Related provisions for LR 10.1.5
241 - 260 of 719 items.
So-called 'mortgage clubs' or 'wholesalers' essentially act as a distribution function for lenders, providing information to intermediaries about current deals available from a range of lenders. They provide information (often through an electronic sourcing system) in a way that helps intermediaries search the market effectively and, as such, do not deal directly with individual borrowers. If only engaged in these activities and without direct contact with individual borrowers,
So-called 'mortgage packaging companies' may undertake certain parts of the mortgage process for lenders on an outsourced basis, ensuring that a complete set of documentation is collated and sent to the lender. This might include receiving application forms from intermediaries, undertaking credit reference checks and instructing a valuer. Other activities might include a product placement service for other intermediaries who provide product advice or recommendations to their clients.
The term 'broker packagers' is typically used to describe intermediaries who either market their services directly to borrowers or who offer other intermediaries a complete mortgage outsourcing service. They are often involved in the sales and advice process, including helping the borrower complete application forms. In the FCA's view, broker packagers carrying on these types of activity in direct contact with the borrower are likely to be carrying on the regulated activities
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
Where the parent undertaking intends to benefit from the exemptions only in relation to the financial instruments referred to in Article 13 of the TD, it shall (in relation to financial instruments giving an entitlement to acquire shares which are admitted to trading on a regulated market) notify to the FCA only the list referred to in paragraph (1) of DTR 5.4.4 R.[Note: article 10(3) of the TD implementing Directive]
A parent undertaking of a management company or of an investment firm must in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that:1(1) the organisational structures of the parent undertaking and the management company or investment firm are such that the voting rights are exercised independently of the parent undertaking;(2) the persons who decide how the voting rights are exercised
A parent undertaking of a third country undertaking must comply with the notification requirements in DTR 5.4.4 R (1) and DTR 5.4.5 R and in addition: (1) must make a statement that in respect of each management company or investment firm concerned, the parent undertaking complies with the conditions of independence set down in DTR 5.4.10 R; and (2) must1 be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that the requirements of DTR 5.4.6 R are respected.[Note: article 23 of the TD
4The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
3(1) A firm must have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing systems.8(2) 8A BIPRU firm and a third country
The matters dealt with in a business continuity policy should include:(1) resource requirements such as people, systems and other assets, and arrangements for obtaining these resources;(2) the recovery priorities for the firm's operations; (3) communication arrangements for internal and external concerned parties (including the appropriate regulator, clients and the press);(4) escalation and invocation plans that outline the processes for implementing the business continuity
A common platform firm and a management company10 must establish, implement and maintain accounting policies and procedures that enable it, at the request of the appropriate regulator, to deliver in a timely manner to the appropriate regulator financial reports which reflect a true and fair view of its financial position and which comply with all applicable accounting standards and rules.[Note: article 5(4) of the MiFID implementing Directive and article 4(4) of the UCITS implementing
1This
chapter applies to:(1) a MiFID
investment firm;(2) a third country investment firm; and to(3) a person who
is the operator of an approved reporting
mechanism or of a regulated
market or MTF that
is used by a firm to report transactions to the FCA; and(4) a firm acting in its capacity as
a manager or operator of:(a) a collective investment undertaking;
or(b) a pension
scheme; or(c) an occupational
pension scheme; or(d) a personal
pension scheme; or(e) a stakeholder
pension
2In
line with guidance from CESR, the FCA acknowledges that, from a practical
point of view, it would be burdensome for branches of investment firms to be obliged to report
their transactions to two competent authorities. Therefore, all transactions executed by branches may
be reported to the competent authority of
the Host State, if the investment firm elects to do so. In these
cases transaction reports should
follow the rules of the competent authority to
which the report is
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FCA2 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA2 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA2 may do this include:222(a) where the FCA2 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;2(b) where previous FCA2 action in respect of similar breaches has failed
The FCA2 and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA2 and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.22
COND gives guidance on the threshold conditions. The FCA3threshold conditions represent the minimum conditions for which the FCA is responsible,3 which a firm is required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retainPart 4A permission. A PRA-authorised person or, as appropriate, a firm seeking to become a PRA-authorised person must also satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the threshold conditions for which the PRA is responsible in order to be given and
(1) Under section 55B(3) of the Act3, in giving or varying a Part 4A permission,3 imposing or varying any requirement or giving consent3, the FCA3 must ensure that the firm concerned will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the FCA3threshold conditions in relation to all of the regulated activities for which it has or will have permission.(2) If, however, the applicant for permission is an incoming firm seeking top-up permission, or variation of top-up permission, under Part 4A3
(1) If, among other things, a firm is failing to satisfy any of the FCA3threshold conditions, or is likely to fail to do so, the FCA3 may exercise its own-initiative powers under either section 55J (Variation or cancellation on initiative of regulator) or section 55L (Imposition of requirements by FCA) of the Act3. Use of the FCA's own-initiative powers3 is explained in SUP 7 (Individual requirements), and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FCA's3 own initiative
(1) Under section 185 of the Act (Assessment: general) the FCA may, subject to consultation with the PRA where the conditions in section 187B of the Act are satisfied, object to an acquisition of an FCA-authorised person if there are reasonable grounds to do so on the basis of the matters set out in section 186 of the Act (Assessment: criteria) or if the information provided by the section 178 notice giver is incomplete. Section 186(d) of the Act (Assessment: criteria) specifies
Section 80 (1) of the Act (general duty of disclosure in listing
particulars) requires listing particulars submitted
to the FCA to contain all such information as investors
and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect
to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of:(1) the assets and liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of
the securities; and(2) the rights attaching to the securi
A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific
information in a particular case must:(1) be in writing from the issuer;(2) identify the specific information
concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the issuer's opinion
one or more of the grounds in section 82 of the Act applies.
The FCA2 will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case when it
determines the length of the period of suspension or restriction (if any)
that is appropriate for the breach concerned,
and is also a sufficient deterrent. Set out below is a list of factors that
may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these
factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors,
not listed, that are relevant.2
The following factors may be relevant
to determining the appropriate length of the period of suspension or restriction
to be imposed on a person under
the Act:(1) DeterrenceWhen determining
the appropriate length of the period of suspension or restriction, the FCA2 will
have regard to the principal purpose for which it imposes sanctions, namely
to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from
committing further
The FCA2 may delay the commencement of the period of suspension or restriction.
In deciding whether this is appropriate, the FCA2 will take into account all the circumstances of a case. Considerations
that may be relevant in respect of an authorised
person, sponsor or primary
information provider2 include:22(1) the impact of the suspension or
restriction on consumers;(2) any practical measures the authorised person, sponsor or primary information provider2 needs to take before
1The FCA2 and
the person on whom a suspension
or restriction is to be imposed may seek to agree the length of the period
of suspension or restriction and other terms. In recognition of the benefits
of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the length of a period of suspension or restriction
which might otherwise have been imposed will be reduced to reflect the stage
at which the FCA2 and
the person concerned reached
an agreement.22
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions
The FCA's3 general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:3(1) the FCA3 has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and2132(2) the FCA's3 supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives. 3
A firm does not have to give notice to the appropriate regulator5 under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:5(1) the appropriate regulator;5 or5(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Article
(1) 3A firm must, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, regularly provide the appropriate regulator with details on the financial conglomerate's legal structure and governance and organisational structure, including all regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches.(2) A firm must disclose publicly, at the level of the EEA financial conglomerate, on an annual basis, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description
Sections 250 and 261L11 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FCA12 to waive the application of certain rules in COLL to:111210(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT, ACS11 or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT, ACS11 or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT), the authorised contractual scheme manager and depositary (in the case of an ACS)11 or the ICVC and
In the FCA's view, for a person to be carrying on the business of advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction1 he will usually need to be doing so with a degree of regularity and for commercial purposes – that is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain some kind of a direct or indirect financial benefit. But, in the FCA's view it is not necessarily the case that advice provided free of charge will not amount to a business. Advice is often given 'free'
In other circumstances, advice issued remotely may still be given in the United Kingdom. For example, the FCA considers that advice is given in the United Kingdom if:(1) it is contained in a non-UK periodical that is posted in hard copy to persons in the United Kingdom;(2) it is contained in a non-UK periodical (or given in or by way of a service) which is made available electronically to such persons.
Many people may be involved in the production of a periodical publication, news service or broadcast. But if the regulated activity of advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction1 is being carried on so that authorisation is required, the FCA's view is that the person carrying on the activity (and who will require authorisation) is the person whose business it is to have the editorial control over the content. In the case of a periodical publication, this
(1) 6A must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that A provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which A’s business is organised;(d) if A is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
(1) 6B must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that B provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which B’s business is organised;(d) if B is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
6The guidance in COND 2.3 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2C of Schedule 6 of the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, paragraph 3B of Schedule 6 of the Act.
In assessing the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2C and 3B of Schedule 6 to the Act6, factors which the FCA6 will take into consideration include, among other things, whether: 6(1) it is likely that the FCA6 will receive adequate information from the firm, and those persons with whom the firm has close links, to enable it to determine whether the firm is complying with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system for which the FCA is responsible6 and to
(1) This section deals with the circumstances and manner in which an AUT is to be wound up or a sub-fund of an AUT is to be terminated. Under section 256 of the Act (Requests for revocation of authorisation order), the manager or trustee of an AUT may request the FCA to revoke the authorisation order in respect of that AUT. Section 257 of the Act (Directions) gives the FCA the power to make certain directions.(2) The termination of a sub-fund under this section will be subject
1This table belongs to COLL 7.4.1 G (4) (Explanation of COLL 7.4)
Summary of the main steps in winding up an AUT or terminating a sub-fund under FCArules Notes: N = Notice to be given to the FCA under section 251 of the Act. E = commencement of winding up or termination W/U = winding up FAP = final accounting period (COLL 7.4.5 R (4)) |
|||
Step number |
Explanation |
When |
|
1 |
Receive FCA approval |
N + one month On receipt of notice from the FCA |
Section 251 of the Act |
2 |
Normal business ceases; notify unitholders |
E |
7.4.3R |
3 |
Trustee to realise and distribute proceeds |
ASAP after E |
7.4.4R(1) to (5) |
4 |
Within 4 months of FAP |
7.4.5R(5) |
|
5 |
Request FCA to revoke relevant authorisation order |
On completion of W/U |
7.4.4R(6) |
(1) Where COLL 7.4.3 R (2) (f) applies, the trustee must cancel all units in issue and1 wind up the AUT or terminate the sub-fund in accordance with the approved scheme of arrangement.(2) In any other case falling within COLL 7.4.3 R:(a) once the AUT falls to be wound up or sub-fund terminated, the trustee must realise the scheme property;(b) after paying out or retaining adequate provision for all liabilities payable and for the costs of the winding up or termination, the trustee
(1) For any annual or half-yearly accounting period which begins1 after commencement of the winding up or termination, the manager is not required to prepare a short report (COLL 4.5.13 R (Provision of short report)), provided that it has reasonably determined1 that the report is not required in the interests of the unitholders.11(1A) The manager must consult the trustee before determining that a short report is not required in the interests of unitholders.1(2) Where (1) applies,
Neither assisting in the administration nor assisting in the performance of a contract alone will fall within this activity. Generally, an activity will either amount to assisting in the administration or assisting in the performance but not both. Occasionally, however, an activity may amount to both assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance. For example, where a person assists a claimant in filling in a claims form, in the FCA's view this amounts
Put another way, where an intermediary's assistance in filling in a claims form is material to whether performance takes place of the contractual obligation to notify claims, it is more likely to amount to assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance. Conversely, in the FCA's view, a person who merely gives pointers about how to fill in the claims form or merely supplies information in support of a claim will not be assisting in the performance of
More generally, an example of an activity that, in the FCA's view, is likely to amount to assisting a policyholder in both the administration and the performance of a contract of insurance is notifying a claim under a policy and then providing evidence in support of the claim, or helping negotiate its settlement on the policyholder's behalf. Notifying an insurance undertaking of a claim assists the policyholder in discharging his contractual obligation to do so (assisting in the
Where a person receives funds on behalf of a policyholder in settlement of a claim, in the FCA's view, the act of receipt is likely to amount to assisting in the performance of a contract. By giving valid receipt, the person assists the insurance undertaking to discharge its contractual obligation to provide compensation to the policyholder. He may also be assisting the policyholder to discharge any obligations he may have under the contract to provide valid receipt of funds,
2The FCA3 will seek to deprive an individual of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA3 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit. Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breaching FCA3rules or other requirements of the regulatory system and the individual’s breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA3
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of an individual’s “relevant income”. “Relevant income” will be the gross amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with which the breach occurred (the “relevant employment”), and for the period of the breach. In determining an individual’s relevant income, “benefits” includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, pension contributions, share options and share schemes;
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the individual in bringing (or
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar breaches
The FCA3 and the individual on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA3 and the individual concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step
(1) Every credit union must send to the PRA a copy of its audited accounts published in accordance with section 3A of the Friendly and Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1968 or provided in accordance with article 49 of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985.1(2) The accounts must: (a) be made up for the period beginning with the date of the credit union's registration or with the date to which the credit union's last annual accounts were made up, whichever is the
1To comply with paragraph 130 of the ESMA recommendations,2 the FCA would expect a valuation report for a property company to be in accordance with either:12(1) the Appraisal and Valuation Standards (5th edition) issued by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors; or(2) the International Valuation Standards (7th edition) issued by the International Valuation Standards Committee.
The deterrent effect and impact
on a person of a suspension
or restriction, by itself or in combination with a financial penalty, may
be greater than where only a financial penalty is imposed. The FCA1 will consider the overall impact and deterrent effect of the
sanctions it imposes when determining the level of penalty and the length
of suspension or restriction.1
The FCA1 expects usually to take the following approach in respect of
the interaction between a suspension or restriction and a financial penalty
or public censure:1(1) The FCA1 will determine which sanction, or combination of sanctions, is
appropriate for the breach.1(2) If the FCA1, following the approach set out in DEPP 6.2, considers it appropriate
to impose a financial penalty, it will calculate the appropriate level of
the financial penalty, following the approach set out
The FCA1 may depart from the approach set out in DEPP 6A.4.2 G.
For example, the FCA1 may
at the outset consider that a financial penalty is the only appropriate sanction
for a breach but, having determined
the appropriate level of financial penalty, may consider it appropriate to
reduce the amount of the financial penalty for serious financial hardship
reasons. In such a situation, the FCA1 may consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction
even if the FCA1 at
the