Related provisions for SUP 9.2.4
401 - 420 of 667 items.
416These procedures should, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the respondent's business, ensure that lessons learned as a result of determinations by the Ombudsman are effectively applied in future complaint handling, for example by:(1) relaying a determination by the Ombudsman to the individuals in the respondent who handled the complaint and using it in their training and development;(2) analysing any patterns in determinations by the Ombudsman concerning
4Firms are not required to notify the name of the individual to the
FSA
or the Financial Ombudsman Service but would be expected to do so promptly on request. There is no bar on a firm appointing different individuals to have the responsibility at different times where this is to accommodate part-time or flexible working.
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the Act) is the UK legislation under which bodies corporate, partnerships, individuals and unincorporated associations are permitted by the FSA to carry on various financial activities which are subject to regulation (referred to as regulated activities).(2) The activities which are regulated activities are specified in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (the Regulated Activities Order):
PERG 1.4.1 G (General guidance to be found in PERG) summarises the general guidance contained in PERG. Readers should note that in a cross-reference, as explained in paragraph 40 of the Readers' Guide, the code letters of the manual or sourcebook immediately precede the chapter number. For example, PERG 1 is the first chapter of the Perimeter Guidance manual. PERG 1.5 provides details of and links to other general guidance on perimeter issues that is available on the FSA webs
(1) Notification of suspicious transactions to the FSA requires sufficient indications (which may not be apparent until after the transaction has taken place) that the transaction might constitute market abuse. In particular a firm will need to be able to explain the basis for its suspicion when notifying the FSA (see SUP 15.10 R). Certain transactions by themselves may seem completely devoid of anything suspicious, but might deliver such indications of possible market abuse,
An investment firm or a credit institution making a notification to the FSA under this section may do so:(1) by mail to:Market Conduct Team25 The North ColonnadeCanary WharfLondon E14 5HS; or(2) by electronic mail to market.abuse@fsa.gov.uk;(3) by facsimile to the Market Conduct Team on 020 7066 1099; or(4) by telephone to the market abuse helpline 020 7066 4900. [Note: Article 10 2004/72/EC]
4It is the responsibility of an insurance intermediary's senior management to determine, on a continuing basis, whether the insurance intermediary is an exempt insurance intermediary and to appoint an auditor if management determines the firm is no longer exempt. SUP 3.7 (amplified by SUP 15) sets out what a firm should consider when deciding whether it should notify the FSA of matters raised by its auditor.6
4The rights and duties of auditors are set out in SUP 3.8 (Rights and duties of all auditors) and SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: notification and report on client assets). SUP 3.8.10 G includes the auditor's statutory duty to report certain matters to the FSA imposed by regulations made by the Treasury under sections 342(5) and 343(5) of the Act (information given by auditor or actuary to the FSA). An auditor should bear these rights and duties in mind when carrying out client
If it appears to the FSA that an appropriate actuary has failed to comply with a duty imposed on him under the Act, it may disqualify him under section 345 of the Act. For more detail about what happens when the disqualification of an actuary is being considered or put into effect, see EG 153 (Disqualification of auditors and actuaries)2. A list of actuaries who have been disqualified by the FSA may be found on the FSA website (www.fsa.gov.uk).3
A primary pooling event occurs:(1) on the failure of the firm;(2) on the vesting of assets in a
trustee
in accordance with an 'assets requirement' imposed under section 48(1)(b)of the Act;(3) on the coming into force of a requirement for all client money held by the firm; or(4) when the firm notifies, or is in breach of its duty to notify, the FSA, in accordance with
CASS 7.6.16 R
(Notification requirements), that it is unable correctly to identify and allocate in its records
The FSA's penalty-setting regime is based on the following principles:(1) Disgorgement - a firm or individual should not benefit from any breach;(2) Discipline - a firm or individual should be penalised for wrongdoing; and(3) Deterrence - any penalty imposed should deter the firm or individual who committed the breach, and others, from committing further or similar breaches.
(1) The total amount payable by a person subject to enforcement action may be made up of two elements: (i) disgorgement of the benefit received as a result of the breach; and (ii) a financial penalty reflecting the seriousness of the breach. These elements are incorporated in a five-step framework, which can be summarised as follows:(a) Step 1: the removal of any financial benefit derived directly from the breach;(b) Step 2: the determination of a figure which reflects the seriousness
An applicant for the admission of securitised derivatives must either:(1) have permission under the Act to carry on its activities relating to securitised derivatives and be either a bank or a securities and futures firm;(2) if the applicant is an overseas company:(a) be regulated by an overseas regulator responsible for the regulation of banks, securities firms or futures firms and which has a lead regulation agreement for financial supervision with the FSA; and(b) be carrying
As soon as a SRB agreement provider has provided the written pre-offer document at Stage One to a SRB agreement seller who is in arrears under his regulated mortgage contract or home purchase plan on the property to which the proposed regulated sale and rent back agreement relates, it must, in a durable medium, immediately notify the mortgage lender, home purchase provider or the providers of other loans that may be secured on the property:(1) explaining that the firm is proposing
The SRB agreement provider must keep a record of the written pre-offer document at Stage One and the written offer document for signing at Stage Two for a period of:(1) one year after the end of the fixed term of the tenancy under the regulated sale and rent back agreement; or(2) five years from the date of the disclosures and warnings, written offer documents and cooling-off period notices;whichever is the longer.
Paragraph 9 of Schedule 17 to the Act (The Ombudsman Scheme) requires FOS Ltd to adopt an annual budget which has been approved by the FSA. The annual budget must distinguish between the costs of operating the Compulsory Jurisdiction, the Consumer Credit Jurisdiction4 and the Voluntary Jurisdiction.
Section 234 of the Act (Industry Funding) enables the FSA to require the payment to it or to FOS Ltd, by firms or any class of firm, of specified amounts (or amounts calculated in a specified way) to cover the costs of: (1) the establishment of 1the Financial Ombudsman Service; and (2) its operation in relation to the Compulsory Jurisdiction.
The following rules in FEES apply to VJ participants as part of the standard terms, but substituting 'VJ participant' for 'firm':(1) FEES 2.2.1 R (late payment) but substituting 'FOS Ltd' for 'the FSA';(2) FEES 2.3.1 R and 2.3.2 R (remission of fees);(3) FEES 4.2.6 R (1)(b) (periodic fees);(4) FEES 5.3.6 R (general levy) but substituting:(a) 'Voluntary Jurisdiction' for 'Compulsory Jurisdiction' ; and(b) 'FOS Ltd' for 'the FSA';(5) FEES 5.3.8 R (calculation of general levy) but
This guidance is issued under section 157of the Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance in the circumstances it contemplates, the FSA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates. Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance
The only kind of body corporate of an open-ended kind that may currently be formed under the law of the United Kingdom is one that is authorised by the FSA. A person intending to form an open-ended body corporate that has its head office in Great Britain should refer to the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1228). Bodies corporate formed under these Regulations are referred to in the Handbook as investment companies with variable capital (or ' ICVCs ').
This manual applies in the following way:(1) FEES 1, 2 and 3 apply to the fee payers listed in column 1 of the Table of application, notification and vetting fees in FEES 3.2.7 R. .10(a) [deleted]1010(b) [deleted]1010(c) [deleted]1010(d) [deleted]1010(e) [deleted]10(f) [deleted]1010(g) [deleted]1010(h) [deleted]1010(i) [deleted]1010(j) [deleted]1010(k) [deleted]1010(l) [deleted]1010(m) [deleted]1010(n) [deleted]104(o) 3345410[deleted]10(p) 55410[deleted]10(q) 6510[deleted]10(r)
In determining whether a UK recognised body has effective arrangements for the investigation and resolution of complaints arising in connection with the performance of, or failure to perform, any of its regulatory functions, the FSA may have regard to the extent to which the UK recognised body's resources and procedures enable it to:(1) acknowledge complaints promptly;(2) make an objective, prompt and thorough initial investigation of complaints;(3) provide a timely reply to the
In determining whether a UK recognised body's arrangements for the investigation of complaints include appropriate arrangements for the complaint to be fairly and impartially investigated by an independent person (a "complaints investigator"), the FSA may have regard to:(1) the arrangements made for appointing (and removing) a complaints investigator, including the terms and conditions of such an appointment and the provision for remuneration of a complaints investigator; (2)
(1) COBS 11.8.8R (2) includes conversations and communications relating to specific transactions which are intended to lead to the conclusion of an agreement by the firm to deal with or on behalf of the client as principal or agent, even if those conversations or communications do not lead to the conclusion of such an agreement. It does not include conversations or communications which are not intended to lead to the conclusion of such an agreement, such as general conversations
A firm must take reasonable steps to retain all records made by it under COBS 11.8.5 R:(1) for a period of at least 6 months from the date the record was created;(2) in a medium that allows the storage of the information in a way accessible for future reference by the FSA, and so that the following conditions are met:(a) the FSA must be able to access the records readily;(b) it must be possible for any corrections or other amendments, and the contents of the records prior to such
25Nothing in this appendix relieves firms of the obligation to consider the particular facts and circumstances of each complaint and to consider whether the assessment of loss and compensation should, in the light of those facts and circumstances, be carried out on a different basis. If, however, the facts and circumstances make it appropriate to do so, the FSA's expectation is that firms will apply the approach and standards set out in this appendix, and where they do not, the
(1) Where a depositary of a master UCITS detects any irregularities with regards to the scheme which may have a negative impact on the relevant feeder UCITS, the depositary must immediately inform:(a) the FSA;(b) the feeder UCITS or, where applicable, its management company; and(c) the depositary of the feeder UCITS.(2) The irregularities referred to in (1) include, but are not limited to:(a) errors in the valuation of the scheme property performed in accordance with COLL 6.3.3
(1) When notifying the FSA of any irregularities in accordance with COLL 11.4.3R (1), the depositary of the master UCITS should also inform the depositary of the feeder UCITS how the master UCITS or its authorised fund manager has resolved or proposes to resolve the irregularity.(2) Where the depositary of a UCITS scheme that is a feeder UCITS is informed by the depositary of a master UCITS of an irregularity and is not satisfied that the resolution or proposed resolution is in