Related provisions for SYSC 19C.3.45
1 - 20 of 54 items.
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
BIPRU Remuneration Code staff comprises categories of staff including senior management, risk-takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk-takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile.
A firm must: (1) maintain a record of its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in line with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its BIPRU Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the BIPRU Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure (as the description of suggested business lines in the first row may be most appropriate to a firm which deals on its own account to a significant extent);
- (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/remuneration-code
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. (3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members
(1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system. (2)
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions: (1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated: (a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in line with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
This Remuneration Principle underlines the link between a firm's variable remuneration costs and the need to manage its capital base, including forward-looking capital planning measures. Where a firm needs to strengthen its capital base, its variable remuneration arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to allow it to direct the necessary resources towards capital building.
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that: (1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in alignment with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of senior personnel; and(3) no variable remuneration
(1) Long-term incentive plans should be treated as pools of variable remuneration. Many common measures of performance for long-term incentive plans, such as earnings per share (EPS), are not adjusted for longer-term risk factors. Total shareholder return (TSR) includes dividend distributions in its measurement, which can also be based on unadjusted earnings data. If incentive plans mature within a two- to four-year period and are based on EPS or TSR, strategies can be devised
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk-alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. (2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
(1) A firm should not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration in hiring new BIPRU Remuneration Code staff (X) unless: (a) it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the remuneration is not more generous in its amount or terms (including any deferral or retention periods) than the variable remuneration awarded or offered by X’s previous employer; and(b) it is subject to appropriate performance adjustment requirements.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) Regarding SYSC 19C.3.47R (3), the 50% minimum threshold for instruments must be applied equally to the non-deferred and the deferred components; in other words, firms must apply the same chosen ratio between instruments and cash for their total variable remuneration to both the upfront and deferred components. (2) This simplified example illustrates the operation of (1). The variable remuneration of a material risk taker (X) is 100, and by SYSC 19C.3.49R (3) X is required
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period of not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount; or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
A firm must ensure that any variable remuneration, including a deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the firm as a whole, and justified according to the performance of the firm, the business unit and the individual concerned.[Note: Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
(1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum: (a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or(b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or(c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.(2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
A firm must:(1) maintain a record of its Remuneration Code staff in accordance with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and(2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
(1) A 3CRRfirm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must
(1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system.(2) The
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note:3article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19A.3.12 R, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note:3article 92(2)(f) of CRD]3
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of3members of its management body; and3(3) no
The appropriate regulator would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to 3members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to 3members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.33
(1) A firm must ensure that any measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components:(a) includes adjustments for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost and quantity of the capital and the liquidity required; and(b) takes into account the need for consistency with the timing and likelihood of the firm receiving potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings.(2) A
(1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.(2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.[Note:3article 94(1)(p) of CRD and Standard 14 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
In the appropriate regulator's view, circumstances in which a person will be using a personal hedging strategy include entering into an arrangement with a third party under which the third party will make payments, directly or indirectly, to that person that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the person'sremuneration is subject to reductions.
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator8 does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:8(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those
4A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:(1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and(2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance
A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans.3 A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:3(1) 3it is exceptional;(2) 3it occurs in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff;3(3) 3the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and3(4) 3it is limited to the first year of service.[Note:3article 94(1)(d) and (e) of CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation Standards]3
3A firm must ensure that remuneration packages relating to compensation for, or buy out from, an employee's contracts in previous employment align with the long term interests of the firm and are subject to appropriate retention, deferral and performance and clawback arrangements.[Note: article 94(1)(i) of CRD]
A firm must set appropriate ratios between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:(1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced;3(2) the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component3; and3(3) 3subject to SYSC 19A.3.44A
(1) A firm must ensure that a substantial portion, which is at least 50%, of any variable remuneration consists of an appropriate balance of:(a) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the firm concerned, or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments in the case of a non-listed firm; and(b) 3where possible other instruments which are eligible as Additional Tier 1 instruments or are eligible as Tier 2 instruments or other instruments
(1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years.(2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component: (a) of a particularly high amount, or(b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature,
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.(2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The appropriate regulator may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material
(1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules1 in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R1 apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:11(a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);(b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration); and(c) SYSC 19A Annex 1.7R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).(1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the appropriate regulator to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified
AIFM Remuneration Code staff comprise those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the AIFMs or of the AIFs the AIFM manages. This includes senior management, risk takers, control functions, and any employees receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
(1) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for AIFM Remuneration Code staff (inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits), an AIFM must comply with the AIFM remuneration principles in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities.(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to the requirement for significant AIFMs to have a remuneration committee (SYSC 19B.1.9 R).(3)
(1) An AIFM that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices, and the incentives created for managing risk.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the governing
(1) 2Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19B.1.4 R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both of the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are
(1) 2£500,000 is a particularly high amount for the purpose of SYSC 19B.1.18R (4).(2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the possibility of lower sums being considered a particularly high amount.(3) Whilst any variable remuneration component of £500,000 or more paid to AIFM Remuneration Code staff should be subject to 60% deferral, firms should also consider whether lesser amounts should be considered to be 'particularly high', taking account, for example, of whether there
There is power in the Act for the Treasury to specify the circumstances in which a person is or is not to be regarded as carrying on regulated activities by way of business. The Business Order has been made using this power (partly reflecting differences in the nature of the different activities). As such, the business test for insurance mediation activity is distinguished from the standard test for 'investment business' in article 3 of the Business Order. Under article 3(4) of
As regards PERG 5.4.2G (1), the Business Order does not provide a definition of 'remuneration', but, in the FCA's view, it has a broad meaning and covers both monetary and non-monetary rewards. This is regardless of who makes them. For example, where a person pays discounted premiums for his own insurance needs in return for bringing other business to an insurance undertaking, the discount would amount to remuneration for the purposes of the Business Order. Remuneration can also
As regards PERG 5.4.2G (2), in the FCA's view, for a person to take up or pursue insurance mediation activity by way of business, he will usually need to be carrying on those activities with a degree of regularity. The person will also usually need to be carrying on the activities for commercial purposes. That is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain a direct financial benefit of some kind. Activities carried on out of friendship or for altruistic purposes will not normally
PERG 5.4.8 G contains a table that summarises the main issues surrounding the business test as applied to insurance mediation activities and that may assist persons to determine whether they will need authorisation or exemption. The approach taken in the table involves identifying factors that, in the FCA's view, are likely to play a part in the analysis. Indicators are then given as to the significance of each factor to the person's circumstances. By analysing the indicators
Table: Carrying on insurance mediation activities 'for remuneration' and 'by way of business'
Carrying on insurance mediation activities 'for remuneration' and 'by way of business' |
||
'For remuneration' |
||
Factor |
Indicators that P does not carry on activities "for remuneration" |
Indicators that P does carry on activities "for remuneration" |
Direct remuneration, whether received from the customer or the insurer/broker (cash or benefits in kind such as tickets to the opera, a reduction in other insurance premiums, a remission of a debt or any other benefit capable of being measured in money's worth) |
P does not receive any direct remuneration specifically identified as a reward for his carrying on insurance mediation activities. |
P receives direct remuneration specifically identified as being a reward for his carrying on insurance mediation activities. |
Indirect remuneration (such as any form of economic benefit as may be explicitly or implicitly agreed between P and the insurer/broker or P's customer – including, for example, through the acceptance of P's terms and conditions or mutual recognition of the economic benefit that is likely to accrue to P). An indirect economic benefit can include expectation of making a profit of some kind as a result of carrying on insurance mediation activities as part of other services. |
P does not obtain any form of indirect remuneration through an economic benefit other than one which is not likely to have a material effect on P's ability to make a profit from his other activities. |
P obtains an economic benefit that: (a) is explicitly or implicitly agreed between P and the insurer/broker or P's customer; and (b) has the potential to go beyond mere cost recovery through fees or other benefits received for providing a package of services that includes insurance mediation activities but where no particular part of the fees is attributable to insurance mediation activities. This could include where insurance mediation activities are likely to:
P charges his customers a greater amount for other goods or services than would be the case if P were not also carrying on insurance mediation activities for those customers and this:
|
Recovery of costs |
P receives no benefits of any kind (direct or indirect) in respect of his insurance mediation activities beyond the reimbursement of his actual costs incurred in carrying on the activity (including receipt by P of a sum equal to the insurance premium that P is to pass on to the insurer or broker). |
P receives benefits of any kind (direct or indirect) in respect of his insurance mediation activities which go beyond the reimbursement of his actual costs incurred in carrying on the activity. |
'By way of business' |
||
Factor |
Indicators that P does not carry on activities "by way of business" |
Indicators that P does carry on activities "by way of business" |
Regularity/ frequency |
Involvement is one-off or infrequent (for instance, once or twice a year) provided that the transaction(s) is not of such size and importance that it is essential to the success of P's other business activities. Transactions do not result from formal arrangements (for instance, occasional involvement purely as a result of an unsolicited approach). |
Involvement is frequent (for instance, once a week). Involvement is infrequent but the transactions are of such size or importance that they are essential to the success of P's other business activities. P has formal arrangements which envisage transactions taking place on a regular basis over time (whether or not such transactions turn out in practice to be regular). |
Holding out |
P does not hold himself out as providing a professional service that includes insurance mediation activities (by professional is meant not the services of a layman). |
P holds himself out as providing a professional service that includes insurance mediation activities. |
Relevance to other activities/ business |
Insurance mediation activities:
|
Insurance mediation activities:
|
Commercial benefit |
P receives no direct or indirect pecuniary or economic benefit. P is a layman and acting in that capacity. P would not obtain materially less income from his main activities if they did not include |
P receives a direct or indirect pecuniary or economic benefit from carrying on insurance mediation activities – such as a fee, a benefit in kind or the likelihood of materially enhanced sales of other goods or services that P provides. P would obtain materially less income from his main activities if they did not include insurance mediation activities. |
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
6Article 72A exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a group personal pension scheme or a stakeholder pension scheme. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract
6Article 72C exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to work-related insurance. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
6Article 72D exempts any financial promotion made by an employer to an employee in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) where the provider of the staff mortgage is an undertaking in the same group as the employer, the employer must not receive or have received, any direct financial benefit (including any commission, discount, remuneration or reduction in premium) as a result of making the communication; and(2) where the communication
6Article 72E exempts any financial promotion made to an employee by or on behalf of a person (“A”) in relation to a staff mortgage. This is subject to certain requirements as follows:(1) the employer and A must have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication may be made;(2) in the case of a communication made by a person (“B”) on behalf of A, A and B must also have entered into a written contract specifying the terms on which the communication
A firm must apply the remuneration requirements in SYSC 19C.3 to: (1) remuneration awarded, whether under a contract or otherwise, on or after 1 January 2014; (2) remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before 1 January 2014 which is awarded or paid on or after 1 January 2014; and(3) remuneration awarded, but not yet paid, before 1 January 2014, for services provided in 2013.
(1) The BIPRU Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FCA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters, such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the BIPRU Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The appropriate regulator considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current
In order to enable the compliance function to discharge its responsibilities properly and independently, a common platform firm and a management company8 must ensure that the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the compliance function must have the necessary authority, resources, expertise and access to all relevant information;(2) a compliance officer must be appointed and must be responsible for the compliance function and for any reporting as to compliance required by SYSC
1The purpose of this section is to ensure that the appropriate regulator10 receives regular and comprehensive information about remuneration in a standard format to assist it to benchmark remuneration trends and practices and to collect remuneration information on high earners. It also takes account of the Capital Requirements (Amendment) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/917) together with the European Banking Authority's Guidelines to article 22(3) and (5) of the Banking Consolidation
(1) A firm to which this rule applies must submit a High Earners Report to the appropriate regulator10 annually.10(2) The firm must submit that report to the appropriate regulator10 within four months of the end of the firm'saccounting reference date.10(3) A firm that is not part of a UK lead regulated group must complete that report on an unconsolidated basis in respect of remuneration awarded in the last completed financial year to all high earners of the firm who mainly undertook
The E-Commerce Directive removes restrictions on the cross-border provision of services by electronic means, introducing a country of origin approach to regulation. This requires EEA States to impose certain requirements on the outward provision of such services and to lift them from inward providers. The E-Commerce Directive defines an e-commerce service (termed an information society service) as any service, normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means,
The E-Commerce Directive does not remove the IMD requirement for persons taking up or pursuing insurance mediation for remuneration to be registered in their Home State. Nor does it remove the requirement for EEA-based intermediaries to acquire passporting rights in order to establish branches in the United Kingdom (see PERG 5.12.7 G (Where is insurance mediation carried on?) in relation to electronic commerce activity carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom) or
(1) The removal of the exclusion for groups and joint enterprises in article 69 of the Regulated Activities Order (Groups and joint enterprises) may have implications for a company providing services for:(a) other members of its group; or(b) other participants in a joint enterprise of which it is a participant.(2) Such companies might typically provide risk or treasury management or administration services which may include regulated activities relating to a contract of insurance.
Article 4(4A) of the Regulated Activities Order (Specified activities: general) disapplies certain exclusions where a person, for remuneration, takes up or pursues insurance mediation (as defined in article 2.3 of the IMD (see PERG 5.2.5 G (Approach to implementation of the IMD) and PERG 5.16.2 G (Text of article 2.3 of the Insurance Mediation Directive)) in relation to a risk or commitment located in an EEA state. The relevant exclusions which are disapplied are:(1) arrangements
If a firm ceases to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes54 part way through a financial year4 of the compensation scheme:4(1) it will remain liable for any unpaid levies which the FSCS has already made on the firm; and41(2) the FSCS may make one or more levies4 upon it (which may be before or after the firm5 has ceased to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes5,4 but must be before it ceases to be an authorised
3(1) A firm must apply the remuneration requirements in SYSC 19A.3 other than SYSC 19A.3.44 R (3) and SYSC 19A.3.44A R in relation to:(a) remuneration awarded, whether pursuant to a contract or otherwise, on or after 1 January 2011;3(b) remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before 1 January 2011 which is awarded or paid on or after 1 January 2011; and3(c) remuneration awarded, but not yet paid, before 1 January 2011, for services provided in 2010.3[Note: article
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the 3CRD which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices on
13In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee must, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings.[Note: article 76(4) of CRD]
(1) An annual long report on an authorised fund, other than a scheme which is an umbrella, must contain:(a) the accounts for the annual accounting period which must be prepared in accordance with the requirements of the IMA SORP;3(b) the report of the authorised fund manager in accordance with COLL 4.5.9 R (Authorised fund manager's report);(c) the comparative table in accordance with COLL 4.5.10 R (Comparative table);(d) the report of the depositary in accordance with COLL 4.5.11
The result of the amendments made to the meaning of the business test in section 22 of the Act is that the test differs depending on the activity in question. Where the regulated activities of advising on investments and advising on a home finance transaction1 are concerned, the business test is not to be regarded as satisfied unless a person carries on the business of engaging in those activities. This is a narrower test than that of carrying on regulated activities by way of
In the FCA's view, for a person to be carrying on the business of advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction1 he will usually need to be doing so with a degree of regularity and for commercial purposes – that is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain some kind of a direct or indirect financial benefit. But, in the FCA's view it is not necessarily the case that advice provided free of charge will not amount to a business. Advice is often given 'free'
A person carrying on certain regulated activities does not require authorisation in specified circumstances if he is acting in a representative capacity. The representative capacities covered by the exclusions depend on the regulated activity concerned but, in most cases, the focus is on persons who are acting as trustee or personal representative. In broad terms, the exclusions apply to specified transactions, or activities, that are part of the discharge of his general obligations
The exclusions apply where the regulated activity is carried out in the course of a profession or business which does not otherwise consist of the carrying on of regulated activities in the United Kingdom. However, activities are only excluded to the extent that they may reasonably be regarded as a necessary part of the other services provided in the course of the profession or business. The exclusion does not apply if separate remuneration is received in respect of any regulated
3A firm must disclose the following information, including regular, at least annual, updates, regarding its remuneration policy and practices for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile:(1) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, including if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services