Related provisions for BIPRU 7.9.31

121 - 140 of 233 items.

MCOB 12.3.3G31/10/2004

A firm may calculate the same level of early repayment charge for all regulated mortgage contracts of a similar type (for example a tranche of regulated mortgage contracts offering a particular fixed rate of interest), rather than on the basis of the individual regulated mortgage contract with the particular customer.

DEPP 6.5B.4G06/03/2010

(1) If the FSA considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FSA may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FSA may do this include:(a) where the FSA considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;(b) where previous FSA action in respect of similar breaches has failed

DEPP 1.2.2G28/08/2007

Table: Summary of statutory and related notices

Notice	Description	Act reference	Further information
Warning notice	Gives the recipient details about action that the FSA proposes to take and about the right to make representations.	Section 387	DEPP 2.2
Decision notice	Gives the recipient details about action that the FSA has decided to take. The FSA may also give a further decision notice if the recipient of the original decision notice consents.	Section 388	DEPP 2.3
Notice of discontinuance	Identifies proceedings set out in a warning notice or decision notice and which are not being taken or are being discontinued.	Section 389	DEPP 1.2.4 G and DEPP 3.2.26 G
Final notice	Sets out the terms of the action that the FSA is taking.	Section 390	DEPP 1.2.4 G
Supervisory notice	Gives the recipient details about action that the FSA has taken or proposes to take, for example to vary a Part IV permission.	Section 395(13)	DEPP 2.2 and DEPP 2.3

PERG 7.5.4G01/07/2005

It is only where there are grounds to think that there is a significant doubt as to the principal purpose of a publication or service that the question of whether or not to apply to the FSA for a certificate under article 54 of the Regulated Activities Order is expected to arise. For example, this may happen where a publication or service has several significant purposes and one of them is a disqualifying purpose referred to in the exclusion in article 54. It may on occasion be

PERG 4.3.9G01/07/2005

Some typical examples where the business test is unlikely to be satisfied are:(1) when an individual enters into or administers a one-off mortgage securing a loan to a friend or member of his family whether at market interest rates or not; or(2) when a person provides a service without any expectation of reward or payment of any kind, such as advice given or arrangements made by many Citizens Advice Bureaux and other voluntary sector agencies (but see PERG 4.3.8G (3) where payment

DEPP 6A.4.3G06/08/2010

The FSA may depart from the approach set out in DEPP 6A.4.2 G. For example, the FSA may at the outset consider that a financial penalty is the only appropriate sanction for a breach but, having determined the appropriate level of financial penalty, may consider it appropriate to reduce the amount of the financial penalty for serious financial hardship reasons. In such a situation, the FSA may consider it appropriate to impose a suspension or restriction even if the FSA at the

BIPRU 3.7.2R01/01/2007

This table belongs to BIPRU 3.7.1 R

[Note: BCD Annex II]

Category	Item	Percentage
Full risk	Guarantees having the character of credit substitutes Credit derivatives Acceptances Endorsements on bills not bearing the name of another credit institution Transactions with recourse Irrevocable standby letters of credit having the character of credit substitutes Assets purchased under outright forward purchase agreements Forward deposits The unpaid portion of partly-paid shares and securities Asset sale and repurchase agreements as defined in Article 12(3) and (5) of the Bank Accounts Directive Other items also carrying full risk	100%
Medium risk	Documentary credits issued and confirmed (see also medium/low risk). Warranties and indemnities (including tender, performance, customs and tax bonds) and guarantees not having the character of credit substitutes. Irrevocable standby letters of credit not having the character of credit substitutes. Undrawn credit facilities (agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide guarantees or acceptance facilities) with an original maturity of more than one year. Note issuance facilities (NIFs) and revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs).	50%
Medium/low risk	Documentary credits in which underlying shipment acts as collateral and other self-liquidating transactions. Undrawn credit facilities (agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide guarantees or acceptance facilities) with an original maturity of up to and including one year which may not be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice or that do not effectively provide for automatic cancellation due to deterioration in a borrower's creditworthiness.	20%
Low risk	Undrawn credit facilities (agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide guarantees or acceptance facilities) which may be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice, or that do effectively provide for automatic cancellation due to deterioration in a borrower's creditworthiness. Retail credit lines may be considered as unconditionally cancellable if the terms permit the firm to cancel them to the full extent allowable under consumer protection and related legislation.	0%

PRIN 3.1.8G30/04/2011

3The Principles will not apply to the extent that they purport to impose an obligation which is inconsistent with the Payment Services Directive or the Electronic Money Directive.5 For example, there may be circumstances in which Principle 6 may be limited by the harmonised conduct of business obligations applied by the Payment Services Directive and Electronic Money Directive5 to credit institutions (see Parts 5 and 6 of the Payment Services Regulations and Part 5 of the Electronic

MCOB 9.5.4R06/04/2007

The illustration provided as part of the offer document in accordance with MCOB 6.4.1 R(1) must meet the requirements of MCOB 9.4, with the following modifications:(1) the illustration must be suitably adapted and revised to reflect the fact that the firm is making an offer to a customer and updated to reflect changes to, for example, for a lifetime mortgage3 the interest rate, charges, the exchange rate or the APR required by MCOB 10 (Annual Percentage Rate) at the date the illustration

DTR 1A.2.2R20/01/2007

(1) An application to the FSA to dispense with or modify, a transparency rule must be in writing.(2) The application must:(a) contain a clear explanation of why the dispensation or modification is requested;(b) include details of any special requirements, for example, the date by which the dispensation or modification is required;(c) contain all relevant information that should reasonably be brought to the FSA's attention;(d) contain any statement or information that is required

COLL 8.5.12G01/04/2004

The maximum period between dealing days for a qualified investor scheme will depend on the reasonable expectations of the target investor group and the particular investment objectives and policy of the scheme. For instance, for a scheme aiming to invest in large property developments, the expectation would be that it is reasonable to have a much longer period between dealing days for liquidity reasons than for a scheme investing predominantly in listed securities.

SYSC 4.1.14G01/05/2011

7The role undertaken by a non-executive director will vary from one firm to another. Where a non-executive director is an approved person, for example where the firm is a body corporate, his responsibility and therefore liability will be limited by the role that he undertakes.

LR 5.1.2G06/04/2010

Examples of when the FSA may suspend the listing of securities include (but are not limited to) situations where it appears to the FSA that:(1) the issuer has failed to meet its continuing obligations for listing; or(2) the issuer has failed to publish financial information in accordance with the listing rules; or(3) the issuer is unable to assess accurately its financial position and inform the market accordingly; or(4) there is insufficient information in the market about

SYSC 4.4.6G06/01/2011

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question		Answer
1	Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person?	An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application).
2	If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?	If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.
3	What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?	The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.
4	If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?	Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).
5	Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?	Yes.
6	Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?	Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).
7	If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?	Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals will nevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14.
8	If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?	Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).
9	What if a firm does not have a chief executive?	Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.
10	What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?	A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)
11	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?	The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R). Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 4.4 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).
12	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?	SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R(2) and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R restrict the application of SYSC 4.4.5 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.
13	What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?	The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).
14	What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?	The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1). 5
15	What about incoming electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?	SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.

FEES 6.7.6R01/10/2011

If a firm ceases to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more sub-classes4 part way through a financial year4 of the compensation scheme:4(1) it will remain liable for any unpaid levies which the FSCS has already made on the firm; and41(2) the FSCS may make one or more levies4 upon it (which may be before or after the firmhas ceased to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more sub-classes,4 but must be before it ceases to be an authorised

LR 9.8.4R06/08/2007

In addition to the requirements set out in DTR 4.1 a listed company1 must include in its annual financial report1, where applicable, the following:1(1) a statement of the amount of interest capitalised by the group during the period under review with an indication of the amount and treatment of any related tax relief;(2) any information required by LR 9.2.18 R (Publication of unaudited financial information);(3) details of any small related party transaction as required by LR

COLL 7.7.15G01/10/2011

(1) An authorised fund manager may add other information to that which is required by COLL 7.7.10 R2 to COLL 7.7.14 R if it considers that it is relevant in the context of the proposed UCITS merger. For example, it may be appropriate for the information provided in accordance with COLL 7.7.13 R (3)(a) to contain a recommendation by the respective manager of an AUT or the directors of an ICVC as to the course of action the unitholders should take.2(2) Where an authorised fund manager

Related provisions for BIPRU 7.9.31

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