Related provisions for PERG 6.7.11
241 - 260 of 667 items.
(1) If it appears to the FSA that there is, or there may be, a breach of the listing rules or the disclosure rules and transparency rules4 by an issuer with a premium listing4, the FSA may in writing require the issuer to appoint a sponsor to advise the issuer on the application of the listing rules, the disclosure rules and the transparency rules4.4(2) If required to do so under (1), an issuer must, as soon as practicable, appoint a sponsor to advise it on the application of
The firm may allocate the responsibility for its insurance mediation activity to an approved person (or persons) performing:(1) a governing function (other than the non-executive director function); or(2) the apportionment and oversight function; or(3) the significant management function in so far as it relates to dealing in investments as principal, disregarding article 15 of the Regulated Activities Order (Absence of holding out etc) (or agreeing to do so) or an activity which
(1) Typically a firm3 will appoint a person performing a governing function (other than the non-executive director function) to direct its insurance mediation activity. Where this responsibility is allocated to a person performing another function, the person performing the apportionment and oversight function with responsibility for the apportionment of responsibilities must ensure that the firm'sinsurance mediation activity is appropriately allocated.3(2) The descriptions of
The FSA will specify in the FSA Register the name of the persons to whom the responsibility for the firm'sinsurance mediation activity has been allocated. by inserting after the relevant controlled function the words "(insurance mediation)". In the case of a sole trader, the FSA will specify in the FSA Register the name of the sole trader as the 'contact person' in the firm.
Section 80 (1) of the Act (general duty of disclosure in listing
particulars) requires listing particulars submitted
to the FSA to contain all such information as investors
and their professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect
to find there, for the purpose of making an informed assessment of:(1) the assets and liabilities, financial
position, profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of
the securities; and(2) the rights attaching to the securi
A request to the FSA to authorise the omission of specific
information in a particular case must:(1) be in writing from the issuer;(2) identify the specific information
concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the issuer's opinion
one or more of the grounds in section 82 of the Act applies.
4The FSA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FSA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
The FSA would not normally seek to gather information using the methods described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4 in a situation where the FSA could not have obtained it under the powers in Part XI of the Act (Information Gathering and Investigations). In particular, the limitations in the following sections of the Act are relevant to this chapter:(1) section 175(5) (Information and documents: supplementary powers) under which no person may be required under Part XI of the Act (Information
When the FSA obtains confidential information using the methods of information gathering described in SUP 2.3 or SUP 2.4, it is obliged under Part XXIII of the Act (Public Record, Disclosure of Information and Co-operation) to treat that information as confidential. The FSA will not disclose confidential information without lawful authority, for example if an exception applies under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disclosure of Confidential Information) Regulations
In determining whether a UK recognised body has effective arrangements for monitoring and enforcing compliance with its rules (and, in the case of a UK RIE, its settlement arrangements), the FSA may have regard to:(1) the UK recognised body's ability to:(a) monitor and oversee the use of its facilities;(b) assess its members' compliance with its rules (and settlement arrangements, where appropriate);(c) assess the significance of any non-compliance;(d) take appropriate disciplinary
In assessing whether the procedures made by a UK recognised body to investigate complaints about the users of its facilities are satisfactory, the FSA may have regard to: (1) whether these procedures include arrangements which enable the UK recognised body to:(a) acknowledge complaints promptly;(b) consider and investigate these complaints objectively, promptly and thoroughly; (c) provide a timely reply to the complainant; and(d) keep adequate records of complaints and investigations;(2)
In assessing whether the arrangements include procedures for the fair, independent and impartial resolution of appeals against decisions of a UK recognised body, the FSA may have regard to at least the following factors: (1) the appeal procedures of the UK recognised body, including the composition and roles of any appeal committees or tribunals, and their relationship to the governing body; (2) the arrangements made to ensure prompt hearings of appeals from decisions made by
In assessing whether a UK recognised body's arrangements include appropriate provision for ensuring the application of any financial penalties in ways described in the recognition requirement, the FSA may have regard to: (1) the UK recognised body's policy regarding the application of financial penalties; (2) the arrangements made for applying that policy in individual cases; but the FSA does not consider that it is necessary for UK recognised bodies to follow any specific policy
In relation to adopting a reasonable approach to the time over which the payment shortfall or sale shortfall should be repaid,1the FSA takes the view that the determination of a reasonable repayment period will depend upon the individual circumstances. In appropriate cases this will mean that repayments are arranged over the remaining term. 11
Firms that propose to outsource aspects of customer relationships (including collection of debts or any other sums due1) should note that and SYSC 8,2 a firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations and1 the FSA will continue to hold them responsible for the way in which this work is carried on.11
1To comply with paragraph 130 of the CESR recommendations, the FSA would expect a valuation report for a property company to be in accordance with either:1(1) the Appraisal and Valuation Standards (5th edition) issued by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors; or(2) the International Valuation Standards (7th edition) issued by the International Valuation Standards Committee.
This chapter sets out the FSA's approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: (1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FSA's approach to the exercise of its powers under:(a) (for RIEs and RCHs)2section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions to recognised
The FSA's general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:(1) the FSA has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and212(2) the FSA's supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives.
1An applicant applying for admission to listing by way of a block listing must submit in final form, at least two business days before the FSA is to consider the application, a completed Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List. An application in respect of multiple schemes must identify the schemes but need not set out separate block listing amounts for each scheme.1Note: The Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List form can be found on
(1) An applicant applying for admission to listing by way of a block listing must notify an RIS of the number and type of securities that are the subject of the block listing application and the circumstances of their issue.(2) The notification in paragraph (1) must be made by 9 a.m. on the day the FSA is to consider the application.
Every six months the applicant must notify a RIS of the details of the number of securities covered by the block listing which have been allotted in the previous six months, using the Block Listing Six Monthly Return.1Note: A copy of the Block Listing Six Monthly Return can be found on the UKLA section of the FSA website.
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the requirements on firms to pay annual fees (through a general levy invoiced and collected by the FSA on behalf of FOS Ltd) and case fees (invoiced and collected directly by FOS Ltd) in order to fund the operation of the Financial Ombudsman Service.This Chapter4 also provides for unauthorised persons to pay case fees to FOS Ltd in respect of any relevant complaints which it handles.44
(1) 1The FSAwill seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FSA will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breaching FSA rules or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FSA will seek to deprive
(1) The FSA will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FSA will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FSA also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm from
(1) The FSA may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FSA considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FSA may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FSA may do this include:(a) where the FSA considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;(b) where previous FSA action in respect of similar breaches has failed to improve
The FSA and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FSA and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.
In respect of banking services, the European Commission believes that "...to determine where the activity was carried on, the place of provision of what may be termed the 'characteristic performance' of the service i.e. the essential supply for which payment is due, must be determined" (Commission interpretative communication: Freedom to provide services and the interests of the general good in the Second Banking Directive (97/C 209/04)). In the FSA's view , this requires consideration
The FSA is of the opinion that UK firms that are credit institutions and MiFID investment firms2 should apply the 'characteristic performance' test (as referred to in SUP App 3.6.7 G) when considering whether prior notification is required for services business. Firms should note that other EEA States may take a different view. Some EEA States may apply a solicitation test. This is a test as to whether it is the consumer or the provider that initiates the business relationshi
The FSA considers that, in order to comply with Principle 3:Management and control (see PRIN 2.1.1 R), a firm should have appropriate procedures to monitor the nature of the services provided to its customers. Where a UK firm has non-resident customers but has not notified the EEA State in which the customers are resident that it wishes to exercise its freedom to provide services, the FSA would expect the firm's systems to include appropriate controls. Such controls would include
(1) If an offer is
made, or admission to trading is
sought, in one or more EEA States excluding
the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom is the Home
State, the prospectus must
be drawn up in a language accepted by the competent authorities of those EEA States or in a language customary in
the sphere of international finance, at the choice of the issuer, offeror or person requesting
admission (as the case may be). [ Note: article
19.2 PD ](2) For the purpose of the scrutiny
by
The FSA will publish on its website, a list of prospectuses approved over the previous 12 months. The list will specify how a prospectus is made available and where it can be obtained, including, if applicable, a hyperlink to the prospectus published on the issuer's or regulated market's website. [ Note: article 14.4 PD ]
(1) This chapter sets out the requirements that a person must follow in applying for an authorisation order for a scheme under regulation 12 of the OEIC Regulations (Applications for authorisation) or section 242 of the Act (Applications for authorisation of unit trust schemes).(2) COLLG 3 (The FSA's responsibilities under the Act) and COLLG 4 (The FSA's responsibilities under the OEIC Regulations) provide more information on what the Act and the OEIC Regulations require in
An application for an authorisation order in respect of an authorised fund must be:(1) in writing in the manner directed and contain the information required in the application form available from the FSA;(2) addressed for the attention of a member of FSA staff responsible for collective investment scheme authorisation matters; and(3) delivered to the FSA's address by one of the following methods:(a) posting; or(b) leaving it at the FSA's address and obtaining a time-stamped receipt;
1An EEA UCITS management company that proposes to act as the manager of an AUT or the ACD of an ICVC that is a UCITS scheme, should be aware that it is required under paragraph 15A(1) of Schedule 3 to the Act to apply to the FSA for approval to do so. The form that the firm must use for this purpose is set out in SUP 13A Annex 3 R (EEA UCITS management companies: application for approval to manage a UCITS scheme established in the United Kingdom). In addition, those firms are
The Listing Principles are as follows:
Principle 1 |
A listed company must take reasonable steps to enable its directors to understand their responsibilities and obligations as directors. |
Principle 2 |
A listed company must take reasonable steps to establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply with its obligations. |
Principle 3 |
A listed company must act with integrity towards holders and potential holders of its listedequity shares.2 2 |
Principle 4 |
A listed company must communicate information to holders and potential holders of its listedequity shares2 in such a way as to avoid the creation or continuation of a false market in such listedequity shares.2 22 |
Principle 5 |
A listed company must ensure that it treats all holders of the same class of its listedequity shares2 that are in the same position equally in respect of the rights attaching to such listedequity shares.2 22 |
Principle 6 |
A listed company must deal with the FSA in an open and co-operative manner. |
Principle 2 is intended to ensure that listed companies have adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable them to comply with their obligations under the listing rules and disclosure rules and transparency rules. In particular, the FSA considers that listed companies should place particular emphasis on ensuring that they have adequate procedures, systems and controls in relation to:(1) identifying whether any obligations arise under LR 10 (Significant transactions) and
This chapter also outlines the FSA's powers to withdraw authorisation from a firm whose Part IV permission has been cancelled at the firm's request. It does not, however, cover the FSA's use of its own-initiative powers to vary or cancel a firm's Part IV permission (see SUP 7 (Individual requirements) and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FSA's own initiative and intervention against incoming firms)).22
The chapter also sets out the FSA'srules, and guidance on these rules, that apply to a firm before it appoints, when it appoints and when it has appointed an appointed representative. The main purpose of these rules is to place responsibility on a firm for seeking to ensure that: (1) its appointed representatives are fit and proper to deal with clients in its name; and (2) clients dealing with its appointed representatives are afforded the same level of protection as if they had
The FSA has produced a leaflet entitled "Becoming an appointed representative" which provides a comprehensive summary of some of the main features of the appointed representative regime. You may download a copy of this leaflet from our website at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/factsheet_appointed.pdf.
2This chapter also sets out guidance about section 39A of the Act, which is relevant to a UK MiFID investment firm that is considering appointing an FSA registered tied agent. It also sets out the FSA'srules, and guidance on those rules, in relation to the appointment of an EEA tied agent by a UK MiFID investment firm.