Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4
321 - 340 of 668 items.
The 'assumption of risk' by the provider is an important descriptive feature of all contracts of insurance. The 'assumption of risk' has the meaning in (1) and (3), derived from the case law in (2) and (4) below. The application of the 'assumption of risk' concept is illustrated in PERG 6.7.2 G (Example 2: disaster recovery business).(1) Case law establishes that the provider's obligation under a contract of insurance is an enforceable obligation to respond (usually, by providing
Contracts, under which the amount and timing of the payments made by the recipient make it reasonable to conclude that there is a genuine pre-payment for services to be rendered in response to a future contingency, are unlikely to be regarded as insurance. In general, the FSA expects that this requirement will be satisfied where there is a commercially reasonable and objectively justifiable relationship between the amount of the payment and the cost of providing the contract
Under most commercial contracts with a customer, a provider will assume more than one obligation. Some of these may be insurance obligations, others may not. The FSA will apply the principles in PERG 6.5.4 G, in the way described in (1) to (3) to determine whether the contract is a contract of insurance.(1) If a provider undertakes an identifiable and distinct obligation that is, in substance an insurance obligation as described in PERG 6.5.4 G, then, other things being equal,
2If a firm requires employees who are not subject to a qualification7 requirement in TC to pass a relevant examination from the list of recommended examinations maintained by the Financial Skills Partnership7, the FSA will take that into account when assessing whether the firm has ensured that the employee satisfies the knowledge component of the competent employees rule.777
For the purposes of LR 10.2.4R (1), the FSA considers the following indemnities not to be exceptional:(1) those customarily given in connection with sale and purchase agreements;(2) those customarily given to underwriters or placing agents in an underwriting or placing agreement;(3) those given to advisers against liabilities to third parties arising out of providing advisory services; and(4) any other indemnity that is specifically permitted to be given to a director or auditor
The FSA may modify these rules to require the aggregation of transactions in circumstances other than those specified in LR 10.2.10 R.Note: If an issuer is proposing to enter into a transaction that could be a Class 1 transaction or reverse takeover it is required under LR 8 to obtain the guidance of a sponsor to assess the potential application of LR 10.
As long as the conditions in section 39 of the Act are satisfied, any person, other than an authorised person, may become an appointed representative, including a body corporate, a partnership or an individual in business on his own account. However, an appointed representative cannot be an authorised person under the Act; that is, it cannot be exempt for some regulated activities and authorised for others.
(1) 12A tied agent is a person who acts for and under the responsibility of a MiFID investment firm (or a third country investment firm) in respect of MiFID business (or the equivalent business of the third country investment firm). Most tied agents appointed by firms are also appointed representatives.(2) Unless otherwise provided, this chapter applies to a firm that appoints a tied agent that is an appointed representative in the same way as it applies to the appointment of
(1) The Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FSA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of
The FSA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FSA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FSA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
If the Part IV permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country banking and investment group of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country banking and investment group, with the rules in Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
Upon request, an issuer or other person must be able to communicate to the FSA, in relation to any disclosure of regulated information:(1) the name of the person who communicated the regulated information to the RIS;(2) the security validation details;(3) the time and date on which the regulated information was communicated to the RIS;(4) the medium in which the regulated information was communicated; and(5) details of any embargo placed by the issuer on the regulated information,
If, notwithstanding the steps taken by a firm to comply with MCOB 1.6.3 R, it transpires that a mortgage which the firm has treated as unregulated is in fact a regulated mortgage contract, the firm must as soon as practicable after the correct status of the mortgage has been established:(1) contact the customer and provide him with the following information in a durable medium:(a) a statement that the mortgage contract is a regulated mortgage contract subject to FSA regulation,
(1) MCOB 1.6.4 R(2) means, for example, that if a firm discovered immediately after completion that a loan was a regulated mortgage contract, the firm would be required to comply with MCOB 7.4 (Disclosure at the start of the contract).(2) Although MCOB 1.6.4 R recognises that firms may become aware that a mortgage is a regulated mortgage contract at a late stage, the FSA expects this to be an extremely rare occurrence. It could arise, for example, if a firm has acted on the understanding,
(1) This section applies to:(a) an authorised fund manager of an AUT or ICVC;(b) any other director of an ICVC; and(c) an ICVC;which is a UCITS scheme whose units may be marketed in another EEA State (the Host State).(2) The marketing of units of a UCITS scheme in the Host State may not commence until the FSA has, in accordance with paragraph 20B(5) (Notice of intention to market) of Schedule 3 to the Act, notified the authorised fund manager, in response to the application of
(1) The authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme whose units are being marketed in the Host State must ensure that:(a) its instrument constituting the scheme, its prospectus and, where appropriate, its latest annual report and any subsequent half-yearly report; and(b) its key investor information document;together with their translations (wherever necessary), are kept up to date.(2) The authorised fund manager must notify any amendments to the documents referred to in (1) to
(1) The authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme whose units are being marketed in a Host State must ensure that an electronic copy of each document referred to in COLL 12.4.4 R (1) is made available on: (a) the website of the UCITS scheme or the authorised fund manager; or(b) another website designated by the authorised fund manager in the notification letter submitted to the FSA under paragraph 20B of Schedule 3 to the Act or any updates to it. (2) Any document that is made
(1) The directors (or director) of an ICVC must take all practicable steps to ensure the ICVC has at all times as its ACD a person who is qualified to act as ACD.(2) If the ICVC ceases to have any director, the depositary must exercise its powers, under the OEIC Regulations, to appoint a person to be an ACD of the ICVC.(3) For an ICVC that holds annual general meetings under the OEIC Regulations, the1 appointment of an ACD (other than the first ACD), under (1) or (2), must terminate
(1) The depositary of an authorised fund may not retire voluntarily except upon the appointment of a new depositary.(2) The depositary of an authorised fund must not retire voluntarily unless, before its retirement, it has ensured that the new depositary has been informed of any circumstance of which the retiring depositary has informed the FSA.(3) When the depositary of an authorised fund wishes to retire or ceases to be an authorised person, the authorised fundmanager may, subject
The FSA would expect a firm'sconflicts of interest policy to provide
for investment research to be
published or distributed to its clients in
an appropriate manner. For example, the FSA considers it will be:(1) appropriate for a firm to take reasonable steps to ensure that
its investment research is published
or distributed only through its usual distribution
channels; and(2) inappropriate for an employee (whether or not a financial
analyst) to communicate the substance of any
The FSA would expect a firm to
consider whether or not other business activities of the firm could
create the reasonable perception that its investment
research may not be an impartial analysis of the market in,
or the value or prospects of, a financial
instrument. A firm would
therefore be expected to consider whether its conflicts
of interest policy should contain any restrictions on the timing
of the publication of investment research.
For example, a firm might consider
whether
The FSA considers that the significant
conflicts of interest which could arise are likely to mean it is inappropriate
for a financial analyst or
other relevant person to prepare investment research which is intended firstly
for internal use for the firm's
own advantage, and then for later publication to its clients (in
circumstances in which it might reasonably be expected to have a material
influence on its clients' investment
decisions).
A common platform firm and a management company8 must, taking into4account the nature, scale and complexity of its business, and the nature and range of financial services and activities8 undertaken in the course of that business, establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures designed to detect any risk of failure by the firm to comply with its obligations under the regulatory system, as well as associated risks, and put in place adequate measures and procedures
The restrictions mentioned in PERG 9.10.3 G are subject to a number of exemptions. For example, the controls in sections 238 and 240 do not apply to financial promotions about certain kinds of collective investment scheme. These are:(1) open-ended investment companies formed in Great Britain and authorised by the FSA under the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001;(2) authorised unit trust schemes; and(3) collective investment schemes that are recognised schemes (see
The FSA has also made rules under section 238(5) which allow authorised persons to communicate or approve a financial promotion for an open-ended investment company that is an unregulated collective investment scheme (that is, one that does not fall within PERG 9.10.4 G). The circumstances in which such a communication or approval is allowed are explained in COBS 4.12.1 R.33
A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted by an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself. But where the open-ended investment company is incorporated outside the United Kingdom, it will
In negotiating its contract with a service provider, a firm should have regard to:(1) reporting or notification requirements it may wish to impose on the service provider;(2) whether sufficient access will be available to its internal auditors, external auditors or actuaries (see section 341 of the Act) and to the FSA (see SUP 2.3.5 R (Access to premises) and SUP 2.3.7 R (Suppliers under material outsourcing arrangements);(3) information ownership rights, confidentiality agreements
(1) 1A firm must, as soon as a customer expresses an interest in becoming a SRB agreement seller, ensure that the 2disclosures and warnings set out in (1A) are 2made to the customer2, both orally and confirmed in writing, and he is given an adequate opportunity to consider them. The firm must not demand or accept any fees, charges or other sums from the customer, or undertake any action that commits the customer in any way to entering into a specific agreement, until:2222(a) 2the
(1) A SRB intermediary2must ensure that, on first making contact with a prospective SRB agreement seller, whether or not he is the firm'scustomer, who is proposing to enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement with an unauthorised SRB agreement provider, it provides him with the written warning in (2) before he enters into any such agreement.2(2) The warning in (1) is that:(a) the agreement provider is not authorised or regulated by the FSA, and that key protections under
A person may enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement as agreement provider without being regulated by the FSA (or an exempt person) if the person does not do so by way of business. However, a SRB intermediary should at all times be conscious of its obligations under Principle 6 (Customers' interests). Should the firm have any reason to believe or entertain any suspicions that the SRB agreement seller may be proposing to enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement
As regards PERG 5.4.2G (1), the Business Order does not provide a definition of 'remuneration', but, in the FSA's view, it has a broad meaning and covers both monetary and non-monetary rewards. This is regardless of who makes them. For example, where a person pays discounted premiums for his own insurance needs in return for bringing other business to an insurance undertaking, the discount would amount to remuneration for the purposes of the Business Order. Remuneration can also
As regards PERG 5.4.2G (2), in the FSA's view, for a person to take up or pursue insurance mediation activity by way of business, he will usually need to be carrying on those activities with a degree of regularity. The person will also usually need to be carrying on the activities for commercial purposes. That is to say, he will normally be expecting to gain a direct financial benefit of some kind. Activities carried on out of friendship or for altruistic purposes will not normally
PERG 5.4.8 G contains a table that summarises the main issues surrounding the business test as applied to insurance mediation activities and that may assist persons to determine whether they will need authorisation or exemption. The approach taken in the table involves identifying factors that, in the FSA's view, are likely to play a part in the analysis. Indicators are then given as to the significance of each factor to the person's circumstances. By analysing the indicators
In the FSA's view, it is the very existence of the body corporate that is the collective investment scheme. There are a number of statutory references that support this view. For example, it is clear that paragraph 21 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme) is drafted on the basis that it is the body corporate itself that is (or would
Analysing a typical corporate structure in terms of the definition of a collective investment scheme, money will be paid to the body corporate in exchange for shares or securities issued by it. The body corporate becomes the beneficial owner of that money in exchange for rights against the legal entity that is the body corporate. The body corporate then has its own duties and rights that are distinct from those of the holders of its shares or securities. Such arrangements will,
In the FSA's view, the question of what constitutes a single scheme in line with section 235(4) of the Act does not arise in relation to a body corporate. This is simply because the body corporate is itself a collective investment scheme (and so is a single scheme). Section 235(4) contemplates a 'separate' pooling of parts of the property that is subject to the arrangements referred to in section 235(1). But to analyse a body corporate in this way requires looking through its
In a few instances, the requirements of a particular exemption may affect the practicality of its being combined with another. These are article 12 (Communications to overseas recipients) and article 52 (Common interest group of a company). Article 12, for example, requires that financial promotions must be made to or directed only at overseas persons and certain persons in the United Kingdom. This presents no difficulty with article 12 being combined with other exemptions in
A number of exemptions require that a financial promotion must be accompanied by certain indications. Article 9 of the Financial Promotion Order states that indications must be presented in a way that can be easily understood and in such manner as is ‘best calculated’ to bring the matter to the recipient’s attention. In the FSA's opinion, the expression ‘best calculated’ should be construed in a sensible manner. It does not, for instance, demand that the indication be presented
Some exemptions are based on the communicator believing on reasonable grounds that the recipient meets certain conditions. For example, articles 19(1)(a), 44, 47 and 49. What are reasonable grounds for these purposes will be a matter for the courts to decide. In the FSA's view, it would be reasonable for a communicator to rely on a statement made by a potential recipient that he satisfies relevant conditions. This is provided that there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
(1) The purpose of the precautionary measure rule is to ensure that an incoming EEA firm is subject to the standards of MiFID and the MiFID implementing Directive to the extent that the Home State has not transposed MiFID or the MiFID implementing Directive by 1 November 2007. It is to 'fill a gap'.(2) The rule is made in the light of the duty of the United Kingdom under Article 62 of MiFID to adopt precautionary measures to protect investors. (3) The rule will be effective for