Related provisions for PERG 9.5.4

21 - 40 of 75 items.
Results filter

Search Term(s)

Filter by Modules

Filter by Documents

Filter by Keywords

Effective Period

Similar To

To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

COLL 8.5.12ARRP
(1) 4The authorised fund manager of a property authorised investment fund must take reasonable steps to ensure that no body corporate holds more than 10% of the net asset value of that fund (the "maximum allowable").(2) Where the authorised fund manager of a property authorised investment fund becomes aware that a body corporate holds more than the maximum allowable, he must:(a) notify the body corporate of that event;(b) not pay any income distribution to the body corporate;
COLL 8.5.12BGRP
4Reasonable steps to monitor the maximum allowable include:(1) regularly reviewing the register; and(2) taking reasonable steps to ensure that unitholders are kept informed of the requirement that no body corporate may hold more than 10% of the net asset value of a property authorised investment fund.
SYSC 4.4.5RRP

A firm must appropriately allocate to one or more individuals, in accordance with the following table, the functions of:

  1. (1)

    dealing with the apportionment of responsibilities under SYSC 4.4.3 R; and

  2. (2)

    overseeing the establishment and maintenance of systems and controls under SYSC 4.1.1 R.

  3. 1: Firm type

    2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):

    3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:

    (1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)

    (1) the firm'schief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or

    the firm's and its group's:

    (1) directors; and

    (2) senior managers

    (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of:

    (a) the group; or

    (b) a group division within which some or all of the firm'sregulated activities fall

    (2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the functions in SYSC 4.4.5R (2) must be allocated)

    (not applicable)

    the firm's and its group's:

    (1) directors; and

    (2) senior managers

    (3) Any other firm

    the firm'schief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)

    the firm's and its group's:

    (1) directors; and

    (2) senior managers

    Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.

SYSC 4.4.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals will nevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R). Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 4.4 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R(2) and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R restrict the application of SYSC 4.4.5 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).

5

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?

SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.

DISP 1.11.15RRP
For the purposes of DISP 1.11.13 R "individual member" includes a member which is a limited liability partnership or a body corporate whose members consist only of, or of the nominees for, a single natural person or a group of connected persons.
COLL 6.2.23RRP
(1) 4The authorised fund manager of a property authorised investment fund must take reasonable steps to ensure that no body corporate holds more than 10% of the net asset value of that fund (the "maximum allowable").(2) Where the authorised fund manager of a property authorised investment fund becomes aware that a body corporate holds more than the maximum allowable, he must:(a) notify the body corporate of that event; (b) not pay any income distribution to the body corporate;
COLL 6.2.24GRP
4Reasonable steps to monitor the maximum allowable include:(1) regularly reviewing the register; and(2) taking reasonable steps to ensure that unitholders are kept informed of the requirement that no body corporate may hold more than 10% of the net asset value of a property authorised investment fund.
PERG 5.11.3GRP
The exclusions outlined in (1) to (7) were available to intermediaries (and in some cases insurance undertakings) acting in connection with life policies before 14 January 2005. In essence, however, the following exclusions do not apply if they concern transactions relating to contracts of insurance:(1) dealing in investments as agent with or through authorised persons (article 22 of the Regulated Activities Order (Deals with or through authorised persons));(2) arranging transactions
PERG 5.11.13AGRP
(1) 2There are two types of travel risks covered by PERG 5.11.13G (4)(b). The first type covers damage to, or loss of, baggage and other risks linked to the travel booked with the provider where that travel relates to attendance at an event organised or managed by that provider and the party seeking insurance is not an individual (acting in his private capacity) or a small business.(2) "Small business" means a sole trader, body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association
SUP 11.5.1RRP

Information to be submitted by the firm (see SUP 11.4.7 R (2)(a))

(1)

The name of the firm;

(2)

the name of the controller or proposed controller and, if it is a body corporate and is not an authorised person, the names of its directors and its controllers;

(3)

a description of the proposed event including the shareholding and voting power of the person concerned, both before and after the change in control; and5

(4)

any other information of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice.5

COLL 5.5.9RRP
(1) An ICVC or a depositary for the account of an authorised fund must not provide any guarantee or indemnity in respect of the obligation of any person.(2) None of the scheme property of an authorised fund may be used to discharge any obligation arising under a guarantee or indemnity with respect to the obligation of any person.(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to:(a) any indemnity or guarantee given for margin requirements where the derivatives or forward transactions
SUP 12.2.3GRP
As long as the conditions in section 39 of the Act are satisfied, any person, other than an authorised person, may become an appointed representative, including a body corporate, a partnership or an individual in business on his own account. However, an appointed representative cannot be an authorised person under the Act; that is, it cannot be exempt for some regulated activities and authorised for others.
PERG 5.12.11GRP
UK-based persons must obtain Part IV permission in relation to their insurance mediation activities in the United Kingdom as one of the following:(1) a body corporate whose registered office is situated in the United Kingdom; or(2) a partnership or unincorporated association whose head office is situated in the United Kingdom; or(3) an individual (that is, a sole trader) whose residence is situated in the United Kingdom.The United Kingdom will, in each case, be the Home State
BIPRU 3.2.9RRP
A firm must assign each exposure to one of the following exposure classes:(1) claims or contingent claims on central governments or central banks;(2) claims or contingent claims on regional governments or local authorities;(3) claims or contingent claims on administrative bodies and non-commercial undertakings;(4) claims or contingent claims on multilateral development banks;(5) claims or contingent claims on international organisation;(6) claims or contingent claims on institutions;(7)
PERG 9.11.1GRP

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question

Answer

1

Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).

2

Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.

3

Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?

The FSA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FSA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FSA's view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FSA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.

4

Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).

5

In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account.

  • The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means.
  • The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFSA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise.
  • Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.

6

Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?

In the FSA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).

7

Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?

In the FSA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.

8

Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).

9

Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?

In the FSA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).

PERG 2.5.5GRP
For persons who are MiFID2investment firms, the activities that must be caught by the Regulated Activities Order are those that are caught by MiFID2. To achieve this result, some of the exclusions in the Order (that will apply to persons who are not caught by MiFID2) have been made unavailable to MiFID2investment firms when they provide or perform investment services and activities. A "MiFID investment firm", for these purposes, includes credit institutions to which MiFID applies
SYSC 4.1.14GRP
7The role undertaken by a non-executive director will vary from one firm to another. Where a non-executive director is an approved person, for example where the firm is a body corporate, his responsibility and therefore liability will be limited by the role that he undertakes.
FEES 4.4.9DRP
3To the extent that a firm4 has provided the information required by FEES 4.4.7 D to the FSA as part of its compliance with another provision of the Handbook, it is deemed to have complied with the provisions of that direction.444
SUP 15.6.7GRP
Firms are reminded that section 398 of the Act (Misleading the Authority: residual cases) makes it an offence for a firm knowingly or recklessly to provide the FSA with information which is false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the FSA'srules or any other requirement imposed by or under the Act. An offence by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association may be attributed to an officer or certain other persons (section 400 of the