Related provisions for PERG 6.1.1

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PERG 4.8.6GRP
If an unauthorised administrator makes arrangements for a mortgage administrator to administer its regulated mortgage contracts, the exclusion may cease to be available because the mortgage administrator ceases to have the required permission, or because the arrangement is terminated. The exclusion gives the unauthorised administrator a one-month grace period during which it may administer the contracts itself. If the period of administration exceeds one month, the unauthorised
SYSC 5.1.5GRP
The requirements on firms with respect to approved persons are in Part V of the Act (Performance of regulated activities) and SUP 10.
COLL 11.5.5GRP
Section 351A of the Act provides that where an auditor of an AUT which is a master UCITS or a feeder UCITS, or any person acting on their behalf, makes a disclosure to comply with rules implementing Chapter VIII of the UCITS Directive, that disclosure is not to be taken as a contravention of any duty to which the person making the disclosure is subject. The OEIC Regulations (see regulation 83A) contain corresponding provisions for auditors of ICVCs that are feeder UCITS and master
MAR 1.1.3GRP
The FSA's statement of policy about the imposition and amount of penalties in cases of market abuse (required by section 124 of the Act) is in DEPP 63 .3
SUP 9.2.1GRP
Requests for individual guidance may be made in writing or orally. If oral queries raise complex or significant issues, the FSA will normally expect the details of the request to be confirmed in writing. Simple requests for guidance may often be dealt with orally, although it is open to a person to seek a written confirmation from the FSA of oral guidance given by the FSA.
PERG 8.15.6GRP
A financial promotion made under article 55A must contain a statement in the following terms: “The [firm/company] is not authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 but we are able in certain circumstances to offer a limited range of investment services to clients because we are members of [relevant designated professional body]. We can provide these investment services if they are an incidental part of the professional services we have been engaged to provide".
CASS 1.4.5GRP
(1) Although CASS does not apply directly to a firm's appointed representatives, a firm will always be responsible for the acts and omissions of its appointed representatives in carrying on business for which the firm has accepted responsibility (section 39(3) of the Act). In determining whether a firm has complied with any provision of CASS, anything done or omitted by a firm's1appointed representative (when acting as such) will be treated as having been done or omitted by the
BIPRU 12.4.3GRP
Consistent with BIPRU 12.3.5R, the FSA expects that the extent and frequency of such testing, as well as the degree of regularity of governing body review under BIPRU 12.4.2R, should be proportionate to the nature scale and complexity of a firm's activities, as well as to the size of its liquidity risk exposures. Consistent with the FSA's statutory objectives under the Act, in assessing the adequacy of a firm's stress testing arrangements (including their frequency and the regularity
SYSC 19A.1.1RRP
(1) 1The Remuneration Code applies to a BIPRU firm and a third country BIPRU firm.(2) In relation to a third country BIPRU firm, the Remuneration Code applies only in relation to activities carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom.(3) Otherwise, the Remuneration Code applies to a firm within (1) in the same way as SYSC 4.1.1 R (General Requirements).
PERG 9.11.1GRP

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question

Answer

1

Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).

2

Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.

3

Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?

The FSA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FSA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FSA's view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FSA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.

4

Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).

5

In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account.

  • The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means.
  • The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFSA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise.
  • Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.

6

Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?

In the FSA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).

7

Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?

In the FSA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.

8

Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).

9

Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?

In the FSA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).
REC 4.4.2GRP
The Act does not provide a mechanism for appeals to the FSA from decisions by recognised bodies in relation to complaints. However, the FSA is required by section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) to have arrangements to investigate complaints (called relevant complaints in the Act) which it considers relevant to the question of whether a recognised body should remain recognised as such. This section describes aspects of the FSA's arrangements for investigating
REC 1.2.3GRP
(1) This sourcebook contains quotations from the Act, the Recognition Requirements Regulations, the RAP regulations3 and the Companies Act 1989 and the MiFID Regulation2and, where necessary, words have been added to, or substituted for, the text of these provisions to facilitate understanding.(2) The additions and substitutions are enclosed in square brackets ([ ]). The omission of words within a quotation is indicated by three dots (...).(3) Any words in these quotations which
MIPRU 3.1.1RRP
2This chapter applies to a firm with Part IV permission to carry on any of the activities:(1) insurance mediation activity;(2) home finance mediation activity;1unless any of the following exemptions apply:1(3) in relation to insurance mediation activity, this chapter does not apply to a firm if another authorised person which has net tangible assets of more than £10 million provides a comparable guarantee; for this purpose:(a) if the firm is a member of a group in which there
FEES 2.2.3GRP
Paragraph 17(4) and paragraph 19B6 of Schedule 1 to6 and section 99(5) of6 the Act permit the FSA to recover fees (including fees relating to payment services,5 the issuance of electronic money8 and, where relevant, FOS levies and CFEB levies6), and section 213(6) permits the FSCS to recover shares of the FSCS levy payable, as a debt owed to the FSA and FSCS respectively, and the FSA and the6FSCS, as relevant, will consider taking action for recovery (including interest) through
PERG 6.7.6GRP
An important part of the conclusion in PERG 6.7.5 G was that, although the provider assumed a risk at the outset of the contract, looking at the contract as a whole and interpreting the common law in the context of the FSA's objectives (see PERG 6.5.2 G and PERG 6.5.3 G) there was no relevant assumption of risk.(1) The presence or absence of an assumption of risk is an important part of the statutory rationale for the prudential regulation of insurance.(2) In Medical Defence Union
SUP 4.2.1GRP
Section 340 of the Act gives the FSA power to make rules requiring an authorised person, or an authorised person falling into a specified class, to appoint an actuary3. Section 340 further empowers the FSA to make rules governing the manner, timing and notification to the FSA of such an appointment and, where an appointment is not made, for the FSA to make an appointment on the firm's behalf. The FSA's rule-making powers under section 340 of the Act also extend to an actuary's3
PRIN 3.1.5GRP
PRIN 3.1.1 R (4) reflects section 266 of the Act (Disapplication of rules).
MCOB 9.5.4RRP
The illustration provided as part of the offer document in accordance with MCOB 6.4.1 R(1) must meet the requirements of MCOB 9.4, with the following modifications:(1) the illustration must be suitably adapted and revised to reflect the fact that the firm is making an offer to a customer and updated to reflect changes to, for example, for a lifetime mortgage3 the interest rate, charges, the exchange rate or the APR required by MCOB 10 (Annual Percentage Rate) at the date the illustration