Related provisions for PERG 6.1.1
41 - 60 of 433 items.
Under section 169(1)(b) of the Act,
the FSA may
appoint an investigator to investigate any matter at the request of an overseas regulator. The powers of the investigator appointed by the FSA (referred to here as the 'FSA's investigator') include the power to require persons to
attend at a specified time and place and answer questions (the compulsory
interview power).
Where the FSA appoints an investigator in response to a request from an overseas regulator it may, under section 169(7) of the Act,
direct him to permit a representative of that regulator to attend and take
part in any interviews conducted for the purposes of the investigation. The FSA may
only give a direction under section 169(7) if it is satisfied that any information
obtained by an overseas regulator as a result of the interview will
be subject to the safeguards equivalent
Before making a direction under
section 169(7) the FSA will discuss and determine with the overseas
regulator how this statement of policy will
apply to the conduct of the interview, taking into account all the circumstances
of the case. Amongst other matters, the FSA will at this stage determine the extent to which the representative
of the overseas regulator will be able to participate in
the interview. The overseas regulator will be notified of this determination
on the issuing
(1) Before an EEA firm other than an EEA pure reinsurer3exercises an EEA right to establish a branch in the United Kingdom other than under the Insurance Mediation Directive, the Act requires it to satisfy the establishment conditions, as set out in paragraph 13(1) of Part II of Schedule 3 to the Act. (2) For the purposes of paragraph 13(1)(b)(iii) of Part II of Schedule 3 to the Act, the information to be included in the consent notice has been prescribed under regulation 2 of
(1) When the FSA receives a consent notice from the EEA firm'sHome State regulator, it will, under paragraphs 13(2)(b), (c) and 13(3) of Part II of Schedule 3 to the Act, notify the applicable provisions (if any) to:(a) the EEA firm; and(b) in the case of an EEA firm passporting under the Insurance Directives, the Home State regulator;within two months of the notice2 date.2(1A) The notice date is:2(a) for a MiFID investment firm, the date on which the Home State gave the consent
A number of controls apply under the Act to the promotion of shares or securities that are issued by any body corporate. These controls differ according to whether the person making the promotion is an unauthorised person (see PERG 9.10.2 G) or an authorised person (see PERG 9.10.3 G to PERG 9.10.6 G). In addition, where a body corporate is not an open-ended investment company:(1) the requirements of Prospectus Rules relating to the publication of an approved prospectus may1 apply
The controls under the Act that apply to promotions of shares or securities by unauthorised persons are in section 21 of the Act (Restrictions on financial promotion). These controls apply where an unauthorised person makes a financial promotion in, or from, the United Kingdom that relates to the shares in or securities of any body corporate. The same controls apply regardless of whether the shares or securities being promoted are issued by a body corporate that is an open-ended
Promotions made by authorised persons in the United Kingdom are generally subject to the controls inCOBS 4 (Communicating with clients, including financial promotions).3 However, in the case of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate which is an open-ended investment company, additional controls are imposed by Chapter II of Part XVII of the Act (Restrictions on promotion of collective investment schemes) (see PERG 8.20). Section 238 of the Act (Restrictions on promotion)
There are a number of other exemptions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) (Exemptions) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1060). In general terms, these exemptions are equivalent to the exemptions from section 21 of the Act that apply to units. There is guidance on those exemptions in PERG 8.20.3 G (Additional restriction on the promotion of collective investment schemes).
A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted by an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself. But where the open-ended investment company is incorporated outside the United Kingdom, it will
(1) 1This chapter applies to an EEA firm that wishes to exercise an entitlement to establish a branch in, or provide cross border services into, the United Kingdom under a Single Market Directive. (The Act refers to such an entitlement as an EEA right and its exercise is referred to in the Handbook as "passporting".) (See SUP App 3 (Guidance on passporting issues) for further guidance on passporting.)(2) This chapter also applies to:(a) a Treaty firm that wishes to exercise rights
This chapter does not apply to:(1) an EEA firm that wishes to carry on in the United Kingdom activities which are outside the scope of its EEA right and the scope of a permission granted under Schedule 4 to the Act; in this case the EEA firm requires a "top-up permission" under Part IV of the Act (see the FSA website "How do I get authorised":http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/how/index.shtml3); or 3(2) an EEA firm that carries on any insurance activity:(a) by the provision of
(1) Under the Gibraltar Order2 made under section 409 of the Act, a Gibraltar firm is treated as an EEA firm under Schedule 3 to the Act if it is:22(a) authorised in Gibraltar under the Insurance Directives; or(aA) authorised in Gibraltar under the Reinsurance Directive; or6(b) authorised in Gibraltar under the Banking Consolidation Directive; or22(c) authorised in Gibraltar under the Insurance Mediation Directive; or2(d) authorised in Gibraltar under the MiFID4.24(1A) Similarly,
(1) This chapter explains how an EEA firm and a Treaty firm can qualify for authorisation under Schedules 3 and 4 to the Act and how a UCITS qualifier is authorised under Schedule 5 to the Act. (2) This chapter also provides guidance on Schedule 3 to the Act for an incoming EEA firm that wishes to establish a branch in the United Kingdom instead of, or in addition to, providing cross border services into the United Kingdom or vice versa.
(1) EEA firms should note that this chapter only addresses the procedures which the FSA will follow under the Act.So, an EEA firm should consider this guidance in conjunction with the requirements with which it will have to comply in its Home State. 6(2) The guidance in this chapter represents the FSA's interpretation of the Single Market Directives, the Act and the secondary legislation made under the Act. The guidance is not exhaustive and should not be seen as a substitute
Each of these aspects of the definition is considered in greater detail in PERG 9.4 (Collective investment scheme (section 235 of the Act)) to PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act)). Although the definition has a number of elements, the FSA considers that it requires an overall view to be taken of the body corporate. This is of particular importance in relation to the investment condition (see PERG 9.6.3 G and PERG 9.6.4 G (The
The FSA understands that the aim of the definition in section 236 of the Act is to include any body corporate which, looked at as a whole, functions as an open-ended investment vehicle. The definition operates against a background that there is a wide range of different circumstances in which any particular body corporate can be established and operated. For example, the definition applies to bodies corporate wherever they are formed. So, in the application of the definition to
For a body corporate formed outside the United Kingdom, there is an additional issue as to how the applicable corporate law and the definition of open-ended investment company in the Act relate to one another. The FSA understands this to operate as follows. The term 'body corporate' is defined in section 417(1) of the Act (Interpretation) as including 'a body corporate constituted under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom'. So, whether or not any particular
Section 341 of the Act (Access to books etc.) provides that an auditor of a firm appointed under SUP 3.3.2 R: (1) has a right of access at all times to the firm's books, accounts and vouchers; and(2) is entitled to require from the firm's officers such information and explanations as he reasonably considers necessary for the performance of his duties as auditor.
In complying with SUP 3.6.1 R, a firm should take reasonable steps to ensure that each of its appointed representatives or, where applicable, tied agents1 gives the firm's auditor the same rights of access to the books, accounts and vouchers of the appointed representative or tied agent1and entitlement to information and explanations from the appointed representative's or tied agent's1 officers as are given in respect of the firm by section 341 of the Act (see also SUP 12.5.5
In complying with SUP 3.6.1 R, a firm should take reasonable steps to ensure that each of its suppliers under a material outsourcing arrangement gives the firm's auditor the same rights of access to the books, accounts and vouchers of the firm held by the supplier, and entitlement to information and explanations from the supplier's officers as are given in respect of the firm by section 341 of the Act.
Firms and their officers, managers and controllers are reminded that, under section 346 of the Act (Provision of false or misleading information to auditor or actuary), knowingly or recklessly giving false information to an auditor appointed under SUP 3.3.2 R constitutes an offence in certain circumstances, which could render them liable to prosecution. This applies even when an auditor is also appointed under an obligation in another enactment.
Under section 397 of the Act (Misleading statements and practices), it is an offence, in purported compliance with a requirement imposed by or under the Act (including the directions in SUP 6.4.5 D), for a person to knowingly or recklessly give the FSA information that is false or misleading. If necessary, a firm should take appropriate professional advice when supplying information required by the FSA. An insurer, for example, may ask an actuary to check assumptions in respect
A firm which is applying for cancellation of Part IV permission and which is not otherwise authorised by, or under, the Act should, at the same time, comply with SUP 10.13.6 R and notify the FSA of persons ceasing to perform controlled functions. These forms should give the effective date of withdrawal, if known (see SUP 10 (Approved persons)).
If the FSA has granted an application for cancellation of Part IV permission and withdrawn a firm's status as an authorised person (see SUP 6.5) it will retain certain investigative and enforcement powers in relation to the firm as a former authorised person. These include:(1) information gathering and investigation powers in Part XI of the Act (Investigation gathering and investigations) (seeEG 3 (Use of information gathering and investigation powers)6);6(2) powers to apply to
However, the FSA will not be able to use the following powers against former authorised persons:(1) powers to take disciplinary action against firms by publishing statements of misconduct under section 205 of the Act (Public censure) or imposing financial penalties under section 206(1) of the Act (Financial penalties); and(2) the power to require firms to make restitution under section 384 of the Act (Power of the FSA to require restitution).
(1) Under section 52(1)of the Act (Determination of applications), the FSA has six months to consider a completed application.(2) If the FSA receives an application which is incomplete, that is, where information or a document required as part of the application is not provided, section 52(2) of the Act requires the FSA to determine the incomplete application within 12 months of the initial receipt of the application.(3) Within these time limits, however, the length of the process
The FSA uses various methods of information gathering on its own initiative which require the cooperation of firms:(1) Visits may be made by representatives or appointees of the FSA. These visits may be made on a regular basis, on a sample basis, for special purposes such as theme visits (looking at a particular issue across a range of firms), or when the FSA has a particular reason for visiting a firm. Appointees of the FSA may include persons who are not FSA staff, but who have
In complying with Principle 11, the FSA considers that a firm should, in relation to the discharge by the FSA of its functions under the Act:(1) make itself readily available for meetings with representatives or appointees of the FSA as reasonably requested;(2) give representatives or appointees of the FSA reasonable access to any records, files, tapes or computer systems, which are within the firm's possession or control, and provide any facilities which the representatives
(1) A firm must permit representatives of the FSA, or persons appointed for the purpose by the FSA, to have access, with or without notice, during reasonable business hours to any of its business premises in relation to the discharge of the FSA's functions under the Act.(2) A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that its agents, suppliers under material outsourcing arrangements and appointed representatives permit such access to their business premises. (See also, in respect
Section 250 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FSA to waive the application of certain rules in COLL to:10(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT) or the ICVC and its depositary (in the case of an ICVC).2
Section 235(1) states that a collective investment scheme means any arrangements with respect to property of any description. The purpose or effect of the arrangements must be to enable the persons taking part in them to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income. The participants must not have day-to-day control over the management of the property (section
Analysing a typical corporate structure in terms of the definition of a collective investment scheme, money will be paid to the body corporate in exchange for shares or securities issued by it. The body corporate becomes the beneficial owner of that money in exchange for rights against the legal entity that is the body corporate. The body corporate then has its own duties and rights that are distinct from those of the holders of its shares or securities. Such arrangements will,
Where a body corporate does come within the definition of a collective investment scheme in section 235(1) to (3), the only relevant issue is to determine whether or not it is excluded. As PERG 9.2.2 G (Introduction) explains, the exclusions are in the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme). If a body corporate satisfies any of the exclusions
In the FSA's view, the question of what constitutes a single scheme in line with section 235(4) of the Act does not arise in relation to a body corporate. This is simply because the body corporate is itself a collective investment scheme (and so is a single scheme). Section 235(4) contemplates a 'separate' pooling of parts of the property that is subject to the arrangements referred to in section 235(1). But to analyse a body corporate in this way requires looking through its
The FSA will usually consider revoking a recognition order if:(1) the recognised body is failing or has failed to satisfy 2one or more of the recognised body requirements1and that failure has or will have serious consequences; or2(2) it would not be possible for the recognised body to comply with a direction under section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations;2 or (3) for some other reason, it would not be appropriate
The FSA would be likely to consider the conditions in REC 4.7.3 G (2) or REC 4.7.3 G (3) to be triggered1in the following circumstances:1(1) the recognised body appears not to have the resources or management to be able to organise its affairs so as to satisfy one or more of the recognised body requirements; or212(2) the recognised body does not appear to be willing to satisfy one or more of the recognised body requirements; or212(3) the recognised body is failing or has failed
In addition to the relevant 1factors set out in REC 4.7.4 G, the FSA will usually consider that it would not be able to secure an overseas recognised body's compliance with the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act by means of a direction under section 296 of the Act, if it appears to the FSA that the overseas recognised body is prevented by any change in the legal framework or supervisory arrangements to which it is subject in its home territory from
The circumstances in which the FSA may vary a firm'sPart IV permission on
its own initiative under section 45 of the Act include
where it appears to the FSA that:(1) one
or more of the threshold conditions is or is likely to be no longer
satisfied; or(2) it
is desirable to vary a firm's permission in order to meet any of the FSA's regulatory
objectives.33
The FSA may also use its powers under section 45 for
enforcement purposes. EG 82 sets out in detail the FSA's powers under section 45 and
the circumstances under which the FSA may vary a firm's permission in this way, whether for enforcement purposes or as part of its
day to day supervision of firms.
This chapter provides additional guidance on when the FSA will use these powers for supervision purposes.2
The FSA may use its powers under section 45 of the Act only in respect of a Part IV permission ; that is, a permission granted
to a firm under section 42 of the Act (Giving
permission) or having effect as if so given. In respect of an incoming EEA firm, an incoming
Treaty firm, or a UCITS qualifier,
this power applies only in relation to any top-up
permission that it has. There are similar but more limited powers
under Part XIII of the Act in
relation to the permission of
an
1Section 301A(1) of chapter3 1A of Part XVIII of the Act places an obligation on a person who decides to acquire or increase control (see sections 301D and 301E of the Act) over a UK RIE3to notify the FSA, before making the acquisition3. Furthermore, those persons are required to obtain the FSA's approval before acquiring control 3or increasing the level of control held.33333
The FSA will approve an acquisition or an increase in 3control if it is satisfied that the acquisition by the person seeking approval does not pose a threat to the sound and prudent management of any financial market operated by the UK RIE (see section 301F(4) of the Act). 4The reference to any financial market is to be read as including a reference to any auction platform as a result of the RAP regulations.3333
Paragraph 9 of Schedule 17 to the Act (The Ombudsman Scheme) requires FOS Ltd to adopt an annual budget which has been approved by the FSA. The annual budget must distinguish between the costs of operating the Compulsory Jurisdiction, the Consumer Credit Jurisdiction4 and the Voluntary Jurisdiction.
Section 234 of the Act (Industry Funding) enables the FSA to require the payment to it or to FOS Ltd, by firms or any class of firm, of specified amounts (or amounts calculated in a specified way) to cover the costs of: (1) the establishment of 1the Financial Ombudsman Service; and (2) its operation in relation to the Compulsory Jurisdiction.
The guidance in COND 2 explains each threshold condition in Part I of Schedule 6 (threshold conditions) to the Act and how the FSA will interpret it in practice. An overview of the threshold conditions is given in COND 1 Annex 1 G. This guidance is not, however, exhaustive and is written in very general terms. A firm will need to have regard to the obligation placed upon the FSA under section 41 (the threshold conditions) of the Act; that is, the FSA must ensure that the firm
(1) For ease of reference, the threshold conditions in or under Schedule 6 to the Act have been quoted in full in COND 2. (2) As these provisions impose obligations, they are printed in bold type. The use of bold type is not intended to indicate that these quotations are rules made by the FSA.(3) Where words have been substituted for the text of these provisions the substitutions are enclosed in square brackets ([ ]). However, none of the changes made by the FSA in these quotations
Section 80 (1) of the Act (general duty of disclosure in listing
particulars) requires listing particulars submitted
to the FSA to contain all such information as investors
and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect
to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of:(1) the assets and liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of
the securities; and(2) the rights attaching to the securi
(1) The listing
particulars must contain a summary that
complies with the requirements in section 87A(5) and (6) of the Act and PR 2.1.4 EU to PR 2.1.7 R (as if those requirements
applied to the listing particulars).(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply:(a) in relation to specialist
securities referred to in LR 4.1.1R (2);
or(b) if, in accordance with PR 2.1.3 R,
no summary would be required
in relation to the securities.
A request to the FSA to authorise the omission of specific
information in a particular case must:(1) be in writing from the issuer;(2) identify the specific information
concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the issuer's opinion
one or more of the grounds in section 82 of the Act applies.
Section 34 of the Act states that an incoming EEA firm no longer qualifies for authorisation under Schedule 3 to the Act if it ceases to be an incoming EEA firm as a result of:(1) having its EEA authorisation withdrawn by its Home State regulator; or(2) ceasing to have an EEA right in circumstances in which EEA authorisation is not required; this is relevant to a financial institution that is a subsidiary of a credit institution (of the kind mentioned in Article 19of the Banking
Within the legal constraints that apply, the FSA may pass on to a skilled person any information which it considers relevant to the skilled person's function. A skilled person, being a primary recipient under section 348 of the Act (Restrictions on disclosure of confidential information by Authority etc.), is bound by the confidentiality provisions in Part XXIII of the Act (Public record, disclosure of information and cooperation) as regards confidential information he receives
The limitations in the following sections of the Act are relevant to this chapter:(1) section 175(5) (Information and documents: supplemental provisions) under which a person may be required under Part XI of the Act (Information Gathering and Investigations) to disclose information or produce a document subject to banking confidentiality (with exceptions); and (2) section 413 (Protected items), under which no person may be required to produce, disclose or allow the inspection
The test in section 236(3)(a) of the Act is whether the reasonable investor would expect that, were he to invest, he would be in a position to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable. In the FSA's view, this is an objective test with the appropriate objective judgment to be applied being that of the hypothetical reasonable investor with qualities such as those mentioned in PERG 9.7.2 G (The investment condition: the 'reasonable investor').
In the FSA's view, the 'realisation' of an investment means converting an asset into cash or money. The FSA does not consider that 'in specie' redemptions (in the sense of exchanging shares or securities of BC with other shares or securities) will generally count as realisation. Section 236(3)(a) refers to the realisation of an investment, the investment being represented by the 'value' of shares or securities held in BC. In the FSA's view, there is no realisation of value where
The use of an expectation test ensures that the definition of an open-ended investment company is not limited to a situation where a holder of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate has an entitlement or an option to realise his investment. It is enough if, on the facts of any particular case, the reasonable investor would expect that he would be able to realise the investment. The following are examples of circumstances in which the FSA considers that a reasonable investor
In the FSA's view, the fact that a person may invest in the period shortly before a redemption date would not cause a body corporate, that would not otherwise be regarded as such, to be open-ended. This is because the investment condition must be applied in relation to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general).
Similarly, if BC issues shares or securities on different terms as to the period within which they are to be redeemed or repurchased (see PERG 9.6.4 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general), BC must be considered as a whole. Whether or not the expectation test is satisfied in relation to a particular body corporate is bound to involve taking account of the terms on which its shares or securities, or classes of shares or securities, are issued. But this
The Act does not contain any definition of the expressions ‘invitation’ or ‘inducement’, leaving them to their natural meaning. The ordinary dictionary entries for ‘invitation’ and ‘inducement’ offer several possible meanings to the expressions. An ‘invitation’ is capable of meanings ranging from merely asking graciously or making a request to encouraging or soliciting. The expression ‘inducement’ is given meanings ranging from merely bringing about to prevailing upon or persuading.
The Treasury, responding to consultation on the draft Financial Promotion Order, stated its intention that only communications containing a degree of incitement would amount to ‘inducements’ and that communications of purely factual information would not. This is provided the facts are presented in such a way that they do not also amount to an invitation or inducement. This was made clear both in the Treasury’s consultation document on financial promotion and during the passage
The FSA recognises that the matter cannot be without doubt. However, it is the FSA's view that the context in which the expressions ‘invitation’ or ‘inducement’ are used clearly suggests that the purpose of section 21 is to regulate communications which have a promotional element. This is because they are used as restrictions on the making of financial promotions which are intended to have a similar effect to restrictions on advertising and unsolicited personal communications
The FSA considers that it is appropriate to apply an objective test to decide whether a communication is an invitation or an inducement. In the FSA's view, the essential elements of an invitation or an inducement under section 21 are that it must both have the purpose or intent of leading a person to engage in investment activity and be promotional in nature. So it must seek, on its face, to persuade or incite the recipient to engage in investment activity. The objective test
Merely asking a person if they wish to enter into an agreement with no element of persuasion or incitement will not, in the FSA's view, be an invitation under section 21. For example, the FSA does not consider an invitation to have been made where:(1) a trustee or nominee receives an offer document of some kind and asks the beneficial owner whether he wishes it to be accepted or declined;(2) a person such as a professional adviser enquires whether or not his client would be willing
An inducement may often be followed by an invitation or vice versa (in which case both communications will be subject to the restriction in section 21 of the Act). An inducement may be described as a link in a chain where the chain is intended to lead ultimately to an agreement to engage in investment activity. But this does not mean that all the links in the chain will be an inducement or that every inducement will be one to engage in investment activity. Only those that are
Links on a website may take different forms. Some will be inducements. Some of these will be inducements under section 21 and others not. Links which are activated merely by clicking on a name or logo will not be inducements. The links may be accompanied by or included within a narrative or, otherwise, referred to elsewhere on the site. Whether or not such narratives or references are inducements will depend upon the extent to which they may seek to persuade or incite persons