Related provisions for SUP 15.3.20
21 - 40 of 71 items.
Where the FSA receives a complaint about a recognised body, it will, in the first instance, seek to establish whether the complainant has approached the recognised body. Where this is not the case, the FSA will ask the complainant to complain to the recognised body. Where the complainant is dissatisfied with the handling of the complaint, but has not exhausted the recognised body's own internal complaints procedures (in the case of a complaint against a UK recognised body, including
In determining whether the UK recognised body meets the recognition requirement in Regulation 6(3), the FSA may have regard to whether that body has ensured that the person who performs that function on its behalf:(1) has sufficient resources to be able to perform the function (after allowing for any other activities);(2) has adequate systems and controls to manage that function and to report on its performance to the UK recognised body;(3) is managed by persons of sufficient
In determining whether a UK recognised body continues to satisfy the recognition requirements where it has made arrangements for any function to be performed on its behalf by any person , the FSA may have regard, in addition to any of the matters described in the appropriate section of this chapter, to the arrangements made to exercise control over the performance of the function, including:(1) the contracts (and other relevant documents) between the UK recognised body and the
Where the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS gives notice to the FSA under section 251 of the Act or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations that it intends to wind up the scheme, it must inform:(1) the unitholders of the feeder UCITS; and(2) where notice is given under COLL 11.6.5R (4) (Application for approval by a feeder UCITS where a master UCITS merges or divides), the authorised fund manager of the master UCITS;of its intention without undue delay.[Note: articles 20(3)
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the FSA's view, the requirement to apply this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels (as provided for in SYSC 19A.3.1 R (1)) is in line
(1) 8If the UK firm'sEEA right derives from the Banking Consolidation Directive or10MiFID8,10 the FSA will give the Host State regulator a consent notice within three months unless it has reason to doubt the adequacy of a UK firm's resources or its administrative structure.8 The Host State regulator then has a further two months to notify the applicable provisions (if any) and prepare for the supervision, as appropriate, of the UK firm, or in the case of a MiFID investment firm,
The high level requirement for appropriate systems and controls at SYSC 3.1.1 R applies at all times, including when a business continuity plan is invoked. However, the FSA recognises that, in an emergency, a firm may be unable to comply with a particular rule and the conditions for relief are outlined in GEN 1.3 (Emergency).
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FSA in accordance with SUP 16.14.
Business and internal control risks vary from firm to firm, according to the nature and complexity of the business. The FSA's assessment of these risks is reflected in how its rules apply to different categories of firm as well as in the use of its other regulatory tools. One of the tools the FSA has available is to give a firm individual guidance on the application of the requirements or standards under the regulatory system in the firm's particular circumstances.
(1) The FSA will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FSA’s view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s employment,
1A firm operating an MTF must:(1) report to the FSA:(a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions; and(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; (2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FSA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and (3) provide full assistance to the FSA, and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse, in
Under Principle 11 and SUP 15.3.1 R, a firm must notify the FSA immediately of any operational risk matter of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice. SUP 15.3.8 G provides guidance on the occurrences that this requirement covers, which include a significant failure in systems and controls and a significant operational loss.
An approved person performing a significant influence function will not
always manage the business on a day-to-day basis himself. The extent to which
he does so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale
and complexity of the business and his position within it. The larger and
more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation
and reporting lines. The FSA will look to the approved person performing a significant
influence function
(1) The FSA will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of an individual’s “relevant income”. “Relevant income” will be the gross amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with which the breach occurred (the “relevant employment”), and for the period of the breach. In determining an individual’s relevant income, “benefits” includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, pension contributions, share options and share schemes;
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for