Related provisions for MCOB 7.6.3
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(1) A mortgage lender,3reversion provider2 or SRB agreement provider3 must quantify, in cash terms, any material inducement it offers to a mortgage intermediary, reversion intermediary,2SRB intermediary3 or a third party. 3(2) In quantifying the value of the material inducement, the firm must include any subsequent payments (such as a trail fee) made where the customer continues with the samehome finance transaction.22
(1) Quantification of any material inducement offered by the mortgage lender or reversion provider2 supports the disclosure requirements elsewhere in MCOB. Further guidance on the disclosure of any inducement in cash terms is provided in MCOB 5.6.118 G for regulated mortgage contracts other than lifetime mortgages, MCOB 9.4.124 G for lifetime mortgages and MCOB 9.4.173 G for home reversion plans.2(1A) Quantification of any material inducement offered by a SRB agreement provider
1A risks and features statement need not be personalised to the customer's circumstances but must:(1) include the Key facts logo in a prominent position at the top of the statement;(2) state that the FSA requires a firm to provide the statement;(3) state that mortgages are available and that the customer should think carefully about the product appropriate to his needs;(4) describe the significant features of the plan, including:(a) how the home purchase plan works;(b) the nature
(1) The authorised fund manager must manage the scheme in accordance with:(a) the instrument constituting the scheme;(b) the rules in this sourcebook;(c) the most recently published prospectus; and(d) for an ICVC, the OEIC Regulations.(2) The authorised fund manager must take such steps as necessary to ensure compliance with the rules in this sourcebook that impose obligations upon the ICVC.(3) The authorised fund manager must:(a) make decisions as to the constituents of the scheme
(1) The depositary of an authorised fund must take reasonable care to ensure that the scheme is managed by the authorised fund manager in accordance with:(a) COLL 5 (Investment and borrowing powers);(b) COLL 6.2 (Dealing);(c) COLL 6.3 (Valuation and pricing);(d) COLL 6.8 (Income: accounting, allocation and distribution); and(e) any provision of the instrument constituting the scheme or prospectus that relates to the provisions referred to in (a) to (d).(2) The depositary must,
(1) The manager of an AUT must, upon any vacancy for the position of auditor for an AUT, with the approval of the trustee, appoint as auditor for the AUT a person qualified for appointment as auditor of an authorised person.(2) The audit fees of the auditor are determined by the manager with the approval of the trustee.(3) The manager of an AUT may, with the approval of the trustee, at any time, remove the auditor of an AUT; this power exists notwithstanding anything in any agreement
(1) Principle 8 requires a firm to manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client. This principle extends to soliciting or accepting inducements where this would conflict with a firm's duties to its customers. A firm that offers such inducements should consider whether doing so conflicts with its obligations under Principles 1 and 6 to act with integrity and treat customers fairly.(2) An inducement is a benefit
(1) This chapter amplifies Principle 6 and Principle 7. 2(1A) 2This chapter requires information to be supplied to customers at the start of a2regulated mortgage contract to enable them to check that the regulated mortgage contract has been set up in accordance with their requirements and to notify them of the first and subsequent payments.2(2) Where a firm provides services to a customer in relation to a further advance, rate switch, or addition or removal of a party to a regulated
(1) Principle 6 requires a firm to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. A firm is also under an obligation, as a consequence of this sourcebook's disclosure requirements,1 to make charges transparent to customers. This chapter reinforces these requirements by preventing a firm from imposing unfair and excessive charges.1(2) The level of charges under a regulated mortgage contract,2home reversion plan1 or regulated sale and rent back agreement2
Firms are reminded that, in relation to a regulated mortgage contract for a business purpose in circumstances where MCOB 7.7.1 R applies, if there is a new early repayment charge or a change to the existing early repayment charge, MCOB 7.7.1 R(2) requires a firm to notify the customer within five business days of the maximum amount payable as an early repayment charge.
The best established of these descriptions appears in the case of Prudential v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1904] 2 KB 658. This case, read with a number of later cases, treats as insurance any enforceable contract under which a 'provider' undertakes:(1) in consideration of one or more payments;(2) to pay money or provide a corresponding benefit (including in some cases services to be paid for by the provider) to a 'recipient';(3) in response to a defined event the occurrence
1The FSA believes that Principle 7 requires charges imposed by a firm on customers to be transparent and that imposing unfair or excessive charges is inconsistent with Principle 6. Note: A firm should also have regard to its obligations under the Unfair Terms Regulations.and may find material on the FSA website concerning the FSA's consumer protection powers useful.
(1) The purpose of MCOB 5.3.1 R, taken in conjunction with other rules in this chapter, is to ensure that the customer has received details of the particular home finance transaction for which he has applied, and has had the opportunity to satisfy himself that it is appropriate for him.1(2) In relation to a regulated mortgage contract, the application should identify the type of interest rate, rate of interest, and the mortgage lender at the point it is submitted by the customer
(1) Where:(a) the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS has submitted the documents required under COLL 11.6.5R (2) and (3); and(b) does not receive the necessary approvals from the FSA by the business day preceding the last day on which the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS can request repurchase or redemption of its units in the master UCITS;the authorised fund manager of the feeder UCITS must exercise the right to repurchase or redeem its units in the master UCITS
Where the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS gives notice to the FSA under section 251 of the Act or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations that it intends to wind up the scheme, it must inform:(1) the unitholders of the feeder UCITS; and(2) where notice is given under COLL 11.6.5R (4) (Application for approval by a feeder UCITS where a master UCITS merges or divides), the authorised fund manager of the master UCITS;of its intention without undue delay.[Note: articles 20(3)
A firm would be unlikely to comply with the client's best interests rule and the fair, clear and not misleading rule, 3if:33(1) the services and costs disclosure document or the combined initial disclosure document that it provided initially did not reflect relevantexpected commission arrangements; or3(2) the firm arranged to retain any commission which exceeded the amount or rate disclosed without first providing further appropriate inducements information and obtaining the client's
(1) In accordance with the rule on information disclosure before providing services (COBS 2.2.1 R), if a firm's initial contact with a retail client with a view to providing a personal recommendation on packaged products is by telephone then the following information should be provided before proceeding further:(a) the name of the firm and, if the call is initiated by or on behalf of a firm, the commercial purpose of the call;(b) whether the firm offers packaged products3 from
Where, in connection with an investment in the units of the master UCITS, a distribution fee, commission or other monetary benefit is received by:(1) a feeder UCITS; or(2) an authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS; or(3) any person acting on behalf of (1) or (2);that fee, commission or other monetary benefit must be paid into the scheme property of the feeder UCITS.[Note: article 65(2) of the UCITS Directive]
(1) An authorised fund manager of a master UCITS must not impose any preliminary charge or redemption charge on the feeder UCITS for the issue, sale, redemption or cancellation of units in the master UCITS.(2) Where the authorised fund manager of a master UCITS requires any addition to or deduction from the consideration paid on the acquisition or disposal of units by a feeder UCITS which is, or is like, a dilution levy made in accordance with COLL 6.3.8 R (Dilution) or SDRT provision
INSPRU 1.2.29R (4) requires regulatory basis only life firms to make allowance for any future annual bonus that a firm would expect to grant, assuming future experience is in line with the assumptions used in the calculation of the mathematical reserves. final bonuses do not have to be taken into consideration in these calculations except in relation to accumulating with-profits policies (see INSPRU 1.2.9 R). The calculations required for accumulating with-profits policies are
For the purposes of INSPRU 1.2.79R (2) and INSPRU 1.2.85 R, future surplus Future surplus may only be offset against future reinsurance cash outflow in respect of surplus on non-profit insurance contracts and the charges or shareholder transfers arising as surplus from with-profits insurance contracts. Such charges and transfers may only be allowed for to the extent consistent with the regulatory duty of the firm to treat its customers fairly.
INSPRU 1.5.18 R does not prohibit a firm from identifying other assets as being available to meet the liabilities of its long-term insurance business. It may transfer such other assets to a long-term insurance fund (see INSPRU 1.5.21 R and INSPRU 1.5.22 R ) and the transfer will take effect when it is recorded in the firm's accounting records (see INSPRU 1.5.23 R). After the transfer takes effect, a firm may not transfer the assets out of a long-term insurance fund except where
Where the surplus arising from business is shared between policyholders and shareholders in different ways for different blocks of business, it may be necessary to maintain a separate fund to ensure that policyholders are, and will be, treated fairly. For example, if a proprietary company writes some business on a with-profits basis, this should be written in a with-profits fund separate from any business where the surplus arising from that business is wholly owned by shareho