Related provisions for REC 6.5.1
81 - 100 of 362 items.
A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted by an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself. But where the open-ended investment company is incorporated outside the United Kingdom, it will
(1) 8Part VII of the Act prescribes certain statutory functions in relation to insurance business transfer schemes for both the PRA and the FCA. In accordance with the Act, the PRA and the FCA maintain a Memorandum of Understanding, which describes each regulator’s role in relation to the exercise of its functions under the Act relating to matters of common regulatory interest and how each regulator intends to ensure the coordinated exercise of such functions. Under the Memorandum
An ROIE1 is required to notify the FCA1 of certain events and give information to it on a regular basis and when certain specified events occur. Section 295 of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) requires each ROIE1 to provide the FCA1 with a report (at least once a year) which contains:111(1) a statement as to whether any events have occurred which are likely to affect the FCA's assessment of whether it is satisfied that the ROIE
The FCA1 would not normally seek to gather information using the methods described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4 in a situation where the FCA1 could not have obtained it under the powers in Part XI of the Act (Information Gathering and Investigations). In particular, the limitations in the following sections of the Act are relevant to this chapter:11(1) section 175(5) (Information and documents: supplementary powers) under which no person may be required under Part XI of the Act (Information
When the FCA1 obtains confidential information using the methods of information gathering described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4, it is obliged under Part XXIII of the Act (Public Record, Disclosure of Information and Co-operation) to treat that information as confidential. The FCA1 will not disclose confidential information without lawful authority, for example if an exception applies under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disclosure of Confidential Information) Regulations
This guidance is issued under section 139A of the Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance and the circumstances contemplated by it, then the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates.
Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance given by the FCA. This guidance represents the FCA's view, and does not bind the courts, for example, in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of the general prohibition on carrying on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom without authorisation (see sections 26 to 29 of the Act (Enforceability of Agreements)).
A firm should satisfy itself that the terms of the contract with its appointed representative (including an introducer appointed representative):(1) are designed to enable the firm to comply properly with any limitations or requirements on its own permission;(2) require the appointed representative to cooperate with the FCA as described in SUP 2.3.4 G (Information gathering by the FCA on its own initiative: cooperation by firms) and give access to its premises, as described in
1If the FCA concludes that it should grant an FCA-authorised person's application for cancellation of permission and end its authorisation, the FCA will:(1) cancel the firm'sPart 4A permission under section 55H(3) of the Act;(2) withdraw the firm'sauthorised status under section 33(2) of the Act by giving the firm a direction in writing; and(3) update the firm's entry in the Financial Services Register to show it has ceased to be authorised.
Section 236(3) of the Act states clearly that the investment condition must be met 'in relation to BC'. In the FCA's view, this means that the investment condition should not be applied rigidly in relation to specific events such as particular issues of shares or securities or in relation to particular points in time. The requirements of the investment condition must be satisfied in relation to the overall impression of the body corporate itself, having regard to all the circ
The FCA's views on the following three elements of the investment condition are explained separately:(1) the 'reasonable investor' (see PERG 9.7 (The investment condition: the 'reasonable investor'));(2) the 'expectation' test (see PERG 9.8 (The investment condition: the 'expectation test' (section 236(3)(a) of the Act))); and(3) the 'satisfaction' test (see PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act)).
(1) Section 55C of the Financial Services Act 2012 (Power to amend Schedule 6) gave HM Treasury the power to amend Schedule 6 of the Act. HM Treasury exercised this power by making The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Threshold Conditions) Order 2013 which entered into force on 1 April 2013 (the "TC Order"). The TC Order's main result is the creation of four sets of threshold conditions, namely:(i) conditions for firms authorised and regulated by the FCA only (paragraphs
(1) As a result of the new legal framework for threshold conditions described in COND 1.1A.1G (1), PRA-authorised persons and firms seeking to become PRA-authorised persons are subject to two sets of threshold conditions:(i) the FCA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(ii)and(ii) one of the two PRA-specific conditions referred to in COND 1.1A.1G (1)(iii) or (iv), depending on the PRA-regulated activities which the PRA-authorised person or firm carries on, or is
The FCA will
adopt a pre-emptive approach which will be based on making forward-looking
judgments about firms' business
models, product strategy and how they run their businesses, to enable the FCA to identify and intervene earlier to
prevent problems crystallising. The FCA's approach
to supervising firms will contribute
to its delivery against its objective to protect and enhance the integrity
of the UK financial system (as
set out in the Act). Where the FCA has responsibilities
While respecting each regulator's
different statutory objectives and
mandates, in undertaking its supervisory activity the FCA will
co-ordinate and co-operate with the PRA as
required and necessary in the interests of the effective and efficient supervision
of regulated firms and individuals.
Both regulators will coordinate with each other as required under the Act, including on the exchange of information
relevant to each regulator's individual objectives. However, the FCA and
In assessing whether to terminate a relationship with an appointed representative, a firm should be aware that the notification rules in SUP 15 require notification to be made immediately to the FCA if certain events occur. Examples include a matter having a serious regulatory impact or involving an offence or a breach of any requirement imposed by the Act or by regulations or orders made under the Act by the Treasury.
A public sector issuer that seeks admission of debt securities referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Schedule 11A of the Act must submit to the FCA in final form a completed Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List.Note: The Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List form can be found on the UKLA section of the FCA's website.1
Firms are reminded that section 398 of the Act (Misleading the FCA or PRA:9 residual cases) makes it an offence for a firm knowingly or recklessly to provide the appropriate regulator9 with information which is false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the appropriate regulator's9rules or any other requirement imposed by or under the Act. An offence by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association may be attributed to an officer or
In cases against individuals, including market abuse cases, the FCA3 may make a prohibition order under section 56 of the Act or withdraw an individual’s approval under section 63 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 reflects the FCA's3 assessment of the individual’s fitness to perform regulated activity or suitability for a particular role, and does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach.
2The FCA3 may withdraw a firm’s authorisation under section 33 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach. However, the fact that the FCA3 has withdrawn a firm’s authorisation, as a result of which the firm may have less earning potential, may be relevant in assessing whether the penalty will cause the firm serious financial hardship.3333
1The rights and duties of auditors are set out in SUP 3.8 (Rights and duties of all auditors) and SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: notification and report on client assets). SUP 3.8.10 G also refers to the auditor's statutory duty to report certain matters to the FCA imposed by regulations made by the Treasury under sections 342(5) and 343(5) of the Act (information given by auditor or actuary to a regulator). An auditor should bear these rights and duties in mind when carrying out
An important part of the conclusion in PERG 6.7.5 G was that, although the provider assumed a risk at the outset of the contract, looking at the contract as a whole and interpreting the common law in the context of the FCA objectives (see PERG 6.5.2 G and PERG 6.5.3 G) there was no relevant assumption of risk.(1) The presence or absence of an assumption of risk is an important part of the statutory rationale for the prudential regulation of insurance.(2) In Medical Defence Union