Related provisions for SUP 9.2.4
461 - 480 of 681 items.
The purpose of this chapter is
to implement Article 27 of MiFID,
which deals with the requirements on systematic
internalisersfor pre-trade transparency in shares, the execution of orders on behalf of clients and
standards and conditions for trading. It also provides a rule requiring investment firms to notify the
FSA
when they become, or cease to
be, a systematic internaliser,
and which gives effect to Article 21(4) of the MiFID
Regulation. The chapter
In the FSA's view, for a person to be carrying on the business of advising on investments or making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments, he will usually need to be carrying on those activities with a degree of regularity. The person will also usually need to be carrying on the activities for commercial purposes. That is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain a direct or indirect financial benefit of some kind. Activities carried on out of friendship
This guidance is issued under section 157 of the Act (Guidance). It represents the FSA's views and does not bind the courts. For example, it would not bind the courts in an action for damages brought by a private person for breach of a rule (see section 150 of the Act (Actions for damages)), or in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of sections 19 (The general prohibition) or 21 (Restrictions on financial promotion) of the Act (see sections
In determining whether or not the
conduct of an approved person performing a significant influence function complies with Statements
of Principle 5 to 7, the following are factors which, in the
opinion of the FSA, are to be taken into account:(1) whether
he exercised reasonable care when considering the information available to
him;(2) whether
he reached a reasonable conclusion which he acted on;(3) the
nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business;(4) his
role and responsibility
(1) The Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook contains high-level record-keeping requirements (see SYSC 3.2.20 R and SYSC 9.1.1 R ).11(2) This sourcebook does not generally have detailed record-keeping requirements: firms will need to decide what records they need to keep in line with the high-level record-keeping requirements and their own business needs. (3) Firms should bear in mind the need to deal with requests for information from the FSA as well
Where, because of the occurrence of any event or circumstances, a UK recognised body is unable to discharge any regulatory function, it must immediately give the FSA notice of its inability to discharge that function, and inform the FSA:(1) what event or circumstance has caused it to become unable to do so; (2) which of its regulatory functions it is unable to discharge; and(3) what action, if any, it is taking or proposes to take to deal with the situation and, in particular,
An issuer must
ensure that listing particulars for securities referred to in LR 4.1.1 R are approved by the FSA and published in accordance with LR 4.3.5 R.Note:
Under LR 2.2.11 R,
the securities will only be listed if listing
particulars for the securities have
been approved by the FSA and published.
The FSA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 9.7A.1 R or LR 9.7A.2 R if it considers that disclosure of such information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that such omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the shares.1
(1) In order to discharge its functions under the Act, the FSA needs timely and accurate information about firms. The provision of this information on a regular basis enables the FSA to build up over time a picture of firms' circumstances and behaviour.(2) Principle 11 requires a firm to deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and to tell the FSA appropriately anythingof which the FSA would reasonably expect notice. The reporting requirements are part of the
Where a UK recognised body's complaints investigator has investigated a complaint arising in connection with the performance of, or failure to perform, any of its regulatory functions, and that complaints investigator has made a recommendation in respect of that complaint that the UK recognised body should:(1) make a compensatory payment to any person; or(2) remedy the matter which was the subject of that complaint;the UK recognised body must immediately notify the FSA of that
(1) The FSA may, at any time, require an issuer to publish such information in such form and within such time limits as it considers appropriate to protect investors or to ensure the smooth operation of the market.(2) If an issuer fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (1) the FSA may itself publish the information (after giving the issuer an opportunity to make representations as to why it should not be published).
Where a UK recognised body decides to put a member into default, it must immediately give notice of that event, and give the following information to the FSA, at the same time as that decision is communicated to that member or to any other member (or group or class of them) of that body: (1) the name of the member and (where relevant) the class of membership; (2) the reasons for that decision; and(3) the names of any other exchange,1clearing house or auction platform 1on which,
A firm should consider whether it should notify the FSA under Principle 11 if:(1) the firm expects or knows its auditor will qualify his report on the audited annual financial statements or add an explanatory paragraph; or (2) the firm receives a written communication from its auditor commenting on internal controls (see also SUP 15.3).
Where a UK recognised body has evidence tending to suggest that any person has:(1) been carrying on any regulated activity in the United Kingdom in contravention of the general prohibition; or(2) been engaged in market abuse; or(3) committed a criminal offence under the Act or subordinate legislation made under the Act; or(4) committed a criminal offence under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Insider dealing); or(5) committed a criminal offence under the Money Laundering
In the FSA's view, the question of whether funds are invested by BC with the aim of spreading investment risk is not affected by the levels of risk involved in particular investments. What matters for these purposes is that the aim is to spread the risk, whatever it may be. For example, the value of each of BC's investments, if taken separately, might be subject to a high level of risk. However, this would not itself result in BC failing to satisfy the property condition as long