Related provisions for SYSC 14.1.27

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10A.7.1 R17) and an application must be made under section 59 of the Act for approval of the individual before the function is performed. There are exceptions from this in SUP 10A.117 (Approved persons - Application).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The appropriate regulator considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R). Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 4.4 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R(2) and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R restrict the application of SYSC 4.4.5 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the appropriate regulator, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The appropriate regulator envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1).

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?

SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.

Correction of box management errors

1

Controls by authorised fund managers

An authorised fund manager needs to be able to demonstrate that it has effective controls over:

(1)

its calculations of what units are owned by it (its 'box'); and

(2)

compliance with COLL 6.2.8 R which is intended to prevent a negative box.

2

Controls by depositaries

(1)

Under COLL 6.6.4 (General duties of the depositary), a depositary should take reasonable care to ensure that a scheme2 is managed in accordance with COLL 6.2 (Dealing) and COLL 6.3 (Pricing and valuation).

(2)

A depositary should therefore make a regular assessment of the authorised fund manager's box management procedures (including supporting systems) and controls. This should include reviewing the authorised fund manager's controls and procedures when the depositary assumes office, on any significant change and on a regular basis, to ensure that a series of otherwise minor changes do not have a cumulative and a significant effect on the accuracy of the controls and procedures.

3

Recording and reporting of box management errors

(1)

An authorised fund manager should record all errors which result in a breach of COLL 6.2.8 R (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units) and as soon as an error is discovered, the authorised fund manager should report the fact to the depositary, together with details of the action taken, or to be taken, to avoid repetition of the error.

(2)

A depositary should report material box management errors to the FCA immediately. Materiality should be determined by taking into account a number of factors including:

• the implications of the error for the sufficiency of controls put into place by the authorised fund manager;
• the significance of any breakdown in the authorised fund manager's management controls or other checking procedures;
• the significance of any failure of systems or back-up arrangements;
• the duration of an error; and
• the level of compensation due to the scheme, and an authorised fund manager's ability (or otherwise) to meet claims for compensation in full.

(3)

A depositary should also make a return to the FCA (in the manner prescribed by SUP 16.6.8 R) on a quarterly basis.

REC 2.2.2 G to REC 2.2.7 G (Relevant circumstances and Outsourcing)

Reg 13

REC 2.3.3 G to REC 2.3.9 G (Financial resources)

Reg 14

REC 2.4.3 G to REC 2.4.6 G (Suitability)

In addition to the matters set out in REC 2.4.3 G to REC 2.4.6 G, the FCA3 will have regard to whether a key individual has been allocated responsibility for overseeing the auction platform of the UK recognised body.

Reg 15

REC 2.5.3 G to REC 2.5.20 G (Systems and controls and conflicts) and REC 2.5A (Guidance on Public Interest Disclosure Act: Whistleblowing)

Reg 16 and 17(2)(f)1

REC 2.6.26 G to REC 2.6.34 G (Safeguards for investors)

Reg 17

REC 2.7.3 G to REC 2.7.4 G (Access to facilities)

The FCA3 shall have regard to whether an RAP provides access to bid at auctions only to those persons eligible to bid under article 18 of the auction regulation.

Reg 17(2)(a) and1 20

REC 2.8.3 G to REC 2.8.4 G (Settlement and clearing services)

Reg 17(2)(d) and 21

REC 2.9.3 G to REC 2.9.4 G (Transaction recording)

Reg 17(2)(e)

REC 2.10.3 G to REC 2.10.4 G (Financial crime and market abuse)

Reg 17(2)(g)

REC 2.11.3 G to REC 2.11.4 G (Custody)

REC 2.11.4 G is replaced with the following for an RAP:

Where an RAP arranges for other persons to provide services for the safeguarding and administration services of assets belonging to users of its facilities, it will also need to satisfy the RAP recognition requirement in regulation 17(2)(h) of the RAP regulations (see REC 2A.2.1 UK).

Reg 17(2)(h)

REC 2.12.11 G to REC 2.12.12 G (Availability of relevant information)

REC 2.12.11 G to REC 2.12.12 G are replaced with the following for an RAP:

REC 2.12.11 G

In determining whether appropriate arrangements have been made to make relevant information available to persons engaged in dealing in emissions auction products2 the FCA3 may have regard to:

(1) the extent to which auction bidders are able to obtain information in a timely fashion about the terms of those emissions auction products2 and the terms on which they will be auctioned, either through accepted channels for dissemination of information or through other regularly and widely accessible communication media;

(2) what restrictions, if any, there are on the dissemination of relevant information to auction bidders; and

(3) whether relevant information is, or can be, kept to restricted groups of persons in such a way as to facilitate or encourage market abuse.

REC 2.12.12 G

An RAP does not need to maintain its own arrangements for providing information on the terms of emissions auction products2 to auction bidders where it has made adequate arrangements for other persons to do so on its behalf or there are other effective and reliable arrangements for this purpose.

Reg 17(2)(c)

REC 2.13.3 G to REC 2.13.6 G (Promotion and maintenance of standards)

Reg 18

REC 2.14.3 G to REC 2.14.6 G (Rules and consultation)

Reg 19

REC 2.15.3 G to REC 2.15.6 G (Discipline)

Reg 22

REC 2.16.3 G to REC 2.16.4 G (Complaints)

Reg 23

The Principles for Businesses (PRIN)

The Principles for Businesses (PRIN) set out, high-level requirements, some of which are imposed by the FCA and some by the PRA.12 They provide a general statement of regulatory requirements. The Principles apply to all12credit unions. In applying the Principles to credit unions, the appropriate regulator12 will be mindful of proportionality. In practice, the implications are likely to vary according to the size of the credit union.

Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC)

SYSC 1 and SYSC 4 to 10 apply to all credit unions in respect of the carrying on of their regulated activities and unregulated activities in a prudential context. SYSC 18 applies to all credit unions without restriction.

Threshold Conditions (COND)

In order to become authorised under the Act all firms must meet the threshold conditions. The threshold conditions must be met on a continuing basis by credit unions. Failure to meet one of the conditions is sufficient grounds for the exercise by the appropriate regulator12 of its powers.

Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER)

The purpose of the Statements of Principle contained in APER 2 is to provide guidance to approved persons in relation to the conduct expected of them in the performance of a controlled function. The Code of Practice for Approved Persons sets out descriptions of conduct which, in the opinion of the appropriate regulator12, do not comply with a Statement of Principle and, in the case of Statement of Principle 3, conduct which tends to show compliance within that statement.

The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons (FIT)

The purpose of FIT is to set out and describe the criteria that the appropriate regulator12 will consider when assessing the fitness and propriety of a person in respect of whom an application is being made for approval to undertake a controlled function under the approved persons regime. The criteria are also relevant in assessing the continuing fitness and propriety of persons who have already been approved.

General Provisions (GEN)

GEN contains rules and guidance on general matters, including interpreting the Handbook, statutory status disclosure, the appropriate regulator's12 logo and insurance against financial penalties.

Fees manual (FEES)

This manual sets out the fees applying to credit unions.

Conduct of Business sourcebook (COBS)

A credit union which acts as a CTF provider or provides a cash-deposit ISA will need to be aware of the relevant requirements in COBS. COBS 4.6 (Past, simulated past and future performance), COBS 4.7.1 R (Direct offer financial promotions), COBS 4.10 (Systems and controls and approving and communicating financial promotions), COBS 13 (Preparing product information) and COBS 14 (Providing product information to clients) apply with respect to accepting deposits as set out in those provisions, COBS 4.1 and BCOBS.

Banking: Conduct of Business sourcebook (BCOBS)

BCOBS sets out rules and guidance for credit unions on how they should conduct their business with their customers. In particular there are rules and guidance relating to communications with banking customers and financial promotions (BCOBS 2), distance communications (BCOBS 3), information to be communicated to banking customers (BCOBS 4), post sale requirements (BCOBS 5), and cancellation (BCOBS 6). BCOBS 5.1.13 R (Value dating) does not apply to credit unions. The rules in BCOBS 3.1 that relate to distance contracts for accepting deposits are likely to have limited application to a credit union. This is because the Distance Marketing Directive only applies where there is "an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme run by the supplier" (Article 2(a)). If, therefore, the credit union normally operates face to face and has not set up facilities to enable customers to deal with it at a distance, such as facilities for a customer to deal with it purely by post, telephone, fax or the Internet, the provisions will not be relevant.

Supervision manual (SUP)

The following provisions of SUP are relevant to credit unions: 13SUP 1A13 (The appropriate regulator's12 approach to supervision), SUP 2 (Information gathering by the appropriate regulator12 on its own initiative), SUP 3.1 to SUP 3.8 (Auditors), SUP 5 (Skilled persons), SUP 6 (Applications to vary or cancel Part 4A12permission), SUP 7 (Individual requirements), SUP 8 (Waiver and modification of rules), SUP 9 (Individual guidance), 13SUP 10A and SUP 10B13 (Approved persons), SUP 11 (Controllers and Close links), SUP 15 (Notifications to the appropriate regulator12) and SUP 16 (Reporting Requirements).

Credit unions are reminded that they are subject to the requirements of the Act and SUP 11 on

controllers and close links, and are bound to notify the appropriate regulator12 of changes. It may be unlikely, in practice, that credit unions will develop such relationships. It is possible, however, that a person may acquire control of a credit union within the meaning of the Act by reason of holding the prescribed proportion of deferred shares in the credit union.

In relation to SUP 16, credit unions are exempted from the requirement to submit annual reports of

controllers and close links.

Decision, Procedure and Penalties manual (DEPP)

DEPP is relevant to credit unions because it sets out:

(1) the FCA's12 decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5); and

(2) the FCA's12 policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties under the Act (see DEPP 6).

Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP)

DISP sets out rules and guidance in relation to treating complainants fairly and the Financial Ombudsman Service.

Compensation (COMP)

COMP sets out rules relating to the scheme for compensating consumers when authorised firms are unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims against them.12

The Enforcement Guide (EG)

The Enforcement Guide (EG) describes the FCA's12 approach to exercising the main enforcement powers given to it by the Act and by regulation 12 of the Unfair Terms Regulations.

Financial crime: a guide for firms (FC)

FC provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime.