gain.

Redress if it is not unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,700)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

£600

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£300)

Net loss:

(£1,400)

Therefore total redress is:

£1,400

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,700)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

Ignored*

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£300)

Net loss taken into account:

(£2,000)

Therefore total redress is:

£2,000

* In this example, and also in Examples 3, 7, 8 and 9, the complainant's circumstances are assumed to be such as to make it unreasonable to take account of any of the gain from lower outgoings.

12Example 3

Example 3

Capital shortfall more than offset by lower endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 8 years

Endowment premium per month: £65

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£7,300

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage:

£7,600

Surrender value less capital repaid:

(£300)

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Total outgoings to date:

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£34,510

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£33,990

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

£520

Basis of Compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because the surrender value of the endowment is less than the capital repaid but has gained from the lower total outgoings of the endowment mortgage. In calculating redress the gain may be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to take account of the gain.

Redress if it is not unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£300)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

£520

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Net gain:

£20

Therefore, there has been no loss and no redress is payable.

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£300)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

Ignored

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Net loss taken into account:

(£500)

Therefore total redress is:

£500

12Example 4

Example 4

Capital surplus more than offset by higher endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 8 years

Endowment premium per month: £75

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£7,800

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage:

£7,600

Surrender value less capital repaid:

£200

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£250)

Total outgoings to date:

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£34,510

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£34,950

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

(£440)

Basis of Compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because of the higher total outgoings to date of the endowment mortgage but has gained because the surrender value of the endowment is greater than the capital repaid. Since the sum of the loss and the conversion cost is greater than the gain, the redress is calculated as the difference between the two.

Redress

Gain from surrender value less capital repaid:

£200

Loss from total extra outgoings under endowment mortgage:

(£440)

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£250)

Net loss:

(£490)

Therefore total redress is:

£490

12Example 5

Example 5

Capital surplus partially offset by higher endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 10 years

Endowment premium per month: £75

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£11,800

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage

£9,700

Surrender value less capital repaid:

£2,100

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£300)

Total outgoings to date:

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£46,800

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£47,500

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

(£700)

Basis of Compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because of the higher total outgoings to date of the endowment mortgage relative to the repayment mortgage. However the sum of this and the conversion cost is less than the complainant's gain from the difference between the surrender value of the endowment and the capital repaid. Thus no redress is payable.

Redress

Gain from surrender value less capital repaid:

£2,100

Loss from total extra outgoings under endowment mortgage:

(£700)

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£300)

Net gain:

£1,100

Therefore, there has been no loss and no redress is payable.

12Example 6

Example 6

Capital surplus and lower endowment mortgage outgoings

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 10 years

Endowment premium per month: £65

Established facts

Endowment surrender value:

£10,100

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage

£9,700

Surrender value less capital repaid:

£400

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Total outgoings to date:

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£46,800

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£46,300

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

£500

Basis of Compensation

In this example, the complainant has gained both because the surrender value of the endowment is greater than the capital repaid and because of the lower total outgoings of the endowment mortgage. These gains are larger than the cost of converting to a repayment mortgage. Thus no further action is necessary.

Redress

As there has been no loss, no redress is payable.

12Example 7

Example 7

Low start endowment mortgage

Background

Capital sum of £50,000

25 year endowment policy

Duration to date: 10 years

Endowment premium per month: starting at £35 in first year, increasing by 20% simple on each policy anniversary, reaching £70 after five years and then remaining at that level.

Established facts:

Endowment surrender value:

£8,200

Capital repaid under equivalent repayment mortgage:

£9,700

Surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,500)

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

(£250)

Total outgoings to date

Repayment mortgage (capital + interest + DTA life cover):

£46,800

Endowment mortgage (endowment premium + interest):

£45,640

Difference in outgoings (repayment minus endowment):

£1,160

Of this difference in outgoings, £800 arose in the five year period when the complainant was paying a low endowment premium.

Basis of compensation

In this example, the complainant has suffered loss because the surrender value of the endowment is less than the capital repaid but has gained from the lower total outgoings of the endowment mortgage. As in Example 3, in calculating redress the whole of the gain should be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to do so. However, unlike Example 3, in a low start endowment mortgage the complainant may have chosen to pay a lower than usual premium in the early years (this would need to be established on the facts of the case). Where it has been established that the complainant chose to make lower payments, even if it is unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from total outgoings, the gain from paying a lower premium during the low start period is normally taken into account. In such cases the redress is calculated as the capital loss plus the conversion cost minus the total amount by which repayment mortgage outgoings would have exceeded the actual low start endowment mortgage outgoings during the five year low start period.

Redress if it is not unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,500)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

£1,160

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£250)

Net loss:

(£590)

Therefore total redress is:

£590

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£1,500)

Gain from total lower outgoings during low start period of endowment mortgage:

£800

Cost of converting to repayment mortgage:

(£250)

Net loss taken into account:

(£950)

Therefore total redress is:

£950

FEES 6.5.2-ARRP
12The FSCS must allocate any compensation costs levy:(1) first, to the relevant classes in proportion to the amount of compensation costs arising from, or expected to arise from, claims in respect of the different activities for which firms in those classes have permission up to the levy limit of each relevant class. The FCA provider contribution classes are not relevant classes for this purpose; and(2) thereafter, where the levy limit has been reached (whether as a result of
FEES 6.5.2AGRP
4The use made by FSCS of borrowing facilities to provide liquidity until the next levy does not affect the attribution of compensation costs, nor the10 allocation of compensation cost levies; the allocation of a compensation costs levy occurs at the time that the FSCS imposes a levy.10
FEES 6.5.3RRP
If a participant firm which is in default has carried on a regulated activity other than in accordance with a permission, the FSCS must treat10 any compensation costs or specific costs arising out of that activity as if the relevant permission were held by the participant firm.1010410
FEES 6.5.4RRP
If the relevant person in default is an appointed representative, the FSCS must treat10 any compensation costs or specific costs arising out of a regulated activity for which his principal has not accepted responsibility to as if the principal had accepted responsibility.1010410
FEES 6.5.5RRP
4(1) A participant firm must pay to the FSCS a share of each compensation costs levy allocated to the classes of which it is a member10 unless either the firm is exempt under FEES 6.2 (Exemption) or the FSCS has chosen to exercise its discretion under FEES 6.3.23 R in respect of that firm.4(2) [deleted]10104
FEES 6.5.6ARRP
12The FSCS must calculate each participant firm's share of a compensation costs levy (subject to FEES 6.3.22 R (Adjustments to calculation of levy shares)) by:(1) identifying each of the relevant classes to which each participant firm belongs, using the statement of business most recently supplied under FEES 6.5.13 R (1);(2) identifying the compensation costs falling within FEES 6.5.1 R allocated, in accordance with FEES 6.5.2 R, to the classes identified in (1);(3) calculating,
FEES 6.5.9RRP

A firm which becomes a participant firm part way through a financial year of the compensation scheme will not be liable to pay a share of a compensation costs levy made in that year.4

FEES 6.5.16RRP
If a participant firm does not submit a complete statement by the date on which it is due in accordance with FEES 6.5.13 R and any prescribed submission procedures:(1) the firm must pay an administrative fee of £250 (but not if it is already subject to an administrative fee under FEES 4 Annex 2A R, Part 119 or FEES 5.4.1 R for the same financial year); and19(2) the compensation costs levy and any specific costs levy will be calculated using (where relevant) the valuation or valuations
FEES 6.3.1RRP
The FSCS may at any time impose a management expenses levy or a compensation costs levy,6 provided that the FSCS has reasonable grounds for believing that the funds available to it to meet relevant expenses are, or will be, insufficient, taking into account expenditure already incurred, actual and expected recoveries and8:668(1) in the case of a management expenses levy, the level of the FSCS's expected8 expenditure in respect of those expenses in the financial year of the compensation
FEES 6.3.2AGRP
8The FSCS will usually levy once in each financial year (and in respect of compensation costs, for expenditure expected in the period of 12 months following 1 July in that year). However, if the compensation costs or specific costs incurred, or expected to be incurred, exceed the amounts held, or reasonably expected to be held, to meet those costs, the FSCS may, at any time during the financial year, do one or more of the following:(1) impose an (1) interim compensation costs
FEES 6.3.5RRP
The maximum aggregate amount of compensation costs and specific costs for which the FSCS can levy each8class in any one financial year of the compensation scheme is limited to the amounts set out in the table in FEES 6 Annex 2 R.22
FEES 6.3.10RRP
The FSCS may include in a compensation costs levy the costs of compensation paid by the FSCS in error, provided that the payment was not made in bad faith.55
FEES 6.3.11RRP
The FSCS must hold any amount collected from a specific costs levy or compensation costs levy to the credit of the classes2 in accordance with the allocation established under FEES 6.4.6 R and FEES 6.5.2 R.228
FEES 6.3.13RRP
Interest earned by the FSCS in the management of funds held to the credit of a class must be credited to that class8, and must be set off against the management expenses or compensation costs2allocated to that class.822228
FEES 6.3.17RRP
(1) The FSCS may use any money held to the credit of one class2(the creditor class)2 to pay compensation costs or specific costs attributable 8or allocated by way of levy8 to 2another class2(the debtor class)2 if the FSCS has reasonable grounds to believe that this would be more economical than borrowing funds from a third party or raising a levy.228822(2) Where the FSCS acts in accordance with (1), it must ensure that:(a) the creditor class2 is reimbursed by the debtor class2
FEES 6.3.19RRP
Unless FEES 6.3.20 R applies, any recoveries made by the FSCS in relation to protected claims must be credited to the classes8 to which the related compensation costs was attributable.828
FEES 6.3.20RRP
(1) Where8 the FSCS makes recoveries in relation to protected claims where a8 related compensation costs levy8 would have been allocated to a class (class A) had the levy limit for class A not been reached and has been allocated to another class or classes in the retail pool, the recoveries must be applied:8888(a) 8first, to the classes to which the costs levied were allocated in accordance with FEES 6.5A in the same proportion as those classes contributed, up to the total amount
DISP App 1.1.1GRP
This appendix sets out the approach and standards which firms should use when investigating complaints relating to the sale of endowment policies for the purposes of achieving capital repayment of a mortgage. It is not intended to be comprehensive. It is primarily concerned with the assessment of whether the complainant may have suffered financial loss, and if so, how much that loss is, and therefore what amount a firm should consider offering by way of fair and appropriate compensation
DISP App 1.1.2GRP
There will also be cases where a firm will conclude after investigation that, notwithstanding its own failure to give compliant and proper advice, the complainant would nevertheless have proceeded with the endowment policy as sold, in which case no compensation will be due.25
DISP App 1.1.3GRP
This appendix only addresses how firms should approach the assessment of loss and compensation where negligence on the part of the firm is established.25
DISP App 1.1.8GRP
25Nothing in this appendix relieves firms of the obligation to consider the particular facts and circumstances of each complaint and to consider whether the assessment of loss and compensation should, in the light of those facts and circumstances, be carried out on a different basis. If, however, the facts and circumstances make it appropriate to do so, the FCA's expectation is that firms will apply the approach and standards set out in this appendix, and where they do not, the
FEES 6.1.5GRP
The FSCS may impose three 6types of levy: a management expenses levy (consisting of a base costs levy and a specific costs levy)9, a compensation costs levy and a MERS levy.6 The FSCS has discretion as to the amount and 9timing of the levies imposed.662
FEES 6.1.6GRP
In calculating a compensation costs levy, the FSCS may include compensation costs expected8 in the 12-month period following the date of the levy. The total amount9 of all management expenses levies attributable to a financial year may not exceed9 the amount set out on an annual basis in FEES 6 Annex 1 R.99
FEES 6.1.14GRP
In imposing a compensation costs levy in each financial year of the compensation scheme the FSCS will take into account the compensation costs which the FSCS has incurred and has not yet raised through levies, any recoveries it has had made using the rights that have been assigned to it or to which it is subrogated and9 those compensation costs it expects to incur (including in respect of defaults yet to be declared) over the 12 months following the date of the levy.9
FEES 6.1.15GRP
9Compensation costs are principally the costs incurred in paying compensation. Costs incurred:5239(1) in securing continuity of long-term insurance; or(2) in safeguarding eligible claimants when insurers are in financial difficulties; or(3) in making payments or giving indemnities under COMP 11.2.3 R; or(4) as a result of the FSCS being required by HM Treasury to make payments in connection with the exercise of the stabilisation power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009; or(5)
FEES 6.1.16GRP
If a participant firm is a member of more than one class9,2 the total compensation costs levy and specific costs levy for that firm in a particular year9 will be the aggregate of the individual levies calculated for the firm9 in respect of each of the classes for that year. Each class9 has a levy limit which is the maximum amount of compensation costs and specific costs9 which may be allocated to a particular class9 in a financial year for the purposes of a levy.29299299
FEES 6.1.16AGRP
The FCA has made rules providing that compensation costs and specific costs attributable to the intermediation classes and the investment provision class, which exceed the classlevy limits, may be allocated to the retail pool. Levies allocated to the retail pool are then allocated amongst the other such classes, together with certain classes (known as FCA provider contribution classes). The FCA provider contribution classes may contribute to compensation costs levies or specific
FEES 6.5A.1RRP
The FSCS must allocate a compensation costs levy or specific costs levy, which has been allocated to the retail pool (under FEES 6.5.2-A R(2)):(1) to classes whose retail pool levy limit has not been reached as at the date of the levy;(2) in proportion to the relative sizes of the retail pool levy limits of the classes in (1); and(3) in accordance with the table in FEES 6 Annex 5.[Note: The retail pool levy limits for classes other than FCA provider contribution classes are the
FEES 6.5A.2RRP
(1) An allocation in FEES 6.5A.1 R to an FCA provider contribution class other than the home finance providers and administrators' contribution class may not be of an amount that, if it were added to any compensation costs levies or specific costs levies which have previously been imposed on the PRA funding class which corresponds to that FCA provider contribution class (as set out in FEES 6.5A.7 R) the combined figure would be greater than the levy limit of the corresponding
FEES 6.5A.5RRP
When the FSCS allocates excess compensation costs levies or specific costs levies under FEES 6.5A.1 R or any levy imposed under FEES 6.5A.2 R (3)(a) , a class to which part of the excess is allocated (a "receiving class") may, as a result of that allocation, itself reach its limit. In that case, the FSCS must apply FEES 6.5A.1 R or FEES 6.5A.2 R so that any resulting excess levy beyond the limit of the receiving class is allocated amongst the remaining classes whose limits have
FEES 6.5A.6RRP
In relation to a specific costs levy or compensation costs levy allocated to an FCA provider contribution class in the retail pool, FEES 6.4.7A R (3) and FEES 6.5.6A R (3), respectively, are replaced by the following: "calculating, in relation to each relevant class, the participant firm's most recent regulatory costs arising from its membership of the corresponding activity group (as listed in FEES 4 Annex 1A R) set out in FEES 6.5A.7 R, as a proportion of the total most recent
DISP 3.7.2RRP
Except in relation to a complaint the subject matter of which falls to be dealt with (or has properly been dealt with) under a consumer redress scheme, a9 money award may be such amount as the Ombudsman considers to be fair compensation for one or more of the following:9(1) financial loss (including consequential or prospective loss); or(2) pain and suffering; or(3) damage to reputation; or(4) distress or inconvenience;whether or not a court would award compensation.17
DISP 3.7.3GRP
17Where the Ombudsman is determining what amount (if any) constitutes fair compensation as a money award in relation to a relevant new complaint or a relevant transitional complaint, the Ombudsman Transitional Order and the Mortgages and General Insurance Complaints Transitional Order require him to take into account what amount (if any) might have been expected to be awarded by way of compensation in relation to an equivalent complaint dealt with under the former scheme in question
DISP 3.7.6GRP
17If the Ombudsman considers that fair compensation requires payment of a larger amount, he may recommend that the respondent pays the complainant the balance. The effect of section 404B(6) of the Act is that this is also the case in relation to a complaint the subject matter of which falls to be dealt with (or has properly been dealt with) under a consumer redress scheme.9

12Example 8

Example 8

Term extends beyond retirement age and policy reconstruction

Background

45 year old male non-smoker, having taken out a £50,000 loan in 1998 for a term of 25 years. Unsuitable sale identified on the grounds of affordability and complaint raised on 12th policy anniversary.

It has always been the intention of the complainant to retire at State retirement age 65.

Term from date of sale to retirement is 20 years and the maturity date of the mortgage is 5 years after retirement.

Established facts

Established premium paid by investor on policy of original term (25 years):

£81.20

Premium that would have been payable on policy with term from sale to retirement (20 years):

£111.20

Actual policy value at time complaint assessed:

£12,500

Value of an equivalent 20-year policy at time complaint assessed:

£21,300

Difference in policy values at time complaint assessed:

£8,800

Difference in outgoings (20 year policy - 25 year policy):

£4,320

Basis of compensation

The policy is reconstructed as if it had been set up originally on a term to mature at retirement age, in this example, a term of 20 years. The difference in the current value of the policy actually sold to the complainant and the current value of the reconstructed policy, as if the premium on the reconstructed policy had been paid from outset, is calculated. The complainant has gained from lower outgoings (lower premiums) of the actual endowment policy to date. In calculating the redress, the gain may be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to take account of the gain.

Redress generally if it is not unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from lower outgoings

Loss from current value of reconstructed policy less current value of actual policy:

(£8,800)

Gain from total lower outgoings under actual policy:

£4,320

Net loss:

(£4,480)

Therefore total redress is:

£4,480

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from current value of reconstructed policy less current value of actual policy:

(£8,800)

Gain from total lower outgoings under actual policy:

Ignored

Therefore total redress is:

£8,800

Additional Information

If the policy is capable of reconstruction, the complainant must now fund the higher premiums himself for the remainder of the term of the shortened policy until maturity. In this example the higher premium could be £111.20. However the firm should provide the complainant with a reprojection letter based on the reconstructed policy such that the actual monthly payment required to achieve the target sum could be even higher, say £130. The reprojection letter should set out the range of options facing the complainant to deal with the projected shortfall, if any.

12Example 9

Example 9

Term extends beyond retirement age: example of failure to explain investment risks

Background

45 year old male non-smoker, having taken out a £50,000 loan in 1998 for a term of 25 years. Unsuitable sale identified on the grounds of affordability and complaint raised on 12th anniversary.

It has always been the intention of the complainant to retire at state retirement age 65.

Term from date of sale to retirement is 20 years and the maturity date of the mortgage is five years after retirement.

In addition, an endowment does not meet the complainant's attitude to investment risk and a repayment mortgage would have been taken out if properly advised.

Established facts

Surrender value (on the 25 year policy) at time complaint assessed:

£12,500

Capital repaid under repayment mortgage of term to retirement date (20 years):

£21,000

Surrender value less capital repaid:

(£8.500)

Difference in outgoings (repayment - endowment):

£5,400

Cost of converting from endowment mortgage to repayment mortgage:

£200

Basis of compensation:

The surrender value of the (25 year term) endowment policy is compared to the capital that would have been repaid to date under a repayment mortgage arranged to repay the loan at retirement age, in this example, a repayment mortgage for a term of 20 years. The complainant has gained from lower outgoings of the endowment mortgage to date. In calculating the redress, the gain may be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to take account of the gain. The conversion costs are also taken into account in calculating the redress.

Redress generally

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£8,500)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

£5,400

Cost of converting to a repayment mortgage:

(£200)

Net loss:

(£3,300)

Therefore total redress is:

£3,300

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from surrender value less capital repaid:

(£8,500)

Gain from total lower outgoings under endowment mortgage:

Ignored

Cost of converting to a repayment mortgage:

(£8,700)

Therefore total redress is:

£8,700

SUP 18.2.38GRP
For any mutual company involved in the scheme, the report should:(1) describe the effect of the scheme on the proprietary rights of members of the company, including the significance of any loss or dilution of the rights of those members to secure or prevent further changes which could affect their entitlements as policyholders;(2) state whether, and to what extent, members will receive compensation under the scheme for any diminution of proprietary rights; and(3) comment on the
SUP 18.2.39GRP
For a scheme involving long-term insurance business, the report should:(1) describe the effect of the scheme on the nature and value of any rights of policyholders to participate in profits;(2) if any such rights will be diluted by the scheme, how any compensation offered to policyholders as a group (such as the injection of funds, allocation of shares, or cash payments) compares with the value of that dilution, and whether the extent and method of its proposed division is equitable
SUP 18.2.51GRP
The assessment is a continuing process, starting when the scheme promoters first approach the appropriate regulator8 about a proposed scheme. Each regulator will have an interest in assessing the scheme.8Among the considerations that may be relevant to both the depth of consideration each gives to, and each regulator's8 opinion on, a scheme are:88(1) the potential risk posed by the transfer to its statutory objectives8;8(2) the purpose of the scheme;(3) how the security of policyholders'
DISP App 3.9.4GRP
The firm should make any offer of redress to the complainant in a fair and balanced way. In particular, the firm should explain clearly to the complainant the basis for the redress offered including how any compensation is calculated and, where relevant, the rescheduling of the loan, and the consequences of accepting the offer of redress.
REC 3.10.1RRP
Where a UK recognised body's complaints investigator has investigated a complaint arising in connection with the performance of, or failure to perform, any of its regulatory functions, and that complaints investigator has made a recommendation in respect of that complaint that the UK recognised body should:(1) make a compensatory payment to any person; or(2) remedy the matter which was the subject of that complaint;the UK recognised body must immediately notify the FCA1of that
COBS 4.4.1RRP
A firm must ensure that any reference in advertising to an investor compensation scheme established under the Investor Compensation Directive is limited to a factual reference to the scheme. [Note: article 10(3) of the Investor Compensation Directive]
GEN 4.4.1RRP
(1) If, in any communication:(a) made to:222(i) 2(in relation to a non-investment insurance contract) aconsumer4;4(ii) 2(in relation to a home finance transaction) a customer; or(iii) 2(in all other cases) a retail client3; and3(b) in connection with a regulated activity carried on from an establishment of the firm (or its appointed representative) that is not in the United Kingdom;the firm indicates that it is an authorised person, it must also, where relevant, and with equal
COBS 20.2.24RRP
Subject to COBS 20.2.25 R, COBS 20.2.25A R and COBS 20.2.25B R, a1firm must not pay compensation or redress from a with-profits fund.11
COBS 20.2.25RRP
A proprietary1firm may pay compensation or redress due to a policyholder, or former policyholder, from assets attributable to shareholders, whether or not they are held within a long-term insurance fund.11
FEES 6.4.6ARRP
4The FSCS must allocate any specific costs levy:(1) first, amongst the relevant classes in proportion to the amount of relevant costs arising from the different activities for which firms in those classes have permission up to the levy limit of each relevant class. The FCA provider contribution classes are not relevant classes for this purpose; and(2) thereafter, where the levy limit has been reached (whether as a result of compensation costs or specific costs or both) for a class
MCOB 1.6.4RRP
If, notwithstanding the steps taken by a firm to comply with MCOB 1.6.3 R, it transpires that a mortgage which the firm has treated as unregulated is in fact a regulated mortgage contract, the firm must as soon as practicable after the correct status of the mortgage has been established:(1) contact the customer and provide him with the following information in a durable medium:(a) a statement that the mortgage contract is a regulated mortgage contract subject to FCA regulation,
DISP App 1.3.7GRP
12If the complainant takes the opportunity to increase his loan on the occasion of the remortgage, the expenses which a firm pays by way of compensation should be paid by reference to the capital sum due under the "old" loan.
CREDS 10.1.3GRP

Module

Relevance to Credit Unions

The Principles for Businesses (PRIN)

The Principles for Businesses (PRIN) set out, high-level requirements, some of which are imposed by the FCA and some by the PRA.12 They provide a general statement of regulatory requirements. The Principles apply to all12credit unions. In applying the Principles to credit unions, the appropriate regulator12 will be mindful of proportionality. In practice, the implications are likely to vary according to the size of the credit union.

121212

Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC)

SYSC 1 and SYSC 4 to 10 apply to all credit unions in respect of the carrying on of their regulated activities and unregulated activities in a prudential context. SYSC 18 applies to all credit unions without restriction.

Threshold Conditions (COND)

In order to become authorised under the Act all firms must meet the threshold conditions. The threshold conditions must be met on a continuing basis by credit unions. Failure to meet one of the conditions is sufficient grounds for the exercise by the appropriate regulator12 of its powers.

1212

Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER)

The purpose of the Statements of Principle contained in APER 2 is to provide guidance to approved persons in relation to the conduct expected of them in the performance of a controlled function. The Code of Practice for Approved Persons sets out descriptions of conduct which, in the opinion of the appropriate regulator12, do not comply with a Statement of Principle and, in the case of Statement of Principle 3, conduct which tends to show compliance within that statement.

12

The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons (FIT)

The purpose of FIT is to set out and describe the criteria that the appropriate regulator12 will consider when assessing the fitness and propriety of a person in respect of whom an application is being made for approval to undertake a controlled function under the approved persons regime. The criteria are also relevant in assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of persons who have already been approved.

12

General Provisions (GEN)

GEN contains rules and guidance on general matters, including interpreting the Handbook, statutory status disclosure, the appropriate regulator's12 logo and insurance against financial penalties.

Fees manual (FEES)

This manual sets out the fees applying to credit unions.

Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS)

A credit union which acts as a CTF provider or provides a cash-deposit ISA will need to be aware of the relevant requirements in COBS. COBS 4.6 (Past, simulated past and future performance), COBS 4.7.1 R (Direct offer financial promotions), COBS 4.10 (Systems and controls and approving and communicating financial promotions), COBS 13 (Preparing product information) and COBS 14 (Providing product information to clients) apply with respect to accepting deposits as set out in those provisions, COBS 4.1 and BCOBS.

Banking: Conduct of Business sourcebook (BCOBS)

BCOBS sets out rules and guidance for credit unions on how they should conduct their business with their customers. In particular there are rules and guidance relating to communications with banking customers and financial promotions (BCOBS 2), distance communications (BCOBS 3), information to be communicated to banking customers (BCOBS 4), post sale requirements (BCOBS 5), and cancellation (BCOBS 6). BCOBS 5.1.13 R (Value dating) does not apply to credit unions. The rules in BCOBS 3.1 that relate to distance contracts for accepting deposits are likely to have limited application to a credit union. This is because the Distance Marketing Directive only applies where there is "an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme run by the supplier" (Article 2(a)). If, therefore, the credit union normally operates face to face and has not set up facilities to enable customers to deal with it at a distance, such as facilities for a customer to deal with it purely by post, telephone, fax or the Internet, the provisions will not be relevant.

Supervision manual (SUP)

The following provisions of SUP are relevant to credit unions: 13SUP 1A13 (The appropriate regulator's12 approach to supervision), SUP 2 (Information gathering by the appropriate regulator12 on its own initiative), SUP 3.1 to SUP 3.8 (Auditors), SUP 5 (Skilled persons), SUP 6 (Applications to vary or cancel Part 4A12permission), SUP 7 (Individual requirements), SUP 8 (Waiver and modification of rules), SUP 9 (Individual guidance), 13SUP 10A and SUP 10B13 (Approved persons), SUP 11 (Controllers and Close links), SUP 15 (Notifications to the appropriate regulator12) and SUP 16 (Reporting Requirements).

Credit unions are reminded that they are subject to the requirements of the Act and SUP 11 on

controllers and close links, and are bound to notify the appropriate regulator12 of changes. It may be unlikely, in practice, that credit unions will develop such relationships. It is possible, however, that a person may acquire control of a credit union within the meaning of the Act by reason of holding the prescribed proportion of deferred shares in the credit union.

In relation to SUP 16, credit unions are exempted from the requirement to submit annual reports of

controllers and close links.

1212121212

Decision, Procedure and Penalties manual (DEPP)

DEPP is relevant to credit unions because it sets out:

(1) the FCA's12 decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5); and

(2) the FCA's12 policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties under the Act (see DEPP 6).

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Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP)

DISP sets out rules and guidance in relation to treating complainants fairly and the Financial Ombudsman Service.

Compensation (COMP)

COMP sets out rules relating to the scheme for compensating consumers when authorised firms are unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims against them.12

The Enforcement Guide (EG)

The Enforcement Guide (EG) describes the FCA's12 approach to exercising the main enforcement powers given to it by the Act and by regulation 12 of the Unfair Terms Regulations.

12

Financial crime: a guide for firms (FC)

FC provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime.

DISP 3.3.4RRP
The Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint without considering its merits if he considers that:(1) the complainant has not suffered (or is unlikely to suffer) financial loss, material distress or material inconvenience; or(2) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious; or(3) the complaint clearly does not have any reasonable prospect of success; or(4) the respondent has already made an offer of compensation (or a goodwill payment) which is:(a) fair and reasonable in relation to the circumstances
LR 10.2.6ARRP
3An arrangement is a break fee arrangement if the purpose of the arrangement is that a compensatory sum will become payable by a listed company to another party (or parties) to a proposed transaction if the proposed transaction fails or is materially impeded and there is no independent substantive commercial rationale for the arrangement.